*1 v DEAN DEAN 8, 1988, Rapids. Docket 98231. December Grand No. Submitted 20, 1989. appeal applied Decided March Leave to for. Schaefer, J., Philip The Kalamazoo Circuit D. entered an modifying granting order the order a divorce to Linda M. Dean requiring pay from John M. Dean Dean to John support daughter, of his even after she age, years reached of while she continued full-time participation leading graduation. school toward Defen- appealed. dant Appeals The Court of held: court, operation Age 1. A circuit because of the of the Act, Majority jurisdictional authority sup- lacks to order child port eighteenth beyond birthday except exceptional a child’s excep- A circumstances. child’s continued education is not an tional circumstance. statutory jurisdiction 2. The court’s expanded by cannot be court rule. creating 3. The wisdom of a situation in which child be terminated while a child is still in school is a question which should be addressed to the rather than the courts. operation Age Majority 4. The of the Act does not result impermissible age equal either discrimination or a denial of protection law, part of the since there is no on the any parent a child after the Reversed. P.J., Legisla- dissented. He would hold that the preclude Majority ture did not intend that the Act beyond award of child the child’s attending high the child is still school. He would affirm. Support — — Parent and Child Child Act. court, operation Age A circuit reason of the References 2d, Separation 1022,1049-1051. Am Jur Divorce §§ for, Responsibility pay of noncustodial divorced or contrib- to, college ute costs of child’s education. 99 ALR3d 322. Dean Dean v exceptional except circumstances under lacks beyond a child’s payment of child order not constitute education birthday; of a child’s continuation empower exceptional type circumstances point beyond to continue *2 (MCL 25.244[52]). 722.52; MSA the Court Johnson, of A. for Marie Court. Circuit the Ninth for Bauhof), F. Bauhof, James P.C. & (by Plaszczak for defendant. Sawyer R. J. P.J., and and
Before: Jason,* JJ. right of appeals as
Sawyer, J. Defendant rais- divorce of judgment a modifying an order per week $40 ing his child school, al- remained his while eight- of attained already she had though reverse. een. We circuit argues defendant appeal,
On
of
order
authority
lacked
court
birth-
the child’s
support beyond
in Felcoski
discussed
this Court
As
agree.
day.
762, 764-765; 407 NW2d
App
Mich
v
159
circumstances,
a
exceptional
(1987), except
11
pay-
order
lacks jurisdiction
circuit court
eighteen:
support beyond
ment
Act,
the enactment
eighteen years now
attaining
age of
a
purposes
legal age for all
"an adult
becomes
duties,
liabili-
whatsoever,” incurring "the same
capacity as
legal
ties,
rights responsibilities,
age.”
years
21
acquired persons heretofore
25.244(52).
circuit
722.52;
Since
MSA
MCL
proceedings is defined
in divorce
jurisdiction
assignment.
Appeals by
sitting
judge,
the Court of
on
* Circuit
App
175 Mich
statute,
plaintiff’s
that MCR
3.209(B)(1)(b) expands
jurisdic-
the circuit court’s
tion over child
The same
matters is without merit.
rejected by
was
rule,
1963,
regard
to the former court
GCR
729.2(1),
language
virtually
identical to
currently
the rule
effect. See McNames v Mc-
477;
App
(1979)];
Names
While disposes bar, Felcoski of the case at since the Friend of the Court filed a brief on behalf of the child which raises a of arguments number as to why Felcoski, we should not follow we will briefly address arguments. those The Friend of the Court first argues that we disagree should Felcoski because Felcoski based its decision on 3.209(B). cases decided adoption before the of MCR argument This because, is without merit pointed out by Felcoski, in the authority Dean Dean v Opinion of the Court child juris- the circuit court to order therefore, in cannot be ex- dictional nature supra 765. rule. The panded by court pending legisla- Friend of the Court also allow child to be ordered tion that would high child is a full-time until nineteen is of no relevance to school student. This case, however, legislation has pending since effect. argument, to its second practical, law should the Friend Court be essence, in last or two of argues, year expensive school and that high very can be practical not to terminate child before school, even if the child has graduation high turned This must be presented to the its determinations fixing jurisdiction of the courts support, age majority, educational is, requirements. impractical That while it may be that, scheme, legislative under current only can be awarded high and that school graduation not occur until after reaching can majority, problem only be reme- Legislature. died reasons, reject
For similar we must upon public of the Court’s next based policy. The Friend of the Court submits that poor public parent’s to terminate policy obligation prior graduation to the of the child from initially point school. We would out divorce, there been no neither would be party obligated though she remained *4 why public policy
We see no reason would dictate on impose obligation parents that we should an obligation a result divorce where no such would 175 Moreover, divorce. there been had be incurred courts above, as discussed impose statutory obligations imposi- permit the not and the statute nature age beyond obligation a child tion of Court believes Friend of the If the only public policy, poor we can this constitutes suggest Legislature approach a to seek age majority, of the modification in the raise educational impose legislation
