Grange Insurance Co of Michigan v. Edward Lawrence

Grange Ins Co Lawrence GRANGE INSURANCE COMPANY OF MICHIGAN v LAWRENCE AUTOMOBILE CLUB v STATE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION FARM

MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (Calendar 1). 145206, Argued April 11, Nos. Docket 143808. No. July Decided 2013. Grange Company Michigan brought Insurance of an action in the Muskegon Court, seeking declaratory judgment regard- Circuit ing responsibility policy its under a no-fault insurance issued Farm

Edward Lawrence reimburse Bureau General Insurance (PIP) Company Michigan personal protection of for insurance paid Lawrence, following Josalyn it had benefits death of minor, as the result of an automobile accident. The accident Josalyn’s mother, Rosinski, driving occurred while Laura was Josalyn’s father, vehicle Farm insured Bureau. Edward Lawrence, and Rosinski were divorced at the time of the accident joint legal child, although and shared of Rosinski had physical primary custody. Edward Lawrence was the in- named policy by Grange. sured on an automobile insurance issued Farm sought partial Bureau paid, reimbursement of the PIP benefits arguing priority was in same order of under MCL 500.3115(2), Josalyn parents’ because was domiciled both 500.3114(1). homes under MCL Farm Bureau filed a counterclaim summary disposition. and both filed insurers motions The court, J., Timothy Hicks, granted summary circuit G. Farm Bureau disposition, finding Josalyn had two domiciles at the of time Grange appealed. Beckering, RJ., Appeals, her death. Court The JJ., affirmed the circuit Ronayne court’s Owens, Krause, order, concluding Josalyn resided and was domiciled with parents. Appeals Grange’s policy The Court both also held that required adjudication was invalid because it a court determining “principal residence,” be conclusive for a child’s improperly Grange’s obligation which would limit where the (2012). App Supreme no-fault act does not. 296 Mich granted Grange’s application appeal Court for leave to in Docket No. 145206 to determine whether the minor child of divorced purpose determining can two for the domiciles 500.3114(1) coverage act, Michigan’s under MCL no-fault MICH the determination order affects whether provision giving preclusive to a policy effect an insurance whether custody arrangement Mich 851 is enforceable. 493 court-ordered (2012). (ACIA)brought in an action Club Association Insurance Automobile Court, seeking regarding Ingham its a determination the Circuit by paid policy PIP duty insurance for benefits under a no-fault Company following the Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance State minor, Campanelli, of an automobile a as the result death of Sarah accident, parents, Francis At the time of the Sarah’s accident. joint Taylor, shared Campanelli and were divorced and Tina custody, Sarah, Campanelli physical had with of but divorce, the the Taylor visitation. after allowed reasonable Soon divorce, family original judgment permitting court modified the change Campanelli domicile to Tennessee. to move and to Sarah’s years later, staying eleven Sarah was the accident occurred When with Michigan after a summer visit her mother. in to attend school by fatally injured passenger in a car driven was while Sarah ACIA, by as the was State Farm. insurer friend that insured Gravelle, Terry household resided Sarah’s uncle and in whose she during Michigan, period paid in Sarah’s medical bills the while respon- was her death. ACIA claimed that State Farm the before 500.3114(4), arguing pursuant to MCL that Sarah sible insurer Michigan and was therefore not not domiciled in that ACIA was 500.3114(1). responsible PIP MCL for Sarah’s benefits under liability parties filed for Farm denied and both cross-motions State J., court, Joyce Draganchuk, summary disposition. The circuit summary disposition granted and ruled ACIA was State Farm benefits, finding that the responsible for PIP facts dem- Sarah’s Michigan in and domiciled in onstrated Sarah resided was part a lack of of a clear intent to return because there was evidence EJ., Appeals, appealed. The Tennessee. ACIA Court of Markey, JJ., reversed, concluding and that there was and Wilder, Stephens, question Appeals of fact Sarah’s domicile. The Court of also as to rejected argument judgment ACIA’s of divorce and the conclusively subsequent Sarah’s domicile modification established coverage. Unpublished opinion per purposes of for insurance (Docket Appeals, No. of the Court of issued June curiam 294324). argument Supreme Court heard oral on ACIA’s application appeal for 143808 to determine leave to Docket No. amended, judgment divorce, conclusively the estab- whether legal residence Tennessee or lished Sarah’s and acquire capacity had a different she the residence whether (2012). of choice. 491 Mich 875 or domicile Co Ins v Lawrence opinion joined In an Justice Chief Justice Young, Kelly, Cavanagh Supreme and Justices and held: Court Viviano, law, common child of Consistent divorced only any given point one domicile at time. A court by operation order establishes child’s domicile law and purposes, including determines the domicile for all act. no-fault 500.3114(4)(1), paid 1. Under MCL PIP benefits are acciden- for injury bodily arising person tal of a out motor vehicle accident to the policy, person’s spouse, named in the and a relative either act, domiciled the same household. As used in the no-fault term according “domiciled” is a technical word that is construed to its 500.3114(1) peculiar meaning. appropriate incorporates MCL place common-law definition of which means that where a person fixed, home, permanent principal establishment, has his which, absent, he whenever he has the intention returning. may residence, While a have more than one he any during point Generally, one domicile at his or her life. by reviewing person’s a domicile is determined as related intent residence, considering to the as well as all the facts and circumstances together. deciding taken When to whom insurers liable would be benefits, 500.3114(1), payment of PIP there is no evidence Legislature the intended to deviate from the common-law of and definition “domicile” use of the word intent evinces an to legal concepts incorporate all common-law the related to term. Accordingly, child, parents a whose are divorced and has more who legal residence, may single only any than one have a domicile at one point acquires in time that continues until the child a different one. holding is consistent with Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins

Exch, (1979), 477; recognized 274 NW2d 373 which that the Legislature given equivalent has sometimes the term “residence” the “domicile”; however, act, meaning purposes of for of the no-fault the equivalent Orange term is “domicile” not the of “residence.” In the Appeals by interpreting Court of erred Workman to mean that equivalent is the of domicile residence that a can he and minor child 500.3114(1) multiple of “domiciled” MCL residences. recognizes acquiring 2. The common law three means of a (1) origin nativity, domicile: domicile or of which is established (2) born; choice, person when a is domicile of which when a occurs person replaces another; by choosing his current domicile and by operation law, domicile which when occurs a with a disability capacity acquire lacks a the to domicile of choice by operation unemancipated and one is established law. An child, adult, competent legal capacity acquire a unlike lacks the to 494 MICH 475 therefore, and, child’s domicile is determined choice a domicile of parents. by her While intent is to the of his or reference domicile adult, determining an a child’s intent is the domicile of critical for are the factors that considered inform irrelevant and Workman applicable change are not when his domicile an adult’s intent born, Rather, determining is the domicile. when child’s origin her is that of his or father remains child’s domicile acquired through is the actions of the same until new domicile point parents in time the minor can the or until that when child’s by emancipation reaching acquire through of choice a domicile majority. age the recognizes following the divorce of a 3. The common law order, entry custody the domicile is parents child’s of a child’s by operation terms of of law consistent with the the established custody the all child’s domicile for order is determinative including purposes, holding the This is also consistent no-fault act. itself, Act, Custody seq., 722.21 et with the Child making custody in a child’s courts with determinations entrusts custody situations, terms of order best interests. these the the child’s In accor- are determinative of minor domicile. therefore law, primarily which focuses on location in dance with the common domicile, the is which a determination of relevant consideration parent physical order. under the terms of the For granted example, parent is a child’s domicile with who physical custody primary or sole under terms of order, parents joint legal custody. regardless of share whether Custody 4. Act is with the common-law The Child consistent person may any given point rule that a one Legislature express and there is no indication that time by legally different That bound intended a result. and, therefore, legal capacity terms lack the of a order independently change the conclu- domicile mandates as a sion that a child’s domicile is established the court matter of law. Grange, denying Grange 5. In the lower courts erred summary disposition. Josalyn Rosinski at the was domiciled with judgment granted time of her accident because of divorce primary physical custody never and the order had been Rosinski Custody Act; provisions pursuant of the modified to the Child addition, Josalyn age majority had not reached the or become emancipated acquire such that she could a different domicile of her choosing. by concluding Josalyn The courts that own lower erred by recognize parents, failing was with both erred to the domiciled order, legal family by applying the court and the effect of erred Grange Ins Co Lawrence inapplicable a minor child whose factors are to that Workman Josalyn by not operation of law. Because was is set domicile insurer, required Lawrence, Grange, to his was with domiciled 500.3115(2) for the PIP Farm Bureau under reimburse paid. it benefits summary ACIA, by denying erred ACIA the lower courts 6. Taylor judgment granted and disposition. The of divorce joint custody. granted Campanelli primary legal It Campanelli custody physical expressly Sarah’s domicile and established by judgment court Michigan. The later modified in order was Campanelli changing re- Sarah’s to Tennessee where domicile residing physical custody. Although was primary Sarah tained accident, Michigan time her her at the domicile with mother by ACIA, the 1996 order. remained in Tennessee as established resided, Michigan which Sarah was not insurer of household 500.3114(1). PIP under MCL liable for benefits entry Grange to court for reversed and remanded the circuit Grange. summary disposition in favor entry circuit court for ACIA reversed and remanded summary disposition in favor of ACIA. joined by Justices and con- Justice Markman Zahra, McCormack, majority in the result in both and curred reached majority agreed any person, including that ACIA. He child, any given only time that can have one domicile at minor proposition does not for the that “domicile” is the Workman stand equivalent act. dis- of “residence” for of the no-fault He however, agreed, majority adopted determining rule the with the under domicile of a child with two residences the Child Custody majority’s holding domicile of a child with Act. family court order two residences is determined establish- (1) custody ing physical improperly of that child: assumes that custody physical order is the same as domicile determination as a (2) law, joint family awarding physical court matter of allows a order custody alternating system, which incon- to establish an may the rule one sistent with that a have ability accurately impinges on an assess its risks insurer’s when agreements places entering an into insurance unreasonable interpret inquire family insurers about and court burden on family Zahra would held that court orders. Justice have presumption orders establish a of domicile be living arrangements clearly the child’s actual so rebutted when that it with the court’s order is reason- inconsistent impliedly expressly reached able to conclude presump- regarding agreement the child’s domicile. To rebut an 494 Mich 475 tion, required Justice Zahra would have courts to the factors consider traditionally used to assess domicile to determine the domicile of minor children. — — — —

1. Insurance No-Fault Words and Phrases Domicile Residence. law, parents with the a child Consistent common whose divorced legal residence, single has more than one who any point one time that until the domicile continues acquires one; born, a child different when is the child’s domicile origin is that of his or her father and remains the same until a acquired through parents new domicile actions of the child’s point acquire or until in time the minor can when domicile through emancipation reaching age majority; of choice pur- the terms “domicile” and “residence” are not the same for act, seq. poses of et the no-fault 500.3101 - - - 2. - Operation Custody No-Fault Insurance Domicile of Law Order. Following entry the divorce of a child’s of a seq., pursuant Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et order to the Child by operation is established of law consistent with the terms of the and is order determinative of the child’s act; domicile for no-fault child’s domicile is with parent granted physical custody who is under the terms of the custody order. Bremer & Nelson LLP Ann M. (by for Byrne) Grange Company Michigan. Insurance Law,

Ward PC (by Ward), Michael D. for Farm Bureau General Insurance Company Michigan.

Horn, Killeen, Siefer, Arene & Hoehn Craig J. (by Pollard) and John A. Lydick, for Automobile Club Insurance Association. Menkes, Cotant

Bensinger, Arndt), & PC. L. (by Dale Farm State Mutual Company. Automobile Insurance Amicus Curiae: Curtis,

Judith A. Argiroff, Anne Shi- Rebecca emke for the State Bar Michigan, Family Law Sec- tion. Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion of the Court

Mary two related present These cases J. Kelly, Beth (1) whether a no-fault act:1 Michigan’s under issues residence has a parents who child of divorced in an automo- injured and who is homes parents’ both in more than one “domiciled” can be bile accident 500.3114(1); and of MCL meaning household within the cus- establishing court order whether of a child’s evidence children is conclusive tody of minor under determining coverage for of 500.3114(1). traditional hold, consistent with We MCL common under the of the term “domicile” definitions 500.3114(1), that in MCL and as that term is used law any domicile at has one parents of divorced a child Further, in the event in time. point given and a court are divorced parents hold, consistent custody, we relating an order entered it pertains of domicile as common law with the orders, nature of legally binding minors and the of by operation established the child’s domicile is determinative of order is thus and that law including purposes, for all the child’s domicile act. no-fault of ACIA, judgment the respective and Grange

In both conclusively established the custody order divorce and reverse the Accordingly, we children’s domiciles. minor which Grange, Court of Appeals judgment can a minor of divorced erroneously held that the circuit court domiciles, and we remand to two in favor of entry summary disposition of ACIA, judgment we reverse Company. Insurance by concluding erred Appeals, of the Court regarding the child’s of fact existed question entry court for sum- remand to the circuit and we in favor of ACIA. mary disposition 500.3101, et seq. 494 Mich Opinion of the Court I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. GRANGE LAWRENCE Lawrence and Laura were Edward Rosinski married daughters, and had Katelyn Josalyn, two the latter whom is the deceased this insured case. 2005; Lawrence and Rosinski divorced in Rosinski remained home and marital Lawrence moved home, into his both located in parents’ Muskegon, The Michigan. judgment granted divorce Lawrence joint legal custody Rosinski Josalyn Katelyn, but given Rosinski was “primary physical custody” of girls. judgment divorce provided Lawrence time, with frequent parenting including alternating weekends, evenings, Wednesday alternating holidays, contact, phone liberal and liberal parenting time when Rosinski was judgment unavailable. The of divorce provided: further parent parenting

