delivered the opinion of the Court.
When the life cycle of a judgment extends beyond an initial appeal, courts often face unique or unsettled jurisdictional and procedural issues. This case presents three of those issues; namely, (1) whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the judgment that the trial court entered after this Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment; (2) whether postjudgment interest should be calculated from the date of the trial court’s first judgment (the “original judgment”) or the date of the judgment that the trial court entered following our remand (the “remand judgment”); and (3) whether the trial court erred by “vacating” the original judgment when it issued the remand judgment. We hold that (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court’s remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court’s order vacating the original judgment was unnecessary because that judgment had already been reversed in its entirety, but it was not reversible error. We affirm the court of appeals’ judgment on these grounds and again remand the case to the trial court for entry of a final judgment consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
This is our second time to hear this health care liability case. Because several
Phillips appealed. The Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed in part and modified and affirmed in part. First, the court found the evidence legally insufficient to support the jury’s gross negligence finding, and thus reversed the part of the original judgment that awarded punitive damages and ordered that the Bramletts take nothing on that claim. The court next found the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s remaining liability and damages findings, except as to certain future damages. The court suggested a re-mittitur on those future damages, which the Bramletts accepted. The court agreed with the trial court that the Stowers exception to article 4590i’s damages cap applied, and therefore affirmed the actual damages portion of the trial court’s original judgment, as modified to conform to the remit-titur.
Back in the trial court on remand, both sides moved for entry of a new judgment. After a hearing at which the trial court admitted no new evidence, the trial court entered a new judgment (the remand judgment) that awarded the Bramletts actual damages capped under former article 4590i plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. In addition, the remand judgment expressly “vacated” the original judgment, did not include the Stowers recitals that were included in the original judgment, and stated that any suit against Phillips’s insurer under former article 4590i was “reserved for another ease.”
In response to the remand judgment, the Bramletts filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court and separately appealed again to the Amarillo Court of Appeals. In both instances, the Bramletts argued that the trial court (1) should have calculated postjudgment interest from the date of the original judgment rather than the date of the remand judgment and (2) should not have vacated the original judgment. The Bramletts asserted that these actions conflicted with the mandate that we issued when we reversed the original judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.
We denied the Bramletts’ mandamus petition without issuing an opinion. Meanwhile, Phillips moved to dismiss the Bram-letts’ appeal, contending that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because this Court had exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its mandate. The court of appeals held that it had jurisdiction and denied the motion to dismiss.
We granted Phillips’s petition for review. Phillips contends that the court of appeals (1) lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s remand judgment, (2) erred in holding that the trial court erred by calculating postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment, and (3) erred in holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment.
II. Jurisdiction Following Remand
Phillips argues that this Court has “exclusive jurisdiction to enforce [its] mandate and opinion,” and the court of appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction over the Bramletts’ appeal from the remand judgment. The court of appeals disagreed, and held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by taking actions outside the scope of our mandate and judgment — specifically; by vacating its original judgment. We therefore begin by discussing the trial court’s and the court of appeals’ jurisdiction over a case that we have remanded to the trial court.
The court of appeals held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction on remand by acting beyond the scope of its authority under our mandate and judgment. While we agree that our mandate and judgment limited the trial court’s authority on remand, such limits are not “jurisdictional” in the true sense of that word.
When an appellate court reverses a lower court’s judgment and remands the case to the trial court, as we did here, the trial court is authorized to take all actions that are necessary to give full effect to the appellate court’s judgment and mandate. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,
Parties and courts sometimes use the term “jurisdiction” to refer to the trial court’s authority on remand, as the court of appeals did here. See Bramlett,
This is why we have reversed, rather than vacated, remand judgments that failed to comport with an appellate court’s mandate. See Wall v. Wall,
Here, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter a judgment upon remand. Although our judgment and mandate limited the trial court’s authority in exercising its jurisdiction, we do not agree with the court of appeals that, to the extent the trial court exceeded its authority, it acted “beyond its jurisdiction.” Rather, to the extent the trial court’s judgment exceeds the requirements of our judgment and mandate, we will reverse the judgment for error rather than vacate it for lack of jurisdiction. See Wall,
Phillips’s challenge to the court of appeals’ ability to review the remand judgment does raise a jurisdictional question. Phillips contends that we have exclusive jurisdiction over a case that we have remanded, and therefore the court of appeals had no power even to consider an appeal from the remand judgment. We disagree.
