History
  • No items yet
midpage
Cyril Korte v. HHS
735 F.3d 654
7th Cir.
2013
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Photo 6 Grote, III; D. William William Dominic

Grote, IV; Grote, Jr.; Walter F. Mi Grote; R. Grote, chael W. Frederick III; Grote; John Industries, R. Grote LLC; Industries, Inc., and Grote Plaintiffs-Appellants, Sebelius, Secretary Kathleen of Health Services, & al., Human et Defendants-Appellees. Cyril KORTE, Korte, B. Jane E. Nos. 13-1077. Luitjohan Contractors,

Korte & Appeals, United States Court of Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Seventh Circuit. Argued May 2013. Decided Nov. SEBELIUS, Secretary Kathleen Services, Health & Human et

al., Defendants-Appellees. *5 White,

Edward Lawrence Attorney, Ann Arbor, MI, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Klein, Alisa B. Bradley Phillip Hum- phreys, Department Justice, Washing- ton, DC, for Defendants-Appellees. FLAUM, ROVNER, Before and SYKES, Judges. Circuit SYKES, Circuit Judge.

These appeals challenge consolidated the federal government’s “contraception among many im- ment. These cases—two mandate,” requirement regulatory currently pending in courts around Department Health posed by the (“HHS”) country important questions implement about Human Services —raise and their closely Patient Protection whether business owners the 2010 the terms of corporations may Act. The mandate held assert and Affordable Care objection to contraception mandate provide coverage for requires employers forcing provide and whether them to procedures contraception and sterilization coverage substantially their plans on a burdens reli- employee in their health-care hold that Noncompliance gious-exercise rights. We car- no-cost-sharing basis. plaintiffs owners and their penalties ries financial and the risk business heavy —the companies may challenge the mandate. of enforcement actions. — compelling further them We hold The are two Catholic families plaintiffs substantially cover these services burdens closely corporations and their held —one religious-exercise rights. Under company in and the construction Illinois justify RFRA the must manufacturing firm in Indiana.' other a of strict burden under the standard scruti- profit, are secular and for businesses so, far ny. So it has not done and we conformity they operate but doubt it can. Because the RFRA faith commitments of the families that own likely claims are to succeed and very plaintiffs object them. The manage protecting balance harms favors the re- providing the man- religious reasons plaintiffs, ligious-liberty rights of we They exemp- dated sued coverage. with instructions to reverse remand statutory tion on constitutional *6 barring preliminary injunctions enter en- grounds. against forcement of the them. mandate juncture stage at this is the Reli Center

gious Restoration Act of 1993 Freedom Background I. (“RFRA”), §§ seq., 2000bb et U.S.C. Contraception The A. Mandate the federal prohibits on “a placing substantial burdens 23, 2010, Congress adopted March On religion,” person’s id. Act, sweeping legis Affordable Cafe 2000bb-1(a), § it can unless demonstrate and overhaul the na regulatory lative is the re applying the burden “least Act system. The “aims tion’s health-care furthering ... strictive means of com [a] increase of Americans cov the number interest,” id. pelling governmental and decrease the ered health insurance 2000bb-l(b). § Focusing primarily oh of Indep. Fed’n cost of health care.” Nat’l claims, plaintiffs in each RFRA (“NFIB”), - U.S.-, Bus. v. Sebelius preliminary injunction. case moved for 2566, 2580, L.Ed.2d 450 relief, judges holding The denied district (2012). the Act is a re One feature of likely were not to succeed. the claims plans health-care quirement employee disagreed enjoined and provisionally We certain min provide governed ERISA1 pending ap of the mandate enforcement partici coverage plan imum levels of peal. pants and beneficiaries. See U.S.C. requirements § (applying 1185d

