On thе surface, this appeal presents a straightforward question: did the district court err when it concluded that the parties reached an enforceable oral agreement to settle their dispute? But we cannot reach that question unless the appellants can overcome several procedural hurdles. The underlying case was brought by Crystal Elustra and her mother Christine Lopez, who appeared as next friend of Crystal’s younger sisters, Moriah Elustra and Najati Elustra (both minors). The suit arose out of an argument that erupted on July 22, 2007, over the bill that the Elustra girls and some Mends owed at the Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant, which is owned by Brad Fralich. Before things settled down, the police had been called and the girls were arrested on charges of disorderly conduct and curfew violations. Those charges were ultimately dropped, paving the way for this action against Frankfurt Police Officer Tom Mineo, Fralich, and Buffalo Wild Wings. The Elustras asserted that Officer Mineo had violated their civil rights and that Fralich had falsely imprisoned them. Moriah Elustra also complained about injuries to her head and wrists that shе suffered during the course of the arrest.
Shortly after the suit was filed, the parties initiated settlement discussions. Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow presided over a two-hour settlement conference, the details of which we provide below. He concluded that the parties reached an oral settlement at the end of that conference and recommended that the district court enter judgment dismissing the suit pursuant to the agreement. The district court did so. Although the court proceedings were not as smooth as they might have been, we see no error in the district court’s decision, and we therefore affirm.
I
The settlement conference before Judge Denlow took place on November 21, 2008. The Elustras attended the conference with their attorney, Michael Conway. Defendants were present only through counsel. During the conference, defendants presented a global settlement offer of $6,000 in exchange for a release of all claims. What happened next is disputed, but it appears that Judge Denlow communicated this offer to the plaintiffs and their attor *703 ney, and they accepted the offer. The settlement conference was off the record, but Judge Denlow later reported that “agreement was reached.”
Before anyone had a chance to commit the terms of the agreement to writing, Morad Elustra — the father of the Elustra girls and a nonparty-asked to speak with Conway. The two men began to argue, and the conversation ended with Morad telling Conway that the family would find another lawyer. The entire family then re-entered the courtroom, gathered their coаts, and left; they pointedly ignored warnings that it was in their best interest to stay and participate in the hearing.
At that point, the defendants orally moved to enter judgment dismissing the case with prejudice, in accordance with the settlement agreement, and Judge Denlow announced that he would rule immediately. He confirmed that an agreement had been reached and indicated that everyone (in particular the plaintiffs) had understood the settlement and that the process had been a fair one. Conway was present for this hearing and сontinued to speak for the Elustras, despite the exchange with their father. Judge Denlow concluded with a recommendation to the district court to “enforce the settlement” — by which he meant to dismiss the case with prejudice in accordance with the agreement the parties had reached. On December 3, 2008, the district court held a brief hearing. Conway appeared for the plaintiffs, notwithstanding Morad’s effort to terminate his representation. (The record does not indicate whether Crystal Elustra or Lopez shared Morad’s dissаtisfaction with Conway.) Conway told the court, without elaboration, that plaintiffs’ recollection was that there was no agreement; he did not mention the confrontation with Morad. Relying on Judge Denlow’s report, the district court entered an order on December 11, 2008, granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice.
On December 29, 2008, Lopez filed a terse, handwritten pro se motion to vacate and reinstate the claims. With new counsel, the Elustras supplemented Lopez’s motion on January 7, 2009. Interpreting the January 7 filing as a motion for relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b) (because it was filed after the expirаtion of the 10-day period for Rule 59(e) motions), the district court denied the motion on April 2, 2009. The Elustras now appeal.
II
The Elustras have asked this court to decide whether the district court correctly found that the parties reached a binding settlement agreement, under which the case would be dismissed with prejudice in exchange for a global payment of $6,000. The defendants, however, argue that we cannot review that decision directly. In their view, the only question properly before us is whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion to reconsider. Thus, there are at least two preliminary questions before us: first, was the district court correct to treat the January 7 filing as the first motion to reconsider, and thus one filed under Rule 60(b), or did it have before it a timely Rule 59(e) motion, thanks to Lopez’s December 29 filing; second, if we are to use the December 29 motion as our point of reference, was it effective to postpone the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal? If the answer to that is yes, then we may reach the merits of the dispute over the settlement agreement. * Otherwise, we would *704 consider only the question whether the district court abused its discretion in rejecting plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration.
A
Although the defendants never raised the issue, we were concerned about Lopez’s apparent effort directly to represent, without counsel, both her minor daughters and her adult daughter when she filed the December 29 motion. We therefore requested supplemental briefing on this question. Normally, representative parties such as next friends may not conduct litigation
pro se;
pleadings may be brought before the court only by parties or their attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (providing that “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) (requiring that every motion be signed by an attorney or a party proceeding
pro se).