A whose time of a child is governed order, change shall residence except compliance 722.31], of the child [MCL with prohibits moving Michigan a child out of the State of greater parent than 100 miles from the non-custodial party without court order. The awarded must notify Court, the Friend of in writing, immediately, when the minor child is moved another address. 24, 2009,

On September eight-year-old Josalyn was a in a car passenger owned and driven by Rosinski when ignored another driver stop sign and hit Rosinski’s vehicle, resulting injuries Josalyn. in fatal Rosinski joint Lawrence were appointed personal repre- of Josalyn’s sentatives estate.2 accident, judgment At the time of the of divorce was still in However, apartment, effect. Lawrence had moved into a two-bedroom

while Rosinski continued to in the reside former marital home. Grange Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion Court and Lawrence submitted accident, Rosinski After (PIP) insurance injury protection for personal claims Rosinski was insurers. respective their benefits to policy pro- insurance an automobile named insured on Company Insurance Bureau General by Farm vided (Farm named in- Bureau); was the Lawrence Michigan policy provided insurance on an automobile sured in- Farm Bureau (Grange). Company Insurance Grange in the accident and involved the car was sured in the accident. any vehicle involved Grange did not insure claim, Bureau more paid Farm regard With to Rosinski’s Josalyn’s injuries for $30,000 in PIP benefits than for PIP benefits. death; denied Lawrence’s claim Grange Grange Farm Bureau asserted Subsequently, PIP priority payment order of for was the same view, “domiciled” because, Josalyn in its was benefits 500.3114(1); to MCL pursuant homes parents’ both reim- Grange partial from sought Farm Bureau thus 500.3115(2). to MCL pursuant of benefits bursement for complaint the claim and filed Grange denied relief, Josalyn seeking a declaration declaratory Rosinski, Lawrence, at the time not was domiciled it not re- the accident. asserted that was the PIP any Farm Bureau for to reimburse quired Josalyn had because paid benefits that Farm Bureau at the time of the with Lawrence was not “domiciled” 500.3114(1), Michigan required by accident as Grange further recognize dual domiciles. law does not PIP benefits obligated pay that it was asserted Josalyn was not named injuries because Josalyn’s policy.3 under its insured policyprovided portion Grange’s PIP to or for pertinent “benefits bodily injury... accident.” The caused an insured who sustains

an any family Grange policy ‘You or member “insured” to include defined “family Grange policy injured further defined accident.” The in an auto member” as: 494 Mich 475 op Opinion the Court seeking

Farm Bureau filed counterclaim a declara- tory judgment that Josalyn was domiciled with each of her at the time of the accident and that Farm Bureau entitled to partial was reimbursement of the PIP paid. benefits it had Farm Bureau argued also the Grange policy conflicted with the no-fault act excluding Josalyn through as an insured its automatic attribution domicile to the residence of the custodial parent.

Both companies insurance filed for summary motions 2.116(0(10) disposition pursuant to MCR and the circuit granted summary court disposition to Farm Bureau. Applying the factors that are traditionally used to determine domicile under the no-fault act as set forth in Workman v Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exc hange4 and Dairyland Insurance Co v Auto-Owners 5Co, Insurance the circuit court concluded that Josalyn had two accident, domiciles the time of the one with each parent. The circuit court thus ordered Grange to Farm reimburse Bureau for 50 percent of the PIP benefits Farm Bureau had paid percent of Farm processing Bureau’s expenses.

Grange appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court’s decision.6 Court of Appeals rejected Grange’s argument that Michigan law you by blood, marriage [A] adoption related to principal

whose residence is at the location shown on the Decla- adjudicated page. parent court has that one rations is the If parent, adjudication custodial respect shall be conclusive with principal to the minor child’s residence. [Emphasis added.] Exch, Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins 477, 496-497; 404 Mich (1979). NW2d 373 5 Dairyland Co, Ins Co v Ins 675, 682; Auto-Owners App 123 Mich (1983). NW2d 6 Lawrence, Ins Co Mich v App 319, 325; 819 NW2d (2012). Grange Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion of the Court child of dual domiciles for a minor recognize does not because, according panel, “[t]he parents divorced .. determined ... Court has . Michigan Supreme act, the terms ‘domicile’ [that] of the no-fault ” “nothing ‘legally synonymous’ and ‘residence’ are . a minor child of divorced 500.3114(1) in MCL . . limits ‘prin- defines domicile as a to one domicile or parents ”7 After the domicile factors applying cipal residence.’ the Court of Dairyland, Appeals from Workman undisputed evidence established concluded Regarding the Josalyn parents. resided with both divorce, which established judgment effect of the Rosinski, the Court of physical custody with primary stated, the fact change “that order does Appeals Josalyn actually that the evidence showed that resided inquiry both her which is the relevant parents, held Appeals under the no-fault act.”8 Court also policy, was invalid because the Grange’s policy adjudication custody court to be requires which residence, determining principal conclusive for a child’s where the no-fault act Grange’s “obligation would limit does not... .”9 this Court

Grange sought appeal, leave to granted.10 Id. at 324. 8 Id. at 324.

9 Id. at 325. (2012). Lawrence, directed the Ins Co v We parties to address: (1) person, particular and in the minor child of divorced whether a determining

parents, purpose two domiciles for the can have (2) 500.3114(1) act; Michigan coverage under no-fault whether, issue, determining answering the first a court order effect; any whether an insurance the minor’s policy provision giving preclusive effect to a court-ordered arrangement [Id.] is enforceable. 494 MICH475 Opinion of the Court

B. ACIA V STATE FARM case, In this Sarah fatally injured is the minor child in a motor vehicle accident. parents, Sarah’s Francis Campanelli Taylor, and Tina were divorced in Michi- gan in 1995. The original judgment of divorce granted joint legal of Sarah sister, and her Ashley, to both and “physical custody” to Campanelli, allowing Taylor only reasonable visitation. Addition- ally, judgment of divorce contained following provision:

DOMICILE OF THE MINOR CHILDREN The domicile or residence of said minor children shall not be Michigan removed from the State of without prior approval Court, [Campanelli] and that shall promptly notify the Friend of the Court whenever said children Eire moved to Emother address.

A little more than a year after the family court granted the judgment divorce, Campanelli secured a job Tennessee that offered a considerable improve- ment his career. He moved the family court to modify original judgment of divorce and successfully ob- tained an 1996, order in February as the custodial parent, him permitting change to the children’s domi- cile to the state of Tennessee.11 Under the terms order, Taylor was entitled to six weeks of visitation in summer, and Campanelli and Taylor were to alter- nate the Easter, one-week Christmas, and winter school vacations. The February 1996 order did not otherwise modify either joint legal custody originally granted to both parents or the physical custody awarded to Campanelli. Permitting court’s order was entitled “Order Defendant Change

to Children’s Domicile to the State of Tennessee.” Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion of the Court 16-years-old, Sarah was she went to when mother, who for the summer with her Michigan stay Gravelle, in great-uncle, Terry How- lived with Sarah’s her ell, During the time that she lived with Michigan. mother, get Sarah decided that she wanted to know and, re- Taylor Campanelli’s permission, better high with her and attended Michigan mained mother school that fall.12 26, 2007, in a passenger

On November Sarah was a friend, Kayla, car driven her and insured State (State Company Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Farm). car, Kayla lost control of the which careened off tree, resulting the road and into a in what would injuries Sarah. ultimately injuries be fatal The severe medical required Sarah sustained care. Automobile (ACIA), Club Insurance Association as the insurer uncle, Gravelle, Sarah’s whose household Sarah resided, paid during period Sarah’s medical bills her before death.13 home, Taylor provided Sarah with a room of her own in her uncle’s Schools, affirming filed an affidavit residence with the Howell Public Taylor Taylor lived in with her. listed Howell that Sarah resided address their Gravelle’s residence. meantime, Taylor, learning Campanelli planning In the after was care, parte

to have Sarah back to medical an ex flown Tennessee for obtained Wayne purporting order from the Circuit Court to transfer Sarah’s Taylor Taylor’s Michigan Wayne to and her domicile to address. The Circuit 7, 2008, January vacating parte later on ex Court reversed itself the order time, however, declaring By passed away it void ah initio. that Sarah had however, injuries. parents, litigate. Taylor her from Sarah’s continued to Court, sought open Livingston County in an estate for Sarah Probate contending Michigan that was domiciled in when died. After a Sarah she two-day hearing, probate that, testimonial the court ruled consistent with provisions proceedings, the of the court’s in the divorce Sarah orders Tennessee, Michigan, in not in on the date of death. The was domiciled her probate pursuant ruling, declaring court entered orders to its Sarah to be a Michigan” giving Campanelli right deci “nonresident of to make regarding arrangements sions funeral for Sarah. 494 Mich 475 Opinion of the Court in an action the circuit court

ACIA commenced (1) that Sarah was not “domi secure determinations (2) therefore, ACIA, in was not Michigan, ciled” PIP benefits under MCL for Sarah’s responsible 500.3114(1), Farm, State insurer in when she was passenger vehicle which Sarah was to the injured, responsible pursuant was the insurer 500.3114(4). of MCL State priority provision no-fault filed liability providers Farm denied and both cross- under MCR summary disposition motions 2.116(C)(10). granted summary disposition

The circuit court Farm, residency Sarah “had finding favor of State that Michigan with her mother and her uncle at the time of the motor vehicle accident.”14 The circuit court noted conflicting testimony on issue of Sarah’s intent Tennessee, then to return to but concluded record reflected a “lack of evidence of a clear intent . In support, return to Tennessee ...” the circuit court any by cited the absence of definite actions Sarah to in Michigan withdraw from school and reenroll Tennessee, coupled school with indications her regarded Sarah her mother’s residence as own. Accordingly, because the circuit court found that Sarah in Michigan, was domiciled it ruled that ACIA was PIP responsible for Sarah’s benefits under MCL 500.3114(1). reversed,

The Court of Appeals reasoning particular evidence of Sarah’s and in her intent, question of fact for resolution presented was, thus, summary and that jury disposition probate The circuit court concluded that it was not bound Tennessee, court’s determination that Sarah was domiciled in see note parties probate proceedings because the to the court were differ ent. Ins Co v Lawrence 489 Opinion Court proper for either party.15 of Appeals Court also rejected argument ACIA’s judgment of divorce and subsequent February 1996 order modifying domi- cile conclusively established Sarah’s domicile for all purposes. According panel, to the court “did not determine Sarah’s domicile for the purpose of insurance coverage, and there authority is no suggests that [the circuit court in the insurance dis- pute] required was adopt ruling of different jurisdictions deciding issue for a different purpose for different parties.”16

State Farm applied to this Court for leave to appeal and ACIA filed a response to that application, as well as a cross-application. We ordered argument on whether to grant the applications or take other action.17

II. STANDARD of review This Court reviews de novo a grant decision to deny a motion for summary disposition.18 Summary 2.116(0(10) disposition under MCR is appropriately granted where no genuine issue of material fact re- mains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 15 Auto Co, Club Ins Ass’n v State Farm Mut Auto Ins unpublished opinion per (Docket Appeals, curiam of 21, the Court of issued June 2011 294324). No. 16 Id. at 4-5. Co, Auto Club Ins Ass’n v State Farm Mut Auto Ins 491 Mich 875 (2012). parties We directed the to address “whether residence and conclusively of the insured minor were established in Tennessee pursuant judgment to the Wayne Court, of divorce entered Circuit amended, or whether capacity acquire the minor had the a different Id., citing Vanguard residence or domicile of choice.” Ins Co v Racine, App 233; 3.211(C)(1) (1997); 568 NW2d 156 MCR (3); Jur, Domicile, 7; Restatement, § Mich Civ Laws, 2d, Conflict of 22(1) §§ 15 and comments a and d. Twp Com’r, Elba v Gratiot Co Drain 265, 277; 493 Mich 831 NW2d (2013). Opinion Court generally determination is A domicile matter of law.19 however, underlying fact; where a question the determination dispute, not in facts are material circuit court.20We law for the question domicile is statutory interpreta- de novo issues likewise review tion.21

III. ANALYSIS liabil- tort act abolishes generally no-fault Michigan’s maintenance, or use of ownership, from the ity arising Instead, are companies insurance motor vehicle.22 insurance benefits party first required provide of the use of a motor arising out bodily injury accidental personal referred to as vehicle, commonly which (PIP) In regard, benefits.23 this insurance protection litigation center of the 500.3114(1), is at the MCL which rule for cases, general provides these both to provide is liable determining Michigan insurer in relevant provides, part: PIP benefits. statute policy described personal protection insurance [A] 500.3101(1)] bodily injury to the applies to accidental [MCL person’s spouse, and a person policy, named in the household, if the in the same relative of either domiciled accident.[24] injury vehicle arises from a motor cases, injured whether the parties dispute these was “do- a relative of the insured who individual was as the insured. in the same household” miciled Co, 358, 362; & Peters 547 NW2d 314 v Cross Quinto (1996). (1933). Radeka, 451, 452; Hartzler v 251 NW 554 Twp, 493 Mich at 278. Elba 22 See MCL 500.3105. 500.3107; MCL MCL 500.3108. added). 500.3114(1) (emphasis MCL Grange Ins Co Lawrence Opinion of the Court In the instance that more one policy than insurer’s is applicable injured provision, to the under 500.3115(2) priority provision then the of MCL trig- is gered allow an to recoup insurer benefits from insurer(s) other is the equal priority.25 This in Grange, situation wherein lower courts held that Josalyn had two “domiciles” within the meaning 500.3114(1) with Lawrence insured by —one Grange and another with Rosinski insured Farm 500.3115(2), Bureau. Pursuant to MCL the lower courts thus concluded that is an insurer of equal priority Bureau, with Farm thereby entitling Farm Bureau to partial of the PIP recoupment benefits that it Josalyn’s had on paid behalf.