The have been briefed and appeals now Public A of Health argued ready part for decision. Plena- Title XXVII and are by the Act amended Affordable ry judg- our earlier Services as has confirmed review Act, rity §§ seq. et Employment 1. The Retirement Income Secu- U.S.C. ERISA-governed Act to group counseling Care health for all reproductive women with plans). specifically, More capacity.” Admin., Affordable Health Res. & Servs. Act general require- Care establishes a Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines: employer-sponsored ment group Expands Care Act Prevention Affordable plans health-care cover “preventive Coverage care Women’s Health and Well- screenings” for women on a Being, no-cost- http://www.hrsa.gov/womens basis; (last 2013). sharing Congress instructed guidelines/ HHS visited Nov. (“the to fill in the details: contraceptives These include oral methods, pill”), implants injec- barrier group plan A health and health insur- tions, emergency contraceptives oral offering group ance issuer or individual (“Plan “Ella”), B” and shall, intrauterine health insurance coverage at a February devices.2 On HHS provide minimum coverage for and shall published regulations final incorporating impose any sharing require- cost guidelines. the HRSA Group Health for— ments Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relat- ing Services, to Coverage of Preventive (4) women, respect such addi- (Feb. 2012). Fed.Reg. 8725 agen- preventive tional care and screenings cy made the mandate effective in the first not described in paragraph pro- plan year August after 2012.3 See comprehensive vided for in guidelines 147.130(b)(1). § 45 C.F.R. supported by the Health Resources Services Administration Noncompliance with the contraception [“HRSA,” agency an within HHS] punished by mandate is steep financial purposes of paragraph. this penalties and other civil remedies. For example, provide failure to the mandated § 300gg-13(a); U.S.C. see also 29 coverage brings penalty a tax per § $100 U.S.C. 1185d. day per employee $36,500 per year per — promulgating Before regulations pursu- employee. 4980D(a), § See 26 U.S.C. directive, ant to statutory the HRSA (b)(1). If employer discontinues offer- sought advice from the Institute of Medi- *7 ing a plan health altogether, penalty the is cine at the National Academy of Science $2,000 per year per employee. See id. about what services to in pre- include (c). 4980H(a), § addition, In noncomply- ventive-care mandate. Based on the Insti- ing employers potential face enforcement recommendations, tute’s the HRSA issued Secretary actions plan of Labor and comprehensive guidelines requiring cover- participants and beneficiaries under age (among things) other Food “[a]ll §§ ERISA. See U.S.C. 1185d. Drug and Administration ap- [“FDA”] proved methods, contraceptive sterilization many Like employer the other man- procedures, patient Act, education and dates the Affordable Care the con- FDA, 2013), See (July http://www.treasury.gov/ Help 2. Birth Control: Medicines You, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/By connect/blog/pages/continuing-to-implement- Audience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm the-aca-in-a-careful-thoughtful-manner-.aspx. (last 7, 2013). 313215.htm visited Nov. The announcement did not mention the con- mandate, traception already which was July Treasury Department In announced 3. effect. We postponement assume that the one-year delay implementation in the of the employer mandate has no effect on the employer so-called mandate. See Mark J. mandate; contraception government Mazur, Continuing Implement the ACAin a not advised otherwise. Manner, Treasury Careful, Thoughtful *8 organ- (June 2010). charities and social-service 34,552 34,538, Fed.Reg. izations; nonprofits; faith-based other are Finally, religious employers some managed closely held businesses for-profit, mandate, exempt contraception from the or mission in accordance with 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A), § but see 45 C.F.R. creed. initially defined “religious employer” was narrowly: quite outcry to the from responded HHS by establishing a employers left-out purposes of these “religious employer” [for [A] certain “safe harbor” for non- contraception temporary exemption pending. Becket Fund for proliferation currently See The prompted a mandate The Religious Liberty, HHS Mandate seeking exemptions on by employers lawsuits Information Central, http://www. Thebecketfund.Org, grounds. By more religious-liberty one count becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral. challenging the mandate than 70 suits profit religious organizations not covered ance carrier and the insurer issues a sepa- exemption. Group Health rate policy with the mandated coverage. Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relat- The accommodation organiza- is limited to Services, ing Coverage of Preventive following tions meet require- Eventually Fed.Reg. agency at 8728. ments: proposed “religious a revised definition of (1) organization opposes The providing employer” and an “accommodation” of a coverage for any some or all of contra nonprofit religious organi-

