Vann v. City of Southaven, Mississippi
876 F.3d 133
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Early-morning controlled buy: Southaven officers used a confidential informant to arrange a one-ounce marijuana sale; Katchens (seller) and Vann (driver) arrived from Memphis.
- Undercover officers boxed Vann’s car with unmarked/plainclothes vehicles; parties dispute whether officers announced themselves or used lights/sirens.
- Vann attempted to flee by maneuvering his car; officers Logan and Jones each fired; Vann died from their shots; Katchens and his child survived.
- Central factual dispute: whether Logan ran into the car’s path and fired to prevent flight (Plaintiff’s view) or was struck/forced to shoot in self-defense as the car headed toward him (Officers’ view).
- Procedural posture: Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional seizure/excessive/deadly force and municipal liability; district court granted summary judgment for all defendants; Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated as to Logan, and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Logan violated Fourth Amendment by shooting Vann (excessive/deadly force) | Logan ran into Vann’s escape route and shot to prevent flight; Vann posed no immediate lethal threat | Logan shot in self-defense after Vann’s car struck/was about to strike him; officer faced imminent danger | Genuine dispute of material fact exists as to Logan’s conduct; summary judgment as to Logan vacated and remanded |
| Whether Logan is entitled to qualified immunity | Garner and related law clearly prohibit shooting an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect; preexisting law put Logan on notice | No controlling case clearly prohibits shooting when an officer reasonably believes he faces imminent threat from a vehicle; plaintiff must identify closely analogous precedent | Plaintiff met burden to create fact question on clearly established law in light of disputed facts; qualified immunity denied as to Logan (remand) |
| Municipal liability against City (failure to train/custom) | City’s policies/practices led to unconstitutional use of force | Plaintiff failed to identify a specific unconstitutional policy or demonstrate underlying constitutional violation as clearly established | Affirmed for City: district court’s grant of summary judgment on municipal claims affirmed |
| Proper temporal focus for excessive-force inquiry (whether prior officer conduct is relevant) | Officer’s decision to move into car’s path and shoot must be considered together; pre-shooting conduct relevant to whether threat existed | Excessive-force inquiry must focus on whether officer faced danger at the moment of the shooting; prior conduct generally irrelevant (provocation doctrine rejected) | Court treated the existence of a material factual dispute about the sequence (and thus whether threat existed) as outcome-determinative; remanded for factual resolution |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (general rule against defining clearly established law at high level of generality)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (use-of-deadly-force / qualified immunity in vehicle-related shootings)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (reasonableness of shooting a suspect fleeing by vehicle when public at risk)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (police may not shoot an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (qualified immunity where fleeing driver posed grave public-safety risk)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (use of force in high-risk vehicular flight)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (on drawing inferences for qualified immunity at summary judgment)
- Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404 (5th Cir.) (applying Garner to vehicle flight contexts)
- McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314 (5th Cir.) (qualified-immunity burden-shifting and summary-judgment standards)
- Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457 (6th Cir.) (denying qualified immunity where officer may have shot low-speed fleeing vehicle without imminent threat)