663 F.Supp.3d 83
D. Me.2023Background
- Plaintiff Adrianna Wadsworth sued RSU 40 (the school district), the former MVHS principal Andrew Cavanaugh, and a school social worker, alleging Title IX, § 1983, and state tort claims for sexual harassment by Cavanaugh while she was a minor student (2016–2018).
- Record shows repeated inappropriate in-person comments, frequent sexually suggestive text messages, gifts, a car provided by Cavanaugh, invitations to move in with him, and other conduct; some faculty and the school resource officer were aware of concerning interactions but not the full content of texts.
- Superintendent Nolan did not learn of the allegations until law enforcement contacted him on November 2, 2017; he promptly placed Cavanaugh on leave and initiated an investigation that led to Cavanaugh’s resignation.
- Assistant principals Pease and Philbrook knew of some facts (pulling the student from class, nicknames, the car, reports/complaints) and had spoken to Cavanaugh, but there is no evidence they knew the sexually explicit content or frequency of texts.
- RSU 40 had a written sexual-harassment policy and complaint procedure directing reports to the “building principal” (interpreted by the Superintendent to include assistant principals) and annual trainings were given (presentations by Cavanaugh whose training files were unavailable after he removed a hard drive).
- Plaintiff agreed to dismiss state tort claims (MTCA immunity). The district moved for summary judgment on Title IX and § 1983 claims; the Court heard oral argument and ruled on March 20, 2023.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an "appropriate person" had actual notice under Title IX | Pease and Philbrook qualify as appropriate persons and their awareness of favoritism, pulling Wadsworth from class, and other conduct suffices to create triable facts of actual notice | Only an official with authority over the harasser (Superintendent) is an appropriate person for staff-on-student harassment; assistant principals lacked authority over the principal and had no actual knowledge of sexual harassment | Court: Assistant principals are "appropriate persons" under Gebser in this context, but the record does not show they had the level of actual knowledge required for Title IX; grant summary judgment to RSU 40 on Title IX claim |
| Whether RSU 40 acted with deliberate indifference (Title IX) | District’s limited responses and ineffective conversations with Cavanaugh show deliberate indifference after notice | When an appropriate official learned (Superintendent), prompt action was taken; assistant principals lacked actual knowledge of sexual harassment | Court: No actual notice to appropriate officials prior to Superintendent’s intervention; deliberate indifference not shown; Title IX fails |
| Whether RSU 40 is liable under § 1983 based on an unconstitutional policy (Monell) | The sexual-harassment policy has a "glaring hole" (saying report to "building principal" without clarifying chain), causing reports to go to the harasser and enabling harm | Policy is lawful; Superintendent and assistants understood "building principal" to include assistant principals and the chain did not create a dead end; no policy caused the injury | Court: No constitutional defect in the written policy as applied; no Monell liability on that basis; grant summary judgment |
| Whether RSU 40 is liable under § 1983 for failure to train | The district either provided no meaningful training or trainings were inadequate, producing reporting failures and deliberate indifference | District provided annual trainings (presentations) and staff knew reporting channels; plaintiff cannot show deliberate indifference or that training deficiency was the moving force causing the harm | Court: Training record does not meet the exceptionally stringent deliberate-indifference standard for municipal liability; no causal link shown; grant summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (Title IX damages require actual notice to an appropriate official and deliberate indifference)
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (Title IX requires actionable harassment to be severe, pervasive, and deny equal access; causation for compensatory relief)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (failure-to-train § 1983 standard; deliberate indifference required)
- Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy or custom causing constitutional violation)
- Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (single-incident failure-to-train only in narrow circumstances; deliberate indifference standard)
- Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61 (First Circuit construing Gebser and appropriate-person/authority requirement)
- Doe v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep’t, 969 F.3d 1 (First Circuit on Title IX deliberate-indifference framework)
- KD v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 001, 1 F.4th 591 (Eighth Circuit: actual-notice standard is onerous; favoritism and vague complaints often insufficient)