Urgent v. United States Marshals Service
704 F. App'x 107
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Ruby Urgent applied in 2011 to MVM, a private contractor that supplies Court Security Officers (CSOs) to the U.S. Marshals Service; MVM interviewed and forwarded her application to the Marshals for a background check.
- Deputy Marshal Kirby conducted Urgent’s background investigation; the report noted Urgent lived with Diedre Finch, a former LCSO who had sued MVM five years earlier.
- An incomplete investigation was submitted by the Marshals before a deadline; an internal affairs file arrived later but was not considered due to a decision not to extend the deadline, and Urgent was disqualified on background-check grounds.
- Urgent filed an EEO complaint (initially checked reprisal but retracted) and later alleged the Marshals failed her to retaliate for Finch’s prior lawsuit; the agency rejected her discrimination and retaliation claims.
- Urgent sued under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Title VII for federal employees/applicants), arguing that because the Marshals controlled the background check she was effectively an applicant to the federal government rather than to MVM.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for the Marshals, concluding the record showed MVM (not the Marshals) paid, trained, and supervised CSOs, so § 2000e-16 did not authorize Urgent’s suit; the Third Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Urgent was an applicant to the federal government under § 2000e-16 | Urgent: Marshals’ control of the background check makes her an applicant to the Marshals | Marshals: Urgent applied to MVM; MVM hires, pays, trains, and supervises CSOs | Held: Urgent was an applicant to MVM, not the Marshals; § 2000e-16 does not authorize her suit |
| Whether the employer inquiry should turn solely on who had hiring/firing control | Urgent: focus on who controlled hiring (background check) collapses the inquiry | Marshals: Darden factors (pay, hire/fire, daily supervision) show MVM is the employer | Held: Court applies Darden factors; two key factors (pay, daily supervision) favor MVM, so Marshals not employer |
| Whether the Marshals were a joint-employer such that § 2000e-16 applies | Urgent: even limited control over standards/background could make Marshals a joint-employer | Marshals: their standards/monitoring insufficient to show routine supervision or control over employment | Held: Even assuming some control, evidence insufficient to find Marshals a joint-employer; result would not change |
| Whether Urgent’s retaliation claim was exhausted despite retracting reprisal box | Urgent: initial EEO submission and later allegations put agency on notice | Marshals: she retracted reprisal designation | Held: Agency’s final decision discussed the retaliation allegations; court treats retaliation claim as not waived for purposes of review |
Key Cases Cited
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992) (framework for determining employer status focuses on control factors)
- Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc., 808 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2015) (applies Darden factors to Title VII employer analysis)
- Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2013) (examines level of control in employment-status inquiry)
- Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2007) (discusses joint-employer analysis in this context)
- Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ., 851 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment affirmed)