Whitfield v. Tennessee
639 F.3d 253
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Whitfield, blind in one eye and with cerebral palsy, worked for the DFA and was later hired by DMHDD on Sept. 4, 2007 under a six‑month probationary period.
- Accommodations at DMHDD were insufficient due to workspace layout and incompatible equipment, despite prior accommodations successful at DFA.
- Whitfield allegedly made spelling/grammatical errors and filing mistakes at DMHDD, with criticism from Brooks and management over performance.
- She was notified Feb. 7, 2008 of termination within the probationary period, with dates extended to Feb. 27, 2008.
- Whitfield exhausted administrative remedies and sued the state entities under the ADA, claiming Title I discrimination and seeking damages, reinstatement, and related relief.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants, addressing Title I and potential Title II theories; Whitfield appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title I claims permit monetary relief against states. | Whitfield seeks monetary damages under Title I. | Garrett bars monetary relief; only prospective relief via Ex parte Young. | Yes for prospective injunctive relief against official capacity. |
| Whether Title II damages can be pursued in employment discrimination claims. | Whitfield asserted a Title II damages claim. | Title II damages not clearly applicable to employment; Eleventh Amendment issues. | Waived Title II damages claim; no decision on applicability to employment. |
| What prima facie framework governs ADA employment discrimination claims in this circuit. | Monette framework should apply; five elements. | Mahon three‑element test governs at the prima facie stage. | Adopt Monette’s five‑element test for prima facie ADA discrimination. |
| Whether summary judgment was proper given pretext and the claimed disability discrimination. | Defendant's explanations are pretextual due to inadequate accommodations. | Whitfield’s performance problems were real and not solely due to disability; non‑pretextual reasons exist. | Summary judgment proper; no genuine issue of material fact on pretext and causation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (U.S. 2001) (Title I does not abrogate state sovereign immunity for monetary damages but allows prospective relief)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1908) (Exemption for official-capacity actions seeking prospective relief)
- Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2002) (Claim-by-claim Ex parte Young analysis for state officials)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court 1973) (McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for discrimination cases)
- Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996) (Adopts five-element prima facie test for ADA discrimination)
- Mahon v. Crowell, 295 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2002) (Three-element Mahon test inconsistently applied with McDonnell Douglas framework)
- Avery Dennison Corp. v. EEOC, 104 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 1997) (Noting the pretext standard distinction at summary judgment)
- Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2007) (Affirms need to show pretext to defeat summary judgment)
- Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 2008) (Related to sole-reason standard discussions)
- Hedrick v. Western Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444 (6th Cir. 2004) (Affirms sole-reason standard in Sixth Circuit (pre-Montette context))
- Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002 (en banc)) (En banc discussion on Title II and Eleventh Amendment)
