A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 279A. J. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School Dist. No. 279
OCTOBER TERM, 2024
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T., ET AL. v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 279, ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-249. Argued April 28, 2025—Decided June 12, 2025
Multiple federal laws afford protections for children with disabilities in public schools. Three statutory schemes are particularly relevant to this case. Section 504 of the
Petitioner A. J. T. is a teenage girl with a rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning. She suffers from seizures that are so frequent in the mornings that she cannot attend school before noon, though she is alert and able to learn from
A. J. T. and her parents then sued under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, requesting a permanent injunction, reimbursement for certain costs, and compensatory damages. The District Court granted summary judgment for the school, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. In so holding, the Eighth Circuit stated that a school district‘s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation was not enough to state a prima facie case of discrimination under Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F. 2d 1164, which requires a plaintiff to prove conduct by school officials rising to the level of bad faith or gross misjudgment.
Held: Schoolchildren bringing ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to their education are not required to make a heightened showing of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” but instead are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. Pp. 7-14.
(a) Outside the educational services context, courts of appeals permit plaintiffs to establish violations and obtain injunctive relief under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act without proving intent to discriminate. To obtain compensatory damages, courts generally require a showing of intentional discrimination, which most circuits find satisfied by “deliberate indifference“—a standard requiring only a showing that the defendant disregarded a strong likelihood that the challenged action would violate federally protected rights. Nothing in the text of the applicable substantive protections or remedial provisions of Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that claims based on educational services should be subject to a distinct, more demanding analysis. Pp. 7-8.
(b) Some courts, however, have come to apply a heightened intent
In Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992, this Court similarly tried to “harmonize” the IDEA‘s specific guarantee of a free appropriate public education with the protections of other antidiscrimination laws, ultimately concluding that the IDEA‘s comprehensive statutory scheme was the exclusive avenue by which a disabled child or his parents could challenge the adequacy of his education. Within two years, however, Congress enacted a new provision of the IDEA overturning Smith. That provision, now codified at
(c) The school district no longer defends Monahan‘s asymmetric rule, and contends instead that bad faith or gross misjudgment is the correct standard of intent for all ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, whether in or out of schools. This argument was not resolved below, was not raised in the brief in opposition to certiorari, and is outside the question presented. The Court declines the invitation to inject into this case significant issues that have not been fully presented. Pp. 12-14.
96 F. 4th 1058, vacated and remanded.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24-249
A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T. & G. T., PETITIONER v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 279, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 12, 2025]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner A. J. T. is a teenage girl who suffers from a rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning. When school administrators denied her certain educational accommodations, A. J. T.‘s parents sued the school district, alleging discrimination on the basis of disability. The courts below held that A. J. T.‘s claims could not go forward because she had not shown that school officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” That standard, the courts explained, applies uniquely in the educational services context and requires a more demanding showing compared to other sorts of disability discrimination claims. We consider whether the courts below were right to require this heightened showing.
I
A
Multiple federal laws afford “diverse” (and occasionally overlapping) protections for children with disabilities in
Beyond these generally applicable antidiscrimination laws, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended,
The IDEA‘s “primary vehicle for implementing these congressional goals is the ‘individualized educational program’ (IEP).” Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 311 (1988). An IEP “spells out” for each child with a qualifying disability “a personalized plan to meet all of the child‘s ‘educational needs.‘” Fry, 580 U. S., at 158 (quoting
B
Petitioner A. J. T. “requires assistance with everyday tasks like walking and toileting,” and suffers from seizures throughout the day that create safety concerns and interfere with her capacity to learn. 96 F. 4th 1062, 1064 (CA8 2024); see App. 515. Although A. J. T.‘s seizures are so frequent in the morning that she “can‘t attend school before noon,” she is “alert and able to learn” from noon until about 6 p.m. 96 F. 4th, at 1064.2
For the first few years of her schooling, A. J. T.‘s parents
In 2018, as the district prepared for A. J. T. to enter middle school, it proposed further cutting back the length of her school day. 96 F. 4th, at 1064. A. J. T.‘s parents again requested that she receive evening instruction and schooling hours comparable to her nondisabled peers. See ibid. School administrators again denied those requests, and also rejected proposals to maintain at least the same length instructional day that A. J. T. had been receiving in elementary school. Ibid.
