William Osborne, an Alaska prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to compel the State to release certain biological evidence that was used to convict him in 1994 of kidnapping and sexual assault. Osborne, who maintains his factual innocence, hopes to subjeсt the evidence, at his expense, to more sophisticated DNA analysis than was available at the time of his trial. He alleges that by refusing him post-conviction access to the evidence, the State has violated his constitutional rights under the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Without reaching the question of whether there exists a constitutional right of post-conviction access to DNA evidence, the district court dismissed Osborne’s action for failure to state a claim. It ruled that because Osborne seeks to “set the stage” for an attack on his underlying conviction, his § 1983 action is barred by
Heck v. Humphrey,
BACKGROUND
Following a March 1994 jury trial in Alaska Superior Court, Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault, and was sentenced to 26 years’ imprisonment. The charges arose from a March 1993 incident in which the victim, a prostitute named K.G., after agreeing to perform fellatio on two clients, was driven to a secluded area of Anchorage, raped at gunpoint, beaten with an axe handle, and shot and left for dead.
K.G. later identified, from photo lineups, Osborne and Dexter Jackson as her assailants. At their joint trial, abundant physical evidence linked Jackson to the crime scene. Specifically, K.G. identified Jackson’s car as the one in which the assault took place, and tire tracks at the scene matched those made by Jackson’s car. K.G. also identified a pocketknife found in Jackson’s car as hers, and ballistics tied a spent shell сasing found at the crime scene to a pistol found in Jackson’s car. By contrast, aside from KG.’s (and Jackson’s) identification of Osborne as the second assailant, the State tied Osborne to the as *1052 sault based primarily on its analysis of biological evidence recovered from the crime scene — nаmely, a used condom, two hairs, and certain bloodied and semen-stained clothing.
The State subjected the sperm found in the used condom to “DQ Alpha” testing, an early form of DNA testing that, like ABO blood typing, reveals the alleles present at a single genetic locus. The results showed that the sperm had the same DQ Alрha type as Osborne; however, this DQ Alpha type is shared by 14.7 to 16 percent of African Americans, and can thus be expected in one of every 6 or 7 black men. The State also recovered two hairs from the crime scene: one from the used condom, and another from K.G.’s sweatshirt. DQ Alpha typing of these hairs was unsuccessful, likely because the samples were too small for analysis. Both, however, were “negroid” pubic hairs with the “same microscopic features” as Osborne’s pubic hair. Tests performed on KG.’s clothing were inconclusive.
This evidence was submitted to the jury, which rejected Osborne’s defense of mistaken identity and convicted him of kidnapping, first-degree assault, and two counts of first-degree sexual assault. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
Jackson v. State,
No. A-5276, at 6 (Alaska Ct.App.1996) (unpublished decision). With his application for state post-conviction relief still pending in the Alaska courts,
Osborne v. State,
Osborne intends to subject the evidence, at his expense, to two forms of DNA testing: Short Tandem Repeat (“STR”) analysis and Mitochondrial DNA (“mtDNA”) analysis. Unlike the DQ Alpha analysis presented at trial, which looks to оnly one genetic locus, STR analysis examines the alleles at 13 genetic loci. It thus has the power to produce a far more specific genetic profile — one shared by one in a billion people, rather than one in 6 or 7. Moreover, if the hairs prove unsuitable for STR analysis, Osborne intends tо submit them to mtDNA analysis, which, unlike STR analysis, is capable of reaching a result on hair samples without intact roots or follicles. Osborne asserts that neither STR nor mtDNA analysis was available at the time of his trial.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissing Osborne’s § 1983 action, finding that because he seeks to “set the stage” for an attack on his underlying conviction, under Heck a petition for habeas corpus is his sole remedy. The district court accepted and adopted this recommendation, and dismissed the action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review
de novo
a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
Decker v. Advantage Fund Ltd.,
DISCUSSION
This case requires us to consider, once again, “ ‘the extent to which § 1983 is
*1053
a permissible alternative to the traditional remedy of habeas corpus.’ ”
Docken v. Chase,
A. Preiser, Heck, and their Progeny
The Court, like this circuit, has attempted to “harmoniz[e] the broad language of § 1983, a general statute, with the specific federal habeas corpus statute.”
Id.
at 491,
Most recently, the Court in
Wilkinson v. Dotson, —
U.S. —,
These cases, taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) — no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceed ings) — if success in that action would neсessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.
