A.B. v. S.U. et al.
No. 22-AP-200
Supreme Court of Vermont
March Term, 2023
2023 VT 32
Mary Miles Teachout, J.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
Tristram J. Coffin and Evan J. O‘Brien of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant S.U.
Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, Eleanor L.P. Spottswood, Solicitor General, and Rachel E. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, Montpelier, for Intervenor-Appellee State.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Carroll, Cohen and Waples, JJ.
¶ 1. REIBER, C.J. Plaintiff1 sued defendants alleging childhood sexual abuse, and defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the statute, which eliminated the prior limitations
period, was unconstitutional. The civil division denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the limitations period was a procedural bar and defendants had no vested right in the expiration of the prior statute of limitations. Defendants2 now bring this interlocutory appeal to determine whether
I. Statutory Backdrop
¶ 2. In 1990, the Vermont Legislature enacted
¶ 3. In 2019, the Legislature amended
Notwithstanding
1 V.S.A. § 214 , this section shall apply retroactively to childhood sexual abuse that occurred prior to the effective date of this act, irrespective of any statute of limitations in effect at the time the abuse occurred. In an action based on childhood sexual abuse that would have been barred by any statute of limitations in effect on June 30, 2019, damages may be awarded against an entity that employed, supervised, or had responsibility for the person allegedly committing the sexual abuse only if there is a finding of gross negligence on the part of the entity.
II. Facts and Procedural Background
¶ 4. In May 2020, plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that in 1983, when he was fifteen years old, he was at a retreat operated by defendant organization and was sexually assaulted by a second defendant who was an adult employee of the organization. Plaintiff alleged three counts: child sexual abuse, nuisance, and grossly negligent supervision and retention. Although the claims were previously time-barred, plaintiff relied on the 2019 amendment to
¶ 5. In lieu of filing an answer, defendants moved to dismiss.3 Defendants argued that
¶ 7. Defendants filed a motion for interlocutory appeal, and this Court accepted the interlocutory appeal on the question of whether
III. Analysis
¶ 8. Statutes are presumed constitutional and reasonable. Badgley v. Walton, 2010 VT 68, ¶ 20, 188 Vt. 367, 10 A.3d 469. “[T]he proponent of a constitutional challenge has a very weighty burden to overcome.” Id.
¶ 9. Article 4 states: “Every person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which one may receive in person, property or character . . . .”
¶ 10. In general, our cases have treated claims under Article 4 similarly to those made under the U.S. Constitution, and we have employed the federal standards to evaluate Article 4 claims. See, e.g., Holton v. Dep‘t of Emp. & Training, 2005 VT 42, ¶ 27, 178 Vt. 147, 878 A.2d 1051 (explaining that there was no violation of federal Due Process Clause and similar result obtained under Article 4). The Vermont Constitution may provide greater protection than analogous provisions in the U.S. Constitution, but the
¶ 11. Here, defendants argue that
A.
¶ 12. Although federal jurisprudence is not controlling in this case involving the Vermont Constitution, it is helpful to understand how the analogous federal provision has been interpreted given that our cases have generally viewed Article 4 as equivalent to the federal Due Process Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that in the civil context an expired limitations period as a defense to an action does not create a vested right and therefore a legislature does not violate the U.S. Constitution by altering an existing limitations period and making it apply retroactively. This principle was articulated in Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620 (1885), a case in which the limitations period lapsed for a contract claim but was revived by generally applicable subsequent legislation. After the plaintiff filed suit under the revised statute, the defendants argued that their limitations defense had been perfected and the subsequent reinstatement violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 622. In rejecting the defendants’ arguments, the U.S. Supreme Court explained the difference between statutes that attempt to alter title to property and those that affect a remedy. The Court held that the limitations period relates to the remedy available and not to the merits of a case, stating that the Court did not “understand that a right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitations is a vested right, so as to be beyond legislative power in a proper case.” Id. at 626, 628. The Court emphasized that statutes of limitations are “arbitrary enactments by the law-making power,” and “no right is destroyed when the law restores a remedy which had been lost.” Id. at 628.
¶ 13. The U.S. Supreme Court has subsеquently reaffirmed that a retroactive expansion of a statute of limitations for a civil claim does not violate due process simply because it restores a remedy that was previously not available. See Int‘l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO, Loc. 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1976) (citing Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1945)). This conclusion rests on the fact that limitation periods are “practical and pragmatic devices” created by the legislature and “represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate” rather than a fundamental right. Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314.5 Therefore, there is no right to a particular limitations period, and the period to bring suit can bе altered even retroactively.