“Realizing that an agreement was beyond reach,” A. J. T.‘s parents filed an IDEA complaint with the Minnesota Department of Education, alleging that the school‘s refusal to provide afterhours instruction denied A. J. T. a free appropriate public education. See id., at 1064-1065. After a five day evidentiary hearing, an Administrative Law Judge determined that the district had violated the IDEA. Id., at 1065. The judge ordered the school to provide several hundred hours of compensatory education and “add certain services to [A. J. T.‘s] IEP, including at-home instruction from 4:30 p.m. to 6:00p.m. each school day.” Ibid.
The school district sought judicial review, and a Federal District Court affirmed. 2022 WL 4226097, *21 (D Minn., Sept. 13, 2022). The court agreed with the agency that school officials’ “steadfas[t] refus[al]” to provide A. J. T.
C
A. J. T. and her parents then sued the school district and the Osseo School Board (collectively, the District) in federal court, alleging violations of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See App. 28-29. They requested a permanent injunction, reimbursement for certain costs, and compensatory damages. Ibid.
The trial court granted the District‘s motion for summary judgment. It acknowledged that A. J. T. is a “qualified individual with a disability” who “was denied the same length school day as her nondisabled peers based on her disability.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a. But the court held that A. J. T. failed to state a prima facie case under Section 504 or the ADA because she did not show that school officials “acted with bad faith or gross misjudgment.” Id., at 35a-36a.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. 96 F. 4th 1058, 1060 (2024). It explained that, under Circuit precedent, when “alleged ADA and Section 504 violations are based on educational services for disabled children,’ a school district‘s simple failure to provide a reasonable accommodation is not enough to trigger liability.” Id., at 1061 (quoting B. M. v. S. Callaway R-II School Dist., 732 F. 3d 882, 887 (CA8 2013)). Rather, “a plaintiff must prove that school officials acted with ‘either bad faith or gross misjudgment,’ which requires
The panel itself, however, went on to question why the Eighth Circuit imposes “such a high bar for claims based on educational services,” when it “require[s] much less in other disability-discrimination contexts.” Ibid., n. 2 (citing cases requiring “no intent” for a “failure-to-accommodate claim” and “deliberate indifference” for damages). “The answer,” the panel said, “is a lesson in why ‘[w]e do not . . . add provisions to federal statute[s].‘” Ibid. (quoting Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U. S. 330, 352 (2010); alterations in original). The Circuit‘s “bad faith or gross misjudgment rule,” the panel opined, added “without any anchor in statutory text . . . a judicial gloss on Section 504,” based on “speculat[ion] that Congress intended the IDEA‘s predecessor to limit Section 504‘s protections.” 96 F. 4th, at 1062, n. 2 (citing Monahan, 687 F. 2d, at 1170–1171). The panel observed that this rule had “spread like wildfire” in the lower courts, although it “ha[d] been questioned” along the way. 96 F. 4th, at 1062, n. 2. And since the rule “remain[ed] the law” in the Eighth Circuit, the panel was bound to follow it. Ibid. A. J. T.‘s petition for rehearing en banc was denied, with three judges dissenting. App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a-45a.
We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement in the Courts of Appeals over whether schoolchildren bringing
II
A
Outside the context of elementary and secondary education, the Eighth Circuit—in line with the general approach of the courts of appeals—permits plaintiffs to establish a statutory violation and obtain injunctive relief under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act without proving intent to discriminate. See, e.g., Hall v. Higgins, 77 F. 4th 1171, 1180–1181 (CA8 2023); Midgett v. Tri-Cty. Metropolitan Transp. Dist. of Ore., 254 F. 3d 846, 851 (CA9 2001). To obtain compensatory damages, however, courts of appeals generally agree that a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination. See Hall, 77 F. 4th, at 1181; see also S. H. v. Lower Merion School Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 262 (CA3 2013) (collecting cases). On that score, “a majority” of the Courts of Appeals to have weighed in on the question—including the Eighth Circuit—find the requirement to show “intentional discrimination” satisfied by proof that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” Id., at 262–263.4 That standard “does not require a showing of personal ill will or animosity toward the disabled person.” Meagley v. Little Rock, 639
We hold today that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims based on educational services should be subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. Nothing in the text of Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act suggests that such claims should be subject to a distinct, more demanding analysis. The substantive provisions of both Title II and Section 504, by their plain terms, apply to “qualified individual[s]” with disabilities.
