This discrimination case, brought under both federal and state law, involves charges of sexual and retaliatory harassment. Faced with a plethora of issues, the district court entered summary judgment for the defendant. On appeal, we must sort out which of the plaintiffs claims are timely; address whether her timeous claims for retaliatory harassment, cast in the form of a hostile work environment, are legally cognizable and sufficiently supported; grapple with her one timely claim of sexual harassment, also cast in the form of a hostile work environment; and discuss various aspects of the case relating to employer liability. After careful consideration of these variegated issues, we conclude (i) that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the retaliation claims, as those claims are timely, cognizable, and supported by sufficient evidence, but (ii) that the district court correctly entered summary judgment on the sexual harassment claims: despite the attempt to recast them in a hostile work environment format, the state-law claim is time-barred and its federal analogue runs afoul of an inexpugnable affirmative defense — the employer’s swift, effective, and ndn-negligent response to the underlying incident. Accordingly, we vacate in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings. ,
I. BACKGROUND
Because this appeal follows a grant of summary judgment, we rehearse the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party (here, the plaintiff), consistent with record support.
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,
A. The Facts.
While on the job on September 11, 1999, plaintiff-appellant Christi Noviello, a parking enforcement officer for the city of Boston, was riding in a city-owned van with her immediate superior, José Ortiz. After first announcing his intentions, Ortiz forcibly unhooked the plaintiffs brassiere, ripped it from her body, hung it on the van’s outside mirror, and bellowed a crude sexual remark to a fellow employee on the street. Over the next few days, the plaintiff reported the incident to a number of municipal hierarchs. They promptly investigated the matter, suspended Ortiz a week after the incident, and ultimately cashiered him.
Soon after Ortiz’s banishment, coworkers began to subject the plaintiff to sundry indignities, or, in the words of the employees themselves, to “bust[] her chops.” The record contains evidence of the following incidents (the plaintiff recounts others, but we have omitted those that lack any conceivable probative value):
• On October 5, 1999, Barbara DiGirola-mo accused the plaintiff of throwing a tampon at a coworker. The charge fizzled out after several witnesses attested to its falsity.
• On October 26, 1999, a coworker shouted that the plaintiff was the “scum of the earth.” Another loudly proclaimed, in reference to the plaintiff, “I smell a rat, do you smell a rat?” Yet another lamented that the parking enforcement officers’ “good” supervisor had been drummed out of office. The plaintiff complained to a senior supervisor, Irene Landry, who took no action.
• On December 8, 1999, a new employee told the plaintiff that although he had no problem with her, other coworkers had advised him to “stay away” because she was “trouble.”
• On December 9, 1999, the entire department ostracized the plaintiff during a holiday party. Consequently, she sat alone for two hours. A deputy commissioner saw her sitting alone, acknowledged the ostracism, and suggested that she change her shift. The plaintiff took the advice, but the harassment continued.
• On December 16, 1999, DiGirolamo informed the plaintiff that all personnel on her shift had to take their dinner breaks separately. The plaintiff later learned that this was not true and that she was the only person who had been told to eat alone.
• On December 21, 1999, Bernadette Gilardi announced in front of the plaintiff that she would be taking up a collection for Ortiz. She proceeded to do so during working hours.
• On December 23, 1999, the plaintiff attended a holiday party on the department’s premises. The collection for Ortiz was in full flower. Coworkers waved the money they had amassed in the plaintiffs face, crowing “look how much money we have collected!” One of the plaintiffs superiors, Kathy O’Brien, advised her to “go to the office” about the harassment. There is no evidence, however, that O’Brien intervened to stop the ongoing conduct.
• On December 30, 1999, the plaintiff met with a high-level supervisor, Kathleen Moccia. She described the toll that the harassment was taking on her and asked Moccia why management was tolerating the harassment. Moccia did not intervene. *83 Moreover, she stated that she did not think that the harassment would stop; rather, she forecast that it would become “ten times worse” with the plaintiffs recent shift change.
