Mt. Emmons Mining Company (Mt.Em-mons) appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, (Secretary) in Mt. Emmons’ action to compel the Secretary to continue processing its application for several mining patents covering ten lode mining claims in Gunnison, Colorado. The district court found as a matter of law that the Sеcretary could not further process the patent application because of a congressionally-imposed moratorium. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse and find that the Secretary has unlawfully withheld agency action in refusing to continue processing Mt. Emmons’ application.
I.
On December 30, 1992, Mt. Emmons filed a patent application for ten lode mining claims with the Colorado office of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). On March 2, 1993, the Secretary revoked the authority of subordinate officials to issue “first half final certificates” (FHFC’s) 1 and patents. Append. I at 25. Nevertheless, patent applications were processed initially in state BLM offices until they reached the point where the issuance of an FHFC would be the next stеp. After review by the proper state director, the application, together with (1) a cover memo with concurrence lines, (2) an FHFC prepared for the Secretary’s signature, and (3) various documents from the case file, were to be sent to the Regional Solicitor’s office, then to the Solicitor, then to the Director, then to the Assistant Secretary of Land аnd Minerals Management, and if all concurred, then to the Secretary. The final review process for issuance of a patent follows a similar chain of command.
Richard Tate, the senior land law examiner for the Colorado BLM office, completed his review of Mt. Emmons’ application and, on September 15, 1994, wrote to Mt. Emmons requesting payment of $875 for purchаse of the lands subject to the patent application. Mt. Emmons immediately tendered payment. On September 19, 1994, BLM accepted payment and on a “Receipt and Accounting Advice,” Tate marked “mineral entry allowed.” Append. I at 128. Tate prepared the application to be sent to the Regional Solicitor's *1169 office, the next level of the review process leading up to issuance of a first half final certificate by the Secretary.
On September 30, 1994, Congress enacted the Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, PL 103-332, 108 Stat. 2499, § 112, which placed a moratorium on the expenditure of funds by the Department of Interior for processing mining or millsite patent applications and issuing pаtents under the general mining laws “[i]f the House-Senate Committee on H.R. 322 fails to report legislation which is enacted prior to the adjournment of the 103d Congress sine die.” 2 Congress also provided an exemption for certain patent applications in § 113 of the legislation:
The [moratorium] provisions of section 112 shall not apply if the Secretary of the Interior determines that, for thе claim concerned (1) a patent application was filed with the Secretary on or before the date of enactment of this Act, and (2) all requirements established under sections 2325 and 2326 of the Revised Statutes (30 U.S.C. 29 and 30) for vein or lode claims ... were fully complied with by the applicant by that date. 3
By Instruction Memorandum (IM) No. 95-01 dated October 4, 1994, the Secretary adopted thе following interpretation of § 113:
Only the following applications may be processed:
(1) Those for which a FHFC was signed before October 1,1994 and;
(2) those for which a FHFC was pending in Washington, D.C., as of September 30,1994.
Tate retained Mt. Emmons’ application in the Colorado BLM office. Mt. Emmons subsequently requested that its application be forwarded to Washington, D.C. Tate responded that local BLM officials no longer had authority to sign final certifiсates and, under the Secretary’s interpretation of the moratorium, Mt. Emmons’ application could not be processed further. It is undisputed that no FHFC was issued and that the application was not forwarded to Washington, D.C.
On December 30, 1994, Mt. Emmons filed the complaint in this action, seeking to compel the Secretary to continue processing its application. The complaint sought relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, mandamus, and declaratory judgment. Mt. Emmons filed a motion for discovery on June 7, 1995. The Secretary filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing he lacked authority to process Mt. Em-mons’ application. The Secretary argued to the district court, as he urges on appeal, that his construction of the scope of the § 113 exemрtion is a reasonable construction and is entitled to judicial deference.