Nor do the applicable remedial provisions suggest any such distinction. Both Title II and Section 504 make the “remedies, procedures, and rights” provided therein available to “any person.”
How, then, did some courts of appeals come to apply a heightened intent standard to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims concerning educational opportunities? The bad faith or gross misjudgment rule traces to the Eighth Circuit‘s opinion in Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F. 2d 1164. See 96 F. 4th, at 1061, n. 2. There the Eighth Circuit—in a case involving an IDEA claim and a Rehabilitation Act claim alleging “improper educational placement“—explained its view that “in order to show a violation of the Rehabilitation
The Eighth Circuit explained that the bad faith or gross misjudgment “standard of liability” was consistent with its “duty to harmonize the Rehabilitation Act and the [IDEA] to the fullest extent possible, and to give each of these statutes the full play intended by Congress.” Id., at 1171. The court also concluded that this standard “reflect[ed] . . . a proper balance between the rights of handicapped children, the responsibilities of state educational officials, and the competence of courts to make judgments in technical fields.” Ibid. (“So long as the state officials involved [did not] depart grossly from accepted standards among educational professionals, we cannot believe that Congress intended to create liability under §504.“).
B
The Monahan court was not alone in its instinct to try to “harmonize” the IDEA‘s specific guarantee of a free appropriate public education, on the one hand, with more broadly applicable antidiscrimination laws, on the other. Indeed, just two years later in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U. S. 992 (1984), this Court applied virtually identical reasoning to hold that the IDEA was “‘the exclusive avenue’ through which a child with a disability (or his parents) could challenge the adequacy of his education.” Fry, 580 U. S., at 160 (quoting Smith, 468 U. S., at 1009).
The plaintiffs in Smith sued a school district under the
Congress apparently did not agree. Within two years, it enacted a new provision of the IDEA, “overturn[ing]” Smith and “‘reaffirm[ing] the viability’ of federal statutes like the ADA or Rehabilitation Act ‘as separate vehicles,’ no less integral than the IDEA, ‘for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.‘” Fry, 580 U. S., at 161 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 99–296, pp. 4, 6 (1985)). Now codified at
“Nothing in [the IDEA] shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act [including §504], or other Federal laws
protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA], the [IDEA‘s] administrative procedures shall first be exhausted].”
The plain text of
In imposing a higher “bar for claims based on educational services” as compared to “other disability-discrimination contexts,” however, the Eighth Circuit in Monahan effectively read the IDEA to implicitly limit the ability of children with disabilities to vindicate their independent ADA and Rehabilitation Act rights. 96 F. 4th, at 1061, n. 2 (recognizing that Congress “rejected Monahan‘s premise” in enacting
The District maintains that Monahan‘s rule survives
The District‘s reading of Monahan is difficult to square with what that opinion said. The Monahan court‘s discussion of Section 504 was inextricably bound with concomitant references to the IDEA. And its reasoning, at bottom, was grounded—much like this Court‘s in Smith—in an effort to strike what it believed was the appropriate balance between the two statutes. See Monahan, 687 F. 2d, at 1170–1171. The District‘s take on Monahan is simply neither the most natural nor the most persuasive one. Besides, it conflicts with the Eighth Circuit‘s own interpretation of its precedent, including in the case before us. See 96 F. 4th, at 1062, n. 2 (noting that Monahan‘s rule was rooted in “specula[tion] that Congress intended the IDEA‘s predecessor to limit Section 504‘s protections“); see, e.g., I. Z. M. v. Rosemount-Apple Valley-Eagan Public Schools, 863 F. 3d 966, 973 (1996); Hoekstra v. Independent School Dist. No. 283, 103 F. 3d 624, 627 (1996) (“In applying a bad faith/gross misjudgment standard to §504, the Monahan court reasoned that such a standard harmonizes the [IDEA] and §504.“). So too with the understandings of other Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Knox Cty. v. M. Q., 62 F. 4th 978, 1002 (CA6 2023).
