Wright-Young v. Chicago State University, 2019 IL App (1st) 181073

Background

Tyrone Lawson, a 17-year-old, was fatally shot in a Chicago State University (CSU) parking lot after a crowded January 16, 2013 high‑school basketball game hosted at CSU’s Jones Convocation Center; two men were arrested for the murder.
Plaintiff Pamela Wright‑Young sued the Chicago Board of Education (Board) (and CSU chief of police Ronnie Watson), alleging multiple theories of tort liability—primarily failures in security planning, implementation, crowd control, and a failure to communicate prior violent incidents to CSU.
The jury found the Board liable and awarded $3.5 million; the Board appealed asserting multiple statutory immunities under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act and other defenses.
The trial court had previously struck some pleadings alleging failures to provide police protection but refused to grant directed verdicts or posttrial relief on immunity grounds; the jury nevertheless returned a general verdict for plaintiff.
On appeal the court held that most theories charged (failures to staff posts, control crowds, prevent fights, etc.) implicated police protection services and thus were barred by absolute immunity under 745 ILCS 10/4‑102, but one theory—failure to communicate prior violent incidents to CSU—did not fall under section 4‑102 and survived immunity.
Applying the general verdict rule, the appellate court affirmed the judgment because at least one legally valid and fact‑supported theory remained (Board’s failure to inform CSU), and that theory could support the jury’s willful-and-wanton finding.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Board’s alleged security failures are barred by absolute immunity under 745 ILCS 10/4‑102	Wright‑Young: failures to implement/maintain security posts, control entrances/exits, prevent fights, and deploy adequate plan caused death	Board: those allegations are failures to provide police protection/services and are absolutely immune under §4‑102	Held: Absolute §4‑102 immunity bars those theories; they implicate police protection services and should not have gone to the jury
Whether Board’s failure to inform CSU of prior violent incidents is covered by §4‑102 or other information immunities (§2‑107, §2‑210)	Wright‑Young: omission to inform CSU is a separate non‑police function, and omission (not affirmative information) is not covered by §§2‑107/2‑210	Board: omission relates to police protection or is protected as provision of information or discretionary policymaking	Held: Failure to inform CSU is not barred by §4‑102 and §§2‑107/2‑210 (they cover provision/affirmative statements, not omissions)
Whether Board’s decision not to inform CSU is protected by discretionary immunity (§2‑201)	Wright‑Young: no evidence Board made a conscious, policy balancing decision to withhold information	Board: decision whether to inform CSU was a discretionary policy judgment by athletics staff	Held: §2‑201 not shown; trial evidence did not establish a conscious discretionary decision to withhold information
Whether jury’s willful-and‑wanton finding and causation are supported on the surviving theory	Wright‑Young: evidence showed Board told parents security changes were made but did not inform CSU; CSU officers testified such info would have affected planning; expert testified coordination was deficient	Board: insufficient evidence that omission was willful/wanton or that better notice would have changed CSU’s actions (causation)	Held: Evidence sufficed to support willful and wanton finding as to failure to inform CSU; Board’s new causation argument was forfeited and not addressed on appeal

Key Cases Cited

Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959) (abolished common‑law sovereign immunity and led to enactment of the Tort Immunity Act)
DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497 (2006) (§4‑102 immunity extends to conduct implicating structural adequacy of police services)
Harinek v. 161 N. Clark St. Ltd. P’ship, 181 Ill. 2d 335 (1998) (duty and statutory immunity are separate legal inquiries; statutory immunity cannot be negated by common‑law duties)
Van Meter v. Darien Park Dist., 207 Ill. 2d 359 (2003) (public entity bears burden to plead and prove statutory immunity)
Wakulich v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223 (2003) (voluntary undertaking can create tort duty where plaintiff relied on the undertaking or omission increases risk)
Doe v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 213 Ill. 2d 19 (2004) (distinguishing police‑type functions from supervisory/attendant roles for immunity analysis)
Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445 (1992) (standard for verdict being against the manifest weight of the evidence)