More specifically, we conclude that, when the town of Burlington (town) adopted § IV.B.5 of the regulations on October 1, 1983, the defendant's property contained three conforming, buildable lots, and that the proposed lot line revisions at issue in this case maintained three conforming, buildable lots. Thus, the defendant's proposed lot line revisions did not create a subdivision because those revisions did not divide one parcel of land into three or more parts. As a result, we further conclude that the defendant did not propose the establishment of a nonconforming use because the property lines, as revised, met the size requirements applicable to lots in existence as of October 1, 1983. Therefore, the trial court improperly applied § III.F.7 of the regulations to the present case. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The record and the trial court's memorandum of decision reveal the following facts and procedural history. The plaintiff resides in Burlington, and the defendant owns property abutting the plaintiff to the east.
The remaining three lots are to the south along Route 179. The first of these lots, located to the east, was previously owned by Clara L. Rainault. The second lot, located in the center, was previously owned by Donald
After the state widened Route 179, there were portions of each of the three southern lots that were unused. The unused portion of the eastern lot had been retained by Rainault but, because of the amount of that lot used to widen Route 179, that remnant became a nonconforming lot. The Department of Transportation had taken ownership of the Wark and Legowski lots in their entirety, and those lots remained conforming, even after a portion of each was used to widen Route 179. As a result, where there had once been four conforming lots, now there were three conforming lots.
In 1986, the defendant's predecessor in title purchased the remnant of the Rainault lot. That lot was then combined with 48 Claire Hill Road to make one lot. The parties do not dispute that when the defendant's predecessor in title purchased the Rainault lot, it was combined with 48 Claire Hill Road. In 2013, the defendant purchased 48 Claire Hill Road, which now included the Rainault lot. Then, in 2014, the defendant purchased the remnants of the Wark and Legowski lots from the state.
Thereafter, the defendant presented a map of the three lots with revised property boundaries to the town's zoning enforcement officer, Liz Burdick, for approval.
Burdick further explained as follows: "The land comprising the current [three] lots was originally [four] lots .... The Rainault, Wark [and] Legowski lots were subject to a state taking for road improvements on Route [179]. The [s]tate ... acquired the Wark [and] Legowski lots in their entirety in 1959. Rainault retained her (now non-conforming) lot and then transferred it to [the defendant's predecessor in title] in 1986 to be combined with 48 Claire Hill Road .... Therefore, as of the time of the filing of the subject [l]ot [l]ine [r]evision map, it is my opinion there were three preexisting lots, one at 48 Claire Hill Road ... and two on [Route 179] ... which could be reconfigured as needed to comply with current minimum bulk requirements
The plaintiff filed an appeal with the town's Zoning Board of Appeals (board), which held a public hearing. The board ultimately denied the appeal and upheld Burdick's decision.
The plaintiff then filed an appeal with the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 8-8 (b), alleging that the board committed both procedural and substantive errors when it denied his appeal. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the proposed realignment of boundary lines for the three lots constituted a subdivision under § 8-18 and that the resultant lots were too small to satisfy the minimum lot area requirements for lots created by subdivision after October 1, 1983.
The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the decision of the board. The trial court found that the board improperly concluded that the defendant's proposed lot line revision did not constitute a subdivision within the meaning of § 8-18. In reaching this conclusion, it relied on the Appellate Court's decision in Goodridge v. Zoning Board of Appeals ,
More specifically, the court stated "it would appear that a new subdivision was created because three new lots were created. [The second proposed lot] did not previously exist, and, at 16,866 square feet, it fails to comply with [§ IV.B.5 of the regulations, which requires
Having concluded that the defendant's proposed lot line revision constituted a subdivision, the trial court determined that § III.F.7 of the regulations must be applied to determine whether the lots were "preexisting." The trial court concluded that the board improperly determined that the lots were "preexisting" pursuant to § III.F.7 of the regulations. Instead, the trial court found that one of the lots in the lot line revision map was a new lot and failed to meet the greater area requirements of the regulations. This appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
I
The defendant first asserts that the trial court improperly concluded that the defendant's revision of the lot lines constituted a "subdivision" for purposes of § 8-18. We agree.
The plaintiff's appeal requires us to construe the meaning of the word subdivision.