broader class of ceptive required services to be covered objections zations with to the mandated 147.130(a)(1)(iv) § under on account of coverage. proposed The new were rules religious objections. 6, 2013, February final form on see Cover- (2) organization operates The as a non- age Services, of Certain Preventive profit entity. Fed.Reg. published in final form on (3) organization The holds itself out as a 39,870, July Fed.Reg. see 78 religious organization. August 1, became effective see id. (4) self-certifies, organization in a revised, exemption As drops the first form and specified by manner the Secre- requirements three of the earlier definition tary, that it para- satisfies the criteria in of “religious employer,” but the change is (b)(1) graphs through of this sec- exemption’s intended to alter tion .... scope. “Religious employer” is now de- 147.131(b). § Notably C.F.R. for our organization fined as “an organized that is purposes, neither the final religious-em- operates nonprofit entity as a and is ployer exemption nor the accommodation 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) referred to section applies to for-profit employers with consci- (iii) Internal Revenue Code of entious religious objections providing 147.131(a). § as amended.” 45 C.F.R. coverage. mandated The cross-reference is the tax exemption integrated churches and their auxilia- C. The Plaintiffs ries, conventions or associations 1. The Kortes and K L& Contractors churches, and exclusively religious ac- Cyril tivities of orders. See 26 and Jane operate U.S.C. Korte own and (iii). 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (“K § Luitjohan Contractors, Korte & HHS has ex- Inc. & plained Contractors”), L simplified that “the and clarified a construction company religious employer Highland, definition of located in does not Illinois. K & L Con- expand the religious employers approximately universe of tractors has 90 full-time that qualify exemption beyond employees, for the belong 70 of whom to a union that sponsors was intended the 2012 final regu- plan. their health-insurance Coverage lations.” The company provides of Certain plan Preventive health-care Services, Fed.Reg. 39,874. for the remaining In 20 or other so nonunion em- words, exemption ployees. Together, Cyril remains limited to and Jane own “[hjouses worship about integrated and their 87% the stock of corporation *9 auxiliaries.” Id. and are only Cyril its directors. is the president secretary and Jane is the rule, Under the revised certain nonprofit company. directors, As they officers and religiously employers may affiliated re- company set all policy. ceive an essentially, an “accommodation”— attempted whereby workaround the ob- The Kortes are Catholic and follow the jecting employer gives notice to teachings its insur- regard- of the Catholic Church hand, concep- grave wrong. human life from moral On the other sanctity ing wrong- and the moral following teachings tion to natural death of their faith and abortion, sterilization, and the fulness refusing comply financially would devas- drugs and artificial of abortifacient use K L tate & Contractors and the Kortes as contraception.' They seek to

means of owners; per day per employee, its at $100 company in accordance with manage their monetary penalties would total In August faith commitments. their $730,000per year. final- contraception mandate was