• In January of 2000, a tow truck driver told the plaintiff that Gilardi had begun circulating a petition urging management to dismiss the plaintiff, but that he had refused to sign it.
• During a snowstorm that month, Gi-lardi refused to pick up the plaintiff from her route. Although that refusal, duly reported, was in derogation of departmental policy, there is no evidence that Gilardi was sanctioned or punished in any way.
On March 6, 2000, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The harassment nonetheless persisted. Two examples follow:
• In February of 2001, the plaintiff approached a van that was used to transport parking enforcement officers to their posts. Gilardi was at the wheel. When she saw the plaintiff approach, she closed the van’s door, ignored the plaintiffs tapping on the window, and drove away, nearly striking the plaintiff. The plaintiff reported the incident and Gilardi admitted that she had seen the plaintiff but nonetheless had pulled away. There is no evidence that Gilardi was disciplined for this conduct.
• In March of 2001, Gilardi told a coworker, in reference to Ortiz’s firing, that the plaintiffs “payday” was drawing near.
The plaintiff alleges that, as a result of this steady stream of what she characterizes as retaliatory harassment, she lost weight, experienced nightmares and panic attacks, became anxious at work, and was forced to seek medical care.
B. Travel of the Case.
On October 16, 2002, the plaintiff requested withdrawal of her administrative complaint in order to pave the way for the institution of suit. The MCAD obliged and the plaintiff commenced a civil action against the city in a Massachusetts state court. Her complaint, filed on November 1, 2002, charged the city with violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4. On April 25, 2003, the plaintiff received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. One month later, she amended her state court complaint to include Title VII claims. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, e-3. At that point, the city removed the case to the federal district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441.
In due course, the city moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, arguing (i) that most of the plaintiffs claims under chapter 151B were time-barred; (ii) that those which remained were not actionable; (iii) that as to the federal retaliation claims, the evidence, even when interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, did not reveal any actionable conduct; and (iv) that the city could not be held liable for Ortiz’s behavior because it had taken prompt and effective remedial action. The plaintiff opposed the motion. Ruling ore sponte, the district court granted summary judgment for the city. The court concluded that there was no timely sexual harassment claim under chapter 151B and that the city’s response to the Ortiz incident foreclosed any sexual harassment claim under Title VII. As to the retaliation claims, the court acknowledged that, viewing the proof in the requisite light, the plaintiff had been subjected to a “series of distasteful, unpleasant, non-empathetic acts ... by a series of subordinate officials.” Nevertheless, the court *84 concluded that the retaliation claims must fail because none of the individual incidents was an “adverse employment action[ ]” that bore directly upon the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs employment. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The plaintiffs suit implicates both federal and state anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes. It requires us to confront — and resolve — two questions of first impression in this circuit.
As framed, all of the plaintiffs claims are dependent upon her allegation that the city tolerated a hostile work environment.
1
In general, a plaintiff may recover on such a theory when “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
Most hostile work environments are bred from an ongoing series of harassing incidents. The plaintiffs claim of a hostile work environment, based singularly upon Ortiz’s assault, is not of this ilk. However, a single act of harassment may, if egregious enough, suffice to evince a hostile work environment.
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
With this brief preface, we proceed to explicate the summary judgment standard and then examine the anatomy of the plaintiffs claims.
A. The Summary Judgment Standard.
An order granting summary judgment engenders de novo review.
Serapion v. Martinez,
Most of the facts presented by the plaintiff, as recounted above, satisfy this standard. In large part, the chronicled events are within the plaintiffs personal knowledge. The insults and taunting
*85
that the plaintiff recounts do not create hearsay problems; those statements are not offered for their truth, but, rather, to show that the words were spoken (and, thus, contributed to the hostile work environment). They are, therefore, admissible.
See Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr.,
We note, however, that two statements give us pause. The first is a statement from an unnamed coworker that other employees told him to “stay away” from the plaintiff as she was “trouble.” Insofar as the plaintiff is attempting to introduce this statement as evidence of
other
coworkers’ harassing behavior, it is hearsay; its probative value ultimately depends on the truth of the declarant’s own unsworn out-of-court utterance. It is, therefore, inadmissible.
