Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434

Background

Vance, an African-American BSU employee, faced racially hostile environment allegations involving Saundra Davis, a BSU catering employee who did not have authority to hire/fire/demote/transfer; district court and Seventh Circuit found Davis not Vance's supervisor, applying a negligence framework to BSU's liability; Supreme Court granted cert. to resolve supervisor status for vicarious liability under Title VII.
Seventh Circuit defined supervisor as one who can hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline; Davis lacked such power, so BSU not liable absent negligence.
Ellerth and Faragher framework set two liability paths: strict vicarious liability for tangible action by a supervisor, and vicarious liability with an affirmative defense if no tangible action; co-worker harassment uses a negligence standard.
Court granted certiorari to clarify supervisor concept and rejected the EEOC Guidance’s broader supervisor standard in favor of a tangible-action-centered test.
Lower courts were split on supervisor scope; Petitioner argued broader, government amici urged EEOC Guidance; amicus briefs referenced various circuits’ approaches.
Court affirmed Seventh Circuit, holding supervisor must be empowered to take tangible employment actions to trigger vicarious liability, rejecting broader EEOC Guidance.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Who qualifies as supervisor for Title VII vicarious liability	Vance argues broader EEOC Guidance defines supervisor	BSU/US argue Ellerth/Faragher framework supports tangible-action test	Supervisor must be empowered to take tangible employment actions
Is the EEOC Guidance's broader standard appropriate	EEOC Guidance should apply, recognizing daily-control authority	Court should reject broad standard in favor of tangible-action test	Rejected; EEOC Guidance not persuasive; adopt tangible-action standard
Whether Davis was Vance's supervisor	Davis had leadership duties and directed kitchen staff	Evidence insufficient to show Davis could take tangible actions	Davis not Vance's supervisor under the Court's standard as no tangible action power shown
Impact on harassment claims when harasser lacks tangible-action power	Victims still protected by negligence standard	Narrow supervisor definition safeguards employers	Negligence standard remains for co-worker harassment; supervisor liability limited to tangible-action power cases

Key Cases Cited

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (U.S. 1998) (established two-path liability framework; tangible-action trigger for strict liability)
Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (U.S. 1998) (supervisor harassment framework with affirmative defense when no tangible action)
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971) (hostile environment recognition under Title VII)
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (U.S. 1986) (developed hostile environment theory under Title VII)
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (U.S. 2004) (constructive discharge and employer liability framework under Ellerth/Faragher)
Noviello v. Boston, 398 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2005) (broad vs tangible-action supervisor interpretations)
Whitten v. Fred's, Inc., 601 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussed supervisor scope and daily-control authority)
Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 1998) (tangible-action and supervisor status discussions)
Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2004) (supervisor status precedents discussed)
Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2003) (EEOC Guidance influence on supervisor definition)
Rhodes v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2004) (harassment by non-tangible-action supervisors analyzed)
Starke v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012) (EEOC v. CRST harassment case cited)
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012) (illustrates supervisor scope and harassment remedies)