Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA
134 S. Ct. 2427
| SCOTUS | 2014Background
- Clean Air Act PSD (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) and Title V impose permitting on "major" stationary sources: PSD triggers at 250 tpy (or 100 tpy for some categories) of "any air pollutant"; Title V major-source threshold is 100 tpy.
- In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held the Act‑wide definition of "air pollutant" includes greenhouse gases (GHGs); EPA thereafter adopted mobile‑source GHG standards (Endangerment/Tailpipe Rules).
- EPA concluded regulating GHGs under any part of the Act would trigger PSD/Title V for vast numbers of small sources, so it issued the Triggering/Tailoring Rules to (1) treat GHGs as regulated for triggering purposes but (2) temporarily raise effective thresholds (e.g., to 100,000 tpy) and phase in coverage to avoid administrability problems.
- Petitioners challenged EPA’s approach in the D.C. Circuit; that court largely upheld EPA (including that PSD/Title V triggers cover GHGs and that BACT applies to GHGs for sources already subject to PSD).
- Supreme Court reviewed whether EPA permissibly (a) treated GHGs as triggering PSD/Title V permits on the sole basis of potential GHG emissions and (b) required BACT for GHGs from "anyway" sources (sources already subject to PSD because of conventional pollutants).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Clean Air Act requires PSD/Title V permits based solely on a source's potential to emit GHGs (i.e., whether "any air pollutant" in the triggers unambiguously includes GHGs for these provisions) | EPA’s inclusion of GHGs follows from Massachusetts: the Act‑wide definition of "air pollutant" includes GHGs, so the PSD/Title V triggers apply. | EPA: Massachusetts establishes GHGs are air pollutants; PSD/Title V triggers therefore apply; practical problems can be fixed by tailoring. | Held: The Act does not compel EPA to treat GHGs as trigger pollutants for PSD/Title V in the statutory thresholds; EPA’s interpretation was not permissible because it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme and would produce an enormous, transformative expansion of regulatory authority. (Affirmed in part, reversed in part.) |
| Validity of EPA’s Tailoring Rule (raising statutory numerical thresholds to 100,000 tpy) | EPA: Tailoring was necessary to avoid catastrophic administrability problems; it was reasonable to phase in and set higher thresholds. | Petitioners: EPA may not rewrite clear statutory numerical thresholds; such a change usurps Congress’s law‑making function. | Held: Invalid. EPA may not rewrite unambiguous statutory thresholds; the Agency exceeded its authority by substituting its own numerical triggers rather than applying the statute as written. |
| Whether EPA may require BACT for GHGs from "anyway" sources (sources subject to PSD because of conventional pollutants) | Petitioners: BACT is ill‑suited to regulate GHGs (global, energy‑use based); allowing BACT here permits unbounded intrusion into facility design and is unworkable. | EPA: The BACT provision requires controls for "each pollutant subject to regulation under" the Act; once GHGs are regulated, BACT can reasonably be applied to GHGs for sources already undergoing PSD review. | Held: Permissible. EPA may require BACT for GHGs emitted by "anyway" sources, subject to case‑by‑case BACT analysis and a justified de minimis cutoff for insignificantly small GHG emitters. |
| Scope of de minimis threshold for GHG BACT application (e.g., EPA’s 75,000 tpy BACT cutoff) | Petitioners: EPA’s numeric cutoffs (75,000 tpy BACT trigger) are arbitrary and not properly justified as de minimis exceptions. | EPA: Adopted practical thresholds as part of tailoring/phase‑in; asserted discretion in setting administrable cutoffs. | Held: EPA may set a de minimis threshold for BACT, but it must justify the level on proper grounds; the Court does not endorse EPA’s 75,000 tpy as necessarily appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (held that Clean Air Act’s definition of "air pollutant" encompasses greenhouse gases and authorized EPA regulation under Title II)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretation)
- FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (courts will reject agency interpretation that reshapes statute’s structure without clear congressional authorization)
- National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (agencies must give effect to unambiguously expressed intent of Congress)
- Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (historic D.C. Circuit interpretation of BACT and PSD concepts)
- MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (significant‑questions doctrine / requirement of clear congressional authorization for agency decisions of vast economic and political significance)