Lincoln v. VigilLincoln v. Vigil
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
For several years in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the Indian Health Service provided diagnostic and treatment services, referred to collectively as the Indian Children’s Program (Program), to handicapped Indian children in the Southwest. In 1985, the Service decided to reallocate the Program’s resources to a nationwide effort to assist such children. We hold that the Service’s decision to discontinue the Program was “committed to agency discretion by law” and therefore not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act,
The Indian Health Service, an agency within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services, provides health care for some 1.5 million American Indian and Alaska Native people. Brief for Petitioners 2. The Service receives yearly lump-sum appropriations from Congress and expends the funds under authority of the Snyder Act, 42 Stat. 208, as amended,
The Service employs roughly 12,000 people and operates more than 500 health-care facilities in the continental United States and Alaska. See Hearings on Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1993 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, p. 32 (1992); Brief for Petitioners 2. This case concerns a collection of related services, commonly known as the Indian Children’s Program, that the Service provided from 1978 to 1985. In the words of the Court of Appeals, a “clou[d] [of] bureaucratic haze” obscures the history of the Program,
Vigil
v.
Rhoades,
953 F. 2d 1225, 1226 (CA10 1992), which seems to have grown out of a plan “to establish therapeutic and residential treatment centers
Congress never expressly appropriated funds for these centers. In 1978, however, the Service allocated approximately $292,000 from its fiscal year 1978 appropriation to its office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the planning and development of a pilot project for handicapped Indian children, which became known as the Indian Children’s Program. See 953 F. 2d, at 1227. The pilot project apparently convinced the Service that a building was needed, and, in 1979, the Service requested $3.5 million from Congress to construct a diagnostic and treatment center for handicapped Indian children. See ibid.; Hearings on Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980 before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 8, p. 250 (1979) (hereináfter House Hearings (Fiscal Year 1980)). The appropriation for fiscal year 1980 did not expressly provide the requested funds, however, and legislative reports indicated only that Congress had increased the Service’s funding by $300,000 for nationwide expansion and development of the Program in coordination with the Bureau. See H. R. Rep. No. 96-374, pp. 82-83 (1979); S. Rep. No. 96-363, p. 91 (1979).
Plans for a national program to be managed jointly by the Service and the Bureau were never fulfilled, however, and the Program continued simply as an offering of the Service’s Albuquerque office, from which the Program’s staff of 11 to 16 employees would make monthly visits to Indian communities in New Mexico and southern Colorado and on the Navajo and Hopi Reservations. Brief for Petitioners 6. The Program’s staff provided “diagnostic, evaluation, treatment
“As you are probably aware, the Indian Children’s Program has been involved in planning activities focusing on a national program effort. This process has included the termination of all direct clinical services to children in the Albuquerque, Navajo and Hopi reservation service areas. During the months of August and September,... staff will [see] children followed by the program in an effort to update programs, identify alternative resources and facilitate obtaining alternative services. In communities where there are no identified resources, meetings with community service providers will be scheduled to facilitate the networking between agencies to secure or advocate for appropriate services.” App. 80.
The Service invited public “input” during this “difficult transition,” and explained that the reallocation of resources had been “motivated by our goal of increased mental health services for all Indian [c]hildren.” Ibid. 2
The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents.
Vigil
v.
Rhoades,
746 F. Supp. 1471 (1990). The District Court held that the Service’s decision to discontinue the Program was subject to judicial review, rejecting the argument that the Service’s decision was “committed to agency discretion by law” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Like the District Court, it rejected the Service’s argument that the decision to discontinue the Program was committed to agency discretion
HH
First is the question whether it was error for the Court of Appeals to hold the substance of the Service’s decision to terminate the Program reviewable under the APA. The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof,”
Over the years, we have read
The allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation is another administrative decision traditionally regarded as committed to agency discretion. After all, the very point of a lump-sum appropriation is to give an agency the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and meet its statutory responsibilities in what it sees as the most effective or desirable way. See
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America
v.
Donovan,
241 U. S. App. D. C. 122, 128, 746 F. 2d 855, 861 (1984) (Scalia, J.) (“A lump-sum appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) to distribute the funds among some or all of the permissible objects as it sees fit”) (footnote omitted), cert. denied
sub nom. Automobile Workers
v.
Brock,
474 U. S. 825 (1985); 2 United States General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, p. 6-159 (2d ed. 1992). For this reason, a fundamental principle of appropriations law is that where “Congress merely appropriates lump-sum amounts without statutorily restricting what can be done with those funds, a clear inference arises that it does not intend to impose legally binding restrictions, and indicia in committee reports and other legislative history as to how the funds should or are expected to be spent do not establish any legal requirements on” the agency.
LTV Aerospace Corp.,
55 Comp. Gen. 307, 319 (1975); cf.
American Hospital Assn.
v.
NLRB,
499 U. S. 606, 616 (1991) (statements in committee reports do not have the force of law);
TVA
v.