C
Perhaps sensing the likely fate of Monahan‘s asymmetric
“As a general rule,” however, “we do not decide issues” that were not “resolved below” and are “outside the questio[n] presented by the petition for certiorari.” Glover v. United States, 531 U. S. 198, 205 (2001). The District‘s position fails on both counts. A. J. T. asked us to review the “uniquely stringent ‘bad faith or gross misjudgment’ standard,” which she characterized throughout her petition as an “arbitrar[y] depart[ure] from the more lenient standards that all courts—including the Eighth Circuit—apply to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims brought by plaintiffs outside the school setting.” Pet. for Cert. i; see also, e.g., id., at 32. For its part, the District never suggested at the certiorari stage that it thought this case was about anything other than the two-tiered approach set forth in Monahan.
We agree with A. J. T. that “it would be unfair at this point” to allow the District “to switch gears and seek a ruling from us that the standard should be” bad faith or gross misjudgment “across the board.” Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Sorrell, 549 U. S. 158, 165 (2007); see Tr. of Oral Arg. 101. We will not entertain the District‘s invitation to inject into this case significant issues that have not been fully presented. See South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U. S. 160, 171 (1999); Sorrell, 549 U. S., at 165. The
*
That our decision is narrow does not diminish its import for A. J. T. and “a great many children with disabilities and their parents.” Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U. S. 142, 146 (2023). Together they face daunting challenges on a daily basis. We hold today that those challenges do not include having to satisfy a more stringent standard of proof than other plaintiffs to establish discrimination under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24-249
A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T. & G. T., PETITIONER v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 279, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 12, 2025]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins, concurring.
The Court‘s opinion correctly resolves the question presented. I write separately to note that in an appropriate case, I would be willing to consider the additional issues raised by the respondents (collectively, the District) at the merits stage. Although those issues were not properly before us in this case, they are important and merit our attention in the future.
We granted certiorari to decide whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act require disabled schoolchildren to satisfy a “uniquely stringent” standard when seeking relief under those statutes. Pet. for Cert. i. In other words, we took the case to decide whether Title II and Section 504 permit courts to subject one subset of plaintiffs to a higher legal standard than other plaintiffs, simply because their claims arise in the school context. At the merits stage, both sides agreed that the answer must be “no.” Brief for Petitioner 2-3; Brief for Respondents 2; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 78. The Court today agrees with the parties, holding that school-related claims are subject to the same legal standards as other claims. Ante, at 8.
To start, the District argues that the plain text of the underlying statutes prohibit only intentional discrimination. Section 504 states that individuals with disabilities shall not “be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination” under any federally funded “program or activity” “solely by reason of her or his disability.”
Relatedly, the District contends that the underlying statutes do not permit one standard for damages and another
The District also raises a constitutional objection, arguing that the Constitution compels a plaintiff to prove intent to discriminate before a court may find a violation of Title II or Section 504 or award any kind of relief. See also Brief for State of Tennessee et al. as Amici Curiae 17–23 (arguing that constitutional considerations “weigh against Petitioner‘s no-intent reading” (boldface deleted)). Here too, I think the District may have a point.
Congress enacted Section 504 pursuant to the so-called Spending Clause. “We have repeatedly characterized Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the [recipients] agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.‘” Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 186 (2002). “Just as a valid contract requires offer and acceptance of its terms, ‘[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power rests on whether the [recipient] voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.“‘” Ibid. Thus, this
The District tells us that a no-intent violation of Title II is even more dubious. As an initial matter, the District observes, it is unclear what constitutional authority Congress has to require a public school, by way of an injunction, to take an affirmative action such as providing additional instruction to a student. Congress enacted the ADA under its “power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce.”