See also
Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co.,
The first question we must address is whether we should look to state or federal law to resolve this problem. On the one hand, Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b) provides that “capacity tо sue” is defined by state law. On the other hand, federal courts are entitled to use their own procedures, whether the case is one arising under federal law (as this one was, in part) or it is one based on another ground such as supplemental jurisdiction (as this one also was, in part) or diversity of citizenship. See
Hanna v. Plumer,
Even though federal law controls, this is the kind of question for which state law might provide useful guidance. It is common for federal law to borrow principles from state law, especially when there is a benefit to having a uniform answer within a particular state on a certain topic. See generally
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
The question for us is whether there is comparable flexibility in the general rule that a person may appear in the federal courts only
pro se
or through counsel. One consequence of the normal rule is that a next friend may not, without the аssistance of counsel, bring suit on behalf of a minor party. See
Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found, of Buffalo, Inc.,
The rule is not ironclad, however. There are, for example, some exceptions for particular kinds of proceedings. Thus, parents may bring claims
pro se
on behalf of their children in an effort to secure social security benefits. See
Machadio v. Apfel,
But the question before us is not such a sweеping one. Lopez did not file this action as next friend without the assistance of counsel, and, with the exception of the period between December 3, 2008, and January 7, 2009, she did not proceed pro se. At least until December 3, she was represented by Conway, and by January 7 she had secured replacement counsel. The narrow question is thus whether the motion that she lodged with the court on December 29 on behalf of at least two of her three daughters, while she was in the process of lining up new counsel and while the 10-day clock that applied at the time for Rule 59(e) motions was ticking, is a nullity because they did not yet have replacement counsel.
If the December 29 motion was a timely Rule 59(e) motion, then the time for taking *706 an appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing the case on the basis of the settlement did not begin to run until the motion was denied, and we can reach the merits of that order. If, on the other hand, the first cognizable motion was the one filed by counsel on January 7, then it was too late to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv) аnd (vi) (as they read prior to December 1, 2009), and we may review only the disposition of the motion to reconsider.
In this connection, it is important to recall that the point of the rule forbidding a next friend to litigate
pro se
on behalf of another person is to protect the rights of the represented party. Discussing the application of the general rule outside the child-party setting, we observed that “[mjany good reasons exist for the strict adherence to this rule, not the least of which is that a party may be bound, or his rights waived, by his legal representative.”
Lewis,
Remedial considerations also support a decision to give effect to the December 29 motion. Many of the cases that reject parents’ pleadings filed
pro se
on behalf of their children acknowledge that the appropriate remedy is to allow the child to re-litigate the case with counsel. See,
e.g., Cheung,
The Elustras have presented additional arguments in support of their position, inсluding one that draws an analogy between the Rule 59(e) motion and a formal notice of appeal, but we see no need to consider them in depth. We note only that while, on the one hand, Fed. R.App. P. 3(c)(2) provides that “[a]
pro se
notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the signer and the signer’s spouse and minor children (if they are parties), unless the notice clearly indicates otherwise,” on the other hand
*707
this court held that a notice of appeal filed by a
pro se
parent on behalf of his child was ineffective as to the child.
Navin,
Under the circumstances of this case— that is, where the plaintiffs had counsel through the issuance of a judgment, the plaintiffs were briefly without counsel during the very limited time allotted for a Rule 59(e) motion, the next friend filed a Rule 59(e) motion pro se on behalf of the minor children, and then counsel was retained to conduct the Rule 59(e) proceedings and any subsequent appeal of the judgment — we conclude that the December 29 motion should not be disregarded just bеcause it was not filed by counsel. (We note that no one has argued that Crystal Elustra, who was an adult at all times, should be excluded from any benefits conferred by that motion; in light of our ruling on the merits, we have no need to explore her situation in greater detail.)
B
The next question is whether Lopez’s December 29 filing was otherwise sufficient as a Rule 59(e) motion. The first hurdle is the time allotted to file such motions (we reiterate, under the version of the rules then prevailing). The district court entered judgment enforcing the settlement agreement on Decembеr 11, 2008. Excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, the last day of the 10-day period fell on Friday, December 26. The clerk’s office was closed on that date, however, and so under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(3), the deadline for the motion fell on the next weekday, December 29, 2008. Lopez’s pro se motion was therefore timely. The court denied that motion on April 2, 2009, and the Elustras (through counsel) filed their notice of appeal on April 30, 2009. This was within the 30 days permitted by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
Even if the December 29 motion was timely, however, defendants argue that it was too vague to satisfy Rule 59(e) and to рermit the Elustras to rely on the April 2 denial of the motion as the starting point for their notice of appeal. This court has held that otherwise timely skeletal motions that fail to satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1) do not postpone the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal, even if the party supplements the motion with additional detail after the 10-day window has expired. See
Martinez v. Trainor,
Rule 7(b)(1) requires that motions must: “(A) be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial; (B) state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order; and (C) state the relief sought.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1). See
Martinez,
I never aggred [sic] to settlement vacate order Dec 11-08 and reinstate case [signed] C. Lopez 12-21-08'
Defendants argue that this motion fails to satisfy Rule 7(b)(1). But it is hard to see how this could be so. The motion complies with each element of Rule 7(b)(1): it is in writing; it states the grounds for relief (plaintiffs did not agree to the settlement); and it states the relief sought (vacate the order and reinstate the case). The purpose of Rule 7 is to provide notice to the court and the opposing party, and that is exactly what Lopez’s motion does. We are satisfied that the December 29 motion complied with Rule 7(b)(1) and thus postponed the 30-day appeal period. We mаy now, at last, turn to the merits of the district court’s decision.