Mt. Emmons filed a Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance pending discovery. Mt. Em-mons argued that, despite the Secretary’s explanation of his treatrrient of the application, discovery was needed to determine the Secretary’s “contemporaneous construction of IM 95-01.” Mt. Emmons further argued its claim for unreasonably delayed agency action prior to the effective date of the moratorium required discovery into the reasons for that delay. The magistrate judge found the only determinative issues in the case dealt with the Secretary’s interpretation of § 113 and, thus, discovery was not needed. The magistrate recommended that summary judgment be rendered in favor of the Secretary. The magistrate specifically held that Mt. Emmons was not entitled to an exception to the moratorium under § 113 because (1) an FHFC had not been issued to Mt. Em-mons before October 1, 1994, and (2) its patent application had not been forwarded to Washington, D.C., and therefore was not “filed with the Secretary on or before the enactment of the Act” as required by § 113. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment on the basis that the moratorium prevented the Secretary from processing the patent application and that the § 113 exemption did not apply under the Seere- *1170 tary’s interpretation of that exemption in IM 95-01.
II.
Mt. Emmons raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the Secretary’s refusal to continue processing its patent application violates § 113; and (2) whеther the district court erred in refusing to permit Mt. Emmons to conduct discovery prior to granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.
Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), as a reviewing court, we must set aside the Secretary’s action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”
See Washington v. Department of Transp.,
The question of whether the Secretary, through IM 95-01, lawfully applied the moratorium to Mt. Emmons’ patent application requires us to interpret § 113 and apply it to the facts presented. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must interpret the statute to effect the unambiguous intеnt of Congress, regardless of the interpretation given to the statute by an administrative agency with responsibility for enforcement.
See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Our initial inquiry is whether the § 113 moratorium exemption is ambiguous. Under § 113, two requirements must be met before the exemption applies. First, the application must be filed with the Secretary on or before the date of enactment of the moratorium. The Secretary conсedes on appeal that Mt. Emmons satisfied this requirement when it filed its application with a state BLM office.
4
Thus, the Secretary does not assert that ambiguity in this provision justifies his interpretation of the statute. The second prerequisite to qualify for an exemption is that all requirements of 30 U.S.C. §§ 29 and 30 “were fully complied with by the applicant” by the date of enactment of the mora
*1171
torium. We have held that an
applicant
meets its obligations under § 29
5
when it files all necessary papers required to process the application, and that from that point forward complete responsibility lies with the Secretary.
Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan,
Even if we were to accept his argument that the statute is in some respects ambiguous, the Secretary’s position would not be much aided. In the evеnt of ambiguity, the Secretary’s interpretation must be reasonable in order to be entitled to deference. As Mt. Emmons argues, the Secretary’s interpretation is contrary to the language of § 113. The Secretary bases an applicant’s eligibility for exemption on how far the Secretary has processed the application (whether an FHFC was signed or transmitted to the BLM office in Washingtоn, D.C.), while §113 clearly and unequivocally bases the applicant’s eligibility only on the applicant’s actions (compliance with 30 U.S.C. §§29 and 30). 6
Although the Secretary is free to adopt a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, he is not free to disregard an unambiguous aspect of the statute to clarify and effect an ambiguous one. The moratorium provisions contain no ambiguity to permit the Secretary’s interpretation of the scope of the § 113 exemption.
The Secretary’s argument on appeal that he cannot expend funds to determine whether an application filed before enactment of the moratorium is complete or to determine whether the application is entitled to an FHFC is inconsistent with his own interpretation of §§ 112 and 113. Under the Secretary’s IM 95-01, applications without FHFC’s (and which might ultimately be determined to be ineligible for FHFC’s) can continue to be processed if they are physically located in Washington, D.C. The Secretary’s distinction based on the physical location of the application package is unreasonable and impermissible in light of the statute’s focus on the applicant’s compliance as the determining faсtor for eligibility for the exemption.
The Secretary is unable to support his position with any language in the moratorium statute. He attempts to justify his construction by reference to the legislative history of the moratorium, pointing out there is history supporting the view that the exemption would exempt those classifications of applications identified in IM 95-01:
The managers agreе that those applications having received first-half-final eertifi- *1172 cates on or before the date of enactment of this Act are not subject to the prohibition in Section 112. In addition, the managers agree that those applications for first-half-final certificates currently pending in the Office of the Solicitor in Washington, D.C. or elsewhere in the Department of the Interior in Washington, D.C. will not be subject to the moratorium in Section 112.