2
See
Fed.R.Evid. 801, 802;
see also Vazquez,
B. Timeliness.
The first question that we must answer pertains to timeliness. In order to prosecute a harassment claim under either Massachusetts or federal law, an aggrieved party must first file a timely administrative complaint. The time parameters for these filings differ. In 1999, chapter 151B mandated filing with the MCAD within six months of the alleged violation.
See
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 5 (1989) (amended 2002). By contrast, the EEOC filing had to occur within 300 days of the date of the alleged violation.
See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1);
see also Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners,
A claimant who wishes to sue under chapter 151B must allow a waiting period to pass, file her suit, and notify the MCAD (which is then required to dismiss the administrative proceeding). Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9. This civil suit must be instituted no later than three years after the occurrence of the alleged violation.
See id.
The federal prototype is different. A Title VII claimant may sue only after the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Once such a letter is received, the claimant must file her suit within ninety days.
Id.
The fact that an analogous state statute of limitations has expired with respect to a parallel state harassment action does not create
*86
a temporal bar to a Title VII suit.
See Burgh v. Borough Council,
Here, the plaintiffs Title VII claims are unquestionably timely: she received a right-to-sue letter on April 25, 2003 and added her Title VII claims to her pending suit on May 19, 2003. The situation is more tenebrous with regard to the chapter 151B claims. The plaintiff first brought suit on these claims on November 1, 2002. Based on the three-year statute of limitations applicable to chapter 151B actions, this would seem to foreclose recovery for any incidents that occurred prior to November 1, 1999, including the original sexual harassment and several of the instances of alleged retaliation.
The plaintiff offers a theory as to why these claims nonetheless are timely. After reviewing her thesis, we conclude that her state-law claims based on the Ortiz imbroglio are barred but that her retaliation claims are not. We explain briefly.
Massachusetts law recognizes that “some claims of discrimination involve a series of related events that have to be viewed in their totality in order to assess adequately their discriminatory nature and impact.”
Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co.,
The application of the continuing violation doctrine sometimes has the effect of expanding the three-year filing deadline for suits under chapter 151B.
See, e.g., Clifton,
On the one hand, we think that reasonable jurors could find that the distasteful and unpleasant actions undertaken by the plaintiffs coworkers before and after November 1, 1999 were part of a pattern of retaliation. For one thing, the harassment began soon after the plaintiff lodged her initial complaint about Ortiz’s boorishness and surfaced most frequently in the first few months after Ortiz was dismissed. When harassment follows hard on the heels of protected activity, the timing often is strongly suggestive of retaliation.
See Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp.,
That said, we find unpersuasive the plaintiffs labored effort to include Ortiz’s solitary act of sexual harassment as part of the pattern of subsequent retaliatory acts. This attempted agglomeration relies heavily, but mistakenly, upon the MCAD’s decision in
Muise v. Credit Exch.,
When an individual sexually harasses a victim and then engages in non-sexual retaliatory harassment, the sexual and nonsexual harassment arguably may be part and parcel of the same violation.
Cf. O’Rourke,
The majority of cases are not cut from this seamless cloth. Even when retaliation is derivative of a particular act of harassment, it normally does not stem from the same animus. Most often, retaliation is a distinct and independent act of discrimination, motivated by a discrete intention to punish a person who has rocked the boat by complaining about an unlawful employment practice.
See, e.g., Ruffino v. State St. Bank & Trust Co.,
This case aptly illustrates the disparity of motives. Ortiz’s attack was a one-time incident of sexual harassment. By contrast, the retaliatory harassment consisted of a series of discrete acts orchestrated by a cohort of different individuals (not including Ortiz) and occurring over a period of many months (beginning only after Ortiz was suspended). Of critical importance, nothing in the record indicates that these retaliatory acts were undertaken for reasons related to the plaintiffs gender. As such, the sexual harassment and retaliatory harassment in this case must be viewed for what they are: two separate and independent harms.
