Washington Environmental Counc v. Theodore Sturdevant
732 F.3d 1131
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Cross-appeal about district court rulings on dispositive motions concerning CAA citizen-suit claims regarding greenhouse gas emissions from Washington refineries.
- Plaintiffs (WEC and Sierra Club) seek to force Ecology and regional agencies to regulate GHGs at five refineries under SIP’s RACT and Narrative Standards.
- WSPA intervened for the Agencies. Court granted summary judgment on RACT claim but dismissed Narrative claim; ordered RACT process by 2014.
- Appellants contend Agencies failed to define/apply RACT for GHG emissions from refineries, violating WAC 173-400-040 and RCW 70.94.154.
- Court considers whether Plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Agencies’ regulatory conduct and the case’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Holding: Because Plaintiffs lack standing, the district court lacked jurisdiction; case vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Agencies’ failure to set RACT for GHGs? | WEC/Sierra Club assert injury-in-fact/causal link to regulatory failure. | WSPA contends causality is too attenuated and standing not satisfied. | No; standing not satisfied; dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
| Is causality sufficiently alleged to link injuries to the Agencies’ inaction on RACT? | Injuries traceable to lack of RACT controls. | Causality too attenuated; multiple third parties/sources. | Causality not established; record lacks plausible nexus between refinery emissions and injuries. |
| Is redressability satisfied for injunctive relief addressing RACT? | Relief would curb emissions and redress injuries. | Redress may be unlikely given global nature of emissions. | Redressability not satisfied; relief unlikely to remedy localized injuries amid global emissions. |
| Does Massachusetts v. EPA relaxed standing for private parties? | Massachusetts supports relaxed standing for states; could apply here. | Massachusetts rests on sovereign status; not applicable to private groups. | Massachusetts does not apply; private plaintiffs not sovereigns; standing not established. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires injury, causation, redressability)
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (sovereign state special solicitude; procedural posture matters)
- NRDC v. EPA, 542 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2008) (standing requires concrete, particularized injuries tied to challenged action)
- Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) (causation chain must be plausible; attenuated links insufficient)
- Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2008) (standing requires more than environmental injury; need nexus to challenged conduct)
- Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2011) (causality in standing absence for global phenomena)
- American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (standing considerations in climate-related claims; context differs from private plaintiffs)