895 N.W.2d 555
Mich. Ct. App.2016Background
- Parties divorced; judgment provided joint custody with children primarily residing with mother; father ordered to pay child support under a Uniform Child Support Order.
- Uniform order continued support for a child who is regularly attending high school full-time and is "residing full-time with the recipient of support," but not beyond age 19½.
- After KG turned 18 while still in high school, father moved to terminate support retroactive to her 18th birthday, arguing she did not "reside full-time" with mother because parents shared a 4/3 parenting-time split.
- A family referee granted father’s motion; the trial court reversed, holding that "residing full-time" meant residing the full amount of time allocated to the recipient under the parenting schedule (i.e., the four days per week).
- The Court of Appeals reviewed the legal meaning of "residing on a full-time basis" under MCL 552.605b(2), reversed the trial court to the extent it equated compliance with the parenting-time order to "full-time" residence, and remanded for factfinding on whether the child actually resided with the mother full-time (including intent).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of "residing on a full-time basis" under MCL 552.605b(2) | "Full-time" should be interpreted to mean the child resides the amount of time allotted to the recipient under the parenting-time schedule (e.g., four days/week). | "Full-time" requires that the child reside only with the support recipient (i.e., continuously), so split custody defeats postmajority support. | "Full-time" residence means the child must reside only with the support recipient for the duration (i.e., not split between parents); compliance with the custody/parenting-time order is irrelevant to that statutory requirement. |
| Whether court may consider intent/legal "reside" concept | Mother: focus on physical overnights under schedule suffices. | Father: physical overnights show child did not reside full-time with mother. | Court: "reside" includes both physical presence and intent; trial court must determine factually whether the 18‑year‑old intended to reside full-time with the mother despite overnights with father. |
| Effect of custody orders on postmajority support inquiry | Mother: existing custody/parenting-time terms inform what "full-time" means. | Father: custody order is inapplicable once child reaches majority; only actual residence matters. | Court: custody jurisdiction ends at majority and parenting-time compliance does not satisfy the statutory "residing full-time" requirement. |
| Standard of review for statutory interpretation vs. support modification | — | — | Statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; modification decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion, but statutory meaning controls the legal framework for remand factfinding. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burba v. Burba, 461 Mich. 637 (Michigan Supreme Court) (standard of review for child-support modification)
- Neville v. Neville, 295 Mich. App. 460 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (statutory interpretation principles)
- Lee v. Smith, 310 Mich. App. 507 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (construction and history of postmajority support statute)
- Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy, Inc., 254 Mich. App. 651 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (use of dictionary when statute omits definition)
- Paulson v. Paulson, 254 Mich. App. 568 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (parental duty to support minor child)
- Macomb Co. Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Westerman, 250 Mich. App. 372 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (parental support obligations)
- Rowley v. Garvin, 221 Mich. App. 699 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (interpretation of "regularly attending high school on a full-time basis")
- Smith v. Smith, 433 Mich. 606 (Michigan Supreme Court) (pre-1990 limitations on postmajority support authority)
- Hayford v. Hayford, 279 Mich. App. 324 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (distinction between custody jurisdiction and child-support authority after majority)
- Adkins v. Adkins, 181 Mich. App. 81 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (Age of Majority Act effects)
- Kubiak v. Steen, 51 Mich. App. 408 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (legal and popular meanings of "reside")
- Workman v. Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch, 404 Mich. 477 (Michigan Supreme Court) (factors for domicile/residence inquiries)
- Tienda v. Integon Nat’l Ins. Co., 300 Mich. App. 605 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (application of Workman factors)
- Grange Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Lawrence, 494 Mich. 475 (Michigan Supreme Court) (relationship of domicile and residence)
- McGrath v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 Mich. App. 434 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (legal meaning of "reside" under related statutes)
- Dean v. Dean, 175 Mich. App. 714 (Michigan Court of Appeals) (mootness of paid support does not render appeal moot)