William Thornton v. Arnold Schwarzeneggar
724 F.3d 1255
9th Cir.2013Background
- Thornton, a California parolee with a prior Tennessee sex-offense conviction, was released on parole and given two contested conditions: GPS electronic monitoring and a residency restriction barring living within 2,000 feet of schools/parks.
- The GPS condition was imposed under the California Department of Corrections’ (CDCR) discretionary authority; the residency restriction was applied pursuant to California Penal Code §3003.5(b) as interpreted to permit individualized (not blanket) parole conditions.
- Thornton sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 seeking damages and injunctive relief, alleging the conditions were unconstitutional and were enforced discriminatorily.
- The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), holding habeas corpus was the exclusive federal remedy under Preiser and Heck because Thornton was “in custody” as a parolee. Thornton appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit majority reversed, holding §1983 is available to challenge parole conditions so long as success would not necessarily imply invalidity of the underlying conviction/sentence or produce speedier release from parole; the court allowed injunctive §1983 claims to proceed but affirmed absolute immunity for parole officers against damages claims tied to the discretionary imposition of conditions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Heck/Preiser bar a §1983 challenge to parole conditions | Thornton: §1983 may be used to challenge parole conditions because success would not shorten parole or invalidate his conviction/sentence | State: As a parolee “in custody,” Thornton must use habeas; §1983 is barred because success would collateral‑attack his sentence | Majority: §1983 allowed where relief would neither speed release nor necessarily imply invalidity of conviction/sentence; reversed dismissal |
| Whether parole officers have immunity from Thornton’s damages claims | Thornton: Officers deprived him of rights by imposing unconstitutional conditions | State: Parole officers are absolutely immune for imposing parole conditions (quasi‑judicial act) | Court: Absolute immunity bars damages for imposition of conditions, but not for claims about arbitrary/discriminatory enforcement (supervisory acts) |
| Whether qualified immunity bars injunctive relief for discriminatory enforcement | Thornton: Injunctive relief for enforcement discrimination is permitted | State: Qualified immunity bars the claims | Court: Qualified immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief; enforcement claim may proceed for non‑monetary relief |
| Whether the discretionary origin of conditions matters under Heck/Dotson | Thornton: These conditions were administratively imposed and thus do not necessarily implicate the criminal judgment | State (dissent): Under California law parole conditions set by CDCR are part of the sentence, so success would invalidate part of the sentence | Majority: Because conditions were discretionary administrative decisions and success would not alter sentence duration or invalidate judgment, Heck/Dotson do not bar §1983 challenge |
Key Cases Cited
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas is the exclusive remedy for claims seeking immediate or speedier release from confinement)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§1983 claim barred if success would necessarily imply invalidity of conviction or sentence)
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (Heck/Preiser bar applies only when success would necessarily imply unlawfulness or shorten confinement)
- Drollinger v. Milligan, 552 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1977) (probation conditions that are part of the sentence must be challenged via habeas)
- Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (parole conditions can amount to confinement; §1983 challenge may be barred where it functions as collateral attack on unexpired sentence)
- Osborne v. Dist. Atty’s Office, 423 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing habeas and §1983 remedies; custody does not automatically foreclose §1983)