We, therefore, begin with the text of the statute. Section 8-18 provides in relevant part: "As used in this chapter ... 'subdivision' means the division of a tract or parcel of land into three or more parts or lots made subsequent to the adoption of subdivision regulations by [a planning commission], for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or building development expressly excluding development for municipal, conservation or agricultural purposes ...."
In interpreting the meaning of the term "subdivision" in § 8-18, we do not write on a clean slate. In McCrann v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission ,
The court concluded first that the language of § 8-18 is clear and unambiguous.
With that construction of § 8-18 in mind, we now must determine whether the lot line revision proposed by the defendant in the present case constituted a subdivision.
The following facts are relevant to the resolution of that claim in the present case. Burdick found that "the three lots that were reconfigured as shown on this map have been in existence since at least September 1958 ...." In making this determination, Burdick explained that the lot retained by Rainault after the taking by the state was "non-conforming" after a portion of it was used to widen Route 179. "Therefore, as of the time of the filing of the subject [l]ot [l]ine [r]evision map, it is my opinion there were three pre-existing lots, one at 48 Claire Hill Road ... and two on [Route 179] ... which could be reconfigured as needed to comply with current minimum bulk requirements of the R-15
The trial court then reversed the decision of the board and sustained the plaintiff's appeal. The trial court found that a new lot was created by the proposed lot line revision. In particular, the trial court determined that, because the lot line revisions were more than minor, and because, in its view, a new lot was created, the defendant's proposed lot line revisions constituted a subdivision.
In the present case, the board's conclusion that the defendant's proposed lot line revision did not meet the definition of subdivision set forth in § 8-18 was supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether the defendant's proposed lot line revision constituted a subdivision, the board sought to determine what the property looked like at the time the town adopted its increased area regulations for new subdivisions in 1983. " Section 8-18 therefore directs our attention to the original tract of land from which the initial division of the property was made." Newman v. Planning & Zoning Commission ,
Instead of reviewing the board's decision to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence, the trial court improperly considered whether the lots proposed by the defendant were of the same topography as the lots that had previously existed. This inquiry both exceeded the scope of the trial court's review of a
It exceeded the scope because the board had determined that there were three conforming lots that had been in existence since at least 1959 and that the defendant's proposed lot line revisions did not divide any lot into three or more parts. Rather than assess whether those findings were supported by substantial evidence, the trial court appears to have disregarded those findings.
Instead, the trial court engaged in an inquiry as to whether the lots created by the defendant's proposed lot line revision were similar in topography to the lots that existed before the proposed lot line revision. Nothing in § 8-18 requires or suggests that maintaining the topography of a lot is a consideration in determining
In the present case, there was sufficient evidence to support the board's determination that the defendant's lot line revision did not constitute a subdivision, as that term is defined in § 8-18 and construed in McCrann , because one lot was not divided into three. The evidence shows that three conforming lots simply were reconfigured into three differently shaped, yet still conforming, lots.
The plaintiff makes one final point we are compelled to address, that is, that the trial court properly relied on Goodridge v. Zoning Board of Appeals , supra,
In Goodridge , the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that the property line changes constituted a subdivision when the plaintiff sought to add 0.005 acres from one lot to another. Id., at 762-64,
In doing so, the Appellate Court explained: "A minor lot line adjustment between two existing lots, whereby no new lot is created, does not constitute a 'subdivision' as defined by § 8-18 and, thus, does not require municipal approval.... To accept
The plaintiff does not point to, and the trial court did not rely on, any language in the text of § 8-18 that supports the conclusion that a lot line adjustment must be both minor and not create a new lot in order for the lot line adjustment not to constitute a subdivision. Instead, the plaintiff and the trial court rely only on the language of Goodridge . We disagree with this reading of Goodridge . Indeed, in that case, the Appellate Court never addressed whether more significant lot line adjustments would constitute a subdivision.
Moreover, the interpretation of § 8-18 adopted by the trial court and asserted by the plaintiff in the present case is not supported by the language of the statute. It is well established that "a court must construe a statute as written.... Courts may not by construction supply omissions ... or add exceptions merely because it appears that good reasons exist for adding them.... The intent of the legislature, as this court has repeatedly observed, is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say.... It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the legislature." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tuxis Ohr's Fuel, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act ,
Nothing in the plain language of § 8-18 indicates that the determination of whether a particular proposal constitutes a "subdivision" depends on the degree of the lot line adjustment. Indeed, § 8-18 does not address a lot line adjustment or the size of an adjustment at all; instead, it addresses "the division of a tract or parcel of land ...."