Ill
This court reviews an order dismissing with prejudice on the basis of a settlement for an abuse of discretion.
Newkirk v. Vill. of Steger,
Under Illinois law, a settlement is valid if there is an offer, acceptance, and a meeting of the minds.
Dillard v. Starcon Int’l Inc.,
A
The Elustras press most strongly the argument that there is no evidence that they accepted the settlement agreement. It is true that the settlement conference was held off the record, making our review more difficult. But the absence of a record does not necessarily invalidate the settlement agreement, even though everyone’s job is easier if there is a contemporaneous record. See
Gevas v. Ghosh,
Judge Denlow placed on the record his own description of what had happened at the settlement conference immediately after the conference concluded. He summarized his recollection as follows:
I felt that they were fair negotiations, that the parties had a complete understanding of what took place, and they so signified that to me and indicated that both sides had the advice of сounsel, were represented by able counsel in these proceedings and agreement was reached.
*709 Conway, ostensibly representing the plaintiffs at that time, did not object. The Elustras themselves (along with Lopez and Morad Elustra) had already left the courtroom, and so they were unable to controvert the judge’s account.
Now, the Elustras want to convince us that they did not accept the offer. They offer the affidavits of Crystal Elustra, Najati Elustra, and Christine Lopez, each of whom states that she did not agree to the settlement. But there is a dearth of contemporaneous evidence that might corroborate this account. Pointing to their fight with Conway and their unceremonious exit from the courtroom does not help their cause. Post-acceptance conduct does not retract an earlier acceptance. The simplest explanation of their behavior is buyers’ remorse, expressed not by any of the plaintiffs or even Lopez, but by the nonparty father, Morad Elustra.
The Elustras have no evidence that the magistrate judge or Cоnway bullied them into the settlement, nor can they show that they did not understand the terms of the deal. The only evidence — Judge Denlow’s statement that “the parties had a complete understanding of what took place” — supports the opposite conclusion. It is also worth noting that the Elustras’ estimated net recovery from the settlement apparently exceeds the cost of their medical bills from the original incident.
Admittedly, Judge Denlow’s use of the passive voice in his statement (“agreement was reached”) leaves some ambiguity аbout whether the plaintiffs or their lawyer manifested the acceptance. But this is civil litigation, and parties are bound to the actions of their chosen agent, even for such an important matter as a settlement. Given the record we have before us, the district court had no choice but to confirm the magistrate judge’s finding that the Elustras — directly or through their lawyer — accepted the agreement.
B
The Elustras also argue that there was no meeting of the minds because the material terms were not “definite and certain.”
Dillard,
The Elustras further argue that the parties’ failure to complete the magistrate judge’s settlement checklist means that no meeting of the minds could have occurred. If they had stated that no agreement would be final until it was in writing, or until the checklist was completed, we would have a different case. But they did not. The oral agreement covered all material terms, even if it did not address everything on the generic checklist.
C
The Elustras next argue that there was no binding settlement because the district court failed to comply with Local Rule 17.1, which says, “Any proposed settlement of an action brought by or on behalf of an infant or incompetent shall not become final without written approval by the court in the form of an order, judgment or decree.” N.D. Ill. Loc. R. 17.1 (2009). The district court’s December 11, 2008, order called upon the parties (including Christine Lopez as the *710 mother and next Mend of the minor plaintiffs) to execute a settlement agreement. But later, in its order of April 2, 2009, dismissing the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate, the district court decided that the December 11 order satisfied Local Rule 17.1.
In the Elustras’ opinion, the December 11 order could not have sufficed, because the final settlement documents had not been drafted at that time. But that begs the question: if there was an enforceable oral agreement settling the ease as of November 21, then it does not matter what was or was not in writing as of December 11. And in any event, wholly apart from the fact that it is not at all clear that the remedy for a violation of Local Rule 17.1 should be rescission of an otherwise regular settlement agreement, we are not persuaded that any violation of the rule occurred. As we have said, the parties agreed to the material terms of their settlement on November 21, and those were the terms that the court approved on December 11. We defer to the district court’s understanding of its own rules. See
Jessup v. Luther,
D
Last, the Elustras argue that the district court abused its discretion when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on their motion to vacate and reinstate claims. Whether to hold a hearing, however, was a matter entrusted to the court’s discretion, and we see no abuse of that discretion here. The court had a record, affidavits from the plaintiffs, and briefs from all parties. That was enough.
The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.
Notes
On December 1, 2009, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altering certain time limits took effect. All of the relevant events in this case occurred before that date. *704 Since the amendments are not retroactive, we apply the Federal Rules as they existed at the time.