In Re: Alexander v. Stein, Debtor. John Mitchell, as Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Alexander Stein v. Burt Vetterlein & Bushnell Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Eric H. Vetterlein Burt & Gordon Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Robert G. Burt Andrea L. Bushnell Burt & Vetterlein Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation, and Mark A. Gordon, in Re: Alexander v. Stein, Debtor. John Mitchell, as Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Alexander Stein v. Burt Vetterlein & Bushnell Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Burt & Gordon Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Robert G. Burt Burt & Vetterlein Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation, and Eric H. Vetterlein Mark A. Gordon Andrea L. BushnellIn Re: Alexander v. Stein, Debtor. John Mitchell, as Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Alexander Stein v. Burt Vetterlein & Bushnell Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Eric H. Vetterlein Burt & Gordon Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Robert G. Burt Andrea L. Bushnell Burt & Vetterlein Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation, and Mark A. Gordon, in Re: Alexander v. Stein, Debtor. John Mitchell, as Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Alexander Stein v. Burt Vetterlein & Bushnell Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Burt & Gordon Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation Robert G. Burt Burt & Vetterlein Pc, an Oregon Professional Corporation, and Eric H. Vetterlein Mark A. Gordon Andrea L. Bushnell
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OPINION
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:
Mark A. Gordon, Robert G. Burt, and Burt & Gordon, P.C.3 appeal the district court‘s denial of their motions to vacate a judgment and to then reenter it so that they could appeal from the reentered decision. See
BACKGROUND
On August 6, 1997, the district court entered a final judgment in favor of bankruptcy trustee John H. Mitchell and against the Attorneys. See
Long after the normal 30-day period had run, the Attorneys filed motions with the district court to obtain relief from their failure to file their notices of appeal. They asserted that they had not received notice of the entry of the orders, and further pointed out that in February of 1998 they had written to the district court to ascertain the status of their post trial motions, but had heard nothing. Only later -April 9 & 10, 1998 -did they discover that the orders denying the motions had been entered on October 1, 1997. They then filed motions to obtain relief from their failure to file their appeals in a timely fashion.
On April 20, 1998, Gordon sought relief by means of a motion to vacate and reenter the judgment. See
The district court denied all of the Attorneys’ motions, and these appeals from the denial followed.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction pursuant to
We review the district court‘s denial of the
DISCUSSION
The district court determined that on the facts of this case relief was not available under Rule 60(b) because the exclusive remedies for a failure to file a timely notice of appeal due to a lack of notice of entry of the judgment or order were contained in Rule 4(a). It added that the Attorneys had not brought themselves within the provisions of Rule 4(a). As we will explain, we agree with those assessments.6
Because of continuing problems in the area of notice of entry and because judgments should achieve finality at some definite point, Rule 4(a) was amended in 1991. Before that, the Rules already contained a relief provision, albeit a very restricted one. “The district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a).” Rule 4(a)(5).7
That rule did not really take care of the situation where a party had failed to file a timely notice of appeal because it had not actually received notice of the entry of the judgment or order. Of course, it had long been the burden of the party to ascertain when the judgment or order was entered, even if the notice of entry was not sent or was not received. See
The district court, if it finds (a) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry and (b) that no party would be prejudiced, may, upon motion filed within 180 days of entry of the judgment or order or within 7 days of receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal.
While Rule 77(d) was also amended, the pertinent part remained the same as it had been before.
A leading treatise has reached the same conclusion. As that treatise puts it: “Rule 4(a)(6) provides the exclusive means for extending appeal time for failure to learn that judgment has been entered. Once the 180-day period has expired, a district court cannot rely on the one-time practice of vacating the judgment and reentering the same judgment in order to create a new appeal period.” 16A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure S 3590.6 at 228 (3d ed. 1999). Other courts of appeals that have reflected upon the matter have agreed with that assessment.
