Wilber v. Hepp, 476 F.Supp.3d 785

Defendant Danny Wilber was convicted of first‑degree intentional homicide for the 2004 killing of David Diaz; several witnesses gave inconsistent statements about whether they saw Wilber shoot the victim.
Physical evidence (wound trajectory, bullet fragments, absence of spent semiautomatic casing) created a nontrivial factual dispute about whether Wilber could have fired the fatal shot.
During a seven‑day trial the judge repeatedly admonished Wilber for facial gestures and verbal outbursts; leg shackles (anchored under defense table) and a stun belt had been employed earlier in the trial.
Just before closing arguments the court ordered Wilber seated in a wheelchair with his hands and wrists visibly restrained and straps over his arm, despite defense objections and a prosecutor’s offer to cover the restraints. The jury saw Wilber in these visible restraints.
Wilber’s state postconviction motions were denied; he filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court applied AEDPA deference to state decisions on the merits but found the visible shackling unconstitutional under Deck v. Missouri.
Relief: federal court granted habeas relief on the shackling claim and ordered Wilber released unless the State elects to retry him within 90 days.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence	Wilber: physical evidence and inconsistent witness testimony made conviction impossible.	State: testimonial and prior inconsistent statements plus investigator testimony sufficed.	Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably applied Jackson; habeas relief denied on sufficiency.
Visible shackling to jury (due process)	Wilber: being visibly chained to a wheelchair during closing comments violated Deck and the presumption of innocence.	State: restraints were necessary for courtroom safety given prior misconduct and deputies’ reports.	Court: use of visible restraints before closing lacked adequate, individualized justification; Deck violation; habeas relief granted.
AEDPA deference / state adjudication	Wilber: state court did not adequately address visible‑restraint issue so de novo review warranted.	State: court of appeals decided the issue on the merits and AEDPA applies.	Court: applied AEDPA but concluded the state court unreasonably applied clearly established law when upholding visible shackling.
Prejudice / burden of proof from shackling error	Wilber: need not show actual prejudice; improper visible shackling requires State to prove no contribution to verdict.	State: argues Wilber must show prejudice and case against him was strong.	Court: Deck controls—State must prove lack of contribution; given evidentiary weaknesses State failed to meet burden.

Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005) (visible courtroom restraints require individualized, trial‑specific justification)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
Allen v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (physical restraint/gagging permissible only as last resort for extreme courtroom misconduct)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless‑error standard; state must prove error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when constitutional violation occurs)
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (appellate reversal for insufficiency is equivalent to acquittal; retrial barred)
McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010) (reversal for insufficiency of the evidence bars retrial on same charge)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (highly deferential AEDPA standard)
Stephenson v. Wilson, 619 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2010) (visible restraint must be least prejudicial means; hide shackles if possible)
Lopez v. Thurmer, 573 F.3d 484 (7th Cir. 2009) (trial court may rely on law‑enforcement views but must make independent judicial decision)
State v. Poellinger, 451 N.W.2d 752 (Wis. 1990) (Wisconsin’s sufficiency standard aligned with Jackson)