Comparatively, some instances no insurer’s PIP policy applicable to the injured person under MCL 500.3114(1) because the person is not “the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, [or] relative of either domiciled in the same household ....” 500.3114(4) event, MCL may apply such that the in- of surer the accident vehicle is liable for PIP benefits to 500.3114(4) of occupant motor vehicle. MCL provides: 500.3114(1)-MCL provided

Except [MCL in 500.3114(3)], person suffering bodily injury accidental arising from a motor occupant vehicle accident while an of a motor shall personal protection vehicle claim insurance benefits following priority: from insurers in the order of 500.3115(2) provides: MCL priority When 2 or more insurers are in the same order of provide personal protection paying insurance benefits an insurer partial recoupment benefits entitled due is from the other priority, together in insurers the same order of with a reasonable partial recoupment expense processing amount of claim, of accomplish equitable in order to distribution of the loss among such insurers. MICH475

Opinion the Court of (a) registrant of the vehicle of the owner The insurer occupied. occupied.

(b) operator the vehicle insurer of The ACIA, dispute where posture This is the a relative” with was “domiciled Sarah involves whether 500.3114(1), or MCL purposes for the Michigan in 500.3114(4) The circuit applies. instead, whether Michigan, in was domiciled that Sarah court concluded uncle ACIA, insurer of Sarah’s making thus PIP benefits liable for Michigan, in resided whom she of the accident Farm, the insurer than State rather vehicle. insurance-coverage these in both pivotal inquiry the term then, interpretation on the turns

disputes, 500.3114(1). Mainly, in MCL as it is used “domiciled” how a “domicile,” specifically meaning deter- the ultimate determined, will dictate for PIP benefits is liable of which insurer mination preliminary addresses the first inquiry each case. Our a child of divorced whether Grange: raised issue can be accident in a motor vehicle injured than one household “domiciled” more posed the question next consider act. We the no-fault court order ACIA: whether both custody conclusively establishes to a child’s pertaining no-fault act. under the child’s domicile ACT AND THE NO-FAULT A. DOMICILE not define the term act does the no-fault Notably, language of MCL unambiguous “domiciled.” 500.3114(1) personal protection that “a states simply bodily injury . . . to accidental policy applies insurance person’s spouse, policy, named to the house- in the same either domiciled and a relative of 493 v Ins Co Lawrence Opinion of the Court . . .”26 construing statutory hold . When this language, our main objective is discern the Legislature’s intent through the language plainly Normally, expressed.27 this will an statutory Court accord undefined term its ordinary and commonly meaning.28 However, used where Legislature uses technical word that has acquired particular meaning law, in the and absent any contrary legislative indication, “ac- we construe it cording to such peculiar appropriate meaning.”29 The term “domicile” is such a just word that precise, technical meaning Michigan’s law, common and thus must be understood to that according particu- lar meaning. over Michigan

For 165 years, courts defined “domicile” to mean place “the where a person has his true, fixed, home, permanent and principal establish- ment, which, and to he absent, whenever is he has the intention of returning.”30 Similarly, a person’s “ has been defined to be place ‘that where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for special a mere temporary but purpose, present with a intention of making it home, his either permanently or for an ”31 unlimited indefinite or length time.’ re- gard, the Court has recognized that “[i]t be laid down as a settled maxim that every man must have such a national domicile somewhere. It equally well

26 Emphasis added. Office, Treasurer, Title Inc v Van Buren Co 516, 519; 469 Mich (2004).

NW2d 207 Co, 352, (2008). Herman v Berrien 366; 750 NW2d 570 29 MCL 8.3a. 1847). High, (Mich, In re Doug 31 Henry Henry, 85, 101-102; v (1960), quoting 106 NW2d 570 Carolina, 226, 236; Williams North 1092; 325 US 65 S Ct 89 L Ed 1577 omitted). (quotation marks 475 494 MICH

494 Opinion the Court of can have more than one such person no settled that domicile, time.”32From this settled and the same at one it follows principle, origin [upon birth] his until

a man retains his domicile another; it, by and so each changes acquiring successive he continues, changed acquiring another. until domicile new acquisition of a equally And it obvious that does, instant, preceding terminate the at the same one.[33] from recognized this our law has way,

In common person’s through time a birth —from childhood only single can have a domicile at person adulthood —a Indeed, in time. there are few any given point providing every established as the one axioms as domicile, may and that a have person has person only one—and one—domicile. domicile, understanding furtherance of distinguished has between the necessarily

common law and “residence:” concepts of “domicile” former, acceptation, ordinary was defined in its home,’ be, person place ‘A lives or has his while where ‘[a]ny place dwelling place,’ temporary of abode or however been, A might it have was said to constitute residence. person’s domicile was his residence home law.[34] contemplation of succinctly,

Stated more one For purposes but more than one residence.35 32 Doug added); Scheyer’s High, (emphasis In re 2 523 see also In re (“One Estate, 645, 651-652; 336 NW2d 33 cannot Mich 59 he place; permanently located in more than 1 one cannot be domiciled period place; than 1 one cannot intend to remain for an extended more place.”). time in more than Doug High, 2 In re at 523. (1924). Klein, 175, 177-178; v Gluc NW 691 Estate, Scheyer’s In re at 651-652. Ins Co Lawrence Opinion of the Court distinguishing “residence,” “domicile” from this Court explained that “domicile is by the acquired combi- nation of residence and the intention to reside in a given If place .... the intention permanently resid- exists, in a ing place a residence pursuance of that short, intention, however will establish a domicile.”36 The traditional inquiry common-law into person’s “domicile,” then, generally intent, is a question of but also considers all the facts and circumstances taken together.37

Returning the language of 500.3114(1), MCL there is no indication that the Legislature intended to deviate from well this established common-law meaning of the And, term “domicile.” because person, a from the moment of onward, his birth can only have one domicile within the traditional of meaning term, that it follows child, that a regardless of his parents’ marital status or his multiple residences, may also have one only any given at point in time.38

Indeed, rather than there being any indication that the Legislature intended to deviate from common- this rule, is, law there in fact, evidence Legislature that the this single-location rule. Had the Legislature favored intended to make insurers liable for PIP benefits for “domiciles,” dual coexisting then it would have used the term “resided,” “domiciled,” because, as previously Detroit, 228, 230; Beecher Common Council 72 NW 206 (1897). (“The High, Doug question In re then, 523-524 is a question intent, found, of fact and and if these elements are the reference place depends upon comparative the domicile to one another the circumstances.”). weight of the explain opinion, Custody Act, For we reasons later the Child governs seq., custody orders, MCL 722.21 et the creation abrogate person only does not a common-law rule that can have a single domicile and does not create a dual-domicile situation. Opinion of the Court residence than one have more

explained, However, Legisla- one domicile. time, but more restrictive to use the expressly chose ture instead the universe “domiciled,” thereby limiting term, MCL liable under are potentially insurers 500.3114(1). rejected fact, specifically Legislature uniform act “residence,” in the as used use of the term modeled, in favor of the no-fault act on which PIP eligible for those defining term “domiciled” 500.3114(1).39 Legislature benefits under it knew had term affirmatively chose thus legislative accord this meaning, and we must particular determining Legisla- weight full when its choice ture’s intent. indication

Therefore, any absence given the Leg- contrary meaning, intended Legislature an intent “domiciled,” evinces of the term islature’s use concepts common-law all those incorporate as it term, of domicile including law related to that Accord- fully addressed below. minors more relates to common-law prin- traditional consistent with the ingly, one domicile at a only have person may that a ciple child, time, whose in we hold that given point one resi- has more than divorced and who are single any point domicile at one dence, only have may acquires differ- in until the time that continues ent one. the acknowledged no-fault act is modeled after that the This Court Mut Act, v State Farm see MacDonald Reparations Uniform Motor Vehicle 1(a)(3)(ii) (1984). Co, 151; 146, of 14 NW2d 233 Section

Ins Laws, ULA, Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident and Remedial Civil Procedural “residing Act, 43, p Reparations those in the same household includes insured,” reparation within the definition of “basic a named insured” 4(b), words, id. p § under eligible 56. other for benefits. See at whom policy act, reside in the same person household as the need the model may reparation claim insured who benefits considered a basic holder be Id. at 57. against company. policyholder’s the insurance Ins vCo Lawrence Opinion of the Court Bureau, however, Farm suggests that we should reach the opposite conclusion —that a child of divorced parents who has two legal may residences also have two domiciles, coexisting parent. one with each In support, Bureau, Farm like the Court of Appeals Grange, asserts that our specifically recog- decision Workman nized synony- “residence” and “domicile” to be legally mous for of MCL 500.3114(1), that, meaning just as a can person residence, have more than one person can also have more than one “domicile.” In Workman, the seminal case in which we interpreted the phrase “domiciled in the same household” used in 500.3114(1), claimant, we considered whether the the daughter-in-law, insured’s adult was domiciled in the same household as the insured. After that no noting caselaw interpreted phrase, “domiciled in the same household,” we articulated a flexible multi-factor test to aid courts determining domicile, in which no one factor is determinative.40 The factors to be considered included:

(1) subjective person or declared intent of the remaining, permanently either or for an indefinite or time, length place unlimited in the he contends is his (2) “household; or “domicile” formality informality or of the relationship person between the and the members of (3) household; place whether where the lives house, is in the curtilage same within the upon same premises, same place lodging existence another person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the ... household .[41] 40 Workman, 404 at Mich 495-496. (citations omitted). Later, Id. at Dairyland 496-497 Ins Co Co, App

Auto-Owners Ins Appeals the Court added determining five more factors relevant no-fault awith particular compli focus on adult children of an insured who living arrangements: cated 494 Mich 475

498 Opinion the of Court test, the stated: Court articulating In this 500.3114(1)] statutory language [MCL Although the as an same household” persons refers “domiciled body [that with the insured, of law deals this we believe insured’s person is ‘resident’ of an question of whether analyti policies,] is particular insurance under ‘household’ before us. We conclude applicable consideration cally to the because, state, this and “resi the terms “domicile” (except special circums legally synonymous are dence” tances)[42] ‘domicile’ terms phrase final It is this —“the Farm legally synonymous” ‘residence’ —on statement, Appeals rely. This and the Court of Bureau opinion, of the entire however, read in context when domicile is proposition not stand for does 500.3114(1). under MCL residence equivalent that, generally, acknowledged Rather, merely Workman given equivalent been sometimes “residence” whether the mailing tained his driver’s license claimant is Other relevant parents, for the claimant address, dependent claimant continues [3] whether he ^[2] whether other indicia of domicile include upon at documents, he maintains some parents’ uses his use ^[4] home, his whether parents’ parents’ support. such factors as possessions a room main- address ^[5] home as whether the on his his ^[1] comprises Workman-Dairyland the one framework multifactored by Michigan question fact commonly employed courts when now is domiciled. as to where exists 42 added). (second emphasis support Workman, 404 Mich legally synony statement, and ‘residence’ are “the terms ‘domicile’ 4, following n 4: mous,” provides id. at 495 footnote Workman 178; (1924); Klein, Hartzler v v Mich 197 NW 691 Gluc Radeka, 451, 452; (1933); Silloway, & NW Reaume 265 Mich (1946). 95; example Tetzlaff, 23 NW2d 219 For an v 315 Mich Inc 1, Fractional, circumstance”, “special No see School District such Twp, Twp District No Custer v School of Mancelona 451, 458; (1926); Miller, App 677, 681; 211 NW 60 Ortman (1971). 190 NW2d Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion of the Court meaning not, of “domicile.” however, Workman did establish that as an interpretation absolute rule. In deed, this is point bolstered cases Workman cites in support of its statement that “the terms ‘domicile’ legally synonymous.” ‘residence’ are Workman first Klein,43 cited Gluc where recognized this Court traditional common-law distinction between “resi “domicile,” dence” and but noted that sometimes the Legislature given has residence the same meaning as domicile. We later made the point same both Hartzler v Radeka44 and Reaume & Silloway, Inc v Tetzlaff.45 Further, the two Workman cases cited as cir “special cumstances” which “domicile” and “residence” are not synonymous both determining involved a minor’s domicile for purposes applying relevant statutes.46

However, corollary domicile has sometimes —that given been the same meaning residence —is simply not true. Court has This never interpreted “domicile” the equivalent “residence,” be as demonstrated by the cases Workman cites and the preceding discussion regarding the common-law meaning domicile. In- deed, Workman itself cannot reasonably interpreted be conclusion, to advocate such a given that Workman adopts multifactor domicile test that is analytically the same as the traditional domicile employed test for more than a century at common law. otherwise, Stated Workman is entirely consistent with our conclusion 43 Gluc, 175, 226 Mich at 178. 44Hartzler, 451, 265 Mich at 452. Silloway, Inc, & Reaume 315 Mich at 99. Twp, See Sch Dist No 1 Fractional 236 Mich at 681 of Mancelona (concluding Legislature, statute, in the of a context school give traditional, intended to the terms “residence” and “domicile” their meanings); Ortman, distinctive common-law App (reaching the same conclusion the context of a motor vehicle accident statute). fund claims MICH 475 Opinion of the Court interpreted same “domicile” is be

that the term meaning. common-law as its clarifies, to the extent holding

Our thus “domicile” imply that been understood to Workman significance retain no independent and “residence” act, the no-fault such conclusion be understood consis- and that “domicile” must valid Further, al- underpinnings. its historical tent with that “domicile” “resi- though recognized Workman by the interchangeably are often used dence” and, therefore described in other contexts Legislature situations, in Workman those synonymous the terms as necessary distinguish often that it is explained also Legislature’s the the terms consistent with between intent, as case.47 in the instant in therefore erred Grange

