William Barnes v. Carlton Joyner, 751 F.3d 229

Background

William Barnes was sentenced to death after a capital trial in North Carolina; immediately after the jury recommended death, defense counsel reported a juror had consulted a clergy member about the death penalty and another juror had read from a Bible during deliberations.
The trial court denied defense requests to question jurors or hold an inquiry; the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal, concluding the allegations did not show extraneous prejudicial information or juror bias.
Barnes later filed a state Motion for Appropriate Relief (MAR) presenting additional post‑verdict affidavits and investigator reports indicating Juror Hollie Jordan called her pastor, discussed the defense closing argument about God’s judgment, was given a biblical verse by the pastor, and read that verse to other jurors; the MAR court summarily denied relief as barred/without merit.
Barnes filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief but granted a certificate of appealability on whether juror contact with her pastor violated the Sixth Amendment.
The Fourth Circuit held the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law by failing to apply the Remmer presumption and by refusing to hold a Remmer hearing on credible allegations of third‑party communication about the matter pending before the jury; it reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine actual prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the state court have to apply a Remmer presumption of prejudice when a juror communicated with her pastor about the death penalty?	Barnes: juror’s pastor contact was an extraneous third‑party communication about the sentencing decision and triggers Remmer’s rebuttable presumption of prejudice.	State: no clearly established law compels Remmer here; the conversation was not "about the matter pending before the jury," so no presumption applies.	Held: Remmer is clearly established; the MAR court unreasonably refused the presumption given the credible allegation that the juror consulted a third party about the sentencing matter.
Was Barnes entitled to a Remmer evidentiary hearing?	Barnes: yes — Remmer requires an adversary hearing when a credible claim of juror contact with a third party about the case is presented.	State: no hearing required because the contact did not concern the matter before the jury and state courts adequately addressed the claim.	Held: The state court unreasonably denied a hearing; a Remmer hearing was required to determine what transpired and whether it was harmless.
Under AEDPA, did the state court’s adjudication constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law?	Barnes: yes — the MAR court demanded proof of actual bias before a hearing, contrary to Remmer and its progeny.	State: reasonable application because precedent is ambiguous and the alleged contact was not shown to affect deliberations.	Held: The MAR court’s approach was objectively unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1) because it ignored Remmer’s presumption/hearing framework.
Was the state‑court error harmless, or did it have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict?	Barnes: the record is unclear; must be allowed a hearing to prove actual prejudice.	State: any error was harmless and district court properly denied relief.	Held: Not resolved on record; remanded for an evidentiary hearing in federal court to determine whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect (Brecht standard).

Key Cases Cited

Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (establishes rebuttable presumption of prejudice and mandates a post‑trial hearing when a juror has private contact about the matter pending before the jury)
Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (explains paucity of facts made a full hearing necessary)
Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) (early articulation that private communications between jurors and third parties may invalidate a verdict unless harmlessness appears)
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (private statements by a court officer to jurors can be inherently prejudicial)
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (continuous association between jurors and key prosecution witnesses can taint jury impartiality)
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (due process requires a hearing where defendant has opportunity to prove actual bias; distinguishes Remmer’s context)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (discusses ultimate inquiry whether intrusion affected deliberations and verdict)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (federal habeas relief requires showing of substantial and injurious effect or influence)
Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663 (4th Cir. 2002) (applies Remmer presumption in § 2254 context for external influences)
Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2006) (distinguishes internal jury influences, court discussed Bible‑in‑jury‑room context)
Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988) (Remmer applied where third‑party statements bore directly on whether to impose death)