554 F.Supp.3d 366
D. Conn.2021Background
- Plaintiffs: two UConn students (Dylan Barkasy and Nicole Wade) and the parent of a third student (Amy DiSalvatore) challenged UConn’s mandatory student COVID-19 vaccination policy as violating procedural and substantive due process.
- UConn’s policy required students to report vaccination or apply for a medical or non‑medical exemption via an online form; UConn had granted a large number of non‑medical exemptions (504 of 771 applications at the time).
- DiSalvatore and Barkasy applied for non‑medical exemptions and were granted them after this suit was filed; Wade did not apply for an exemption.
- Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction; defendants moved to dismiss, arguing Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and lack of Article III standing/mootness.
- The court dismissed the Board of Trustees on Eleventh Amendment grounds, allowed only an Ex parte Young–style claim against the president for prospective federal‑law relief, and held the two granted‑exemption plaintiffs’ claims moot and Wade’s claims non‑justiciable for lack of standing because she failed to seek an exemption and did not show futility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity | UConn acted ultra vires; claims against state actors are permissible | Board and state university are arms of the State and immune; only prospective federal relief against officials fits Ex parte Young | Board dismissed as immune; President immune except for prospective relief under Ex parte Young |
| Mootness of claims by plaintiffs who received exemptions | Suit filed before exemptions were granted; relief still necessary because policy could change | Granted exemptions remove any ongoing injury; case now moot as to those plaintiffs | Claims of DiSalvatore and Barkasy are moot and dismissed |
| Standing of plaintiff who did not apply for exemption (Wade) | She need not exhaust because policy is unconstitutionally vague and invasive | A plaintiff must submit to a policy offering exemptions before suing unless doing so would be futile | Wade lacks standing for failure to apply; no futility shown; claims dismissed |
| Vagueness/futility exception to exhaustion | Policy lacks published criteria so application would be futile or pointless | Futility is narrowly construed; high grant rate and successful co‑plaintiffs show applying is not futile | Court rejects vagueness as an excuse to avoid application; futility not established |
Key Cases Cited
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (federal courts must have jurisdiction before reaching merits)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (exception to Eleventh Amendment allowing prospective injunctive relief against state officials)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (limits on federal relief against state entities)
- Virginia Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247 (2011) (state official not the State for Ex parte Young purposes when ordered to comply with federal law)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (standing requires concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury)
- TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (federal courts do not adjudicate abstract disputes; concrete injury required)
- Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (standing is assessed as of the time the suit is filed)
- Jackson‑Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1997) (failure to use a simple administrative procedure can defeat standing)
- United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012) (no standing where plaintiff failed to apply for a license provided by statute)
- Libertarian Party of Erie County v. Cuomo, 970 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2020) (plaintiffs who received the relief they sought lack standing to challenge the underlying requirement)
- In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612 (2d Cir. 2007) (Ex parte Young exception scope for injunctive relief against state officials)
- Janakievski v. Executive Director, Rochester Psychiatric Center, 955 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2020) (mootness doctrine when changed circumstances eliminate redressable injury)