140 Cong. Rec. H9536-01 (1994).
In the absence of ambiguity requiring clarification, there is no need to resort to the legislative history.
See United States v. Gonzales,
— U.S. -, -,
The Secretary argues in part that the statute is ambiguous, but more importantly he argues it is silent on the important question of how he is to decide whether an applicant is eligible for the moratorium exemption. The Secretary argues Congress left the mechanism for determining eligibility to him and he could therefore adopt the two-part test in IM 95-01. While the Secretary is indeed free to implement an internal procedural mechanism of his own choice to determine exemption eligibility, 7 he is not free to change the standard for qualifying for the exemption by selection of one mechanism over another to exclude from the exemption applications Congress had chosen under the language of the statute to include. Yet this is what the Secretary has done through IM 95-01 by refusing to determine whether applications filed before enactment of the moratorium but not yet forwarded to Washington, D.C., qualify for the exemption.
The Secretary also argues an applicant has not complied with the responsibility to file a complete application as contemplated by § 113 until he decides the application is complete. He argues Mt. Emmons is not qualified for the exemption until and unless the Secretary makes a final determination that Mt. Emmons is entitled to an FHFC, which he has not done and will not do as long as the moratorium is in effect. The Secretary’s circular argument again ignores the emphasis of § 113 on the applicant’s actions rаther than the Secretary’s actions, and ignores the duty Congress places on the Secretary to determine if the application is complete so as to qualify for the exemption.
Finally, the Secretary argues Mt. Emmons is not entitled to compelled agency action because it is not unquestionably entitled to a patent. The Secretary misconstrues the relief which Mt. Emmons seeks. Mt. Emmons seeks an order requiring the Secretary to continue to process its patent application. This relief is appropriate without regard to Mt. Emmons’ ultimate entitlement to a patent.
See Marathon Oil,
III.
The district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary is REVERSED. The Secretary is ordered to continue processing Mt. Emmons’ patent application tо determine whether it is suffi- *1173 eiently complete to qualify for the § 113 exemption as interpreted herein. Given our interpretation of § 113, the question of whether Mt. Emmons should have been permitted discovery before entry of summary judgment is moot. Both of Mt. Emmons’ motions to supplement the record are DENIED.
Notes
. On its face, the FHFC certifies a patent “may issue if all is found regular and upon demonstration and verification of a discovery of a valuable mineral deposit.” Append. I at 88. According to the BLM Manual H-3860-1, ch. VI, pp. VI-1 and -2, the FHFC "[c]ertifies that the applicant has satisfactorily complied with all of the ‘paperwork’ requirements of the Mining Law (title, proofs, posting requirements, purchase money).” On appeal, the Secretary concedes "the signing of thе FHFC establishes only that the applicant has submitted the appropriate filing fees, affidavits, and necessary documents, and has submitted the purchase prices.” Appellees' br. at 11 n. 5.
. The committee failed to report the legislation prior to adjournment.
. The moratorium provisions remain in effect through fiscal year 1997. PL 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, Omnibus Appropriations Act 1997, § 314(a)-(b).
. The Secretаry acknowledges that the reasoning of the district court is flawed in holding the Secretary's requirement that the application be in Washington, D.C. is based on the statutory requirement that the application be filed with the Secretary. The Secretary acknowledges that applications filed in state BLM offices are filed with the Secretary. Appellees’ br. at 27.
. Section 30 is nоt at issue in Mt. Emmons' patent claim; therefore, the focus is only on compliance with § 29.
. Further support for Mt. Emmons’ position that the Secretary's interpretation of the scope of the exemption is unreasonable is found in the language of a similar moratorium exemption passed by Congress on oil shale patent applications in 1991. That act explicitly provided the moratorium applied “unless the holder of a valid oil shale mining claim has received first half final certificate for patent by dale of enactment of this Act.” PL 102-154, 105 Stat. 990 (1991). Congress did not use this same language with explicit reference to the receipt of an FHFC in § 113. Had Congress intended to adopt the Secretary's rule, it clearly knew how to do so.
. Section 113 says only “if the Secretary of Interior determines,” without specifying the mechanism the Secretary must use.