USA V.tony Buck, 23 F.4th 919

In 1995 Tony Buck robbed two U.S. Postal Service carriers; in the second incident he (with accomplices) shot a carrier who survived.
In 1996 Buck was convicted of two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) (assaulting a mail carrier with intent to steal), attempted murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1114, and three § 924(c) counts for using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence; aiding and abetting convictions also applied.
Sentencing produced concurrent 210‑month terms for the substantive convictions and consecutive § 924(c) terms of 60 months (first § 2114(a) predicate) and 240 months (attempted murder predicate), totaling 510 months; one § 924(c) count was not separately imposed as duplicative.
In 2016 Buck filed a § 2255 motion arguing that his § 2114(a) convictions do not categorically qualify as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3), which if successful would reduce his § 924(c) exposure by twenty years.
The district court denied relief; the Ninth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed, holding the aggravated § 2114(a) offense (putting life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon) is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether aggravated § 2114(a) (life‑in‑jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon) is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A)	Buck: § 2114(a) does not categorically meet the elements clause; it can be satisfied by non‑violent or reckless conduct	U.S.: the life‑in‑jeopardy aggravated element requires violent physical force and thus meets the elements clause	Held: Yes; that aggravated § 2114(a) offense is categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)
Whether § 2114(a) is divisible into separate offenses (basic vs. aggravated and among aggravated elements)	Buck: aggravated language could be alternative means rather than separate elements	U.S.: statute creates distinct aggravated elements (wounding; life in jeopardy by dangerous weapon; subsequent offense)	Held: § 2114(a) is divisible into basic and aggravated offenses and the aggravated clause is further divisible into three alternative elements
Whether § 2114(a)’s aggravated element can be satisfied by mere recklessness or requires intent/knowing conduct	Buck: statute permits conviction for reckless conduct, which would not satisfy elements clause	U.S.: aggravated offense requires intentional conduct (intent to rob and intentional use/awareness of dangerous weapon)	Held: Requires purposeful/knowing conduct; mere recklessness insufficient; mens rea attaches to the aggravating element

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopts categorical approach to predicate offenses)
Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held the residual clause of § 924(c) unconstitutionally vague)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishes divisible statutes from alternative means)
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (requires purposeful or knowing conduct for elements‑clause crimes)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (permitted record‑peek under the modified categorical approach)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (elements, not facts, determine categorical match)
United States v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2017) (defines "violent physical force" for elements analysis)
McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16 (1986) (display of an unloaded gun can qualify as a dangerous weapon)
United States v. Coulter, 474 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1973) (interprets "putting in jeopardy the life" as an objective state of danger)
United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2018) (held armed bank robbery under § 2113(d) is a crime of violence)