The Eighth Circuit addressed the question in Zimmer St. Louis, Inc. v. Zimmer Co., 32 F.3d 357 (8th Cir. 1994). In that case, a party sought to use Rule 60(b) -in particular 60(b)(6) -for the purpose of obtaining relief after it had failed to meet the provisions of Rule 4(a). See id. at 359. It had attempted to ascertain whether an order had been entered by checking the district court‘s file and docket, but had failed to come across the entry. See id. The Court of Appeals referred to the materials we have already mentioned and then declared:
It is our view that the 1991 amendment was designed to respond to the circumstances that had prompted courts to use
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to circumvent the deadlines specified byFed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) . Other courts and commentators have so concluded as well.It therefore appears that the plain language of both
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6) andFed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) addresses specifically the problem of lack of notice of a final judgment. That specificity, in our view, precludes the use ofFed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) to cure problems of lack of notice. Since that language also delineates a specific period during which the period for appeal may be reopened, moreover, we conclude that the district courts no longer have the discretion to grant motions to reopen the period for appeal that are filed outside that specific period, even if the appellant does not receive notice until that period has expired. 160
Id. at 360-61 (citations omitted). We agree with that analysis, and do not see how the Attorneys’ added reliance on Rule 60(b)(1) can have any effect whatsoever upon it. Use of Rule 60(b)(1), no less than use of Rule 60(b)(6), would derogate from the purpose and effect of Rule 4(a). Neither of Rule 60(b)‘s provisions is the handsel that the Attorneys seek.
Nor is there any authority to the contrary. Quite the reverse. In Eaton v. Jamrog, 984 F.2d 760 (6th Cir. 1993), the court overturned the district court‘s vacation and reentry of judgment for the purpose of giving “plaintiffs the opportunity to perfect a timely appeal.” Id. at 762. The court said, “[a] district court may not vacate its earlier judgment to avoid
In fine, Rule 4(a) and Rule 77(d) now form a tessellated scheme; they leave no gaps for Rule 60(b) to fill. Therefore, the district court did not err when it declined to allow the Attorneys relief under Rule 60(b).
B&G, however, alternatively claims that Rule 4(a) itself mandates relief. We disagree because B&G‘s motion was filed far outside the limitation periods in Rule 4(a)(5)-(6). Clearly, it was not filed within the 30-day period provided by Rule 4(a)(5). Nor was it filed within the 180-day period provided by Rule 4(a)(6); for that matter, it was not even filed “within 7 days of receipt of notice.” See Rule 4(a)(6). But, argues B&G, the 30-day period of Rule 4(a)(5) should be tacked onto the 180-day period of Rule 4(a)(6), and it did file within that time. We do not agree.
The provisions clearly stand alone as entirely separate methods of affording relief from a failure to file within the appropriate time -the one provides a 30-day window for extending the normal time to appeal, and the other a separate maximum 180-day window to reopen the time. As the Advisory Committee notes show, the generous 180-day period was intended to be the “outer time limit” for relief. See Rule 4(a) advisory committee‘s note (1991 Amendment). Nothing suggests an intent to add still another 30-day period to that. B&G believes that the 1998 amendments show that the 30-day extension period can be added to the 180-day reopening period.10 But the contrary is true. Were there the slightest doubt before the change, the specific reference to 4(a)(1) & (3) in the 1998 amendments has wiped it away. Those amendments were, as we have noted, for the purpose of making “the rule more easily understood” and were “intended to be stylistic only.” 1998 Amendment Communication to Congress. The clarification shows that “the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)” was intended to be one of the initial periods referred to in Rule 4(a)(1) & (3). It also underscores the intuition that the prescribed time for filing a notice of appeal does not include the time during which the Rule 4(a)(5) motion to extend time could itself be filed. Similarly, it does not include the time during which a Rule 4(a)(6) motion to reopen could be filed. B&G is not entitled to relief.11
CONCLUSION
Gordon and B&G failed to check the docket and, thus, did not ascertain that the orders denying their post trial motions had been entered. They did not discover their error until after the relief periods provided in Rule 4(a) had passed. The district court, therefore, properly refused relief under that rule. Moreover, Rule 60(b) cannot be used as an apotropaion that will avert the harm which has befallen them. Again, the district court did not err.12
AFFIRMED.
Notes
(A) The district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal if: (i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time pre scribed by this Rule 4(a) expires: and (ii) that party shows excusable neglect or good cause. (B) A motion filed before the expiration of the time prescribed in Rule 4(a)(1) or (3) may be ex parte unless the court requires otherwise. If the motion is filed after the expiration of the pre scribed time, notice must be given to the other parties in accor dance with local rules. (C) No extension under this Rule 4(a)(5) may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time or 10 days after the date when the order granting the motion is entered, whichever is later.