when responded The Kortes to the conflict ized, that their then- the Kortes discovered legal religious between their and duties in plan covered sterilization existing health First, ways. they promulgated two ethical contraception coverage they did and — L guidelines for K & Contractors memori- they carrying. not realize were Because alizing the faith-informed moral limitations their providing coverage conflicts with company’s provision on the of health-care convictions, they began to investi- benefits, including inability provide its plans with the gate alternative health-care -abortion, coverage insurance abortifa- terminating existing plan their intention artificial drugs, contraception, cient and substituting one that conforms to the Second, K sterilization.5 the Kortes and & of their faith. requirements L Contractors filed suit the Southern contraception stood in The mandate religious exemp- District of Illinois for a way. company’s existing their health- from mandate. tion January plan care was set renew on the, triggering requirements of the 2. The Grotes and Grote Industries large penalties mandate and the financial Family manages The Grote owns and they if possible enforcement actions Industries, Inc., a manufacturer of Grote comply. did not As the Kortes understand headquartered in safety systems vehicle religious obligations, providing Kortes, Madison, coverage mandated facilitate a Indiana.6 Like the would counseling, except company’s guidelines are in the limited cir- 5. The ethical as fol- physician cumstances where a certifies lows: procedures drugs sterilization or certain faith, 1. As adherents of the Catholic we contraceptives being commonly are used as teachings hold to the of the Catholic Church prescribed with the intent to treat certain regarding sanctity life from human conditions, medical not with the intent conception We to natural death. believe that prevent pregnancy, vi- or terminate without actions intended to terminate an innocent hu- olating our beliefs. abortion, including man life abortion-in- ducing drugs, gravely sinful. We also Family plain- 6. includes individual The Grote III; teaching Grote, to the Catholic re- adhere Church’s D. William Dominic tiffs William Grote, Jr.; immorality Grote, IV; garding the of artificial means of Walter F. Michael R. Grote, III; Grote; contraception and sterilization. W. Frederick and John R. equal together family Together 2. As shareholders who with other members Grote. controlling Luitjo- plaintiffs, fully own a interest in Korte & own Grote not named as Contractors, Inc., Industries, Inc., manag- han we wish to conduct the which in turn is the Industries, LLC, ing ... in a manner that does not violate member of Grote business reference, manufacturing For ease of our faith and values. firm. Luitjo- companies as "Grote Accordingly, we and Korte & we refer to the two Grote, Contractors, for, arrange William D. III is Chair- han Inc. cannot Industries.” Grote, for, facilitate, CEO; pay provide, man William Dominic IV is or otherwise Officer; employee coverage Operating Wal- support plan health President and Chief member; sterilization, abortion, Grote, Michael contraceptives, F. Jr. is a board abor- ter Treasurer; W. Fred- tion-inducing drugs, R. Grote is the Assistant related education *10 Family claim. In both plaint due-process the Grote are Catholic adds members of plaintiffs prelimi- the moved for a in ac- cases they manage Grote Industries suit, commitments, nary injunction day filing the after cordance with their focusing primarily though exclusively not including téaching regard- moral Catholic their RFRA on claims. ing sanctity of human life and the abortion, wrongfulness of abortifacient In Korte the district court Southern contraception, artificial and sterili- drugs, motion, concluding that Illinois denied the zation. K L not the Kortes and & Contractors had demonstrated a likelihood of success on 1,148 Grote Industries has full-time em- Regarding RFRA claim in merits. locations, ployees including at various particular, judge although held that company pro- States. The the United L the Kortes and K & Contractors are plan vides a health-care self-insured is RFRA “persons” meaning within the annually every and renews on the first may protection, invoke the statute’s year. Family’s Consistent with the Grote contraception mandate does not sub- faith, prior January Catholic stantially religious-exercise burden their employee plan health-care did cover so, held, rights. judge This is because contraception procedures. and sterilization coverage the link between the mandated date, however, Starting on that the re- by and the acts condemned Kortes’ quirements contraception mandate words, religion In is too attenuated. other in. kicked the burden on exercise is insub- Contractors, Like the Kortes and K & L compelled provision stantial because the Family the Grote and Grote Industries contraception coverage too far removed object religious grounds providing on independent from the plan decisions coverage contraception, abortion-induc- participants and con- beneficiaries use ing drugs, procedures. and sterilization traception. The court also found the free- workforce, large But with its full-time unlikely exercise claim to succeed. company penalty faced an annual of almost Grote In the district court in Southern if it comply million did not with the $17 motion, Indiana likewise denied the also mandate. The Grotes and Grote Indus- concluding plaintiffs that the were not like- suit in tries filed the Southern District ly to claim. succeed their RFRA Un- Indiana for a exemption from the Illinois, colleague like her Southern mandate. however, judge the Indiana doubted that a secular, for-profit corporation like Grote Litigation D. The religious-exercise rights Industries has un- complaints Both name the Secretaries judge der RFRA. The did not decide the HHS, Labor, Treasury and the as defen- however, question, concluding instead that declaratory injunctive dants and seek any burden on the Grotes Indus- Grote against contraception relief mandate. insignificant many tries because too in- plaintiffs allege Both sets of that the man- dependent separate provision decisions RFRA; date violates their under coverage prac- of the mandated and the Clause, the Free Exercise the Establish- tices deemed immoral the Catholic Clause, Speech ment and the Free Clause Church. The court also found the consti- Amendment; of the First and the Admin- tutional Procedure Act and Administrative unlikely istrative Procedure Act. The Grote com- claims to succeed. Grote, Secretary; Secretary.

