Werley v. Cannon, 344 S.W.3d 527

Cannons and Andrew Smith sued Dr. Scott Ashton, Ashton Podiatry Associates, and ISR Partners for medical malpractice; Werley was involved as the sanctions defendant.
Plaintiffs obtained a protective order to shield Brandy Cannon's privacy and prohibit ex parte communications with her non-party treating physicians.
The court sanctioned Werley for ex parte contacts and other misconduct, ordering $12,660 in attorneys' fees and $500 in costs and prohibiting designation of Cannon's treating physicians as experts; Dr. Cook's deposition portions were also stricken.
After settlement of the underlying suit, the sanction was severed into a separate action and a final judgment awarded $12,660 against Werley plus conditional appellate attorneys' fees.
Werley appealed, challenging the protective order, the sanctions, and the appellate fee award; the appellate court concluded it could not review the protective order due to plenary-power expiration but affirmed the sanctions and the appellate fees.
The court found a direct nexus between Werley's conduct and the sanction and held the amount was not excessive; appellate fees were properly conditioned on unsuccessful appeals and supported by the Pittard affidavit as non-conclusory.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Protective order and sanctions review timely?	Werley argues trial court abused discretion issuing the protective order and sanctions.	Cannons contend court lacked plenary power to modify after dismissal; sanctions valid under Rule 215.	Protective-order issue not reviewable; sanctions affirmed.
Appellate fees award proper?	Werley contends appellate fees unjust and based on hearsay affidavit.	Cannons show appellate fees reasonable, evidence sufficient via Pittard affidavit; fees conditioned on unsuccessful appeals.	Appellate fees properly awarded and conditioned on unsuccessful appeals.

Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. 2006) (sanctions must be just and not exceed necessary to promote compliance)
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991) (sanctions must be no more severe than necessary to satisfy purposes)
Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. 2003) (consider less stringent sanctions to promote compliance)
Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992) (sanctions must be appropriate to deter misconduct)
In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1998) (reasonableness of sanctions and fees; guidances for discovery sanctions)
Texas Commerce Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. New, 3 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 1999) (affidavit testimony on attorneys' fees not conclusory when supported by qualified expert)
Pollard v. Pollard, 316 S.W.3d 246 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2010) (plenary-power and finality considerations post-judgment)
First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1984) (plenary power window after judgment; bill of review limits)
Thursby v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. 1983) (orig. proceeding; plenary-power cutoff)
Darya, Inc. v. Christian, 251 S.W.3d 227 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2008) (attorney's fees factual sufficiency in sanctions context)
Stromberger v. Turley Law Firm, 315 S.W.3d 921 (Tex.App.—Dallas 2010) (sanctions upheld based on time spent on sanctions motion)
New v. Texas Commerce Bank, Nat. Ass'n, 3 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. 1999) (attorney-fee affidavits not conclusory when properly supported)