Washington v. Ryan
833 F.3d 1087
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Theodore Washington, a death-row inmate, filed a notice of appeal (NOA) one business day after the 30-day deadline in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) following denial of his §2254 petition; counsel had miscalendared the deadline.
- Rule 4(a)(5) permits a district court to grant a 30-day extension on a showing of excusable neglect or good cause; Rule 4(a)(6) addresses failures caused by lack of notice.
- Washington did not seek a Rule 4(a)(5) extension because he did not learn his NOA was late before the 30-day extension window expired — partly because the district clerk delayed sending the NOA to the appellate clerk as required by the then-applicable Rule 3(d).
- Washington moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6) to vacate and reenter the district court’s judgment so the appeal would be timely; the district court denied relief and a panel affirmed, but the court granted en banc rehearing.
- The en banc Ninth Circuit majority concluded Rule 60(b) can, in narrow extraordinary circumstances, authorize reentry of judgment to restore the right to appeal; it reversed and directed the district court to reenter judgment nunc pro tunc so the appeal could proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Washington) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court may use Rule 60(b) to vacate and reenter judgment to reset the time to appeal | Rule 60(b) authorizes relief from judgment and may be used in extraordinary, non–lack-of-notice cases to restore appellate rights | Rule 4(a) deadlines (backed by 28 U.S.C. §2107) are jurisdictional; Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent statutory jurisdictional time limits | Majority: Yes in narrow, extraordinary cases distinct from Rule 4(a)(6) lack-of-notice cases; remanded for reentry of judgment nunc pro tunc |
| Whether Washington satisfied Rule 60(b)(1) (excusable neglect / mistake) under Pioneer factors | Counsel’s calendaring mistake plus district clerk’s failure to promptly forward the NOA prevented discovery of the lateness; Pioneer factors favor relief given absence of State prejudice and high stakes (death sentence) | State emphasized counsel’s initial error and argued lack of diligence; claimed permitting Rule 60(b) relief would undermine Rule 4(a) | Majority: Pioneer factors (prejudice, delay length, reasons, good faith) weigh in favor; district court abused its discretion denying 60(b)(1) relief |
| Whether alternative relief is available (construe COA motion as Rule 4(a)(5) motion or treat NOA as premature) | Argued COA filing could be read as a Rule 4(a)(5) extension request or the NOA was premature until COA issued | State contended procedural safeguards and statutory deadlines control and those arguments were not raised below | Majority: Did not reach these alternatives because Rule 60(b) relief resolved jurisdictional obstacle |
| Scope and limits of Rule 60(b) post‑1991 amendments (interaction with Rules 4 and 77) | Historical practice and post-Hill decisions recognize a narrow role for Rule 60(b) to restore appeal rights for non–lack-of-notice extraordinary circumstances | Dissent: Bowles and statutory §2107 show appellate time limits are jurisdictional; Rule 60(b) cannot be used to create equitable exceptions and doing so undermines finality and statutory scheme | Majority: Rule 60(b) consistent with rules and precedent outside pure lack-of-notice cases; relief is rare and limited; reversed denial of 60(b) motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (Sup. Ct.) (Rule 4(a) deadlines are "mandatory and jurisdictional")
- Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520 (Sup. Ct.) (district court vacated and reentered judgment to restore the right to appeal where lack of notice prevented timely appeal)
- Pioneer Investment Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (Sup. Ct.) (standard for excusable neglect and four-factor test applied to late filings)
- Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (Sup. Ct.) (attorney abandonment can constitute extraordinary circumstances excusing procedural default)
- Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognized Rule 60(b) relief for attorney abandonment in habeas context)
- Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434 (6th Cir. 2015) (district court may vacate and reenter judgment under Rule 60(b) in extraordinary non–lack-of-notice cases)
- In re Stein, 197 F.3d 421 (9th Cir. 1999) (Rule 60(b) relief limited in pure lack-of-notice cases after Rule 4(a)(6) addition)
- Yadav v. Charles Schwab & Co., 935 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1991) (district clerk violated Rule 3(d) by delaying forwarding NOA; prompt forwarding could permit curing jurisdictional defects)
- Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257 (Sup. Ct.) (discussed interplay of post-judgment motions and appeal deadlines; concurrence noted Rule 60(b) could have been operative if invoked)