As a general matter, our statutes and rules confirm that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review the final judgments of trial courts within their districts. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.220(a) (“Each court of appeals has appellate jurisdiction of all civil cases within its district of which the district courts or county courts have jurisdiction when the amount in controversy or the judgment rendered exceeds $250, exclusive of interest and costs.”); Tex.R.App. P. 25.1(b) (“The filing of a notice of appeal by any party invokes the appellate court’s jurisdiction over all parties to the trial court’s judgment or order appealed from.”). Phillips contends that this general jurisdiction does not exist after this Court remands a case to the trial court because this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its mandates and judgments. The cases on which Phillips relies do not support his contention. See Wells v. Littlefield,
In Wells, we observed the now well-established principle that this Court has jurisdiction to enforce its judgments and mandates, regardless of whether we render judgment or remand to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with our instructions.
In City of Irving, we held that when we remanded the case to the trial court, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case was exclusive with respect to other trial courts, and another trial court with a related case could not enjoin prosecution of the remanded case.
In Conley, we held that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and enforce judgments that we render on appeal, not judgments that a trial court enters after we remand the case.
Finally, Bilbo Freight Lines provides no support for Phillips’s position, for several reasons. In that case, the Austin Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal because the entity that filed the appeal, Bilbo Freight, was not a party to the suit below and had failed to establish standing to appeal.
As an initial matter, Bilbo Freight Lines, like Conley, involved the interpretation and enforcement of a final judgment that this Court rendered — not a judgment that the trial court rendered on remand. Seventeen years after this Court modified and affirmed the judgment of the trial court and court of appeals, the State moved in the trial court for injunctive relief that it had sought but not obtained in the original judgment. Id. at 926. Despite our final judgment in the case, the trial court purported to grant an additional judgment, and none of the parties to the judgment appealed or otherwise attacked the new judgment. Id. Only Bilbo Freight, which was not a party and did not establish privity of estate or interest with any party, challenged the trial court’s action. See id.
We have held under similar circumstances that a trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear a nonparty’s motion for relief from a final judgment after the expiration of the trial court’s plenary power, and consequently the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the trial court’s decision on such a motion. Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones,
Moreover, the Austin Court of Appeals has since limited its dicta in Bilbo Freight Lines. See Tex. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n v. El Paso Cnty. Hosp. Dist.,
To the extent that the Hospitals are suggesting that lower courts literally have no jurisdiction to interpret an appellate court’s judgment or mandate, even if only to determine their meaning in order to comply, that notion is belied by more recent Texas Supreme Court decisions. The core notion underlying decisions like Conley, as we have more recently observed, is simply that a higher court’s mandate imposes a mandatory, ministerial duty on the lower court to comply with the higher court’s judgment. It is in this respect that the lower court has no “jurisdiction” or “discretion” in regard to “reviewing” or “interpreting” the mandate.
The cases that Phillips cites do not support his contention that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over the Bram-letts’ appeal from the trial court’s remand judgment, and we have found no case in which this Court has preempted the courts of appeals’ jurisdiction following a remand to the trial court for entry of judgment. We thus hold that a court of appeals has jurisdiction, consistent with section 22.220(a) of the Texas Government Code, to review a trial court’s final judgment after remand from this Court. And we in turn have jurisdiction, consistent with section 22.001(a) of the Government Code, to review the court of appeals’ judgment. To be sure, we also retain jurisdiction to enforce our judgments and mandates and are authorized to exercise our writ power to do so, see In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas,
III. The Trial Court’s Remand Judgment
We now turn to the issue of whether the trial court or the court of appeals erred in the exercise of their jurisdiction. Phillips contends that the trial court got it right by calculating postjudgment interest based on the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment, by vacating its original judgment, and by declining to include the Stowers recitals in its remand judgment. The Bramletts contend that the court of appeals got it right by holding that postjudgment interest must be calculated based on the date of the original judgment and that the trial court lacked authority to vacate its original judgment containing the Stowers recitals.
The parties agree, as do we, that the first appeal resulted in a complete reversal of the trial court’s original judgment. The court of appeals reversed the original judgment with respect to punitive damages, rendered a take-nothing judgment on punitive damages, and affirmed the remainder of the trial court’s judgment as modified to conform to the remittitur.
The parties disagree, however, on whether, on remand, the trial court should have entered a judgment modifying its original judgment or entered a completely
A. Postjudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest and postjudgment interest compensate judgment creditors for their lost use of the money due to them as damages. See Miga v. Jensen,
Here, however, we have held that the Bramletts’ damages are capped under former article 4590i.
