Adam Gaff v. Indiana-Purdue University of Fort Wayne
2016 Ind. LEXIS 287
Ind.2016Background
- Adam Gaff sued his former employer, Indiana–Purdue University Fort Wayne (IPFW), alleging constitutional violations and Title VII retaliation after termination.
- The trial court granted summary judgment to IPFW; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court challenged summary judgment on federal/state constitutional claims and Title VII retaliation.
- Central factual record: an Agreed Statement of Material Facts showing Gaff complained to a supervisor that a coworker called him derogatory names about weight and sexual orientation; complaints did not explicitly allege discrimination because of a protected class.
- IPFW moved for summary judgment arguing Gaff could not establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation (protected activity and causation).
- The Supreme Court considered whether Indiana’s heightened summary judgment standard requires the movant to negate the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim, despite federal substantive law governing the elements of Title VII claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Indiana summary judgment procedure requires the movant to negate a Title VII retaliation claim | Gaff implicitly argued summary judgment was improper because factual disputes remained and federal prima facie standards control substantive elements | IPFW argued Gaff could not establish protected activity or causation and thus summary judgment was proper | Held for IPFW: under Indiana law the movant must affirmatively negate the claim; the Agreed Statement of Facts showed no protected activity or causal link, so summary judgment was proper |
| Whether federal or state procedural standards govern summary judgment on a federal statutory claim filed in state court | Gaff relied on federal standards for Title VII elements | IPFW relied on state procedural summary judgment law while acknowledging federal substantive law governs the elements | Held: federal law defines substantive elements of Title VII, but Indiana procedural law (Trial Rule 56 and its heightened burden) governs summary judgment proceedings |
| Whether Culver Educational requires plaintiff to carry initial burden at summary judgment on discrimination claims | Gaff and Court of Appeals applied Culver language suggesting plaintiff bears ultimate persuasion at all times | IPFW and Supreme Court argued Culver was not a summary judgment case and does not alter Indiana's summary judgment allocation | Held: Culver (not a summary judgment case) does not displace Indiana’s established summary judgment rule requiring the movant to show absence of a genuine issue; plaintiff retains ultimate burden of persuasion at trial but movant must negate claim at summary judgment |
| Whether the complaints about derogatory names constituted statutorily protected activity under Title VII | Gaff treated the complaints as protected activity related to sex/sexual orientation | IPFW argued the complaints did not allege discrimination because of a protected class and thus were not protected activity | Held: The recorded complaints in the Agreed Statement of Material Facts did not demonstrate protected activity under Title VII; plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact |
Key Cases Cited
- Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014) (Indiana requires the summary-judgment movant to affirmatively negate the opponent's claim)
- Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. Culver Educ. Found., 535 N.E.2d 112 (Ind. 1989) (ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff)
- Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 1994) (summary judgment jurisprudence explaining burdens)
- James v. City of Boise, 136 S. Ct. 685 (U.S. 2016) (federal courts’ interpretation of federal statutes governs substantive meaning)
- Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938) (forum procedural law governs, substantive law of originating jurisdiction applies)