University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius
988 F. Supp. 2d 912
N.D. Ind.2013Background
- Notre Dame seeks a preliminary injunction to block the ACA contraception coverage mandate as applied to its self-insured employee plan.
- Notre Dame objects on religious grounds and argues the ACA accommodation (opt-out) coerces its stance by triggering third-party contraception payments.
- The self-insured plan is administered by a TPA; Notre Dame does not directly pay for contraception; payments flow through the government marketplace and TPA arrangement.
- Regulatory history: initial narrow religious exemption evolved into an accommodation for eligible religious nonprofits; Notre Dame qualifies for the accommodation if self-certified.
- The court notes Notre Dame waited to file and proceeded with a rapid briefing/hearing schedule; the court evaluates standing, RFRA, and related constitutional claims, balancing equities.
- The court ultimately denies the injunction, finding Notre Dame unlikely to succeed on the merits and balancing equities against granting relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RFRA substantial burden standard | Notre Dame alleges the accommodation imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise by resulting third-party contraception. | The accommodation does not force Notre Dame to alter its conduct; third parties bear contraception costs and Notre Dame’s actions remain consistent with its beliefs. | Not likely to succeed; no substantial burden on religious exercise. |
| RFRA strict scrutiny applicability | RFRA requires strict scrutiny due to a substantial burden on religious exercise. | Because there is no substantial burden, strict scrutiny does not apply. | Not reached/not necessary because substantial burden found unlikely. |
| Free Exercise Clause applicability | The accommodation and contraception mandate infringe Notre Dame's Free Exercise rights. | RFRA governs and the accommodation does not force a modification of Notre Dame’s conduct; free exercise not violated. | Unlikely to succeed on Free Exercise claim. |
| Establishment Clause concerns | Exemption for religious employers and accommodation create entanglement or establish religion. | The law has secular purposes; entanglement is not excessive given neutrality and tax-code-based distinctions. | Unlikely to succeed on Establishment Clause claim. |
| Free Speech claim (compelled speech or gag order) | Accommodations compel Notre Dame to facilitate contraception and impose a gag on speech. | Certification and accommodation regulate conduct, not speech; parties remain free to express views. | Unlikely to succeed on Free Speech claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (coercion and modification of plans central to RFRA analysis; for-profit cases contrast with nonprofit accommodation)
- Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (U.S. 1988) (government action may affect beliefs without imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise)
- Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009) (coercive religious burden in prison diet context; substantial burden requires modification of behavior)
- Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (administrative actions after an opt-out do not necessarily create a substantial burden)
- Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (government actions causing emotional or spiritual offense not per se a substantial burden)
- Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (U.S. 1986) (administrative use of government tools generally does not infringe religious exercise protections)
- Droz v. Comm’r, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995) (neutral, secular exemptions with general applicability not entangling)