500 NORTH AVENUE, LLC v. PLANNING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF STRATFORD
AC 42235
Appellate Court of Connecticut
Argued December 9, 2019—officially released July 21, 2020
Alvord, Prescott and Lavery, Js.
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Syllabus
The plaintiff landowner appealed from the decision of the defendant planning commission, which had concluded that the plaintiff was required to file an application for subdivision approval in order to revise the lot lines of two abutting properties that it owned. The plaintiff submitted a map of the properties to the town‘s planning and zoning administrator, seeking a lot line adjustment that would reduce the acreage of one property and increase the acreage of the second property by ten acres. Following a hearing, the commission denied the plaintiff‘s request for a lot line revision, concluding that the plaintiff‘s map required subdivision approval because it created a drastic change in the existing lots. Thereafter, the plaintiff apрealed to the Superior Court, which rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the plaintiff‘s proposed lot line revision constituted a subdivision under the applicable statute (
- The Superior Court improperly concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission‘s finding that the plaintiff‘s proposed lot line adjustment of two adjacent lots constituted a subdivision under
§ 8-18 : because no new lot was created from the boundary adjustment that resulted in three or more parts or lots, the proposed lot line revision did not satisfy the definition of subdivision pursuant to§ 8-18 ; although one of the properties had previously been subject to a first cut, the commission‘s decision that subdivision approval was required was contrary to the language of§ 8-18 as the plaintiff‘s proposal did not divide that property a second time, resulting in three or more parts or lots. - The Superior Court improperly concluded that subdivision approval was required because the proposed lot line revision was more than a minor adjustment: there was nothing in the language of
§ 8-18 that addresses the degree of the lot line adjustment, rather, the only relevant inquiry is whether the property was divided into three or more lots, and the mere changing of lot lines or adding additionаl land to lots, no matter how sizeable, does not constitute a subdivision. - The defendants could not prevail on their claim that because the proposed boundary line revision would create a third part, it required subdivision approval, which was based on their claim that the distinction in
§ 8-18 between “parts” and “lots” could indicate that the legislature meant the words to be read separately, and, therefore, the proposed lot line revision could still satisfy the definition of subdivision by dividing the first property into a third part: this court concluded that the legislature intended the word “parts” to refer to separate but whole, not fractional, members of a tract of land, thus, when the word “parts” is read in light of its commonly approved usage and together with the definition of “resubdivision” in§ 8-18 , its meaning is plain and unambiguous, and is to be read together with the word “lots” so as to clarify the latter‘s meaning.
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the defendant denying the plaintiff‘s application for certain property line revisions, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the court, Radcliffe, J., granted the motion to intervene filed by the defendant Judith Kurmay et al.; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Radcliffe, J.; judgment dismissing the plaintiff‘s appeal, from which the plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court; subsequently, this court granted the plaintiff‘s motion to substitute JRB Holding Co., LLC, as the plaintiff.
Stephen R. Bellis, for the appellant (substitute plaintiff).
Alexander J. Florek, for the appellee (named defendant).
Joseph A. Kubic, for the appellees (defendant Judith Kurmay et al.).
Opinion
LAVERY, J. The plaintiff, 500 North Avenue, LLC, appeals from the judgmеnt of the trial court dismissing its appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Planning Commission of the Town of Stratford (commission),1 concluding that the plaintiff was required to file an application for subdivision approval in order to adjust the lot lines of two abutting properties that it owns by adding ten acres to one property
The record and the court‘s memorandum of decision reveal the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff is the owner of two adjacent properties in the town of Stratford (town). The first property is located at 795 James Farm Road and consists of fifteen acres of land. The second property is located at and known as Peters Lane and consists of ten acres of land. On or about March 24, 2017, the plaintiff submitted a Mylar map2 of the two properties to the town‘s planning and zoning administrator, Jay Habansky, seeking a lot line adjustment. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to reduce the James Farm Road property from fifteen acres to 4.7 acres and to increase the Peters Lane property from ten acres to approximately twenty acres, thus, reconfiguring the properties.