Id. at 1248. Dotson thus erases any doubt that Heck applies both to actions for money damages and to those, like this one, for injunctive relief, and clarifies that Heck provides the relevant test to determine whether § 1983 is a permissible avenue of relief for Osborne.
B. Osborne’s Claim
Although the district court recognized that Osborne raises “a direct challenge to [neither] the fact nor duration of imprisonment,” it ruled that his claim was Heck-barred because he seeks to “set the stage” to attack his underlying conviction. Though this circuit has not yet applied Heck in the context of a § 1983 action seeking post-convictiоn access to DNA evidence, the district court was not without guidance in assessing Osborne’s claim. As it observed, three circuits — the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh — have previously confronted the very question we now face. *1054 These opinions provide valuable guidance to us as well.
The State argues that Osborne seeks to use § 1983 as a discovery device for a later habeas petition, and that allowing him to do so would circumvent habeas procedural requirements and undermine the principles of comity and federalism that
Heck
protects. It suggests that Osborne reads
Heck’s
“necessarily implies” language too narrowly, and that it is enough if — as the district court was persuaded- — -the § 1983 action seeks to “facilitate” or “set the stagе” for an attack on a conviction in a later proceeding. Put simply, the State contends that if a claim
can
be brought in habeas, it
must
be brought in habeas. Accordingly, it urges us to adopt the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in
Harvey v. Horan (Harvey I),
Osborne argues, by contrast, that the appropriate question under
Heck
is not whether he seeks to “set the stage” to attack his underlying conviction, but rather whether success on his § 1983 claim “necessarily implies” the invalidity of his conviction. This question must be answered in the negative, he submits, because success on his § 1983 claim guarantees only access to the DNA evidence. Though he concedes that he ultimatеly hopes to establish his innocence, he points out that additional DNA testing may inculpate him, exculpate him, or be inconclusive. And, even if the testing exonerates him, release would come through an entirely different proceeding, either habeas or clemency. Osborne thus suggests we adopt the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in
Bradley v. Pryor,
We agree with Osborne, and join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that
Heck
does not bar a prisoner’s § 1983 action seeking post-conviction access to biological evidencе in the government’s possession. It is clear to us, as a matter of logic, that success in such an action would not “necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”
Dotson,
C. Dotson
Any rеmaining doubt as to the propriety of this approach is removed, we believe, by the Court’s recent opinion in
Dotson,
which reads “necessarily” to mean “inevitably” and rejects the notion that a claim which
can
be brought in habeas
must
be brought in habeas.
The problem with Ohio’s argument lies in its jump from a true premise (that in all likelihood the prisoners hope these actions will help bring about earlier release) to a faulty conclusion (that habeas is their sole avenue for relief).
Id.
at 1246. This confirms our prior understanding, articulated in
Docken,
The Court in Dotson also observed that Preiser’s implied exception to § 1983 coverage exists “where the claim seeks — not where it simply ‘relates to’ — ‘core’ habeas corpus relief, i.e., where a state prisoner requests present or future release.” Id. at 1247. And, it repeatedly emphаsized that to be barred under Heck, a § 1983 claim must, if successful, necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Id. at 1247-48; see id. at 1248(citing counsel’s concession below that the claims would not “inevitably” lead to release). These statements undercut considerably the State’s argument that Osborne’s claim is Heefc-barred even if he seeks only to “facilitate” or “set the stage” for a future attack оn his conviction.
Moreover, in response to Ohio’s argument that allowing Dotson to sue under § 1983 would contravene principles of comity and federalism, the Court said: Our earlier cases ... have already placed the States’ important comity considerations in the balance, weighed them against the competing need to vindicate federal rights without exhaustion, and concluded that prisoners may bring their claims without fully exhausting state-court remedies so long as their suits, if established, would not necessarily invalidate state-imposed confinement. Thus, we see no reason for moving the line these cases draw....
Id. at 1249 (citation omitted). This critically weakens the State’s comity argument.
Ultimately, the
Dotson
court found it key that neither prisoner sought an injunction ordering “immediate or speedier release”; at most, success meant a new parole hearing, at which the prisoners might — or might not — receive reduced sentences.
Id.
at 1248. Thus, the Cоurt concluded that “a favorable judgment will not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentences.”
Id.
(citing
Heck,
We acknowledge that the Fourth Circuit, in
Harvey I,
raised weighty concerns about comity, finality, and the proper role of the courts in fashioning the contours of “new” constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Osborne’s § 1983 action “should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.”
Heck,
REVERSED and REMANDED.