erick III is the and John R. Grote is the Assistant

665 Sec’y Specialties Corp. Illinois reached Wood v. the U.S. from Southern The case Servs., 1, first, January 2013 Human 724 F.3d just Dep’t of before the Health & us (3d Cir.2013). mandate. compliance with the re deadline 377 The D.C. Circuit injunction sought pending an plaintiffs cently closely The held the owners of two on our In a brief order and based appeal. held, for-profit likely to suc businesses merits, provisionally we early review mandate, challenge ceed on a RFRA to the likely to the RFRA claim is held that although companies are not. Gilardi weighs of harms succeed and the balance Servs., Dep’t v. Health & Human religious-liberty rights of in favor of the 13-5069, 1208, 733 F.3d 2013 WL No. Sebelius, v. No. plaintiffs. See Korte (D.C.Cir. 2013). 1, Nov. 5854246 583, 587-88, 12-3841, Fed.Appx. (7th 2012). 6757353, *4-5 Cir. Dec.

WL Analysis II. enjoined of the mandate We enforcement 2012 WL pending appeal. Id. ap These cases come to us on colleague at *5. Our dissented. in peals denying preliminary from orders 2012 WL at *5-6 Id. junctive § relief. See 28 U.S.C. 1291. To (Rovner, J., dissenting). preliminary injunction, moving win a (1) it no party must demonstrate that strength provisional of our deci-

On remedy will adequate at law and suffer Korte, Indus- the Grotes and Grote sion irreparable preliminary injunc harm if a court tries returned to the district denied; tion is there is some likeli asked for reconsid- Southern Indiana and of the claim. judge acknowledged The the sim- hood of success on merits eration. ilarity City Chicago, between the two cases but declined 651 F.3d See Ezell Cir.2011). (7th our order in Korte moving party to reconsider because If the plaintiffs The precedential burden, had no effect. this threshold the court meets injunction pend- appealed and asked for weighs competing parties harms to the Korte, analysis in ing appeal. Tracing our injunction granted if an or denied and request enjoined en- granted we interest. See public also considers the appeal. pending forcement of the mandate Ind., Inc. v. Planned Parenthood Sebelius, 708 F.3d 853-55 Grote Health, Dep’t Comm’r the Ind. State (7th Cir.2013). Again, colleague our disa- (7th Ezell, Cir.2012); 699 F.3d thoughtful explain- dissent greed, filing balancing pro equitable F.3d at 694. This contrary position. Id. at 855-67 ing her sliding-scale analysis; ceeds on a J., (Rovner, dissenting). likelihood of success on the greater merits, heavily the less the balance briefing, to full appeals proceeded fa tip moving party’s must in the harms argument May. at the end of and we heard Parenthood, F.3d at vor. See Planned then, have reached deci Since four circuits to minimize the costs of a 972. The aim is sion in similar cases. The Tenth Circuit Stutter, wrong Inc. v. Steak decision. See held, closely for-profit that two busi held Enters., Inc., F.3d N Shake likely nesses and their owners are to suc (7th Cir.2012). on a proceeds Our review exemption ceed on a claim for an from the legal review split standard of review: We Hobby Lobby RFRA. mandate under novo, fact for findings of Stores, Sebelius, conclusions de Inc. v. (10th Cir.2013). error, equitable balancing clear and Third Cir The Sixth Ezell, 651 F.3d at abuse of discretion. Corp. Autocam v. Sebeli disagree. cuits (6th us, Cir.2013); Conestoga 730 F.3d 618