¶ 14. Defendants assert that the question is not fully settled under federal law and that there are constitutional limits on the state‘s power to revive time-barred claims. Defendants rely on William Danzer & Co. v. Gulf & S.I.R. Co., 268 U.S. 633, 637 (1925), arguing that it held that a retroactive application of the statute of limitations violated due process. Defendant‘s interpretation of Danzer is overbroad. Danzer held that a new statute defining both liability and a limitations period was not applicable retroactively because the statute did not explicitly make its provisions retroactive. Id. Danzer distinguished Campbell based on this lack оf explicit retroactivity and the fact that the statute of limitations in Danzer was part of the cause of action whereas Campbell was only a change in the limitations period. Id.; see Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 312 n.8 (differentiating Danzer on the basis that it involved statute that created liability); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 997 F.2d 39, 51 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining narrow holding of Danzer). Danzer does not support defendants’ position in this case where the statute altered the limitations period—not a party‘s liability—and the Legislature made
B.
¶ 15. Therefore, we turn to the question of whether
¶ 16. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court has described limitations periods in statutes as creating a remedy and not a substantive right. See Carter v. Fred‘s Plumbing & Heating Inc., 174 Vt. 572, 575, 816 A.2d 490, 494 (2002) (mem.) (rejecting plaintiff‘s claim that change in statutory limitations period applied retroactively and describing statute as limiting “the availability of a remedy,” rather than interfering with a right). “Statutes which regulate the forms, modes and times of remedies, do not violate the obligation of contracts, and are not unconstitutional, though they are retrospective in their operation.” Bell v. Roberts, 13 Vt. 582, 585 (1841). Because a limitations statute is a legislated bar to a remedy and does not create a right to be free of suit, the expired
¶ 17. Defendants contend that nonetheless other Vermont cases support the notion that defendants obtained a vested right in the expired limitations period. Defendants’ arguments are not persuasive because the cases are distinguishable.
¶ 18. First, several cases defendants cite are inapplicable because they involved legislative acts that attempted to interfere with or alter settled rights of parties in a particular action. Foremost among those cases is Bates v. Kimball, 2 D. Chip. 77 (Vt. 1824). In that case, a claim was allowed against an estate, and no аppeal was filed within the time provided by law, resulting in a final judgment. Id. at 82. Subsequently, the Legislature enacted a statute purporting to allow an appeal by the administrator of that particular estate as if it had been timely made. The statute was not of general application. The validity of the statute was challenged. In analyzing the case, this Court reiterated that the Legislature retains the power to “prescribe the mode in which causes shall be brought” before the courts and “to enlarge or restrict the power of granting appeals, reviews, and new trials.” Id. at 85. However, the power of granting appeals, reviews, and new trials for litigants in particular actions belongs to the judicial branch and cannot be concurrently exercised by the legislative branch. The Court concluded that the statute in Bates was not attempting to prescribe a new rule for general application but was divesting the litigant in a particular action of a right to an existing judgment. Id. at 88. Because there was a judgment that “vested a right in the present plaintiff,” the legislative attempt to void that settled judgment was unconstitutional. Id. at 89. The Court emphasized that the legislative action was an attempt to reverse a determination in a particular case, which was beyond its authority.
¶ 19. Similarly, in Town of Bradford v. Brooks, 2 Aik. 284 (Vt. 1827), the Legislature enacted a statute authorizing a probate court to renew a commission for the estate of a particular deceased person whose estate had already been closed. Again, this was not an act of general application, but related to a claim that was settled by a judicial determination. The Court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, explaining that “[t]his act is not general in its оperation, extending alike to all in like circumstances. It is retrospective in its effect, and goes to take away rights vested by the general law, and to give rights extinguished by the same general law, and we believe it an act which courts cannot enforce.” Id. at 294-95.
¶ 20. Defendants contend that Bates and Town of Bradford support the proposition that the Legislature cannot retroactively deprive a party of a vested right and that laws altering the rights of parties only apply to future cases. Assuming this general statement is correct, it is not applicable in this case. Defendants have not obtained a judgment, аnd the legislative act challenged here is not aimed at invalidating an existing adjudicated right between the parties. The legislative act at issue is generally applicable and not an attempt to invalidate an existing final judgment between the parties. Defendants have not obtained any vested interest like the challengers in Bates and Town of Bradford.
¶ 21. Second, defendants assert that this Court has construed amendments to statutes of limitations to have prospective effect to avoid constitutional problems and this must mean that retroactive statutes
C.