On May 1, 2017, upon request from Habansky, Attorney John A. Florek3 submitted a memorandum advising Habansky not to sign or approve the plaintiff‘s Mylar map. In the memorandum, Florek relied on language from Goodridge v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 58 Conn. App. 760, 765–66, 755 A.2d 329, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 930, 761 A.2d 753 (2000), in which this court stated: “A minor lot line adjustment between two existing lots, whereby no new lot is created, does not constitute a ‘subdivision’ as defined by
In response to Florek‘s memorandum, on May 4, 2017, the plaintiff‘s counsel sent a letter to Habansky explaining that because there was no division of 795 James Farm Road or the Peters Lane property into three or more lots pursuant to
On May 16, 2017, the commission held an administrative hearing, in which it considered Florek‘s memorandum, the plaintiff‘s
After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision on June 22, 2018. The court held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission‘s decision that the 2003 conveyance, as described in Ahlberg‘s memorandum, constituted a “first cut” of 795 James Farm Road. As such, the court stated that the plaintiff‘s “[M]ylar map . . . represent[ed] a second division of 795 James Farm Road . . . . Therefore, the reduction of the fifteen . . . acre parcel to 4.7 acres, is not subject to the ‘first cut’ exemption contained in [
On July 6, 2018, the plaintiff petitioned this court for certification to appeal, and the petition was granted on September 24, 2018. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly upheld the commission‘s decision by concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission‘s finding that the plaintiff‘s proposed lot line adjustment of the 795 James Farm Road and Peters Lane properties constituted а subdivision for purposes of
“Although we employ a deferential standard of review to the actions of zoning [commissions] . . . the issue raised here is one of statutory construction. Issues of statutory construction present questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Benson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 89 Conn. App. 324, 329, 873 A.2d 1017 (2005); see Clifford v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 280 Conn. 434, 453, 908 A.2d 1049 (2006) (applying deferential standard of review to decision of zoning commission). “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In othеr words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,
The issue before this court requires us to interpret the statutory definition of subdivision.
“In interpreting the meaning of the term ‘subdivision’ in
In Cady, our Supreme Court further interpreted the language of
Because the present case involves the application of
The following additional facts are relevant to the resolution of the issue presented. Florek, guided by Ahlberg‘s memorandum, concluded that 795 James Farm Road was “first cut” in 2003, thus leaving three abutting parcels of land, 795 James Farm Road, Peters Lane, and 875 James Farm Road. He further concluded that because the plaintiff‘s proposal sought to “severely change the character of the lots involved,” subdivision approval was necessary. Specifically, Florek relied on language from Goodridge, concluding that the plaintiff‘s proposal was not “minor” and “constitute[d] more than a simple lot line revision.” Florek further relied on Stones Trail, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-06-4010003-S (May 6, 2008), in which the court stated: “[W]here a boundary line adjustment is significant in size and made for the purpose of development, even where no additional lot is created, it does constitute a subdivision of property.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Accordingly, Florek advised the commission to deny the plaintiff‘s proposal.6
At the administrative hearing, the commission was tasked with deciding whether “(1) an additional lot was or was not created; (2) if [the proposal] is simply a lot line revision; [and] (3) if [the proposal] is a subdivision that is created for the specific purpose of facilitating development.” The commission relied on the case law cited in Florek‘s memorandum and concluded that the plaintiff‘s proposal should be considered a subdivision, and not a lot line adjustment. On appeal, the trial court upheld the commission‘s decision, concluding that, although the proposal created no new lot,
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly interpreted the language of
The trial court‘s conclusion that the plaintiff‘s proposed lot line revision met the definition of a subdivision set forth in
The commission asserts that Cady instructs this court that “[
We acknowledge that 795 James Farm Road was subject to a first cut in 2003. We cоnclude, however, that because the plaintiff‘s proposal does not divide 795 James Farm Road a second time, resulting in three or more parts or lots, the commission‘s decision that subdivision approval was required is contrary to the language of
The plaintiff next claims that the trial court improperly relied on language from Goodridge in upholding the commission‘s decision and concluding that subdivision approval was required because the lot line revision was morе than “minor.” Specifically, the plaintiff cites to Cady, to argue that “[our Supreme Court] found that nothing in the plain language of . . .