666 (1)

Here, are analysis begins legal questions and ends Two contested: secular, on the merits for-profit corporation “per- with the likelihood of success is a (2) strength RFRA; of the RFRA claim. On the son” under does the'con- alone, injunctive preliminary that claim re traception substantially mandate burden warranted; lief is there is religious-exercise rights any no need of the weigh remand for the district courts to If plaintiffs, corporate? individual or injunction Although the claim is equities. questions “yes,” answer to these statutory, protects RFRA First Amend government discharge must its burden of rights, free-exercise and “in First ment justifying the mandate under strict scruti- cases, ‘the likelihood of suc Amendment ny. corpo- conclude as follows: The We often cess on the merits will deter plaintiffs “persons” rate under RFRA ” Alvarez, minative factor.’ ACLU Ill. v. may protection; invoke the statute’s (7th Cir.2012) (quoting 679 F.3d 589 contraception substantially mandate Park, Village Washington Joelner v. religious-exercise rights burdens the of all (7th Cir.2004)). Ill., 878 F.3d 620 plaintiffs; government and the “This is because the ‘loss of First Amend not carried its burden under strict scruti- unquestionably ment freedoms ... consti ny- injury.Id. irreparable (quoting tutes First, however, away pos- we clear some Burns,

Elrod v. jurisdictional objections. sible (plurality opin 49 L.Ed.2d 547 ion)). Moreover, moving party once the A. Jurisdiction establishes a likelihood of success on the merits, Although the “normally government the balance of harms never chal lenged jurisdiction, granting preliminary injunctive favors re either the district “ here, ‘injunctions lief’ because court or protecting independent First we have an always obligation satisfy jurisdic Amendment freedoms are in the ourselves that ” public (quoting interest.’ Id. at 590 tion proceeding Chris is secure before to the Walker, Minn-Chem, Legal Soc’y tian 453 F.3d Agrium merits. See Inc. v. (7th Cir.2006)). (7th Cir.2012) (en Inc., government 859 The 683 F.3d banc); equitable balancing, Stryker hasn’t addressed con Carroll v. Corp., 658 F.3d (7th Cir.2011). ceding point the plaintiffs. So the There are two appeals entirely plain arguable jurisdictional turn on whether the lurking issues here: likely Anti-Injunction tiffs’ RFRA claims are standing succeed. and the Act.7 argument, government Anti-Injunction 7. Just oral apply. before that the Act does not Supplemental Briefing 12-15, filed a "Notice of . Id. at WL at *12-15. Issues,” drawing Jurisdictional Circuit, our attention banc, sitting The Tenth en unani response jurisdiction- to a brief it filed in to a mously corporations held that the have stand Hobby al order from the Tenth Circuit in ing Anti-Injunction and that the Act does not Lobby. plaintiffs moved to strike apply; four members of the court also con Although government's ap- "notice.” plaintiffs cluded that the individual have unorthodox, proach is we have reviewed its standing. Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at supplemental brief in the Tenth Circuit case. J.); (Tymkovich, id. at 1154-56 government argued corpo- In it the that the J., (Gorsuch, concurring); id. at 1184 — 89 Hobby Lobby plaintiffs standing rate have (Matheson, J., concurring part and dissent corporations but the owners of the do not. ing part). We have our conducted own Supplemental Appellees Brief for Hob- jurisdictional analysis jurisdic and find no Stores, Sebelius, by Lobby Inc. v. impediments reaching tional the merits. Cir.2013), (10th WL government’s Accordingly, "Notice of position *3-9. The also took the Standing other enforcement action easily suffi standing cient to establish challenge Article III of the Constitution lim prior mandate to its enforcement. The judicial power its the to “Cases” and “Con *13 companies need not violate the mandate troversies,” III, 2, 1; § cl. U.S. Const. art. and risk enforcement of regulatory USA, Amnesty Clapper v. Int’l