¶ 22. Defendants also rely on a decision from the Utah Supreme Court that concluded that a similar statute in that state violated the due process provision in the Utah Constitution. Mitchell v. Roberts, 2020 UT 34, 469 P.3d 901. Utah enacted a stаtute reinstating previously time-barred claims against perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse. The Utah Supreme Court held that the statute violated the state constitution for two main reasons: prior state court precedent provided that the state legislature could not alter a ripened statute of limitations defense, id. ¶ 11; and the history regarding the original understanding of “due process” at the time of the state constitution‘s formation “flavored the original understanding of the ‘legislative power‘” in Utah, id. ¶ 33. Based on an analysis of the language and history of the state constitution, the court concluded that the Utah Legislature was prohibited under the state constitution from retroactively reviving a time-barred limitations defense. Id. ¶ 5.
¶ 23. Defendants argue that the Utah court‘s decision is highly persuasive authority and should be adopted by this Court to reach a similar result. Defendants recognize that, in addition to the body of state-specific precedent, the Utah Supreme Court decision rested on an analysis of the Utah Constitution, convention records, and other authoritative sources to reach its decision. Defendants offer no similar analysis for their requested interpretation of the Vermont Constitution. Not only is there no precedent in Vermont for the outcome defendants seek, defendants have also not provided any similar historical analysis or textual argument for using the Utah decision as a guidepost. The two constitutions do not have similar language. See
¶ 24. On the other hand, there is much more persuasive analysis from several other states holding that state legislatures may retroactively revive previously barred civil claims without violating state constitutional provisions ensuring due process. These states, like Vermont, view limitations periods as relating to remedies rather than rights. See Vaughn v. Vulcan Materials Co., 465 S.E.2d 661, 662 (Ga. 1996) (holding that there is “no vested right in a statute of limitation“); Roberts v. Caton, 619 A.2d 844, 849 (Conn. 1993) (explaining limitations period is part of remedy and does not create substantive right and therefore change can be retroactively applied). On that basis, several other states have upheld statutes, like the one at issue here, reviving childhood sexual-abuse claims. In Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247 (Del. 2011), the Delaware Supreme Court considered a statute that abolished a civil limitations period for claims of сhildhood sexual abuse and created a two-year window to allow victims to bring previously barred claims. The Delaware Court explained that historically it gave the state constitutional provision the same meaning as the due process clause in the federal constitution. Id. at 1258-59. The court rejected the defendant‘s argument that the expired statute of limitations for a civil action is a “fundamental vested right.” Id. at 1259. Because the limitations period “affects matters of procedure and remedies, not substantive or vested rights,” the court held that the statute did not interfere with any fundamental right. Id.
¶ 25. Other states have reached a similar conclusion regarding state constitutional claims where the state had construed the state constitutional due process provision consistently with the U.S. Constitution, as Vermont does. See Sliney v. Previte, 41 N.E.3d 732 (Mass. 2015) (rejecting argument that statute altering limitations period for sexual abuse of minor from three to thirty-five years and containing retroactivity provision violated defendant‘s state constitutional rights); Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776, 779 (Mont. 1993) (applying federal due process analysis and concluding that “Montana due process is not violated by the retroactive application of the statute” reviving expired civil tort claims of childhood sexual abuse); Deutsch v. Masonic Homes of Cal., Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 368, 380 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that statute reviving child sexual abuse claim “was not unconstitutional and did not deprive appellant of a vested liberty or property interest“); PB-36 Doe v. Niagara Falls City Sch. Dist., 152 N.Y.S.3d 242, 248 (Sup. Ct. 2021), aff‘d, 182 N.Y.S.3d 850 (App. Div. 2023), reargument denied, 186 N.Y.S.3d 783 (App. Div. 2023) (denying motion to dismiss complaint on grounds that revival clause of Child Victims Act is unconstitutional). Like these states, we have generally construed Article 4 consistently with the federal Due Process Clause, and defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating why the Vermont Constitution should be applied differently from the U.S. Constitution. Seе Jewett, 146 Vt. at 225-27 (explaining burden of demonstrating how Vermont differs from U.S. Constitution).
D.
¶ 26. Finally, defendants list various concerns about how reviving old claims might impact defendants’ ability to litigate the case because the passage of time might prevent defendants from having adequate access to documentation or witnesses. Defendants argue that
¶ 27. These arguments are not persuasive. Stogner involved a criminal statute and the constitutional protections and concerns in that case, rooted in the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution, are not applicable here concerning a civil claim. Moreover, defendants’ ability to litigate against these particular claims given the passage of time is not relevant to the limited question presented to this Court—whether
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT:
Chief Justice