Warren Crozier v. Westside Community School Dist
973 F.3d 882
8th Cir.2020Background
- In 2016 A.C., an eighth-grade student, expressed views in class critical of kneeling during the national anthem; the teacher allegedly interrupted her, later told other students A.C. was a racist and had used the “N-word,” and suggested she had been suspended.
- A.C. suffered harassment, severe emotional distress, two suicide attempts, therapy, and was withdrawn from school by her parents; parents later transferred her to a new school.
- Warren and Paula Crozier filed a pro se § 1983 complaint on behalf of A.C. (and asserted derivative damages for themselves); the district court held non-attorney parents cannot represent a minor pro se and dismissed without prejudice (Crozier I).
- After failing to retain counsel (27+ lawyers contacted), the Croziers refiled and moved for appointed counsel; the district court denied appointment because the claims were “not likely to be of substance” and A.C. lacked standing for prospective relief (Crozier II) and again dismissed without prejudice.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed that non‑attorney parents may not litigate a child’s § 1983 claims pro se, but reversed the denial of appointed counsel and remanded with directions to request counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), finding the core First Amendment retaliation claim warranted counsel to avoid effectively terminating the case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether non‑attorney parents may represent a minor pro se in federal court under § 1983 | Crozier: parents should be allowed to proceed pro se to protect child’s access and because their interests are aligned | Court/defendant: federal practice and state law prohibit non‑lawyers from representing others; parents lack authority to litigate child’s claims | Held: Parents cannot litigate a minor’s § 1983 claims pro se; affirmed |
| Whether parents may bring individual § 1983 claims derivative of the child’s constitutional injury | Crozier: they claimed personal damages from child’s harms and asserted their own claims | Court/defendant: parents lack standing to bring individual § 1983 claims that arise solely from alleged violations of their child’s rights | Held: Parents lack standing to assert only-derivative § 1983 claims; affirmed |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying appointment of counsel to indigent plaintiffs | Crozier: denial relied improperly on merits (Hale) and failed to account for Patterson factors; counsel necessary to avoid delay/prejudice | Court/defendant: court may consider merits plus plaintiff’s efforts and resources; claims appeared unlikely to succeed so counsel not warranted | Held: Reversed — district court erred; core First Amendment retaliation claim was serious and denial coupled with pro se prohibition effectively terminated the case; remanded with direction to request counsel under § 1915(e) |
Key Cases Cited
- Martin‑Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1982) (pro se complaint standards; liberally construed)
- Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (U.S. 1969) (students do not shed First Amendment rights at school)
- Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (U.S. 1988) (schools may regulate curricular student speech for pedagogical reasons)
- Myers v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2005) (non‑attorney parents generally may not litigate minor children’s claims)
- Patterson v. Kelly, 902 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2018) (factors relevant to appointment of counsel in civil cases)
- Hale v. North Little Rock Hous. Auth., 720 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1983) (district court may consider merits, efforts to obtain counsel, and finances when deciding appointment)
- Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2002) (framework for appointing counsel in social‑security context; outlines factors courts may consider)
- Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2010) (no broad exception permitting non‑attorney parents to litigate § 1983 claims)