201 Conn.App. 339
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- Petitioner Ian Wright, a Jamaican national, was convicted of murder (and related firearm offense) and sentenced to an effective 35-year term; removal to Jamaica was ordered by the U.S. Immigration Court in 2013.
- Wright sought a deportation-parole eligibility hearing under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-125d(c), claiming he became eligible after serving 50% of his sentence and that denial violated federal and state due process.
- He filed a habeas petition alleging denial of a deportation parole eligibility hearing; the Commissioner moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that Wright had no liberty interest.
- The habeas court held § 54-125d did not create a liberty interest (noting DOC discretion and that § 54-125d(c) applies only to those restricted by § 54-125a(b)(2)), dismissed the petition, and denied certification to appeal.
- Wright appealed the denial of certification; the Appellate Court reviewed whether the habeas court abused its discretion and whether Wright had a constitutionally or statutorily protected liberty interest in deportation-parole eligibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the habeas court abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal? | Denial was an abuse; issues are debatable and deserve appellate review. | Denial proper because underlying claim lacks merit and is not debatable under Simms. | No abuse; petition failed Simms two-pronged test. |
| Does the due process clause itself create a liberty interest in deportation parole? | Wright: constitutional due process protects a right to a deportation-parole hearing after 50% served. | Commissioner: Constitution does not guarantee parole or conditional release. | No constitutional liberty interest in parole; no inherent right to early release. |
| Does § 54-125d(c) (use of "shall") create a state-created liberty interest for Wright? | Wright: "shall" makes him eligible after serving 50% and creates an expectancy of release. | Commissioner: § 54-125d(c) applies only to those restricted by § 54-125a(b)(2), which excludes murder; thus "shall" inapplicable to Wright. | "Shall" is inapplicable to Wright; § 54-125d(c) does not create a protected liberty interest for him. |
| Does § 54-125d(b) or the referral scheme create a protected expectancy? | Wright: statutory scheme entitles him to an eligibility hearing after 50%. | Commissioner: § 54-125d(b) vests DOC with discretion (intake interviews/standards), and referral by sentencing court is discretionary and barred for class A felonies like murder. | No state-created expectancy: DOC discretion and referral limits make parole a mere possibility, not a protected expectancy. |
Key Cases Cited
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (no constitutional right to parole; mandatory statutory language can create a state-created expectancy in some contexts)
- Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) (mandatory language in parole statute may create a presumption of release and thus a protected liberty interest)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (rejects mandatory-language test for certain confinement-condition claims; focuses on atypical and significant hardship)
- Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (reiterates that there is no constitutional right to parole independent of state law)
- Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178 (1994) (Connecticut two-pronged test governing appellate review when habeas court denies certification to appeal)