Cady implicitly overruled this court‘s decision in Goodridge in regard to the subject mattеr of the size of a proposed lot line revision. In particular, our Supreme Court explained that the use of the phrase “‘minor lot line adjustment‘” is not supported by the language of the statute. Cady v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 330 Conn. 515. The court stated: “Nothing in the plain language of
In the present case, the trial court‘s conclusion that subdivision approval was required because the proposed lot line revision of 795 James Farm Road was “more than minor,” was based on its reliance on the language of Goodridge. In light of the holding in Cady, however, we conclude that the trial court‘s reasoning is flawed. As Cady indicated, there is nothing in the language of
Even though the proposed lot line adjustment in the present case includes a nearly ten acre change in the size of the two properties, the degree of a lot line adjustment is not determinative of the need for subdivision approval. As such, the trial court‘s reliance on the term “minor” was improper. Because we have determined that 795 James Farm Road has not
III
Kurmay and Martinez assert one final argument that we are compelled to address, namely, that the language of
The determination of whether the word “parts” as used in
Although our Supreme Court in McCrann and Cady determined that the language of
Furthermore, “[t]he rule of [statutory] construction that the words in a statute must be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning [is informed by] the doctrine of [in pari] materia, under which statutes [and statutory provisions] relating to the same subject matter may be looked to for guidance in reaching an understanding of the meaning of the statutory term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pommer, 110 Conn. App. 608, 616, 955 A.2d 637 (citing R. Williams, Jr., “Statutory Construction in Connecticut: An Overview and Analysis,” 62 Conn. B.J. 313–14 (1988)), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 951, 961 A.2d 418 (2008). We are further guided by the principle that “the legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . . [T]his tenet of statutory construction . . . requires [this court] to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . . Accordingly, [i]n determining the meaning of a stаtute . . . we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction. . . . [T]he General Assembly is always presumed to know all the existing statutes and the effect that its action or [nonaction] will have upon any one of them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Crete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, supra, 280 Conn. 678.
Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary defines the word “part” as “one of the often indefinite or unequal subdivisions into which something is or is regarded as divided and which together constitute the whole . . . one of the several or many equal units of which something is composed or into which it is divisible . . . .” Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003), pp. 902–903.
Applying this definition and the canons of construction outlinеd in the preceding paragraph, we conclude that the legislature intended the word “parts” to refer to separate but whole, not fractional, members of a tract of land. Specifically, the purpose of the inclusion of “parts” is to elucidate the meaning of the word “lots” by clarifying that the type of lot referred to in
Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that, when creating the statutory definition of subdivision, the legislature included the definition of resubdivision in its meaning. In the definition of resubdivision, the legislature used only the words “lot,” “lots,” and “building lots” to impart the type of land that is to be considered in a resubdivision. There is no use of the word “parts.” As highlighted above, this court has previously explained that “[s]tatutes should be read as to harmonize with each other, and not to conflict with each other.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fuhrman v. Dept. of Transportation, 33 Conn. App. 775, 778, 638 A.2d 1091 (1994). In light of the legislature‘s specific inclusion of the definition of resubdivision within the definition of subdivision and the fact that statutes should be read to harmonize with each other, we must presume
Moreover, Kurmay‘s and Martinez’ interpretation of the definition of subdivision is inconsistent with prior judicial interpretations of the statute. In Cady v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 330 Conn. 514, our Supreme Court concluded that the “appropriate inquiry under
As such, we conclude that when the word “parts,” as used in the definition of subdivision pursuant to
Lastly, the defendants argue that the proposed lot line revision was submitted solely for the purposes of development and, therefore, meets the definition of subdivision pursuant to
The record reveals that the plaintiff‘s proposed lot line revision simply reconfigures two conforming lots into two differently shaped, yet conforming, lots. There is no division that results in the creation of three or more lots. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court‘s judgment upholding the commission‘s decision requiring subdivision approval deviated from the plain language of
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment sustaining the plaintiff‘s appeal.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.