See
Go
guen v. Quality Plan Adm’rs,
11 Mass.L.Rptr. 288,
For much the same reason, we decline the plaintiffs invitation to treat her case as one involving a “mixed-motive” claim. In support of this entreaty, the plaintiff relies upon
Lam v. Univ. of Hawaii,
To sum up, we find timely the plaintiffs Title VII sexual harassment claim and her federal and state claims for retaliatory harassment. We find untimely, however, her state-law sexual harassment claim (and, therefore, affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the defendant on that claim).
C. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment: Cognizability.
We turn now to the cognizability of the retaliatory harassment claims. Both Title VII and chapter 151B contain provisions that make it unlawful for employers to retaliate against persons who complain about unlawfully discriminatory employment practices.
See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4). To engage the gears of either statute, a plaintiff must show that (i) she undertook protected conduct, (ii) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (in) the two were causally linked.
See Dressler v. Daniel,
Here, there is no dispute that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing a complaint. The parties instead spar over the second and third elements, which in this instance collapse into a single question: did the plaintiff sustain an adverse employment action in the form of a hostile work environment based on retaliation for filing a sexual harassment complaint against Ortiz?
Typically, an adverse employment action involves a discrete change in the terms and conditions of employment (say, a discharge, demotion, or reduction in pay). This case is more nuanced. In order for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment on this record, she must show that, as a legal matter, the creation and perpetuation of a hostile work environment itself can constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action. She also must show that, as a factual matter, her coworkers’ actions furnished a sufficient basis to ground a finding that a hostile work environment actually existed.
As to the legal point, the plaintiff maintains that a hostile work environment may constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of both Title VII and chapter 151B. The city demurs. It notes that the plaintiff has not been cashiered, demoted, denied promotion, stripped of meaningful duties, or otherwise materially disadvantaged in the terms and conditions of her employment. Thus, the city argues, she *89 cannot be said to have suffered an adverse employment action.
This precise question — whether a hostile work environment can constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action — has never been fully addressed either by this court (with regard to Title VII) or by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (with regard to chapter 151B). We look at the federal and state claims separately.
1.
Tille VIL
The weight of authority supports the view that, under Title VII, the creation and perpetuation of a hostile work environment can comprise a retaliatory adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See,
e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland,
Although this court has never fully analyzed the question, our case law tilts noticeably toward the majority view. The pertinent decisions form a totem pole. At the base of the pole is*
Wyatt v. City of Boston,
This conclusion is compelled by the statutory text and comports with congressional intent. The operative provision of Title VII makes it unlawful “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Given Congress’s intention “to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to
*90
work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment,”
Harris,
We move next' to Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. That provision directs an employer not to discriminate against any employee “because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Here, the term “discriminate” appears without the qualifier. A familiar canon of construction teaches that “[a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears.”
Ratzlaf v. United States,
Our interpretation of the statutory text is shared by the EEOC, which finds the lack of any qualifier on the term “discriminate” in the anti-retaliation context to evince a purpose to “prohibit
any
discrimination that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity.”
EEOC Compl. Man.
(CCH) ¶ 8005, § 8-II.D.3 (2004). This is important because an administrative interpretation of a federal statute by the agency charged with its enforcement, while not controlling upon the courts, constitutes an informed judgment to which some deference ordinarily is due.
3
See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — this capacious reading of section 2000e-3(a) is consonant with its purpose of “[mjaintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
2. Chapter 151B. As for the state-law claim, we believe that, were the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) squarely presented with the question, it would find a retaliatory hostile *91 work environment to be an adverse employment action cognizable under chapter 151B, § 4(4). Several factors enter into this determination.
First and foremost, the statute’s anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions are very similar to the counterpart provisions contained in Title VII. Where such linguistic similarity exists, the SJC frequently looks to federal court interpretations of Title VII for guidance.
