Wooten v. State
2010 Ark. 467
| Ark. | 2010Background
- Wooten was convicted of capital murder, criminal attempt to commit capital murder, and aggravated assault, resulting in death sentence, life and lesser terms.
- This court previously affirmed the convictions and postconviction denials in Wooten’s chain of Arkansas cases (Wooten I–IV).
- Wooten sought federal habeas relief; federal courts ultimately noted potential merit but found no state-exhaustion path to relief, and suggested recall of the mandate could be pursued in Arkansas.
- Current counsel petitioned to recall the mandate to allow a second Rule 37 proceeding, arguing extraordinary circumstances under Robbins/Lee/Collins.
- The majority granted recall, finding a breakdown in the postconviction process due to lack of verification by Wooten and deficient mitigation presentation by Rule 37 counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does lack of verification justify recalling the mandate? | Wooten argues Robbins/Lee warrant recall for extraordinary reasons, including verification failure. | State contends verification issue is insufficient alone to recall the mandate; Robbins/Lee require broader defects. | Yes; verification defect alone constitutes grounds to recall the mandate. |
| Does the breakdown in Rule 37 proceedings due to counsel warrant recall? | Wooten argues counsel incompetence prevented presentation of mitigating evidence, constituting a breakdown of the process. | State contends no breakdown or applicable standard supports recall based on counsel issues. | Yes; breakdown in Rule 37 process due to counsel deficiencies supports recall. |
| Are Robbins/Lee factors controlling or merely illustrative for recalls in death cases? | Wooten contends Robbins/Lee govern recall as a three-factor test for extraordinary relief. | State argues these factors are the controlling framework for such recalls. | The factors are not a rigid test; each case is one-of-a-kind, but the recall here is warranted on verified defects and process breakdown. |
| Was Clawson's conduct or status as a disbarred attorney dispositive on eligibility for representation? | Wooten argues Clawson’s disbarment rendered representation ineffective and unauthorized, triggering recall. | State contends Clawson’s Arkansas licensure rendered him eligible at the time; later disbarment did not strip him retroactively for purposes of recall. | Majority held Clawson’s status did not preclude representation at the relevant time; recall still warranted on verification and mitigation concerns. |
Key Cases Cited
- Robbins v. State, 353 Ark. 556 (2003) (three-factor framework for extraordinary recalls; case described as one-of-a-kind)
- Lee v. State, 367 Ark. 84 (2006) (Robbins factors applied to extraordinary recalls; counsel impairment cited)
- Collins v. State, 365 Ark. 411 (2006) (Rule 37.5 procedural breakdown; remand for qualified counsel and verified petition)
- Howard v. State, 366 Ark. 453 (2006) (death-penalty Rule 37 verification issues; remand guidance for verified petition)
- Porter v. State, 389 Ark. 15 (1999) (remand/remedy for unverified petition in death case; not on point for verification alone)
- Willett v. State, 322 Ark. 613 (1995) (precedent cited for extraordinary recall in death-penalty cases)
- Engram v. State, 360 Ark. 140 (2004) (court clarified purpose of recall in Robbins context)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (mitigation evidence importance; prejudice from inadequate presentation)