The Court of Appeals that the to mean domicile is interpreting Workman that a minor child can be of residence and equivalent 500.3114(1) in mul- of MCL “domiciled” for plain Workman nor the lan- residences.48 Neither tiple 47 351, Sch, 356; Portage Similarly, 451 547 Feaster v Pub Mich see Sch, (quoting Portage App Pub 210 328 Feaster NW2d 657; (1995), (1996), citing in turn Sch NW2d 242 rev’d Mich 351 681-682), Twp, at this where Dist No Fractional of Mancelona recently legal the difference the terms more reasserted between Court applying school statutes and “residence” in context of “domicile” residency children, concluding “[i]t is minor well established Likewise, legal equivalent purposes is domicile.” not the educational synonymous construing under no-fault “domicile” “residence” as entirely specific legislative employ defeat choice to act would place “resided.” term “domiciled” of broader term more restrictive suggestion reason, this this Court For same Farm Bureau’s case, Corp Appeals holding Walbro of a Sixth Circuit Court of follow (CA 6, Walbro, Cos, 1988), unavailing. In F3d is v Amerisure interpreted permit dual domiciles where Sixth Circuit Workman joint result with as a of a minor had a residence both any precedential physical its order. Aside from lack of value, statutory language MCL and the Walbro misconstrued Workman Co Ins v Lawrence Opinion of the Court 500.3114(1) of MCL guage support conclusion. The holding Court of Farm Appeals’ Grange, and Bu- position, reau’s adherence to that plainly is inconsistent with our jurisprudence regarding meaning of “do- 500.3114(1) language micile” the clear of MCL which, as explained, we have the common- incorporates meaning law of that term.

B. A DETERMINING CHILD’S DOMICILE holding, Our that a child have only one domicile any one with time consistent traditional common-law principles, single not does establish how a child’s domi- cile determined. Workman and its progeny applying the traditional domicile test defined relation but, to an adult for reasons that will explain, we these helpful determining factors a child’s domicile. To resolve how child’s domicile is determined —and our given conclusion that the Legislature intended that “domiciled,” the term 500.3114(1), as used in MCL be interpreted consistent its common-law meaning further consider the law of it domicile as —we pertains to minors.

i. THE COMMON LAW OF DOMICILE PERTAINING TO MINORS recognizes Our common law three of acquir- means ing a generally which are applicable to all persons depending on circumstances, the factual includ- (1) (2) ing: domicile of or origin nativity; of domicile of (3) choice; and by domicile of operation law.49A domicile origin of or nativity of is person established when a is 500.3114(1) Appeals in the same manner as of in the Court as permitting person point a given to have than more one domicile at a in wrongly applied, explain time. Walbro also for we in reasons later opinion, the Workman domicile factors to determine the child’s domicile. 49 Jur, Domicile, § 8 Mich Civ 1. Opinion the Court a every person maxim that

born, fulfilling Meanwhile, a domicile time of birth.50 from the domicile current replaces a his person by choice occurs when another, with the by choosing consistent domicile must have a domicile every person proposition a domicile Finally, is new determined. until a a legal a law occurs when by operation a domicile of acquire to disability capacity lacks the by operation choice, and the domicile is established thus of law.51 discussion preceding indicated in the

Typically, factors, an adult by and demonstrated Workman his or her choosing a one of new domicile acquires preemi- choice, makes the intent question One of determining an adult’s domicile. nent concern choice, then, acquiring domicile of requisites for required form the intent necessary to legal capacity to a new domicile.52 select children, ability acquire a child’s new

Regarding limited an ability adult’s ways domicile is because, for purposes a domicile is not. This is acquire High, Doug See In re 523-524. Restatement, Laws, 2d, 23; Jur, §§ 8 Mich Civ Conflict Domicile, § 5. Restatement, § provide: b of the Comments acquisition Requirements for of domicil of choice. The a. (1) acquiring

requirements a domicil of choice are (3) (2) so, presence capacity do physical § as described in 16 and § described in 18 toward the the existence of the attitude mind place question.... person may acquire a of choice if b. A domicil law, having operation of as a domicil had a domicil such place origin, in a than acquires he a domicil of choice other his domicil; former (2) having place, acquires in one he had a domicil of choice place. [Emphasis added.] domicil of choice another new Ins Co Lawrence v 503 Opinion of the Court of child, our an system, unemancipated unlike a competent adult, legal capacity lacks the to make legally binding and, determinations for him or herself there- fore, a child lacks the to capacity a domicile acquire of Thus, choice.53 while intent is critical for determining adult, domicile of an a child’s intent regarding simply irrelevant, domicile is and the traditional factors applied in determining an adult’s domicile are likewise Instead, irrelevant. the child’s domicile is determined by reference to the his domicile of or her parents.54 For instance, our common has recognized law that when a born, child is the child of acquires origin, which is that of his father.55 The child’s domicile of origin remains child’s domicile until a new domicile is acquired through the actions the child’s or parents until time point minor, when through either emancipation by reaching age majority, can acquire a domicile of choice.56 53 See unemancipated id. It is basic black letter an law that minor lacks legal capacity acquire Yarborough a domicile of choice. See v (“[Minor Yarborough, 202, 211; (1933) 181; 290 US 54 S 78 L Ct Ed 269 child] capable changing domicile.”); was her own act her Miss Holyfield, 30, 48; Band 1597; Choctaw Indians v 490 US Ct 109 S 104 (1989) (“[M]ost L legally Ed 2d 29 incapable forming minors are ...”). requisite intent Legislature to establish a domicile . Our recognized unemancipated necessary legal capacity lack minors acquire by expressly granting emancipated a domicile of choice minors right 722.4e(1)(d). separate “the to establish domicile.” MCL 54 Holyfield, (“[Generally, See 490 US at 48 a child’s] domicile is parents.”); Micou, determined that of their see also Lamar v 112 US 452, 470; 221; (1884) L (stating general 5 S Ct 28 Ed 751 rule that the father). domicile of an infant follows that of his 55 High, Doug See In (recognizing acquires re at 523-524 that a child origin upon a domicile of parents); Hering birth that is the same as his

Mosher, 152, 154; (noting 107 NW domicile). origin domicile of is the same as his father’s High, Doug (explaining See In re at 524 that a “was child who bom in Vermont, year 1812, about the where he continued to reside with his parents, there, prior who were domiciled he until went south some time 494 Mich Opinion the Court domicile becomes more into a child’s inquiry are divorced. Our when the child’s

complicated of law, however, types for these has accounted common in nearly century ago familial a Specifically, situations. of a the domicile Volk,57 Court considered In re this Michigan courts determining whether of purposes judgments faith and credit Ohio accord full must case, In of the parents child. that pertaining a Ohio, after but their child had lived previously minor in Michi a new domicile the mother established divorce explained: The Court gan. divorce, given [the was the mother

[U]nder the decree of custody. His domicile be child’s] unrestricted thereafter mother, and, she removed to this that his when came of here, of the child the domicile State and became domiciled Michigan.[58] was in changed by child’s domicile acknowledging that the

By divorce, the decree of of as a result of operation law domicile, a recognized upon child’s expressly Court parents, child’s separation the divorce he parent to whose has been same as More simply to a order.59 given pursuant legally twenty-one[,]” 1832, age was domiciled in and before had attained the he nativity Vermont, “Vermont, then, his was domicile birth or ... and another, acquired he not it to be until he could continued his domicile added]). Indeed, age....” [emphasis foil in the do until he arrived at married, parents parents acquire a when the where child’s remain instance choice, acquires that same a domicile of the child also domicile new circumstances, parents’ with the intent. Under these because consistent parents’ to his in relation is determined they only factors relevant to the extent that used Workman remain parents’ Holyfield, 490 US at 48. determine the intentions. See Volk, 25; (1931), part on 235 NW 854 overruled In re (1963). Hentz, grounds Mich 335 other Hentz added). (emphasis In re Volk 31-32 recognized principle Supreme United the same States Court Yarborough, 290 it indicated that the child’s “domicile US at when Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion of the Court put, re held that a custody Volk determination is determinative of a child’s domicile.60 Under our com- law, then, a mon child’s domicile upon the divorce of his entry order is established by operation of law consistent with the terms custody order.

We reaffirm and, these common-law principles doing so, emphasize we singular domicile is a concept. as a person Just domiciles, does have two person likewise does not opera- have domicile set by tion law for some perhaps a different domicile for other purposes as for consideration —such or any under no-fault act other statute that uses the term “domicile.” A person’s domicile for one purpose is his domicile for all purposes; similarly, child does not domicile set court order for certain purposes, but not The Legislature others.61 made a deliberate choice in the selecting term “domiciled” in entry [the father’s] continued to be same as her [divorce] until of the judgment question granted custody [which the child].” mother Likewise, Restatement, 22,§ part, the comment d states in “A child’s domicil, separation parents, in the case the divorce or of his the is same parent custody legally as that the to given.” whose he has been Volk, Similarly, In re recently, Mich at 31-32. and more Vanguard Racine, 229, 233; App (1997), Ins Co 568 NW2d 156 Appeals party and, the domicile, Court noted that a has one in the parents, case of minor child of divorced the one domicile would be that parent’s “spent majority home where the minor the of his time where parent] physical custody [the judgment.” had . under .. the divorce added.) (Emphasis creating an effort to avoid a two-domicile situation under its i.e., presumption test, rebuttable the concurrence would child allow to have one domicile for of the no-fault act and another different family context, argues family the law the concurrence authority court lacks the to determine minor child’s domicile in its custody position, however, orders. This conflicts with the concurrence’s presumption test, recognizes rebuttable which court’s author ity regard treating in this presumptive order as evidence of a minor child’s domicile. Opinion of the Court domicile is set act, and where no-fault Michigan’s full given must be law, that determination operation legal effect. of this end articulation analysis could with

Our principles. rule and affirmation these common-law acknowledge remiss, however, not be We would to the pursuant provi- are created orders Act,62 enacted Custody which was sions of the Child be- Consequently, re decided. after In Volk was years 500.3114(1) incor- that MCL we have concluded cause provides which porates the common law of a child’s domi- custody order is determinative that a necessary to further consider whether cile, it is Act consistent with this common-law Custody Child Custody Act is the Child directive. We conclude rule that the Act’s the common-law consistent with re- provisions the traditional determinations enforce legal capacity entities have the estab- garding what domicile. a minor child’s lish AND THE CHILD CUSTODY ACT DOMICILE

ii. Act the creation of child Custody governs The Child statutory comprehensive orders and provides it,With resolving custody disputes.63 scheme for interests of sought promote has best Legislature To children, any custody is the hallmark of order. courts, end, charged any Legislature custody, “declaring] the child’s dispute regarding and duties establishing] rights inherent rights custody... to the child’s accordance with as act.”64 seq. 722.21 et Child MCL Act, Custody 63 MCL 722.26. 722.24(1). Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion of the Court outset, that Custody

At we note the Child isAct only consistent with the notion that a child have a may single any given domicile at in time. point Nowhere does Child Act indicate a Custody that dual domiciles, Rather, have as Farm Bureau suggests. while the Child Act a Custody permits child to a have “legal residence with each parent,” language that as an merely acknowledgment serves a child may that have more than one residence.65 Absent an express Legislature indication that a intended different result, we not presume will in- Legislature modify tended to applicable common-law rule to children and adults alike that a person may single at a given point domicile in time.66

However, no provision of the Custody Child Act expressly provides that establishing an order is conclusive evidence of a child’s domicile for purposes the no-fault act or Moreover, otherwise.