See Wheatley v. AT & T Co.,
Second, to the extent that any ambiguity lurks in the statutory language, Massachusetts law explicitly directs that the provisions of chapter 151B “shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes.” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9. As with Title VII, the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision in chapter 151B is to allow parties to “seek redress for allegations of discrimination without fear of retaliation for or interference with the exercise of that right.”
Sahli v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc.,
Third, although the SJC has not spoken directly to the subject, the Appeals Court has recognized a claim of retaliatory harassment based on a hostile work environment.
See Clifton,
To say more on this topic would be to paint the lily. For the reasons elucidated above, we hold that, under Massachusetts law as under Title VII, subjecting an employee to a hostile work environment in retaliation for protected activity constitutes an adverse employment action (and, thus, triggers the statutory prophylaxis).
D. Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment: Sufficiency of Proof.
We have established that, as a theoretical matter, subjecting a party to a hostile
*92
work environment in retaliation for protected activity may be actionable under both Title VII and chapter 151B. That poses the question whether the evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
Garside,
1.
Elements of the Cause of Action.
An allegedly retaliatory act must rise to some level of substantiality before it can be actionable.
Wideman,
In order to prove a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that she was subjected to severe or pervasive harassment that materially altered the conditions of her employment.
Faragher,
This framework is readily transferable to the retaliatory harassment context. On the one hand, if protected activity leads only to commonplace indignities typical of the workplace (such as tepid jokes, teasing, or aloofness), a reasonable person would not be deterred from such activity. After all, an employee reasonably can expect to encounter such tribulations even if she eschews any involvement in protected activity. On the other hand, severe or pervasive harassment in retaliation for engaging in protected activity threatens to deter due enforcement of the rights conferred by statutes such as Title VII and chapter 151B.
.Along this continuum, rudeness or ostracism, standing alone, usually is not enough to support a hostile work environment claim.
See Manatt v. Bank of Am.,
2. Applying the Requirements. Having sketched the contours of retaliatory hostile work environments in the Title VII and chapter 151B milieus, we reach the central question presented in this appeal: viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most flattering to the plaintiff, is the evidence of retaliatory harassment adequate to allow a reasonable jury to find that she was confronted by a hostile work environment?
At the outset, we take note of a unique difficulty posed by allegations of retaliatory harassment. When dealing
*93
with discriminatory harassment (e.g., harassment based on gender, race, or the like), there is seldom, if ever, a defensible purpose behind the injurious actions. The only question is whether the bad acts, taken in the aggregate, are sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment.
See, e.g., Cardenas v. Massey,
Retaliatory harassment, however, requires a more nuanced analysis. The very act of filing a charge against a coworker will invariably cause tension and result in a less agreeable workplace.
Von Gunten,
Even with these nuances in mind, we conclude that the evidence in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit — although certainly not compel — a reasonable jury to find that the plaintiff was subjected to a retaliation-based hostile work environment. In reaching this conclusion, we take into account the relative ubiquity of the retaliatory conduct, its severity, its natural tendency to humiliate (and, on occasion, physically threaten) a reasonable person, and its capacity to interfere with the plaintiffs work performance.
See Harris,
In the months immediately following the plaintiffs initial series of complaints about Ortiz’s actions, she was subjected to a steady stream of abuse. Much of this was significant and was of a kind that courts historically have found persuasive as evidence of a hostile work environment. She was falsely accused of misconduct (DiGiro-lamo levied a baseless charge against her in the tampon-throwing incident) — and the case law recognizes that false accusations of misconduct can contribute to the creation of a hostile work environment.
See Ray,
Gilardi’s continued tormenting of the plaintiff is also relevant. Soon after the collection incident, Gilardi interfered with the plaintiffs ability to work by leaving her out in the cold (literally, not figuratively). This conduct may be seen as having contributed to the creation of a hostile work environment.
See Gorski v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr.,
Of course, no pat formula exists for determining with certainty whether the sum of harassing workplace incidents rises to the level of an actionable hostile work environment.