The District contends that Title II, which targets “State [and] local government[s],”
I express no definitive views on the additional issues raised by the District here. And, I agree with the Court‘s decision to answer only the question presented today. See this Court‘s Rule 14.1(a). But, in a case where the District‘s additional issues are properly before us, I would be willing to address them. Whether federal courts are applying the correct legal standard under two widely utilized federal statutes is an issue of national importance, and the District has raised serious arguments that the prevailing standards are incorrect.
Of course, this Court‘s resolution of these issues could have significant ramifications for both disability law and discrimination law more generally. See Reply for Petitioner 24 (explaining that adopting the District‘s position would “cause a sea change in disability law“). That these issues are consequential is all the more reason to wait for a case in which they are squarely before us and we have the benefit of adversarial briefing. Until then, I hope lower courts will carefully consider whether the existing standards comport with the Constitution and the underlying statutory text.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 24-249
A. J. T., BY AND THROUGH HER PARENTS, A. T. & G. T., PETITIONER v. OSSEO AREA SCHOOLS, INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 279, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[June 12, 2025]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins, concurring.
I join in full the Court‘s opinion, which holds that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims regarding educational services are subject to the same standards applied in other disability discrimination contexts. In reaching that conclusion, the Court rightly declines to entertain respondents’ newly raised argument that “bad faith or gross misjudgment” is the correct standard for all disability discrimination claims under Title II and Section 504 of those Acts. See ante, at 12-15. I write separately, however, to highlight a foundational flaw in respondents’ theory. Respondents contend that the “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard is appropriate because the statutes require a showing of “improper purpose” or “‘animus.‘” Brief for Respondents 11–12, 16-17. That is incorrect. The statutes’ text and history, as well as this Court‘s precedent, foreclose any such purpose requirement.
Recall that Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
That statutory language contains no reference to improper purpose. To the contrary, the phrase “by reason of” requires no more than a causal link between the individual‘s disability and her “exclu[sion] from” participating in or receiving the benefits of a covered service, program, or activity. Ibid.;
Persons with disabilities can, of course, lose access to benefits and services “by reason of,” or “because of,” their disabilities absent any invidious animus or purpose. Stairs may prevent a wheelchair-bound person from accessing a public space; the lack of auxiliary aids may prevent a deaf person
*Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: “No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.”
There can be no question, too, that the statutes impose an affirmative obligation on covered entities to provide reasonable accommodations, undercutting any improper-purpose requirement. Title II of the ADA defines a “‘qualified individual with a disability” to mean an individual who, with “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,” is able to “mee[t] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.”
The statutes’ use of the passive voice (“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded...“) only reinforces that conclusion.
If there were any remaining doubt, the history and purpose of the statutes further confirm that Congress never intended to impose an ulterior-purpose requirement. As this Court recognized in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U. S. 287 (1985), when Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act, it “perceived” “[d]iscrimination against the handicapped” as “most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect.” Id., at 295; see also id., at 296 (collecting statements by legislators describing the Act as a response to “‘neglect” of the handicapped). As a result, “much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.” Id., at 296–297. That observation applies with equal force to Title II of the ADA, which Congress modeled on Section 504. Cf. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 580 U. S. 154, 159 (2017) (noting the two statutes impose the “same prohibition” on covered entities).
Consider one of the paradigmatic applications of these two laws: ensuring the “elimination of architectural barriers” to provide access for individuals with disabilities. See Alexander, 469 U. S., at 297 (describing this as “one of the central aims of the [Rehabilitation] Act“). Architectural
*
In short, there is good reason no court of appeals has adopted respondents’ eleventh-hour argument. Congress was not naive to the insidious nature of disability discrimination when it enacted the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. It understood full well that discrimination against those with disabilities derives principally from “apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus.” Alexander, 469 U. S., at 296. The resulting laws reflect that understanding, and it is not the Judiciary‘s prerogative to override Congress‘s policy judgments.