In the present case, the board's decision that there were three lots in existence as of 1983 and, therefore, that the defendant's proposed lot line revision did not constitute a subdivision because it also
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly applied § III.F.7 of the regulations to its lots. Specifically, the defendant argues that its proposed lots meet the minimum size requirements for lots in existence prior to October 1, 1983, and therefore § III.F.7 of the regulations does not apply. We agree.
Section III.F.7 of the Burlington Zoning Regulations provides: "Where safe and adequate disposal of sewage and a safe water supply, as required by the Public Health Code, can be provided without endangering the health and [safety] of adjoining residents, nothing in these [r]egulations shall prevent the construction of a permitted building or the establishment of a permitted use on a lot containing less than the prescribed area or width which at the time of adoption hereof or any pertinent amendment hereto was ... [o]wned separately from any adjoining lot and filed in the Burlington land records, or ... [s]hown on a plan of subdivision by the Planning and Zoning Commission and filed in the Burlington land records." (Emphasis added.)
Section III.F.7 of the Burlington Zoning Regulations applies only to "a lot containing less than the prescribed
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
APPENDIX
Notes
We note that, although the Town of Burlington Zoning Board of Appeals and its zoning enforcement officer, Liz Burdick, were also named as defendants in the underlying administrative appeal, they neither appealed nor filed briefs in this court. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to these parties by name and to GM Retirement, LLC, as the defendant.
The defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. We then transferred that appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
General Statutes § 8-18 provides in relevant part: "As used in this chapter ... 'subdivision' means the division of a tract or parcel of land into three or more parts or lots made subsequent to the adoption of subdivision regulations by [a planning commission], for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or building development expressly excluding development for municipal, conservation or agricultural purposes, and includes resubdivision ...."
A map depicting the various properties at issue in the present case, together with the defendant's proposed boundary revisions, has been attached as an appendix to this opinion. See footnote 6 of this opinion.
The information contained within the record indicates that, at the time of this taking, this roadway formed part of Route 4. For the sake of simplicity, we use the road's current designation throughout this opinion.
For ease of reference, a portion of this map has been reproduced as an appendix to this opinion. We note that the solid bold lines on this map show the boundaries proposed by the plaintiff. Previously existing parcels, by contrast, were delineated by simple dotted lines.
Section IV.B of the regulations outlines the requirements applicable to lots within the R-15 zoning district, which is a residential zone. Specifically, § IV.B.5 of the Burlington Zoning Regulations provides in relevant part:
| "Minimum Lot Area: | 43,560 square feet | • For any lot created and record[ed] after January 1, 2002 |
| • For any lot created by subdivision and recorded after October 1, 1983 | ||
| 15,000 square feet | • For [any] lot in existence as of October 1, 1983 ...." |
The parties do not dispute that the lots proposed by the defendant in the May 22, 2014 map would meet the minimum lot area requirements applicable to lots in existence as of October 1, 1983.
The plaintiff had asserted, before both the board and the trial court, that there were only two lots in existence in 1983 because the Wark and Legowski lots merged at some point prior to 1983 when both lots were owned by the state. The board determined that the lots did not merge, and the trial court did not reverse that finding but instead concluded that "whether they merged is not really an issue." We conclude that we need not reach this issue because, even if there were only two lots in existence in 1983, the defendant's proposed lot line revision still would not constitute a subdivision. As we explained previously in this opinion, a subdivision is created only when one lot is divided into three or more parts. In the present case, one lot was never divided into three. Even under the plaintiff's view of the lots, two lots were divided into three, which does not constitute a subdivision for purposes of § 8-18.
Although § 8-18 does not address the degree of the lot line adjustment, it is undisputed that, even if a lot line revision does not constitute a subdivision, the resultant lots still must meet the applicable minimum lot area requirements. In the present case, it is not disputed that the defendant's proposed lot line revision contained three lots that all met the minimum lot area requirements for the R-15 zoning district for a lot that was in existence as of October 1, 1983. See footnote 7 of this opinion.