Act allows myriad for possible postdivorce scenarios in familial relationships, recognizing different combina- 722.31, pertains requirements See MCL necessary to the change residence, provides part “[a] child whose parental governed has, court order for the of this section, Notably, parent.” residence with each the caselaw addressing disputes change residency related to motions also interchangeably describe change these motions as motions for Rains, See v App domicile. Rains 313; _ NW2d _ (2013); McKimmy (2011). Melling, App 577, 580-582; 291 Mich 805 NW2d 615 “residency” The courts loose use of the terms and “domicile” in the change residency 722.31, context of however, motions to under MCL impact Legislature’s express no on the decision to use the term “resi dence,” opposed meaning and does inform Custody Child Act. 3, § (indicating See Const art common law remains “changed, until repealed”); force it is amended or also see Dawe v Dr Assocs, PC, 20, 28; Reuven Bar-Levav & 780 NW2d 272 (“[T]he Legislature speak ‘should in no uncertain when terms’ it exer law.”). authority modify cises its the common 475 494 Mich

508 Opinion of the Court offering flexibil- custody, legal physical tions arrangements.67 Ulti- time ity parenting in terms Act Custody the Child though, believe that mately we support further rules lend and related court aby is established that a child’s domicile conclusion because that family court custody determination laws with the entity entrusted our single is the entity under these circum- to determine domicile capacity stances. to a pursuant judg- order is entered custody

Once a custody order is otherwise, that ment of divorce or and the order cannot be legally binding parents on the with the approval compliance court or modified absent Act.68 Be- Custody of the Child provisions applicable legally by the terms of the parents are bound cause order, negates parents’ therefore custody the order 67 possibility “joint recognizes example, cus MCL 722.26a For joint physical custody joint or tody,” of either which consist 722.26a(7) custody. joint custody physical and defines or both “joint custody” to mean following 1 or both of the is

an order of the court specified: (a) alternately specific periods shall reside for That parents. each of the (b) decision-making authority as That the shall share important affecting the child. decisions the welfare of designated statute, custody “Although specifically de- in the 722.26a(7)(a)] commonly joint physical [MCL is referred to as scribed 722.26a(7)(b)] joint custody, [MCL that referred described is 660, 670; legal custody.” Kloenhamer, App Dailey Mich 811 v NW2d (2011). (2004) 194; Harvey Harvey, v NW2d 835 See order); (indicating binding once court orders are entered 339, 354; Brausch, App NW2d 77 Brausch binding (indicating is that a court’s order valid and for all modified). properly aside otherwise until set Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion of the Court legal capacity, necessary which is to establish a domicile of choice the minor child different from that Specific provisions established order. Custody

the Child Act support the par- notion not, ent’s ultra law, vires acts do as a matter of effect a change in a child’s court-ordered domicile: If a parent custody order, wishes to modify the Act requires a parent to move for modification of the custody order and to change demonstrate or proper cause of circum- stances related to the established custodial environ- And, ment.69 in the instance that a parent seeks to change legal the child’s residence, the parent prohib- is ited from a child moving across state lines without court and, situations, approval in some prohibited is from moving the child more than prior 100 miles without Therefore, court approval.70 parents legally are 722.27(1)(c), family may See MCL which that a indicates court “modify previous judgments proper or amend its or orders for cause change shown or because of until circumstances the child reaches 18 years age [and .. . change the] court shall not. .. the established presented custodial environment of a child unless there is clear convincing evidence that-it is in the best interest of the child.” 722.31, provides part: See MCL which in relevant (1) parental governed by custody A child whose is court order has, purposes section, legal for the of this residence with each

parent. Except section, provided parent as otherwise in of a a governed by custody is change whose order court shall not legal residence the child to a location is that more than 100miles legal from the child’s residence at the time the commencement of the action which the is order issued. (2) parent’s change A aof not the child’s residence is (1) by to, parent restricted if subsection the other consents or if court, complying (4), permits, after with subsection the residence change. apply governing This section does if the order custody grants legal custody parents. child’s sole 1to of the child’s 3.211(C)(3), provides: See MCR also which judgment awarding custody A provide or order of a minor must Mich 475 Opinion op the Court conclusion that mandates the custody orders by bound as a by the court order domicile is established a child’s of law.71 matter conclusion —that prior that our

We thus believe divorced, the a child’s the instance where to the pursuant order entered court’s the child’s domicile Act establishes Custody Child of law and is determinative operation the no-fault act—is consistent holding gives This Act itself.72 Custody the Child with Custody Child of the provisions effect to the best deter- making custody Act, entrusts courts interests,” including those “best minations a child’s (1) from not be moved domicile or residence of minor judge Michigan approval who awarded without ** successor,* judge’s or the parenting governed parent time of a child whose except change residence of the child order shall not Custody Act, compliance 11 of with section the Child 722.31. by acknowledges parents legally are bound that The concurrence' ability orders, custody parents to then that retain the but concludes custody a in contravention of order. establish a minor child’s domicile reasoning presumption test that stems from This rebuttable —and domiciliary departs Michigan’s principles com from established it— statutory and, instead, on the that law is based concern mon law and custody may aligned not be with the minor dictated order domicile arrangements. approach supportable living is not child’s actual This give legal living that a child’s we to effect to fact our law and decline custody may consistent with the order. situation not be agreements concerning recognize parents often reach informal We that arrangement through custody or, having court matters established formal order, through arrange agreement to deviate from that mutual decide custody living aligned with the ment that a child’s situation is such ability not, reality, holding in their to order. does restrict Our regards, custody arrangements in these but courts should be address custody arrangement parents’ cognizant to the that informal modifications custody no on a child’s domicile. in a order have effect established Lawrence Ins Co v Opinion of the Court rule could contrary Any arrangements. living to related un- orders entered custody with noncompliance foster sanctioning by implicitly Act Custody the Child der domicile minor child’s establish might conduct Instead, custody order. controlling of a contravention controls custody order the rule to adherence encour- domicile minor child’s of a the determination court orders binding legally with compliance ages statutory law. cover- over an insurance

Therefore, presiding courts par- divorced minor child of involving the age dispute conclusive evidence order as treat a must ents order sets a a court domicile.73Where a child’s law, factual by operation domicile custody or child’s intentions or parents’ or the circumstances Rather, the the domicile determination.74 irrelevant to the terms of is focused on analysis appropriate to abide directing courts order. Custody the Child order, cognizant we are custody and physical a distinction between Act draws to where custody pertains custody: Physical “reside,” custody whereas physically shall authority as to decision-making to mean understood Be- the child’s welfare.75 affecting decisions important respect law with our common cause the focus under location and the mostly question concerns holding directive, argues that our Despite clear the concurrence it is the uncertainty law. We believe that injects into the realm of no-fault uncertainty presumption create test that would rebuttable concurrence’s parents’ claims of domicile require insurers to evaluate because it would liability. exposure regarding guessing its risk of leave an insurer example, by court order— by operation law—for A domicile set Workman-Dairyland analysis engage in an the need to obviates person’s help domicile when factors, designed determine which were question. open an or contested it was 722.26a(7)(a) custody) (physical Compare MCL 722.26a(7)(b) custody). (legal 494 Mich 475 Opinion op the Court respect

same true with to a child’s domicile the divorced,76 instance that the parents the relevant parent physical custody consideration is which has By way under terms of the order.77 example, child’s domicile will be with a if parent custody order grants parent that or sole cus- primary physical tody, expressly or establishes domicile parent with that through domicile provision, regardless of whether the share parents joint legal custody.78 Volk, 31-32, re See In 254 Mich at which determined that given parent physical custody was with domicile that who had been of the child. recognize custody may We that a order allow for reasonable or However, parenting physical-custody inquiry, flexible time. governs determination, primary the domicile has to do with the child’s physical express custody location under the terms order and not “parenting Indeed, by allowing with how order allots time.” for parenting custody order, reasonable flexible time in a court relinquished authority physical custody has not its establish of the minor child. 78Although presently Court, recognize before this we determining custody appear may reference to a order perplexing grants joint lead parent to a result where the order each 722.26a(7) physical custody equal under MCL and creates an 50/50 physical custody. with, begin emphasize division To we that an joint physical custody automatically award of alone does not create potentially perplexing although may situation because an order joint physical custody, may parent award it also establish that one has primary physical custody. Alternatively, physical the details of the custody parent physical custody division reveal one parent despite more joint physical often than the other custody arrangement. Thus, very it is in the rare event that a joint physical custody grants parents order awards both equal physical an amount of time to exercise that this issue 722.26a(7) Indeed, require arises. does not share equal physical joint physical time custodial for a court to award 722.26a(7)(a)] custody; rather, merely joint [MCL physical defines specific an alternately “[t]hat order the child shall reside periods parents.” Emphasis each with added. The statute does not, however, require parent that the child reside each for an equal joint physical custody. amount of time to constitute Co Ins v Lawrence Opinion of the Court

C. APPLICATION i. GRANGE LAWRENCE V the 2005 family judgment the court entered

When Rosinski, their child Lawrence and divorce between of law consis- Josalyn acquired by operation a domicile Specifi- the of divorce. judgment with the terms of tent joint and Rosinski cally, granted the order Lawrence granted primary was custody, while Rosinski parenting and Lawrence liberal time. custody physical primary physical the granted Because order Rosinski long custody, domicile was with Rosinski. So Josalyn’s to a new Josalyn capacity acquire lacked the as parents her success- domicile of choice and neither of through the a motion to modify moved to order fully under MCL 722.27 or change custody or residence continuing jurisdiction, in a court of family 722.31 pursu- would remain with Rosinski Josalyn’s the of divorce. judgment to the terms of ant the judgment At the of the accident time the provi- had never been modified pursuant divorce Custody had reached Josalyn of the Child Act. Nor sions such that age majority emancipated, the become domicile of her own acquire she could different Therefore, accident, at the the Josa- choosing. time of the terms lyn’s pursuant domicile was with Rosinski grant equal an order does division of In the unusual event that instance, custody, only the physical in this then child’s domicile and to he the as that of the alternate so as same would between (1971). Restatement, living § 22 parent time. with whom he is physical custody Thus, parent with the who has the child’s domicile is by specific order at time of incident at established approach This consistent with the terms of the order issue. finding coexisting a rule the child has dual domiciles. Such avoids that understanding traditional is consistent with In re Volk retains our only person one a time. can have domicile at Mich 475 Opinion of the Court of the judgment reaching contrary divorce. Josalyn domiciled both par- conclusion was with ents, courts concluding person lower erred domiciles, dual erred by failing recognize could have custody order, legal effect court’s the Workman factors that are erred by applying inap- plicable operation to a whose domicile is set law.

Therefore, Josalyn because can one Lawrence, it that she not domiciled follows was Grange’s insured. The terms of the judgment divorce provide Josalyn’s and, conclusive of evidence domicile there no in being ambiguity order, that there is no fact question of that was in Josalyn domiciled Rosinski’s household. It further that Josalyn follows because was not Lawrence, domiciled Grange with is not for liable Josa- 500.3114(1). lyn’s PIP benefits under MCL For this same reason, is Grange not an insurer of equal priority with and, thus, Farm Grange Bureau is not to reim- required 500.3115(2) burse Farm Bureau under for the PIP it for care paid Josalyn’s benefits her following accident.79 courts by lower therefore erred denying Grange summary disposition.

ii. ACIA V STATE FARM ACIA, judgment of granted divorce Taylor and Campanelli joint legal custody, Campanelli holding Given our that a a minor determination of domicile, governs argument policy Grange’s Farm Bureau’s that conflicts unavailing. pertinent portion with the no-fault act is Recall that of Grange’s adjudicated policy parent states: “If a court has that one is the adjudication parent, respect custodial that be shall conclusive to the with principal provision plainly minor child’s residence.” This is consistent with holding not, Appeals held, coverage our and does as the Court restrict permitted otherwise would have been under the no-fault act. Co v Lawrence Ins Opinion the Court domicile and, express in an custody, physical primary Michigan in Sarah’s established provision, order, Sarah’s of this entry Upon Campanelli. law and her by operation established domicile was to establish legal capacity had the longer no behalf, and nor choice on Sarah’s domicile of different majority Sarah, age reached the having not could her domicile of a new emancipated, acquire being however, successfully moved choosing. Campanelli, own and the court residency in 1996 change of divorce modifying judgment an order entered Taylor and domicile to Tennessee. changing Sarah’s Campanelli joint legal retained Campanelli Sarah’s custody. primary physical retained of law to Tennessee then, changed by operation was order. entry of the 1996 upon expressly 1996 order dispute

There is no in Tennessee remained establishing Sarah’s domicile Sarah the accident when effect at the time of Although Sarah was then years age. was was domi- Michigan, her mother in Sarah residing with of the accident as the time ciled Tennessee no being question the 1996 order. There established Tennessee, it is clear of fact to Sarah’s domicile household, ACIA, Michigan the insurer of the PIP under MCL for Sarah’s benefits liable 500.3114(1). Instead, the insurer first State Farm is benefits, and the lower courts thus PIP priority pay summary disposition. by denying erred ACIA IV CONCLUSION in our common law long been established It has child, single a person, including principle time. We reaffirm this any domicile at one may have parents divorced who hold that child of 494 MICH Concurring Opinion J. Zahra, residence, more than one nevertheless still has only one domicile at a given point time, including for purposes of the no-fault act. In the instance that are divorced and a family court has entered an order relating custody, hold, we consistent with our common and the Custody Act, law Child the child’s domicile is established by operation of law and that the custody order is determinative child’s domicile for of the no-fault act.