Hill,
437 U. S. 153, 191 (1978) (“Expressions of committees dealing with requests for ap
Like the decision against instituting enforcement proceedings, then, an agency’s allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation requires “a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise”: whether its “resources are best spent” on one program or another; whether it “is likely to succeed” in fulfilling its statutory mandate; whether a particular program “best fits the agency’s overall policies”; and, “indeed, whether the ageney has enough resources” to fund a program “at all.”
Heckler,
470 U. S., at 831. As in
Heckler,
so here, the “agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”
Id.,
at 831-832. Of course, an agency is not free simply to disregard statutory responsibilities: Congress may always circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by putting restrictions in the operative statutes (though not, as we have seen, just in the legislative history). See
id.,
at 833. And, of course, we hardly need to note that an agency’s decision to ignore congressional expectations may expose it to grave political consequences. But as long as the agency allocates funds from a lump-sum appropriation to meet permissible statutory objectives,
The Service’s decision to discontinue the Program is accordingly unreviewable under
The Court of Appeals saw a separate limitation on the Service’s discretion in the special trust relationship existing between Indian people and the Federal Government. 953 F. 2d, at 1230-1231. We have often spoken of this relationship, see,
e. g., Cherokee Nation
v.
Georgia,
5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831) (Marshall, C. J.) (Indians’ “relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian”), and the law is “well established that the Government in its dealings with Indian tribal property acts in a fiduciary capacity,”
United States
v.
Cherokee Nation of Okla.,
480 U. S. 700, 707 (1987); see also
One final note: although respondents claimed in the District Court that the Service’s termination of the Program violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, see supra, at 189, that court expressly declined to address respondents’ constitutional arguments, 746 F. Supp., at 1483, as did the Court of Appeals, 953 F. 2d, at 1228-1229, n. 3. Thus, while the APA contemplates, in the absence of a clear expression of contrary congressional intent, that judicial review will be available for colorable constitutional claims, see Webster, 486 U. S., at 603-604, the record at this stage does not allow mature consideration of constitutional issues, which we leave for the Court of Appeals on remand.
Ill
We next consider the Court of Appeals’s holding, quite apart from the matter of substantive reviewability, that before terminating the Program the Service was required to abide by the familiar notice-and-eomment rulemaking provisions of the APA,
It is undisputed that the Service did not abide by these notice-and-comment requirements before discontinuing the Program and reallocating its resources. The Service argues that it was free from any such obligation because its decision to terminate the Program did not qualify as a “rule” within the meaning of the APA. Brief for Petitioners 29-34. Respondents, to the contrary, contend that the Service’s action falls well within the APA’s broad definition of that term. § 551(4).
6
Brief for Respondents 17-19. Determin
Our decision in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.
v.
Volpe,
401 U. S. 402 (1971), confirms our conclusion that the Service was not required to follow the notice-and-comment procedures of
Overton Park
is authority here for the proposition that decisions to expend otherwise unrestricted funds are not, without more, subject to the notice-and-eomment requirements of
Nor, finally, do we think that the Court o‘f Appeals was on solid ground in holding that Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199 (1974), required the Service to abide by the APA’s notice- and-comment provisions before terminating the Program. Those provisions were not at issue in Ruiz, where respondents challenged a provision, contained in a Bureau of Indian Affairs manual, that restricted eligibility for Indian assistance. Although the Bureau’s own regulations required it to publish the provision in the Federal Register, the Bureau had failed to do so. Id., at 233-234. We held that the Bureau’s failure to abide by its own procedures rendered the provision invalid, stating that, under those circumstances, the denial of benefits would be “inconsistent with ‘the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.’” Id., at 236 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U. S. 286, 296 (1942)). No such circumstances exist here.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Notes
By its terms, the Snyder Act applies to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, an agency within the Department of the Interior. Under
As of August 1985, the Program was providing services for 426 handicapped Indian children, and the Bureau continues to provide services for such children in discharging its responsibilities under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 773, as amended,
In full,
Significantly, Congress did see fit on occasion to impose other statutory restrictions on the Service‘s allocation of funds from its lump-sum appropriations. For example, the appropriations Act for fiscal year 1985 provided that “none of the funds appropriated under this Act to [the Service] shall be available for the initial lease of permanent structures without advance provision therefor in appropriations Acts.” Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1864. Similarly, the appropriations Act for fiscal year 1983 provided that “notwithstanding current regulations, eligibility for Indian Health Services shall be extended to non-Indians in only two situations: (1) a non-Indian woman pregnant with an eligible Indian’s child for the duration of her pregnancy through postpartum, and (2) non-Indian members of an eligible Indian’s household if the medical officer in charge determines that this is necessary to control acute infectious disease or a public health hazard.” Pub. L. 97-394, 96 Stat. 1990.
In ‘“matter[s] relating to . . . benefits,’” the Secretary of Health and Human Services has determined, as a matter of policy, to abide by the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. Brief for Petitioners 33, n. 19.
Section 651(4) provides that “‘rule’ means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.”
We express no view on the application of the publication requirements of §552, or on the propriety of the relief granted by the District Court. The Court of Appeals did not address these issues. See supra, at 190.