system, would or age parents beyond obligations on majority. Court’s next graduation support until to award child failure age discrimination, is novel. The constitutes argues that, chil- since some Friend of the Court dren, supported eighteen, until be will those under graduate graduation after others, those who while supported, reaching eighteen, the fail- not will be graduation provide con- ure to disagree. age We would We discrimination. stitutes point that, as Court to the fact Friend of the obligation parents have no noted age majority. reaches the after that child a child parental obligation to the issue It is irrelevant graduated whether accept Court’s Friend of the To would require that a us to conclude is, infinitum. That a child ad stop support age discrimination if it constitutes at discrimination sixty? Simply put, significant changes age eighteen, also constitute not stop support payments at under the occur when a to their with the relationship mat- for that large. seriously doubt that ter, the world to alter or abolish intended *5 Dean v Dean Opinion op the Court being responsibilities it an adult when enacted prohibiting age discrimination. statutes In of the above a variation that the child would be of the Court next contends denied denied child dents, equal protection law she were while other school stu- age, of their would be entitled to because support. Again, in the Friend of the child Court’s the flaw recognize is that it fails to eighteen, upon reaching child, is eighteen-year-old every treated as other Specifically, age of state. majority she has reached the legally recognized
and as an adult is and solely responsible for herself. We would also adult, it note as an is the choice of the parties’ daughter whether she wishes to continue obligation, her education. She is under no neither imposed imposed par- one law nor one her definitely ents, to continue to do so. While to daughter’s advantage so, the encourage to do and we would her continued parties
both to financially education, otherwise, and legal authority any and the circuit court lack to compel either to render such assistance. analysis,
In the final such, an adult she make adult must deci- including life, sions about the course of her amount receives, and nature of education she and light ability must make those choices in of her herself in those endeavors. While she parents voluntary assistance, look to her for their legal right expect she has no that assistance. parents This is true whether her united. While her were divorced or perhaps can, should, assistance, render neither can be compelled to do so. requests Court next that this equity support.
Court do and order continued child financial to the fact that mother’s It for her to continue difficult renders situation graduation. reiterate mother has no continue that support equita- if it Even would be neither defendant. payments, conclusion to order ble make, the circuit like choose not to we court, any jurisdiction to do so. lacks *6 the the comment that to the Friend of Court’s daughter obligation to her continues mother’s obligation, is able to avoid his while defendant as neither that observation is flawed inasmuch obligation daughter, party any other has to their they assume, that which choose to since than majority. While has reached the might that defendant would assume such we wish obligation, imposing in there is law for an basis on him. such points the the next The Friend of Court language "exceptional in MCL circumstances” 25.97(1), permits 552.17a; the MSA support beyond majority in such of child cases. As discussed impose support obligations child
declined merely in remains school. because supra. Felcoski, Rather, the "ex- we believe that language ceptional circumstances” the statute suffering such as a child refers severe situations handicap. Smith, Smith v See (1987). App 423; 414 NW2d argues The Friend of Court next that precedent in- take in matters rules over statutes volving practice procedure and, there- rules 3.209(B) fore, follow MCR and affirm we should support. However, Court in award supra, pointed out, Dean v Dean Opinion op the Court jurisdictional court to order precedence. therefore, the statute takes argues The Friend of the Court next Supreme relying Court, on cases decided before the Age Majority effect, Act went into will conclude proper support beyond to award child while a child remains Supreme might interpret While the applicable Court the the urged by
statutes in the manner disagree Friend of the we see no reason interpretation with the Felcoski until and unless Supreme has, fact, Court so ruled. argues The Friend of the Court next prohibit Act does not the award- ing of child to a who has reached eighteenth birthday his or her to the statutory spousal support authorization of as evi- pay dence that courts can order one adult of another adult. While the Friend of might Legisla- well be correct that constitutionally ture can authorize the courts to pay order one adult to of another spousal support adult, such as is the case situa- tions, that would lead to the conclusion that *7 Legislature could authorize the courts to order a a child after that child has reached adulthood. The flaw the Friend of reasoning, the Court’s as dis- Legislature above, cussed the has not authorized the courts to award child to children who eighteen, except excep- have reached the tional Legislature Thus, circumstances. while the perhaps could authorize the courts to order such support, Legislature the has not done so. The fact Age Majority prohibit that the Act does not awarding of child to children who have reached the is irrelevant as the analysis Legislature centers on the fact that Mich 714 175 by Doctoroff, J.,P. Dissent legislation permits
has not enacted do so. courts to final is that of the Court’s dismissed as moot because could be appeal high graduated daughter now
parties’ part support that the most has been school and for arrearage on the account exist- paid, a small First, merit. ing. This is without dismissed, to en- could seek appeal plaintiff were arrearage although that arrearage, force that Second, pre- will amount. since defendant modest he entitled to recover vail in this appeal, period for the after support paid amount of child Thus, daughter reached the being the issue is far from moot. portion
For the reasons discussed provided court’s order which for trial parties’ of child payment eighteenth birthday is vacated. To provided extent that order prior to the child’s birth- tax the order is affirmed. Defendant day, costs. Jason, J.,
R. J. concurred. I (dissenting). dis- respectfully P.J. Paaso v opinion sent. I with the agree (1988), Paaso, App 628; NW2d Shepherd, J. The Act authored preclude does not an award of child be- child’s if that child is yond I do attending still not believe intended for school seniors unsupported the noncustodial go financially This defeat of the child parent. purpose would statute, which is to ensure financial stabil- through ity for the children divorced their formative years.
I affirm.