In Grange, judgment of divorce conclusively estab- lished the minor child’s domicile with her mother at the and, thus, time of the accident Grange is not hable for PIP providing following benefits the child’s automobile accident. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals Grange and remand we to the circuit entry court for summary disposition Grange. favor of ACIA, order conclusively established the minor child’s domicile with her father at the time of and, thus, the accident ACIA is not liable for providing PIP benefits following child’s automobile accident. We thus the judgment reverse of the Court of Appeals and we remand to the circuit court for entry of sum- mary disposition in favor of ACIA. Young, C.J., JJ., Cavanagh con Viviano, J.

curred Kelly, J. I (concurring). concur in the result reached Zahra, by the majority in these cases. I also agree with the majority that person, including child, minor can have only one domicile at any given time. I disagree, however, with the majority rule the adopted determining the domicile aof child with two residences under the Child Custody Act1 for several reasons. The majority MCL 722.21 et seq. Co v Lawrence Ins Opinion by Concurring Zahra, J. legal resi- child with two of a that the domicile holds court order family with a necessarily equated dences is child, regardless of custody of that establishing physical family court’s in fact follow the parents the whether the benefit of rule to have Although appears this order. custody of a binding nature legally the reaffirming far of address- rule falls short order, perfunctory such a rela- familial post-divorce realities of ing practical tionships. custody orders physical

The assumes majority a matter of determinations as the same as domicile Instead, I believe the assumption. question law.21 authority family court Custody grants Act Child environment(s) of the child the custodial establish It from this custodial to that order. is subject children of domicile determination environment made. can be joint order of that a court disagree

I also alternating an custody can establish physical wherever minor child’s domicile is whereby the system, to be. supposed indicates the child is custody order our tradi- a semantic end-run around system Such a is one domicile may only have tional rule that a all virtually reality ignores practical that will primary have a residence cases, a child will domicile. the child’s constitute unduly impinges rule majority’s

I conclude that the accurately assess its risks an insurer to ability on the by custody operation majority equating physical with domicile minimum, share, law, despite fact that a child whose parent. While in the joint legal residence with each has a domicile is overwhelming it turn out that a child’s of cases number view, order, my as that indicated the same creating it creates the instead does not have the effect order can he established. See from which domicile custodial environment 1(C). part 494 MICH 475 Concurring Opinion Zahra, J. entering agreements

when insurance an places about, unreasonable burden on insurers to inquire obtain, family court interpret orders. This is be- majority places cause the rule no-fault personal protec- (PIP) tion liability insurance on the insurer of the who has parent physical been ordered custody, even the child primarily living when is not with that parent. rule, The majority’s my view, is inconsistent with the act, no-fault PIP provides protection for “acci- bodily injury dental to the named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative either domiciled in the same household . . . .3

It is an undeniable fact that parents involved often an disputes agreement reach between to provide themselves for a different custodial environ- ment than provided that in the family court’s initial order of I custody. would adopt rule that recognizes reality. this I Specifically, would family conclude that court orders of custody establish a presumption of that be rebutted when the child’s actual living are arrangements clearly so inconsistent with the family court’s order that it is reasonable to conclude the expressly or impliedly reached an agreement regarding the child’s domicile. To rebut I presumption, would require courts to

consider the traditionally factors used to assess domi- cile to determine the domicile of minor children.4

Thus, in I Grange, conclude that the presumption of by domicile created family judgment court’s 500.3114(1) added). (emphasis 4 Notwithstanding good all intentions behind a court order estab lishingjoint custody, reality remains that there is but one domicile for explained fully a minor child. opinion, part 1(F), As more in this see goes school, factors such as where the majority where the belongings kept, register and the address used to the child for making functions will assist a fact-finder in a domicile determination. Ins Co v Lawrence Opinion by Concurring Zahra, J. and, under the facts of this case divorce is not rebutted judg- I reverse the majority, would consistent with remand to the circuit Appeals ment of the Court of in favor of entry summary disposition court ACIA, Appeals I that the Court of conclude Grange. the child’s finding regarding erred of fact question whole, I conclude Reviewing domicile. the record as cre- presumption, the evidence did not rebut orders, court’s the child was ated majority, I domiciled Tennessee. Consistent with of the Court of judgment Appeals would reverse the entry summary court for remand to circuit in favor of ACIA. disposition

I. ANALYSIS DOMICILE A. GENERALLY A domicile is in a of person’s significant variety contexts,5 and it roots in Michi- concept deep is gan law.6 This Court in 1847 that it stated is “well person settled that no can have more than one [na- domicile, tional] and the one same time . .. .”7 This recently Court has reiterated that a person may have domicile, one and “a place domicile is ‘the where a home, person has his with no present intention of removing, and to which he intends to return after going 5 (2011) See, e.g., 373, 376; People Dowdy, v 489 Mich 802 NW2d 239 (addressing “whether homeless sex offenders have a ‘residence’ or they comply” Registra ‘domicile’ such that can with the Offenders Sex (2009) Act); Servaas, 634, 642; tion In re 484 Mich 774 NW2d 46 1963, 6, 20, (discussing judge justice § requires Const art or beyond vacate his or her office if he or she “removes his domicile ..”). territory appointed limits of the from which he was or elected . . 6 (“It (1847) 515, High, Doug See re be laid down as a domicile somewhere.”). every settled maxim that man must have such a national 7 Id. 494 MICH Opinion by Concurring Zahra, J. ”8 longer Generally,

elsewhere for a or shorter time.’ intent[,]” and a question domicile is “a of fact and looking determination of domicile involves at all the to determine whether the facts circumstances evi- dence that a domiciled in one location out- person is weighs the evidence that a is domiciled in another location.9 by majority,

As there are three means of observed domicile, acquiring depending on the factual context: “(1) (2) origin nativity; domicile of or of domicile of choice; In Miss operation law.”10 Band Holyfield, Supreme Choctaw Indians concept Court of the United States discussed the domicile, drawing on “common-law of domi- principles and explaining: cile” is, course, concept widely

“Domicile” used in both jurisdiction federal and state courts and conflict-of-laws purposes, meaning generally and its is uncontroverted. necessarily synonymous “Domicile” is with “resi- 8 Dowdy, Radeka, 451, quoting 489 Mich at Hartzler v (1933). 452; 251 NW 554 High, Doug As this Court in In stated re at 523-524: always place qualities [Domicile] is which has more of the residence, principal permanent pretensions of a and more to be such, said, any place. things, considered as than other Two it is First, residence, must concur to constitute domicile. which how indispensable ever is not to retain domicile after it has been once and, secondly, acquired; making intention it the home of the party: Story’s Laws, then, question § 44. The Confl. intent, found, question of fact and and if these elements place depends upon reference of the domicile to one or another comparative weight language of the circumstances. In the justice, Pick., 178, in Abington Bridgewater, chief v. North “it facts, depends, upon proving particular all but whether together, tending facts and circumstances taken to show that a place,

man has his or domicile in one home overbalance all the like proofs tending to it in establish another. 10 Jur, Domicile, § 8 Mich Civ 1. Ins Co v Lawrence Concurring Opinion by Zahra, J.

dence,” place one can reside one but be domiciled in adults, by physical another. For domicile is established presence place in a in connection with a certain state of concerning mind one’s intent to remain there. One ac quires birth, origin” a “domicile of at and that domicile (a choice”) continues until a new one “domicile of is acquired. legally incapable Since most minors are of form ing requisite intent to establish a their by parents.[11] domicile is determined that of their by Domicile operation of law occurs when a person lacks capacity to by establish domicile choice.12There- fore, because a minor child typically cannot form the intent requisite choice, to establish a domicile by minor child’s domicile determined, is by operation of law, by the domicile of the parents.13 One’s domicile of origin is the starting point, and it remains a domicile person’s until that domicile is usurped by subsequent by domicile attained choice or by operation of law.14Where a child’s parents changed their own Holy field, 30, 48; Miss Band Choctaw Indians v 490 US 109 S Ct (1996) (citations omitted). 1597; 104 L Ed 2d 29 Jur, Domicile, § Civ 5. Indians, Jur, Miss Band Choctaw 490 US at 48. See 8 Mich Civ Domicile, (“Everyone § assigned origin by is a domicile of at birth law.”) added). operation (emphasis note, But when a minor child has emancipated, been he or she establish a domicile choice. See MCL 722.4e(1)(d), provides: emancipated by operation “A minor of law rights or court order responsibili shall be considered to have the emancipated ties of an adult.... A minor shall be considered for the of, to,.. right separate [t]he but not limited . establish domicile.” 14 Specifically, origin “[t]he domicile] domicilie] which a birth[,]” legitimate “[t]he has at domicilie] of a child at birth time, subject domicilie] is the § its father at that the rule stated in pertaining separation parents. divorce If the child is not the legitimate father, death, child of its or is born after the father’s its domicilie] birth is the of its mother at that time.” Restate Laws, 2d, 14(2), p origin § ment Conflict of 59. The domicile of “continues acquired.” until a new domicile is Id. at comment b. 475 494 Mich 522 by Opinion Concurring Zahra, J. by changes child likewise domicile of the the However, common law notions of law.15 these

operation a child the of where question do not resolve of domicile share, at a mini- child’s parents when the is domiciled that the child has two mum,16 custody such joint legal Custody the Child Act.17 pursuant residences NO-FAULT ACT IT RELATES TO THE MICHIGAN B. DOMICILE AS 500.3114(1), pro- the no-fault act Pursuant to MCL to the bodily injury PIP for “accidental protection vides and a in policy, person’s spouse, named the the person the household .. . .” relative of either domiciled in same for pur- domicile determinations Generally speaking, in liability insurer the no-fault con- assessing poses by considering made the factual circumstances text are by balanc- surrounding living the situation party’s factors, none of which is ing weighing several A list of determinative on its own.18 non-exhaustive person is “domiciled determining factors whether act in the household” under the no-fault was same articulated this Court Workman: 15 Mosher, Hering v 152, 154, 155; (1906), 144 Mich See NW stated, doctrine, accept general proposi as a which this Court “We the tion, origin, surviving that the domicile of a child is that of its or of its last Wayne parentE,]” gained [the father] [in “If a domicile County], conceding general apply, it rule to became law Hering recognized “[a] domicile of child.” This Court also by consenting parent may give different from his own his adoption; proceedings formal we consider to its that he do so less equally permissible.” Id. at 156. physical custody primarily or Even when a court order awards exclusively parent, Legislature has determined that where to one joint legal custody exists, child has a residence with each the minor I(C). part parent. MCL 722.31. See also I(E). part See Exch, 477, 496; Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Workman v (1979). NW2d 373 Ins Co v Lawrence Concurring Opinion by Zahra, J. (1)

Among the following: relevant factors are subjective or declared person intent of the remaining, permanently either or for an length indefinite or unlimited time, place in the he contends is his “domicile” or (2) “household”; formality informality or of the rela tionship person between the and the members of the (3) household; place whether the where the lives is house, in the curtilage same within the upon same premises; same place existence of lodging another person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household.[19]

To address “the particular problems posed by young people departing from the parents’ home and establish- ing new domiciles part as of the normal transition to adulthood and independence[,]”20 the Court of Appeals has considered whether a child of majority age is “domiciled” with the parents in several cases.21 In the first of cases, these Dairyland, the Court of Appeals laid out additional relevant factors for deter- mining whether a child is domiciled with his or her parents: [(1)] whether the claimant continues to parents’ use his [(2)] home mailing address, as his whether he maintains possessions [(3)] some parents, with his whether he uses parents’

his address on his driver’s license or other docu [(4)] ments, whether a room is maintained for the claimant [(5)] parents’ home, at the whether the claimant is dependent upon parents support.[22] for (citations omitted). Id. at 496-497 20Dairyland Co, 675, Ins Co v App 681; Auto-Owners Ins 123 Mich (1983). NW2d 322 21 See, e.g., Ass’n, Fowler v App 362; Auto Club Ins 254 Mich 656 NW2d (2002); Progressive Co, Goldstein v App 105; Cas Ins 218 Mich (1996) (noting NW2d injured child, who was a student attending college parents’ residence, out of state from his specific with no age provided, parents, was domiciled with his college). not at the 22Dairyland, App at 682. 494 MICH Concurring Opinion J. Zahra, where a

However, yet this has not addressed Court of no-fault for child is “domiciled” minor sepa- maintain two when the child’s insurance households, residence which both constitute rate Be- Act.23 Custody to the Child pursuant the child Custody law and the Child Act domestic relations cause context, appropriate no-fault it is implicated custody. the law child regarding to review C. CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS Act, a child turns Custody Under the Child until to make child jurisdiction court has custody dispute.24 when there is child determinations part: Act Custody provides, pertinent The Child custody dispute has to the If a child been submitted original action this act or circuit court an under incidentally action in the circuit court arisen from another court, judgment the best an order or of the circuit for the court do 1 or more of interests following:

(a) the child 1 or more of the Award provide payment parties involved or to others child, years support for the the child reaches 18 until age.... ^[25] joint custody first for Custody provided

The Child Act family MCL 722.26a court to advise requires 1981.26 and, joint custody upon request either parents awarding joint of a child. custody to consider parent, as: custody” “Joint is defined 1 of the

... an order of the court or both following specified: is

23 722.31(1). MCL 24 722.27. MCL 722.27(1)(a). MCL 26 MCL 722.26a. Ins v Co Lawrence Concurring Opinion by Zahra, J.

