Vidal v. Duke
295 F. Supp. 3d 127
E.D.N.Y2017Background
- Plaintiffs (individual DACA recipients, states, and an NGO MRNY) challenge DHS's September 2017 rescission of the DACA program and related changes (renewal deadline, information-use policy).
- Court considers only jurisdictional and justiciability defenses per Second Circuit direction; defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1).
- Defendants argue (1) APA review is precluded because the rescission is committed to agency discretion (5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)), (2) INA § 1252(g) bars review of deferred-action decisions, (3) various plaintiffs lack Article III standing, and (4) some plaintiffs fall outside the APA "zone of interests."
- Court analyzes whether there is "law to apply" for APA review, whether the rescission is a presumptively unreviewable enforcement/non-enforcement decision, and whether constitutional claims remain reviewable.
- Court also examines whether the suits "arise from" the three discrete actions in §1252(g) and whether MRNY and the States sue "by or on behalf of any alien."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether APA §701(a)(2) bars review of rescission | Plaintiffs: rescission is reviewable; there is "law to apply" (INA text, DACA history, OLC opinion); procedural and substantive APA claims permitted | Defs: decision committed to agency discretion (enforcement/prosecutorial choice) and thus unreviewable | Held: §701(a)(2) does not bar review — there is law to apply; rescission was affirmative program elimination, not a Chaney-style non‑enforcement refusal, and constitutional claims remain reviewable |
| Whether INA §1252(g) strips jurisdiction | Plaintiffs: programmatic challenge does not "arise from" decisions to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders | Defs: rescission is the denial of deferred action and a necessary step toward enforcement, so §1252(g) applies | Held: §1252(g) inapplicable — it covers only three discrete actions; programmatic rescission is not one of them; MRNY and States are not "by or on behalf of any alien" and thus §1252(g) does not bar their suits |
| Article III standing — Batalla Vidal individuals (rescission, procedures, info-use) | Individuals: loss of work authorization and increased risk of removal are concrete, traceable, and redressable; procedural and info-use injuries are cognizable | Defs: speculative future harm; no individualized notice injuries shown | Held: Individuals have standing to challenge rescission, procedural APA claims, and info‑use policy (information will facilitate removal); they lack standing for the notice claim (no alleged missed deadline or concrete harm) |
| Standing — State Plaintiffs and MRNY; parens patriae limits; zone-of-interests (jurisdictional posture) | States/MRNY: proprietary and quasi-sovereign harms (state employers, universities, economic effects, operational harms to MRNY) | Defs: harms are indirect/too generalized; Mellon bars parens suits against federal government to protect citizens from federal enforcement; zone-of-interests may exclude these plaintiffs | Held: States have standing to challenge rescission and related substantive/procedural APA and RFA claims based on proprietary harms (e.g., employing DACA recipients); States and MRNY lack standing for notice and information‑use claims (no cognizable proprietary or permissible quasi‑sovereign injury); question whether plaintiffs fall within APA zone-of-interests is a merits/cause-of-action issue and not resolved at jurisdictional stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (agency decisions not to enforce are presumptively unreviewable under §701(a)(2))
- Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (constitutional claims remain reviewable even where statute commits action to agency discretion)
- Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (interpreting §1252(g) as limited to three discrete actions and discussing reviewability of deferred-action decisions)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (strong presumption favoring judicial review in immigration context)
- Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (§701(a)(2) is a narrow exception; courts look for "law to apply")
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing requirements: injury-in-fact, causation, redressability)
- Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993) (procedural APA claims reviewable even when substance involves enforcement discretion)
- Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.) (distinguishing classwide affirmative immigration policy from enforcement discretion; cited for reviewability of programmatic actions)
- Salazar v. King, 822 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2016) (examining sources of "law to apply" for APA review)