Background

• Vidro, a plaintiff under the FTCA, sues the United States for alleged malicious and false grand jury testimony by two federal officers, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress.
• The officers allegedly testified before a federal grand jury about Vidro’s involvement in a drug conspiracy.
• Vidro alleges that as a result he was indicted, detained for four months, and suffered injury including humiliation and economic losses.
• The district court dismissed Vidro’s complaint at the pleading stage, ruling the United States was immune under the FTCA.
• The court concluded Connecticut would recognize absolute immunity for grand jury witness testimony, so the United States could not be vicariously liable for the officers’ statements.
• This appeal addresses whether FTCA defenses mimic private-party defenses and whether grand jury testimony is absolutely privileged under Connecticut law.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012) (grand jury witness immunity justified by public policy)
• Gallo v. Barile, 935 A.2d 103 (Conn. 2007) (absolute immunity for judicial proceedings; broad privilege extends to grand jury)
• Craig v. Stafford Constr., Inc., 856 A.2d 372 (Conn. 2004) (definitional scope of judicial proceedings and quasi-judicial authority)
• Amerex Grp., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2012) (FTCA immunity analysis aligns with private-state-law defenses)
• Petyan v. Ellis, 510 A.2d 1337 (Conn. 1986) (policies for qualified vs. absolute immunity in investigative contexts)
• Napolitano v. Flynn, 949 F.2d 617 (2d Cir. 1991) (state-law definitions of immunities apply to FTCA defenses)
• Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam Inc., 79 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1996) (statements made in judicial context treated as privileged)