(a) alternately That the child shall specific reside for periods parents[, with each of the or]

(b) parents decision-making That the shall share au thority important affecting as to the decisions the welfare [][27] of the child. not

Although specifically named such by statute, as [(a)] custody “the commonly described is referred [(b)] joint as physical custody, and that described in is joint Therefore, referred to as legal custody.”28 (1) may grant custody” court “legal to one both or (2) parents and “physical custody” solely parent to one or jointly both, which would involve the child “resid- ing] alternately for specific periods with each of the parents.”29 722.31, MCL

Under where of a child joint legal custody share parental custody child is governed by order, a court the child consid- is ered to have a legal residence with each parent purposes of parent’s evaluating change action to child’s legal residence.30 722.26a(7). MCL (2011). Dailey Kloenhamer, 670; App 660, 811 NW2d 501 722.26a(7)(a). provides, part: MCL 722.31 (1) parental custody A governed by child whose is court order has, section, legal for the of this residence each

parent. Except provided section, parent otherwise in this governed child whose is court order shall not legal change a residence child to a location that more legal than 100 miles from the child’s residence at the time of the commencement of the action in which the order is issued. (2) parent’s change A of a child’s residence is not parent to, restricted subsection if the other if consents permits, change. court... apply the residence This section does governing if grants the order the child’s sole parents.... to 1 of the child’s 475 494 MICH 526 Opinion by Concurring Zahra, J. MAY HAVEDUAL DOMICILES A MINOR CHILD NOT

D. a the domicile of determining arise Complications the child no-fault insurance where child for her his or legal residences because two The court and the Court trial legal custody. share conclusion extraordinary reached Appeals both had one with Ros- two domiciles: Grange Josalyn departs Lawrence. This conclusion inski and one with have Michigan person may from law established reaffirming join majority I one domicile.31 Further, agree I principle. this long-standing “does not stand conclusion majority’s Workman32 equivalent for the that domicile proposition 500.3114(1).”33 residence under MCL As Court v Klein: stated Gluc law, the common there was distinction between

Under former, ordinary in its “domicile” “residence.” be, place “A acceptation, defined to where was home,” “Any place of or has his while abode lives been, dwelling place,” temporary might it however person’s A was said to constitute residence. domicile was law.[34] contemplation his residence or home in commonly pursuant parent 722.31 are referred to Actions of petitions change despite MCL 1’s use of the term 722.3 580-582; See, e.g., McKimmy Melling, App 291 “residence.” Mich (2011) (discussing change change 615 of domicile and 805 NW2d interchangeably). significant Legislature It is that while the residence residence,” practitioners “legal some and courts chose to focus on apparently colloquially use term “domicile.” 385; Dowdy, High, Doug 489 Mich at re at 522. 32 Workman, (stating 404 Mich at 495 “the terms ‘domicile’ legally synonymous”). ‘residence’ 33Ante at 498. Klein, 175, 177-178; (emphasis Gluc v NW

added). Ins Co v Lawrence Concurring J. Opinion Zahra, may While “residence” be defined in more restrictive ways Michigan law,35 under for example, “legal resi Gluc, dence” as discussed in underlying distinction concepts between the domicile residence re a person may domicile, mains: while one only he or she have more than one residence. And while legal often equated domicile, residence is because there can only domicile, be one where legal two residences exist, it is axiomatic one only that can be determined to be the domicile. The fact that a domicile determination is complicated by the factual circumstances of the inquiry does not constitute a sound reason to depart from the established that a principle person can have only Therefore, one domicile. even where a child is considered to have a legal residence with each parent, his or her domicile must be that of one of only parents. child’s

E. THE BY MAJORITY’S DOMICILE OF OPERATION LAW APPROACH

The majority attempts extend the common-law doctrine of domicile by operation of beyond law its logical and practical bounds. I agree with the majority that unemancipated minor children cannot establish a choice, domicile by given that they incapable of forming the requisite intent.36 But by opera- law, tion of the means by which unemancipated minors e.g., Dowdy, Mich at See, where this Court noted that Legislature chose to define the word “residence” as used in the Sex Registry Offender Act to mean place that at which a her person his or habitually sleeps, keeps regular lodging. and has a personal effects, If a place person than 1 more or if wife has a residence, residence from separate that of the at husband, which the resides place greater of the time shall he his her official part residence of this act. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.] Indians, Miss Band Choctaw 490 US at 48. 494 Mich 475 Opinion Concurring Zahra, J. easily parents, of their

acquire the domicile custody, joint legal when share determined resi- legal creates two joint given child, of which could constitute for the either dences domicile-by-operation-of- domicile.37 While are two potential indicates that there law framework domiciled be considered where child could residences can be one context, given that there in this answering, “Which stops it short domicile?” constitutes the child’s residence agree and I majority the fact that the Despite time, any given may only have one domicile theory for children majority’s alternating-domicile contradicts custody parents joint physical whose share permits in substance long-standing principle this alternating- for such children. This dual domiciles juris- in the unprecedented is domicile concept domicile state, domicile as that of this views which prudence returns, despite going ultimately a person where place states, majority As period for a time.38 the elsewhere defined Michigan courts have years, “For over 165 722.31(1). domicile, general “[a] is that in the MCL The rule parents, separation his is the same as that of the case of the divorce or legally given.” has Restatement Con parent to whose he been However, Laws, 2d, 22, unhelpful § rule comment d. is where flicts of Volk, given parents. legal custody jointly In re has to both See also been (1931), grounds 25, 32; part in on other NW 854 overruled Hentz, (1963), by v in which this Court concluded Hentz given of her minor child whose mother was unrestricted a judgment pursuant with the child’s to of divorce was domiciled stated, RCL, 549, mother, quoting p has “When a divorce been wife, however, granted the minor child to the and unrestricted given decree, marriage the in her own and not her the issue, However, father’s, the the cases establishes that of child.” custody. Volk, parent joint the Neither unlike shared custody, present granted unrestricted as Volk. either of the cases was Therefore, majority’s question reliance on this case. I the Doug High, 2 at 522-523. In re Ins Co Lawrence Concurring Opinion Zahra, J. place ‘domicile’ to mean ‘the where a person has his true, fixed, home, and permanent principal establish ment, which, absent, to whenever he he is ”39 intention of returning.’ fact that a child cannot establish a domicile is by choice sufficient reason ignore that permanence underpins the concept our jurisprudence.40

Further, majority opinion assumes that a custody order establishes domicile aas matter of law. While a family court’s orders pertaining custody and if child, residence of a implemented, certainly can establish custodial environments from which domicile thus, and, arises a legal determination domicile can I made, be question whether the family court has the authority under Child Custody Act set a explicitly child’s domicile court order. The Child Act Custody speaks in of “legal terms residence” and uses the word “domicile” in statute, one section of the 722.27b(9), which states:

The court prohibiting shall not enter an order an legal custody individual who has changing of a child from prohibition domicile of the child if primarily purpose allowing grandparent rights to exercise conferred in grandparenting time order entered under this section.

Significantly, the use of “domicile” in this section does suggest family not that courts authority have the to establish, law, as a matter a child’s in making custody Rather, determination. this section a parent child, assumes custody of a it and prohibits barring court from parent from 39 493, quoting High, Doug Ante at 2 re at 523. 40 (“[Domicile] High, Doug always place See In re 2 at 522 is which qualities principal permanent residence, has more of the of a or and more pretensions such, any place.”). to be considered as than other 494 Mich 475 Concurring Opinion Zahra, J. or may seek grandparent that a of domicile so

change child. with the maintain visitation requires insurance rule now Moreover, majority the orders, custody obtain a about inquire to companies orders to orders, those interpret and copy of those risks,41 unduly insur- burdens its which properly assess into an insur- uncertainty injects ers unreasonable majority’s pre- rule The process.42 er’s risk-assessment ask, simply able to “Who being from vents an insurer Ultimately, its the to risks. you?” resides with assess view, is with the rule, my in inconsistent majority’s PIP “to acciden- act, provides protection no-fault in the policy, the named the bodily injuiy tal to in the a relative either domiciled spouse, and person’s ,”43 rule, a majority’s .. . Under the same household to in one state pursuant could be “domiciled” child It order, actually but live in another state.44 is a situation could constitute difficult to discern how such in the same household. being domiciled 570; Hyten, 817 NW2d 562 Titan Ins Co See duty investigate (reaffirming principle that “an insurer has no insured”). verify representations potential of a majority’s opinion, in which indicates Footnote 77 joint legal physical custody, alternate domicile would situations orders, troubling particularly in this with the court’s is consistent regard. 500.3114(1). Emphasis added. couple Take, following hypothetical: Michigan example, for A divorced, joint gets and the father awarded mother couple’s three-year-old daughter, mother is awarded but custody. physical he The father moves to Florida because cannot sole months, Michigan. Ultimately, find after several mother work young child, this with not want to raise the discusses decides she does father, sent live with father Florida. and the change go back court to seek mother and the father do age gets into a car accident at the in either state. The child rule, majority’s the child would be domiciled 16 in Florida. Under the nearly Michigan, living years despite in Florida under the care her father. exclusive 531 Ins Co v Lawrence Concurring by Opinion J. Zahra,

F. DETERMINATION OF DOMICILE OF CHILDREN WITH TWO LEGAL RESIDENCES A domicile determination a for minor child of parents

who have separate brings domiciles with it unique consid- erations to the family due court’s in making involvement child custody determinations and the court’s involvement in circumstances a in change legal where residence of a child is Like the traditional of a examination disputed.45 domicile, in person’s my view, determination domicile of child legal a with two requires residences review of all the facts and circumstances to determine whether the evidence the child is domiciled in one residence legal outweighs the evidence that the child is domiciled another light But residence.46 family determining court’s involvement in where child resides, deference owed to that court’s determi- nations, an into inquiry where domiciled also necessarily involves consideration of family court’s orders relating custody of a child and a residence(s). generally While one no factor is conclusive in determining unique context, this family domicile,47 court’s and residence determinations are the starting point for determining a child’s domicile because party must an obey “[a] order entered court with Therefore, I proper begin would jurisdiction.”48 presumption that the parties family court orders relat- ing and residence of the child fact obeyed implemented those orders.49 45 MCL 722.27; 722.31. 46 High, Doug See In re 2 at 522-523. 47 Workman, 404 Mich 496. 48 Kirby Ass’n, High v Mich Sch Athletic NW2d 23, 40; (1998). State, Secretary in Johnson v See the discussion presumptions (1979), Mich 280 NW2d 9 where Court 432; noted: Zahra, J. Concurring Opinion determinations

Further, custody and residence disputes arise between courts when by family made and residence A court’s parents.50 the and with whom inform where determinations time, live, or spend his her sleep, to supposed child is return, though may spend the child ultimately pre- rule that I would establish a time elsewhere. determinations reflect the actual that these sumes and, a child, thus, function as living situation the regarding parents for the intent the proxy inability to to form parents’ due the child’s joint a intent. parental that, the

Nonetheless, recognize reality I the with always time, living a child’s situation will not passage orders, the align family despite general the court’s with of a It is rule a must follow the orders court. party that custody for the bitterness parents, common after subsided, to differences over has resolve their dispute living an the agreement regarding time and to reach invariably producing evidence is not allocated to burden of proved. pleader be of the fact to be That burden otherwise the based, by judicial among Legislature the or decision other allocated factors, special probabilities, on an estimate of the fairness and considerations, may justify policy and similar concerns the cre- law, ation, judicially by presumption party aid the who or production. the burden of (CA 1995) 648, Snider, 3, See Juvelis F3d also v (permitting by operation “pro- the domicile of law conclusion that year foundly physically handicapped old” is domiciled retarded and (1) parents were domiciled to be rebutted “several where his objective support had factors the conclusion” that the man (2) Pennsylvania,” expressed in “established man’s residence, ability “subjective his his attachment” to “within limited attachment, parents express his acted to” such an fact that good by asserting the man faith and in the man’s interest best Pennsylvania). was at the residential home domiciled 722.31(2). 722.27(1);MCL See MCL Ins Co v Lawrence Concurring Opinion Zahra, J. arrangements commonly their child.51Parents reach amicable, private agreements, joint reflective of their intent, existing that conflict with an order. family court change

Regarding residence, Child Custody Act requires parents family seek the court’s approval moving before a child more than 100 miles residence, from unless, among his or her other exceptions, parent the other consents to the move.52 order, Regarding a modification of a custody however, Custody the Child Act envisions returning to family Therefore, court seek modifications.53 Harvey Harvey, 186, 194; This Court held 680 NW2d 835 (2004), parties authority cannot “limit trial court’s to review by stipulation particular arrangement. determinations” ato question legal-residence There is no that if a came matter before court, family charged making court alone is determina interests, stipulation by parties tions in the best to an custody arrangement usurp However, authority. alternative cannot this currently Court; is not the situation in the cases before this situation in the question parents, entry is one in regarding after the of a court order residence, legal sought family or subsequent have not the court’s amicably chosen, despite legal intervention binding and have the nature of orders, the family to in act contravention aof court’s orders. See also Phillips Jordan, 17, 23-24; App v 241 Mich (holding 614 NW2d 183 properly stipulated that the trial court set aside a order where “the stipulated trial court change custody entered the making order to without any independent regarding determination the best of interests the child Act”). pursuant Custody to the Child 52 722.31(2). MCL 722.27(1)(e) provides, part: MCL custody dispute If a child has been submitted the circuit to original court incidentally as an action act under this or has arisen

from judgment another action in the circuit court or an order of or court, the circuit for the best interests of the the child court may]... (c) Modify previous judgments proper or amend its for or orders change cause shown or because of of the child circumstances until Concurring Opinion Zahra, J. family to the duty seek legal while cus- agreements regarding approval of amicable court’s The modifications, always this occur. does tody reality to this into account. view fails take majority’s realities, at the of while same In consideration these consis- the need a rule that fosters recognizing time for that, determining I hold for tency, would act, regard- facts under the no-fault where the living reasonably arrangements the child’s ing family court’s provisions consistent with the orders, will be determinative of the child’s those orders However, living where the facts the child’s domicile.54 and, age subject support years section reaches 18 5b of 552.605b, act, parenting PA time enforcement years age. court and 6 months of until child reaches judgments modify previous amend or orders or shall not its change custodial issue a new order so as the established presented and con- of a child unless there is clear environment vincing that it is the best interest of the child. evidence exist, they are, view, family my central When court orders determining in the the domicile of minor child no-fault context. But decisions have effect in domicile determinations no-fault no adjudications regarding a child’s residence. court Family charged making that focus on courts are determinations 722.27(1) (“If custody dispute best interests of the child. See MCL child original an under submitted to the circuit court as action been incidentally act or has arisen from another action in the circuit court or court, judgment an order or of the circuit best interests the child added); following!.]”) (emphasis the court do 1 or more see (“Before 722.31(4) permitting change also MCL residence other (1), restricted the court shall consider each of wise subsection following factors, primary in the with the as the court’s focus deliberations!.]”) added); Glowacki, (emphasis Gagnon App (2012) (“After 557, 570; granting change 815 NW2d 141 change in trial court must determine whether there will be a and, so, if determine whether the established custodial environment by evidence, relocating parent prove, convincing that the can clear and interest.”) added). (emphasis change is in the child’s best No-fault regarding priority the determina decisions insurer on basis domicile inapposite in residence the tions are to determinations Grange Ins Co v Lawrence Concurring Opinion by Zahra, J. arrangements clearly are so fam- inconsistent with the ily orders that it is to court’s reasonable conclude that parents the expressly impliedly child’s reached an the agreement regarding child’s domicile that differs from by family orders, the domicile indicated the court’s the presumption of domicile by family created court’s orders be rule, would rebutted.55 Under this courts would make light determinations situation, actual facts of the custodial than rather solely on a court order that may have little to relevance the actual living situation of the child after passage family practical court context because no-fault law on focuses issue of coverage insurer liable for insurance and does not take into Again, question consideration the best interests the child. I whether authority Custody court has the under the Child Act to explicitly opposed establishing set child’s the custodial environment which the child will live. 55 majority approach recognize fails to a court order allow parents modify spends parent. example, the time a child with each For provides: order Defendant, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the EDWARD LAWRENCE, rights parenting

