Wyo-Ben Inc. v. Haaland, 63 F.4th 857

Background

Wyo-Ben filed a mineral-patent application (placer claims, ~7,070 acres) with BLM in March 1993.
Congress enacted a moratorium on processing mineral-patent applications effective September 30, 1994, but included a statutory exemption requiring the Secretary to determine whether certain pending applications qualify.
On October 3, 1994, BLM determined Wyo-Ben’s application did not qualify for the exemption; Congress reenacted the moratorium and exemption annually through 2019.
Wyo-Ben sued the Secretary and BLM in October 2019 under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), alleging the Secretary unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed reviewing its application and asking the court to compel a review under the 2019 appropriations act.
The district court dismissed as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), concluding accrual occurred in 1994 (BLM’s decision) and rejecting continuing/repeated-violations theories.
The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding the complaint challenges the Secretary’s ongoing inaction (not BLM’s 1994 act) and that the claim is timely under the repeated violations doctrine; the case was remanded for further proceedings on merits and factual issues (e.g., completeness of application; delegation to BLM).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Proper characterization of claim (BLM action vs Secretary inaction)	Wyo-Ben challenges the Secretary’s continued failure to review the application each year, not BLM’s 1994 determination	Respondents and district court treated BLM’s 1994 classification as the operative unlawful act that triggered accrual	Court: Complaint alleges Secretary’s inaction; district court misconstrued the claim and thus erred
Applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) six‑year limitations to § 706(1) claims	Wyo-Ben argued doctrines could render claim timely; did not press that §2401(a) is inapplicable	Respondents and district court assumed §2401(a) applies and accrued in 1994	Court assumed §2401(a) applies for decision purposes (parties litigated on that basis) but did not decide whether §2401(a) generally applies to §706(1) claims
Timeliness under continuing‑violation vs repeated‑violations doctrines	Wyo-Ben: Secretary’s repeated inaction each time Congress reenacted the moratorium constitutes discrete repeated violations (and could also fit continuing‑violation theory)	Respondents and district court: Only a single wrongful act occurred in 1994; neither doctrine applies; claim untimely	Court: Wyo‑Ben waived continuing‑violation argument but claim is timely under the repeated‑violations doctrine (each discrete failure to act restarts accrual)
Relief on appeal (compel review now)	Wyo‑Ben asked this court to order the Secretary to review its application	Respondents opposed immediate relief, noting factual disputes (e.g., application completeness; delegation)	Court declined to compel; remanded for district court to resolve factual/delegation issues and, if necessary, the merits

Key Cases Cited

Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093 (10th Cir. 2019) (adopts repeated‑violations doctrine; daily failures can constitute separate violations restarting limitations period)
Sierra Club v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 816 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 2016) (explains continuing‑violation doctrine for claims seeking redress for a series of acts that together form one unlawful act)
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (§706(1) relief available only to compel discrete agency action unlawfully withheld)
Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 1997) (Secretary has duty to determine completeness/FHFC eligibility; unlawful withholding of review can support §706(1) relief)
Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980 (10th Cir. 2022) (extends repeated‑violations doctrine to §1983; each day of ongoing harm can trigger a new limitations period)
The Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discusses timeliness of §706(1) claims and treats ongoing agency inaction as distinct from past discrete acts)