See Harris,
E. The Liability Standard.
This conclusion takes us to the liability standard. In importing the hostile work environment doctrine into the anti-retaliation context, courts are left to draw the standards for employer liability from- the case law involving hostile work environments in the anti-discrimination context. The Supreme Court has divided the universe of employer liability along a line that separates supervisors from non-supervisors. When a supervisor creates a hostile work environment, the employer is vicariously liable for it, subject, however, to a possible affirmative defense.
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
This defense, familiarly known as the
Faragher/Ellerth
defense, consists of two elements which, if proven, permit the employer to avoid liability. First, the employer must show that it “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly” the harassment.
Ellerth,
524
*95
U.S. at 765,
As with Title VII, chapter 151B makes employers vicariously liable for hostile work environments created by supervisors.
College-Town,
When coworkers, rather than supervisors, are responsible for the creation and perpetuation of a hostile work environment, Title VII and chapter 151B seem essentially coterminous as they relate to employer liability. Notwithstanding the absence of a controlling Supreme Court precedent, several federal courts, including this court, have held that, in such situations, an employer can only be liable if the harassment is causally connected to some negligence on the employer’s part.
See, e.g., Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc.,
At the summary judgment stage, these determinations are complicated. The question of whether an employee is a supervisor in the relevant sense is itself factual in nature.
Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co.,
The district court’s skepticism about the claimed supervisory status of some of the harassers seems well-founded. The key to determining supervisory status is the degree of authority possessed by the putative supervisor.
Joens v. John Morrell & Co.,
In this case, the plaintiff has not presented facts sufficient to show that she was harassed at the hands of persons who qualify as .supervisors. The deposition of Irene Landry provides the clearest evidence of the organizational structure of the workplace. The parking enforcement officers are on the lowest rung of the ladder. On the next rung are the shift supervisors, who drive the parking enforcement officers to their assigned routes and pick them up. The third rung is occupied by more senior supervisors, (each of whom holds the title “senior supervisor II”). The functions of these individuals include dealing with personnel problems. During the time in question, Landry held the position of senior supervisor II. She reported to Moccia, a higher-level official who held the title of senior supervisor of parking enforcement. Moccia had authority to handle a wide variety of employee issues and complaints.
The plaintiff uses the word “supervisor” indiscriminately, referring to people on the second, third; and fourth rungs as “supervisors” and making no distinctions among them. That approach elevates nomenclature over actual authority. When we shift the focus to those persons whose actual authority made them supervisors in the relevant sense, a different picture emerges.
Landry and Moccia each appear to have possessed the requisite authority, but neither of them were guilty of any retaliatory harassment. The only two “supervisors” whose actions rationally can be said to have contributed to the hostile work environment are Gilardi and DiGiroiamo. Gi-lardi was a second-rung shift supervisor, and DiGirolamo’s level of authority seems no greater (the record only permits us to speculate on this point, and the lack of proof counts against the plaintiff). The plaintiff has presented us with no evidence that either woman had the power to terminate, discipline, or otherwise affect the terms and conditions of her employment. In the absence of such evidence, the city cannot be held vicariously responsible for their harassment.
The plaintiffs claim thus reduces to one of coworker harassment. The viability of that claim depends on whether there is sufficient evidence to permit a finding that the employer knew or should have known about the hostile work envi
*97
ronment, yet failed to stop it. We conclude that sufficient evidence exists. Plaintiff complained of the harassment to two senior supervisors (Landry and Moc-cia). Landry did not deal with the plaintiffs complaints at all and Moccia, rather than rectifying the situation, speculated that the harassment would likely become “ten times worse” with the plaintiffs recent shift change. Moreover, the deputy commissioner was aware of the harassment, but did nothing to dispel it. Since Landry, Moccia, and the deputy commissioner were appropriate recipients of the plaintiffs complaints, there is enough evidence to allow a finding of actual notice on the city’s part.