BLAINE shall have time following the minor child at the times: Alternating Friday 6p.m. Sunday 1. from weekends until at p.m.; Every Wednesday p.m. p.m.[;] 2. 4:30 from until 7:30 Alternating Holidays agreement. ; 3. mutual .. Any parties may agree 4. other reasonable times to[.] that the

[Emphasis added.] order, provision parents Under this were free to alter the living arrangements primarily such that the father could be responsible physical custody majority for the of the child. The would ignore subsequent decision make the father the new primary fact, reasoning changes custodian in that such alter parenting time and not the domicile. For the reasons stated opinion, approach we believe the better is to make domicile determina- living tions on the basis of the actual situation the child. 475 494 Mich 536 by Opinion Concurring Zahra, J. actually regard parent to which time, namely, presumption child.56 This of the

has physical certainty domicile determina- regarding promote would long- context,57 maintain the tions in the no-fault as inquiry of the no-fault domicile standing character situation,58 the on actual facts inquiry an focused that the deference appropriate and afford ought given out- determinations to be legal-residence context.59 domestic relations side the 56 custody” “physical important is a term It to note that while is 722.26a(7)(a), commonly the described in MCL associated with However, Custody phrase in Act. is not the Child this defined Child-Custody 722.1102(n), provision the Jurisdiction Uniform Act, custody” physical “physical care and as “the Enforcement defines supervision of a child.” 57 Ins, Community App 65 Mich Mut Ins Co v Servs See Citizens (“There (1975) limiting 733; 182 is reason for insurance 238 NW2d any spouse his relatives relative of the insured or those benefits It limit to the in the household. creates a domiciled insured’s definite insurer, determining exposure in an essential the insurance factor added); Group premium.") (emphasis Bierbusse v Farmers Ins but see Cos, 34, 36-38; (declining App to follow NW2d doing rule in Mutual” because so would “hard and fast set forth Citizens couple deny plaintiff daughter, holding, separated “When a is relief to policy, pending spouse is a no-fault divorce and the named insured on one by spouse and the children of the named insured covered other though they separate policy, house even are domiciled no-fault finalized.”). holds, Appeals is The Court of in Bierbusse until the divorce stated, agreeing interpreted in a also that the statute should be “While reasonably scope risk that allows an insurer to calculate manner thereto, per rule premium do not se and the incidental we believe excluding coverage any from not domiciled the same house relative legislative at intent.” Id. hold as the named insured is accord with added). (emphasis 58 Workman, 496-497; High, Doug at In re 523. propose decision in The rule I is consistent with Court’s Volk mother child determined to be domiciled with which the was rule, my just given custody. mother Under where the was unrestricted rule, given majority child mother or father is sole under the whose i.e., custody, physical custody, parent is has unrestricted where one parent is one domiciled with because there residence can the child’s domicile. constitute Co Ins v Lawrence Concurring Opinion by Zahra, J. In determining presumption whether this can be rebut- ted, I would have courts look to the traditional nonexclu- determining sive factors for domicile for purposes of no-fault insurance articulated this Court in Workman and, those articulated the Court of particularly, Appeals in Dairyland, address specifically whether domiciled with his or her under the no-fault act. Dairyland While child that had age involved reached the I find majority, similarly of these factors to be relevant for determining the intent of minor child’s parents regard- they the domicile ing objective child’s because focus on indicators of the intent to have the child remain perma- Additionally, nently given home. there are other relevant that are to the of unique factors context minor (1) children joint whose share custody: where the child actually majority time, the of his or spends her actually where the child the of sleeps majority the however, It nights repeating, week. bears that none of these domicile factors alone be would determinative.60

II. APPLICATION A. GRANGE INS OF MICH CO v LAWRENCE Because the underlying necessary facts to determine Further, Vanguard I Racine, note that in App Insurance Co v 233; (1997), Appeals NW2d 156 Court the of that a stated has one domicile and concluded that the child at issue be” “would domiciled with the [the child’s mother because the child] mother’s home “was where spent majority physical [the mother] the of his time and where had [the of judgment.” However, child] under the divorce I note that the Appeals fully Court analyzing of made this statement without this issue and providing authority support Additionally, without to its conclusion. this Appeals fairly interpreted statement of the Court of indicating cannot he court judgment the considered the determination in the domicile, given court, breath, divorce to be conclusive that the in the same pointed spent majority to where the the his time. 60 Workman, 404 Mich at 496. Mich 475 Concurring Opinion J. Zahra, her death at the time of

Josalyn’s question is a Josalyn was domiciled dispute, where case, judgment divorce present In the law.61 Lawrence and Ros- both joint legal granted and a custody to Rosinski inski, physical but primary to Lawrence. The time parenting amount significant in- it was judgment demonstrates family court’s of her Josalyn majority spend tended that would residence, and while there was time at Rosinski’s his Josalyn time with Lawrence at spend intent for the child to return residence, always for the intent was Therefore, I under rule to Rosinski’s residence. establish, custody determination contained would create of divorce in case would judgment within the the child was domiciled presumption a rebuttable Rosinski. created regard presumption With whether this rebutted, I could be would court order it under the of this case. conclude that cannot facts Because was identified whenever Rosinski’s residence child, little mail an address was needed would have sent to this address. Josalyn received been Josalyn’s and death certificate both report accident home. home as the child’s While listed Rosinski’s a room for the children in his Lawrence did maintain bed, majority shared a and the apartment, sisters clothing pets and her at Rosinski’s Josalyn’s kept were Josalyn depended parents residence. on both her Josalyn spent facts that support. The also indicate majority overnights her time and the of her majority of Significantly, at Rosinski’s home. both Lawrence Josalyn’s indicated home Rosinski that Rosinski’s was residence, ordinary meaning given of the primary Overall, the facts in this case indicate that phrase. Fowler, at 364. See App Grange Ins Co v Lawrence Concurring Opinion Zahra, J. Lawrence and Rosinski implemented the custody order and do not demonstrate that Lawrence and Rosinski jointly intended for Lawrence’s residence to be the child’s only basis, domicile. On I this would conclude that the lower courts erred concluding that Josalyn was domiciled with both Lawrence and Rosinski that Grange was liable for PIP arising benefits out of Josalyn’s injuries and death.62 grant order, parties our part this Court asked the address policy provision “whether an giving preclusive insurance effect ato custody arrangement court-ordered Grange is enforceable.” Ins Co of (2012). Lawrence,

Mich v 493 Mich 851 For reasons set forth opinion, agree majority I Grange with the summary is entitled to disposition. Nonetheless, rule, my under portion I would conclude that a Grange policy may be invalid. degree policy] [a “To statute, is in conflict with the [no-fault] contrary public policy and, therefore, it is invalid.” Cruz v State Farm Co, (2002). 588, 601; Mut Auto Ins Regarding 648 NW2d 591 benefits, PIP policy “insured,” pertinent defined a covered part, “any family member,” which in turn was defined as: person you by blood, [A] marriage related to adoption principal whose residence the location shown on the Decla- Page. adjudicated rations a court parent that one is the If parent, adjudication custodial respect shall be conclusive with principal to the minor [Emphasis residence. added.] whether, my rule, The issue is portion under the italicized of this act, definition provides would violate the no-fault for PIP benefits insured, who, for relatives of an part, in relevant are a [a “relative of policy person’s named in the spouse] or the domiciled in the same 500.3114(1) added). household . . . .” (emphasis policy’s It is clear from phrase “principal choice of the Grange anticipated residence” that the factual dilemma that arose in parents this case: a child of divorced with two residences under Michigan policy’s law. The adjudication statement that a court regarding custody Grange’s is conclusive attempt constitutes to close potential gap what it saw as a in the no-fault act that could have been interpreted expand Grange’s liability. Because a minor child of legal residences, divorced Grange recognized could have two entirely that it was Michigan clear under law whether such a child could likewise have two domiciles for of PIP benefits MICH475 Opinion by Concurring Zahra, J. AUTO CO MUTUAL INS B. ACIA V STATE FARM determine Sarah’s to necessary facts The material in dispute; her are not time of death domicile at the question is a therefore, Sarah was domiciled where granted physical The divorce original judgment law.63 the child’s Campanelli to and indicated However, Campanelli Michigan. be in was to by order of parent, the custodial permission as obtained court, change the domicile to Tennessee. to the circuit death, parte an ex order from Before the child’s to Taylor transferred Sarah purportedly court Taylor’s Michigan ad- changed Sarah’s domicile to dress; however, subsequently this was vacated and order granting of divorce judgment void ab initio. declared custody Campanelli subsequent order physical demonstrate the child’s domicile to Tennessee changing spend majority it intended that Sarah that was would in Tennessee. While there Campanelli her time with spend for Sarah to leave Tennessee to time was the intent always for Taylor Michigan, in the intent was Sarah Therefore, I would conclude that return Tennessee. that Sarah presumption these orders would establish Campanelli. in Tennessee with was domiciled to whether could be regard presumption With in case, presented in this the factual situation overcome than question presented ACIA is closer the situation However, Grange, as in I would conclude that Grange. under the facts likewise cannot be rebutted presumption her stayed Michigan fact Sarah after ofACIA. The break, high Michigan attended school summer job following fall, part-time Michigan, and obtained 500.3114(1). However, Grange’s policy pursuant because to MCL policy would conflict makes orders conclusive opinion. proposed in this with the rule I have Fowler, App 364. See Ins Co Lawrence by Concurring Opinion Zahra, J. indicates Taylor’s that Sarah used address as her mailing address on Taylor’s documents. address was also listed as Sarah’s address on Sarah’s hospital records and length death certificate. Given the in stay Sarah’s can Michigan, it be inferred that she had a significant amount possessions Taylor’s Michigan at residence. The facts indicate that Sarah had room in her own Michigan Taylor provided and that Sarah for while she Michigan. inwas It is also clear that period for the time Sarah in staying Michigan, actually was spent she most of her time and in overnights Michigan; however, coming to Sarah to

prior Michigan, spent nearly she years in Campanelli, only Tennessee with occasionally visiting in Taylor Michigan. None of the facts in the record

suggest exist; that Sarah’s domicile in to Tennessee ceased facts Campanelli indicate that gave permission Sarah stay temporarily in after the Michigan summer to in attend school the fall so get that Sarah could to know Taylor stated, Campanelli eventually better. “I did agree that she could stay temporary on in high basis and enroll school!,]” stated, and further “It was never intended to be permanent....” in facts this case are not so clearly inconsistent the family

with court’s orders so rebut presumption that domicile is established the custody order. Absent joint evidence a clear intent part on the parents of Sarah’s to change Sarah’s presumption that Sarah was domiciled Tennessee certainly would stand. While the facts indicate that there was the intent for Sarah to an remain for ex- tended period Michigan, of time the facts do not clearly parents indicate that jointly Sarah’s intended her for in Michigan. remain view, my the lower courts improperly focused on regard

Sarah’s intent to her domicile and whether 494 Mich Concurring Opinion J. Zahra, to Ten- or return Michigan to remain in intended she old, at years older teen Sarah was an nessee. While minor An emancipated. unemancipated not was she where the determining is pertinent child’s intent act.64 The appro- under the no-fault child is domiciled focuses on whether the child’s instead priate inquiry the child’s joint regarding reached a intent by the from the domicile indicated that differs orders. court’s Sarah was domiciled with I conclude that would death; time of her Tennessee Campanelli PIP therefore, providing ACIA not benefits liable injuries and death. for Sarah’s

III. CONCLUSION I would reaf- majority opinion, Consistent with Michigan’s long-standing principle person, firm child, can one domicile. including minor Further, in majority’s I results these concur by holding I results instead cases. would reach those residences that when a minor child two Act, family Custody to the Child court orders pursuant relating of the child and the child’s resi- dence(s) presumption create a rebuttable cases, act. Under facts of these under the no-fault cases not be rebutted. presumptions these would JJ., Markman concurred McCormack, J. Zahra, Indians, 722.4e(1)(d). 48; Band Choctaw I Miss See 490 US at MCL recognize preference is considered court 722.23(i) (listing prefer “[t]he certain circumstances. See MCL reasonable child, age of the if court the child to be of sufficient ence considers express preference!),]” a factor the best-interest-of-the-child determi nations). However, distinguish I intent would determining pertinent domicile under no-fault act.

Case Details

Case Name: Grange Insurance Co of Michigan v. Edward Lawrence

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 29, 2013

Citation: 494 Mich. 475

Docket Number: Docket 145206, 143808

Court Abbreviation: Mich.