The Legislature has instructed that any “money judgment of a court in this state must specify the postjudgment interest rate applicable to that judgment,” Tex. Fin.Code § 304.001, and that, with one exception, the postjudgment interest accrues beginning on the date the judgment is rendered:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection
(b), postjudgment interest on a money judgment of a court in this state accrues during the period beginning on the date the judgment is rendered and ending on the date the judgment is satisfied.
(b) If a case is appealed and a motion for extension of time to file a brief is granted for a party who was a claimant at trial, interest does not accrue for the period of extension.
Id. § 304.005.
The Finance Code does not define the term “judgment” or otherwise distinguish between a trial court’s original judgment and judgments on remand or appeal. The issue here is whether, when a trial court enters a second judgment following remand, the “date the judgment is rendered” is the date of the remand judgment (as Phillips contends) or of the original judgment (as the Bramletts contend). We hold that, when an appellate court remands a case to the trial court for entry of judgment consistent with the appellate court’s opinion, and the trial court is not required to admit new or additional evidence to enter that judgment, as is the case here, the date the trial court entered the original judgment is the “date the judgment is rendered,” and postjudgment interest begins to accrue and is calculated as of that date.
Construing the predecessor to section 304.005, we have repeatedly held that, when an appellate court reverses a trial court’s judgment and renders judgment on appeal, postjudgment interest begins to run from the date of the trial court’s judgment, not the later date of the appellate court’s judgment. In American Paper Stock Co. v. Howard, the trial court entered a judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the jury’s verdict for the plaintiff, and the court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the jury’s verdict, but calculated post-judgment interest from the date of the jury verdict instead of the date of the trial court’s or appellate court’s judgment.
We reaffirmed this holding in Thermal v. Cargill, Inc., when we reformed a court of appeals’ judgment to provide for post-judgment interest from the date of the trial court’s original judgment, after the court of appeals had reversed and rendered judgment but failed to include an award of postjudgment interest.
Phillips acknowledges these decisions, but argues that a different rule should apply when an appellate court remands the case to the trial court rather than renders judgment on appeal. When an appellate court remands a case, Phillips contends, the trial court’s original judgment becomes a “nullity,” as if it never existed, and the remand judgment becomes the court’s “operative” judgment under the postjudgment interest statute. The logic of Phillips’s distinction between render and remand fails. When we have reversed a trial court’s original judgment, that judgment is ineffective and unenforceable; this is no more or less true whether we then render judgment ourselves or remand the case to the trial court to render judgment in accordance with our opinion. It is the reversing of the judgment, rather than the rendering of a new judgment or the remanding of the case, that makes the original judgment ineffective. Thus, Phillips’s reliance on the ineffectiveness of the trial court’s original, reversed judgment is not a basis for distinguishing between render and remand.
Instead, we are guided by D.C. Hall Transport, Inc. v. Hard,
Similarly, in Vassallo v. N ederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, we reversed a trial court’s take-nothing judgment against a plaintiff and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with our opinion.
Phillips asserts that D.C. Hall “is not persuasive authority” because, unlike this case, D.C. Hall involved a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But Phillips does not explain why the presence or absence of a J.N.O.V. should be a determinative factor. In both this case and D.C. Hall, the trial court could have entered a correct judgment based on the jury’s verdict, but did not, and in both cases we remanded the case to the trial court for entry of the correct judgment based on the existing jury verdict and governing law. We agree with the holdings in D.C. Hall and Vassallo.
As a matter of statutory construction, additional reasons support our conclusion. First, this Court “presume[s] the Legislature is aware of relevant case law when it enacts or modifies statutes.” In re Allen,
Second, subsection (b) of section 304.005 evidences an expectation that post-judgment interest will accrue during the pendency of an appeal, subject to subsection (b)’s exclusion. See Tex. Fin.Code § 304.005(b) (excluding period of claimant’s extensions of time to file brief from postjudgment interest calculation). In providing for postjudgment interest “on a money judgment of a court in this state,” the Legislature did not distinguish between a judgment rendered by an appellate court and a judgment rendered by a trial court on remand as directed by the
Finally, our rules of procedure expressly authorize this Court to remand a case to the trial court in the interest of justice “even if a rendition of judgment is otherwise appropriate.” Tex.R.App. P. 60.3. Our decision to remand rather than render is a procedural decision, often based on practical considerations, the purpose of which generally is not to alter a party’s substantive right of recovery. It should not be the basis for altering whether a party is entitled to postjudgment interest during the pendency of the appeal.
