Wayne Ventling v. Patricia M. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143

Background

In 1995 Ventling and Johnson entered an agreed divorce decree providing Ventling would pay Johnson $25,537 lump sum and $210,000 in contractual alimony; Ventling stopped payments in 1997 and litigation followed.
Multiple proceedings and appeals ensued: trial rulings in 1998 and 2001 (one vacating the decree) and appellate decisions (Johnson I and II) led to further enforcement proceedings beginning in 2007.
In 2009 the trial court denied Johnson’s enforcement motion; the court of appeals reversed in 2010 (Johnson II) and remanded, instructing the trial court to award $142,500 in unpaid alimony, prejudgment interest, and attorney’s fees.
On remand the trial court (Feb. 21, 2012; amended Mar. 21, 2012) awarded $142,500 principal, limited prejudgment interest, $70,275 past attorney’s fees, costs, and postjudgment interest from the 2012 date; it denied conditional appellate fees.
The court of appeals (Johnson III) affirmed parts, awarded postjudgment interest on the $142,500 dating to Jan. 9, 1998, awarded postjudgment interest on attorney’s fees from Feb./Mar. 2012, and reversed denial of conditional appellate fees.
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed: key questions were the proper accrual dates for prejudgment and postjudgment interest across the fragmented proceedings and whether conditional appellate attorney’s fees must be awarded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Johnson)	Defendant's Argument (Ventling)	Held
When does postjudgment interest on the $142,500 alimony award begin to accrue?	Interest should run from the earliest trial date when judgment could have been rendered (Johnson argued as early as Jan 9, 1998, or at least from Jun 16, 2009).	Postjudgment interest cannot accrue until the final, post-remand trial court judgment (Mar 21, 2012).	Postjudgment interest on alimony accrues from June 16, 2009 (the trial court judgment reversed by the court of appeals), because no new evidence was needed on remand for the alimony claim.
When does postjudgment interest on past attorney’s fees and costs begin to accrue?	Fees required additional evidence, so interest should run from final adjudication after remand.	Same: interest runs from the trial court’s final post-remand judgment (2012).	Postjudgment interest on past attorney’s fees and costs accrues from March 21, 2012 (the final judgment after the evidentiary hearing).
Did the trial court improperly create a gap between prejudgment and postjudgment interest (years without any interest)?	Prejudgment interest should run until the date the judgment for which postjudgment interest accrues; thus prejudgment interest should extend through June 15, 2009 (or until the later accrual date).	Johnson waived additional prejudgment interest by stipulating a figure (argued trial court limited award accordingly).	Trial court abused discretion by denying prejudgment interest for the period up to June 16, 2009; prejudgment interest must be adjusted to run until the day before the judgment date used for postjudgment interest.
Are conditional appellate attorney’s fees recoverable and from what date does postjudgment interest on such fees run?	Johnson (prevailing on contract claim) may recover appellate fees presented in trial court; if awarded conditionally, postjudgment interest should run from the appellate court’s final judgment making the award final.	Ventling contended appellate fees available only for successful defense and that Johnson did not prevail on appeal.	Trial court erred in denying conditional appellate fees; fees are mandatory if supported by evidence. Postjudgment interest on conditional appellate fees accrues from the date the award becomes final: Dec. 19, 2013 for the court of appeals portion and from the date of this Court’s judgment for the Supreme Court portion.

Key Cases Cited

Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. 2013) (when an appellate court reverses and could have rendered judgment, accrual of postjudgment interest can relate back to original judgment date)
Long v. Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 426 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2014) (postjudgment interest accrues from trial judgment date only when record was sufficient; reopening record on remand delays accrual)
Danziger v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass’n, 732 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1987) (appellate courts may render judgment in part and remand severable claims like fees)
Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Britton, 406 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1966) (attorney’s-fee claims are severable and may be remanded separately)
Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998) (under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 38, trial court must award reasonable attorney’s fees if supported by evidence)
Intercontinental Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009) (defining when a party "prevails" for fee awards under chapter 38)
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1992) (a plaintiff prevails when a judgment materially alters the legal relationship and confers a benefit)