See Crowley,
The city’s only rejoinder is that the supervisors responded to the plaintiffs allegations in an appropriate manner. At best, this presents a factual dispute that is not amenable to resolution on summary judgment. Consequently, there is a trial-worthy issue as to whether the city was negligent in not putting a stop to the harassment.
F. Sexual Harassment Under Title VII.
This brings us to the plaintiffs claim that Ortiz’s assault subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her sex.
6
Even if the assault was sufficient, in and of itself, to create a hostile work environment — a proposition that we regard as highly dubious — the plaintiff cannot prevail. Though she refers to Ortiz as her “supervisor,” the record contains a paucity of evidence about his job description and authority. That which does appear indicates that Ortiz, like Gilardi, was merely a second-rung shift supervisor. As the plaintiff provided no evidence that such an employee had the authority to hire, fire, or otherwise dictate the terms and conditions of employment, vicarious liability is off the table. It follows that the plaintiff can survive summary judgment only if she can show that a rational jury could find the city negligent because it knew or should have known of the harassment yet failed to take prompt action to stop it.
Crowley,
The plaintiff cannot carry this burden. There is no evidence of any prior misconduct on Ortiz’s part. The first that the city knew (or could have known) about his assaultive demeanor was when it received the initial report of the attack. The undisputed evidence shows that a mere seven days elapsed between the time of the assault and the commencement of disciplinary proceedings (which began with Ortiz’s immediate suspension and culminated in his discharge). Between the assault and the suspension, the plaintiff says that she “encountered” Ortiz in the workplace, but there is no evidence that she was forced to work with him or was exposed to further harassment by him. While we leave open the possibility that, under certain extreme circumstances, a delay of seven days in separating a harasser and his victim might evince negligence, there is nothing to indicate that the city acted here in a dilatory manner. On this record, a rational jury could only conclude that, as to the Title VII sexual harassment claim, the city acted in a professional and appropriate manner to resolve the problem. No more was exigible.
See, e.g., Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc.,
*98 That ends this aspect of the matter. One of the main purposes of Title VII is to encourage proactive resolution of workplace harassment. We would undermine that purpose were we to subject the city to sexual harassment liability despite its prompt and effective action in investigating the incident and removing the perpetrator from the workplace.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. To recapitulate, we hold that the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her retaliatory harassment claims under Title VII and chapter 151B. As to her sexual harassment claims, however, we reach a different conclusion. Her chapter 151B claim is time-barred and her Title VII claim is foreclosed by her failure to present a trialworthy issue about whether the city was negligent in its handling of the Ortiz situation.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. No costs.
Notes
. This is an odd configuration for the claim that Ortiz, on a single occasion, sexually harassed the plaintiff. We assume that the plaintiff attempts to force the harassment claim into that mold in an effort to elude the limitations question under chapter 15IB. See infra Part 11(B).
. Were that statement offered as evidence of the declarant’s contribution to the hostile work environment, it would likely be admissible. In that event, its effect on the plaintiff would be the same regardless of the truth of the matter asserted.
See Mota,
. We emphasize that we refer here only to
Skidmore
deference, not
Chevron
deference.
Compare Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
. To be sure, the mere fact that coworkers collect money on behalf of a person accused of discrimination is not actionable. Such behavior falls outside the realm of conduct undertaken out of animus toward a complainant and should not be considered for purposes of determining whether there was a hostile work environment. The fact that coworkers *94 rubbed the plaintiffs nose in the collection is a horse of a different hue'. If the incident occurred as the plaintiff suggests (an assumption that we must indulge at the summary judgment stage), it was a clear indication of open hostility directed at the plaintiff and would have deleteriously affected her working conditions.
. The Second Circuit takes a somewhat broader view. That court considers a supervisor to be someone who has actual authority to direct an employee's work-related tasks in a way that could increase her workload or saddle her with less desirable tasks.
Mack v. Otis Elev. Co.,
. This claim is, of course, limited to Title VII. Insofar as it might have been brought under chapter 151B, it is time-barred. See supra Part 11(B).