Yeasin v. Durham
719 F. App’x 844
| 10th Cir. | 2018Background
- While off campus, Yeasin physically restrained his ex-girlfriend (A.W.) on June 28, 2013; criminal charges were later diverted and A.W. obtained a protection order by consent.
- A.W. filed a university sexual-harassment complaint; IOA issued a no-contact order prohibiting direct or indirect contact, including social-media references.
- Yeasin posted multiple tweets referring indirectly and, by his admission, directly to A.W.; IOA warned him that further references could lead to referral for sanctions.
- A university hearing panel found Yeasin violated the student code and sexual-harassment policy (based on the restraint incident and his tweets) and recommended sanctioning; Dr. Tammara Durham, Vice Provost, adopted the recommendation and expelled and banned him.
- A Kansas state court set aside the expulsion, holding the code did not authorize discipline for off-campus conduct; the university reinstated Yeasin.
- Yeasin sued Durham in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment and substantive due-process violations; the district court dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Durham violated Yeasin’s First Amendment right by disciplining him for off-campus, online speech | Yeasin: tweets were off-campus protected speech; university lacked authority to punish content | Durham: tweets, combined with a violent off-campus incident, harmed another student and disrupted campus; discipline permissible | Court: declined to decide the merits but held plaintiff failed to show the First Amendment right was "clearly established" in these circumstances |
| Whether Durham violated substantive due process by expelling Yeasin | Yeasin: expulsion for off-campus online conduct was arbitrary and deprived property interest in education | Durham: decision was non-academic disciplinary action based on conduct threatening another student; reasonable exercise of authority | Court: did not decide merits but held plaintiff failed to show clearly established substantive-due-process violation |
| Whether qualified immunity shields Durham from § 1983 liability | Yeasin: existing precedent should have put Durham on notice disciplining for this speech was unlawful | Durham: law at intersection of university discipline, Title IX, and off-campus social-media speech is unsettled; reasonable official could have believed action lawful | Court: qualified immunity applies because precedent did not clearly establish the unlawfulness of Durham’s conduct |
| Appropriate scope of university authority over off-campus conduct affecting campus | Yeasin: university and Dr. Durham exceeded the student-code scope by applying it to off-campus tweets | Durham: university may act when off-campus conduct has on-campus effects and threatens another student's access to education | Court: acknowledged close tension but found controlling precedent not sufficiently particular to negate qualified immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (schools may restrict student speech that would materially and substantially disrupt school)
- Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (college speech decisions reviewed under Tinker disruption principles)
- Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (student expression protected where it did not interfere with others or disrupt university functions)
- Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public university cannot enforce content-based exclusion in a generally open forum)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent or knowingly unlawful officials)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (clearly established-law inquiry requires particularized precedent)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausible claims)
- Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (academic dismissals reviewed deferentially as professional judgments)
- Gossett v. Oklahoma ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2001) (substantive-due-process claim where dismissal may have been based on impermissible reasons)