However, we are not holding today that postjudgment interest always accrues from the date of the original judgment when an appellate court remands a case to the trial court, although some of our courts of appeals have suggested that this is the case even when the trial court is required to admit additional evidence on remand. In State Department of Highways & Public Transportation v. City of Timpson, for example, the plaintiff sued both the City and the State, but when the plaintiff settled with the City, the trial court dismissed the City and entered judgment against the State based on the jury’s verdict.
Relying on City of Timpson, the Tyler Court of Appeals recently held that “the general rule is that after examining the entire procedural history of a dispute, a party that ultimately prevails is entitled to postjudgment interest from the date the original judgment was rendered, irrespective of whether the original judgment was erroneous, because that is the date upon which the trial court should have rendered a correct judgment.” Long v. Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship,
Because we remanded the case for entry of judgment consistent with our opinion, and the trial court was not required to admit new or additional evidence to enter that judgment, the date the trial court entered the original judgment is the “date the judgment is rendered,” and post-judgment interest began to accrue and must be calculated as of that date.
B. Recitals in the Judgment
Finally, we address the Bramletts’ arguments that the trial court should not have vacated its original judgment and that it should have included the Stowers recitals in its remand judgment. Regardless of the correctness of the trial court’s Stowers-related determinations, the Bramletts have not explained and we do not see what continuing effect the trial court’s recitals could have now. They are recitals and not part of the judgment’s decretal language. They are not material to the ultimate disposition of the case, and they do not represent jury findings.
We do not agree with the court of appeals that the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” by vacating the original judgment, because, as we have explained, the trial court had “jurisdiction” on remand even to enter an erroneous judgment. The issue is whether the trial court exceeded its authority in light of our mandate, not whether it acted without jurisdiction. But by the time we remanded the case to the trial court, we had reversed the original judgment in its entirety. Although we can agree that the trial court erred in “vacating” a judgment that no longer had any effect, any such error was harmless. See Tex.R.App. P. 44.1(a), 61.1; G & H Towing Co. v. Magee,
This leaves us with the question of whether, as the Bramletts contend, the trial court should have included the Stow-ers recitals in the remand judgment. To the extent that the Bramletts believe that such findings were necessary to support application of the Stowers exception to article 4590i’s cap on actual damages, we had already resolved that issue in our prior opinion, thus making any such findings moot on remand. And to the extent that the Bramletts believe that the recitals are somehow relevant or necessary to their subsequent Stowers claim against Phillips’s liability insurer, they have failed to explain to us how that could be or why they would be entitled to obtain such recitals in a case to which Phillips’s liability insurer was not a party. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in declining to include the Stowers recitals in the remand judgment.
IV. Conclusion
We agree with the court of appeals that it had jurisdiction over this appeal and that the trial court erred in calculating post-judgment interest based on the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. We disagree with the court of appeals that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by vacating the original judgment. Though it was unnecessary for the trial court to vacate its original judgment, which had been reversed in its entirety, the trial court did
Notes
. See Phillips v. Bramlett,
. Respondents are Dale Bramlett, individually and as administrator of the estate of Vicki Bramlett, deceased, Shane Fuller, and Michael Fuller. Dale Bramlett is Vicki’s surviving husband; Shane and Michael Fuller are her surviving sons.
. See Act of May 30, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S. ch. 817, § 11.02, 1977 Gen. Laws 2039, 2052 (former Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4590i, § 11.02), repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884 (eff. Sept. 1, 2003) [herein, "article 4590i”].
. Section 11.02(c) of article 4590i provided that the damages cap in section 11.02(a) does "not limit the liability of any insurer where facts exist that would enable a party to invoke the common law theory of recovery commonly known in Texas as the 'Stowers Doctrine.’ ” Article 4590i, § 11.02(c).
.A party who seeks to hold a liability insurer liable for rejecting a settlement offer under the Stowers doctrine must prove, among other things, that an ordinarily prudent insurer would have accepted the offer, considering the likelihood and degree of the insured’s potential exposure to an excess judgment. See Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia,
. This analysis is dicta, and not an alternative basis for the court of appeals' holding, because the court of appeals had determined that, due to Bilbo Freight’s lack of standing, no appeal was properly before the court. Bilbo Freight Lines,
. The Bramletts argue that our opinion directed the trial court to "conform" its existing judgment to our opinion, not enter a new judgment. But this language in our opinion relates to how trial courts should apply section 11.02 of former article 4590i in the first instance: "both the statutory cap and its exception can be applied as written by conforming the judgment against the physician to section 11.02(a)’s cap and reserving for another case any suit against the insurer under section 11.02(c)’s Stowers exception.” Id. at 882. By contrast, our instruction to the trial court for remand was that it should "apply the cap and render judgment consistent with our opinion.” Id. at 883.