U.S. —— -, 1138, 1146, 185 bringing scheme before suit. See Wis. 133 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 264 (2013), Right a limitation understood to confine State Political Action Comm. Life Barland, the federal courts to “the traditional role (7th 139, v. 664 F.3d Cir. courts, Anglo-American which is to re 2011). implies The “existence of a statute prevent imminently dress or actual or a prosecute, pre-enforcement threat so injury persons by threatened caused challenges proper are Article [under III] law,” private or official violation of Sum probability because a injury of future Inst., 488, mers v. Earth Island 555 U.S. ‘injury’ counts for purposes of stand (2009). 492, 1142, 129 S.Ct. 173 L.Ed.2d 1 ing.” 704, Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d limi standing The doctrine enforces this (7th Cir.2010). Id.; Lujan tation. v. Wild Defenders of The Kortes and Grotes also have Article 555, 560, 2130, life, 504 U.S. S.Ct. standing, although III. (1992). this conclusion re L.Ed.2d 351 To invoke author court, quires a bit more ity of a federal elaboration. The contra litigant must have concrete, injury “an particularized, ception injures is mandate the individual imminent; fairly actual traceable to plaintiffs First, ways. two concrete be action; challenged the defendant’s and re- held, corporate ownership closely cause- is dressable ruling.” favorable Horne v. the mandate’s indirect effect on the finan Flores, 433, 445, 557 U.S. 129 S.Ct. cial interests the Kortes and Grotes as (2009). 174 L.Ed.2d 406 controlling inju shareholders a concrete ry III support sufficient Article stand contraception The in mandate ing prec under Court and circuit Supreme flicts a concrete particularized injury edent. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. of Calif. plaintiffs.8 on all of the op mandate Ltd., 331, 336, Alcan Aluminium 493 U.S. directly erates on K & L Contractors and (indi 661, 107 110 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 696 Industries, forcing provide Grote them to rect sole III shareholders have Article contraception coverage employee in their standing to challenge taxes assessed plans pain health-care of onerous finan subsidiaries); against wholly owned cial penalties possibility and the of enforce Co., v. Texor Petroleum 521 F.3d regulators charged ment actions federal Rawoof (7th Cir.2008) (sole 750, 756 implementing the Affordable share-holder Care Act.9 The threat financial penalty corporation operating pe- of a a branded Supplemental Briefing” inconsequential, corporate plaintiffs "per- 9. Whether the deny plaintiffs' and we motion to strike. religious-exercise rights sons” with within meaning question, of RFRA is a merits not a plaintiff 8. We note that ‘‘[w]here least one Chafin, jurisdictional question. v. See Chafin standing, jurisdiction is secure and the — -, 133 S.Ct. adjudicate court will the case whether the (2013); L.Ed.2d 1 Steel Co. v. Citizens for plaintiffs standing additional have or not.” Env’t, 83, 102-03, Better 523 U.S. City Chicago, 651 F.3d 696 n. Ezell Minn-Chem, (1998); 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (7th Cir.2011) (citing Village Arlington Inc., (7th Agrium Inc. 852-53 Heights Corp., v. Metro. Hous. Dev. (en banc). Cir.2012) 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)). Verner, (1972); standing Sherbert v. has Article III

troleum franchise (1963). 1790, 10L.Ed.2d 965 termination of the challenge franchisor’s Marketing Petroleum under the franchise the share Finally, we note Act). Practices holder-standing rule does not block the challenging Kortes and Grotes Second, Kortes and Grotes aspect mandate. The rule is an of third- no less concrete intangible face an but doctrine, party standing implements rights. It injury religious-exercise to their litigants may general principle associa organizational is axiomatic that rights of sue in federal court to enforce the tions, only act corporations, including *14 Bd., others. See Franchise Tax 493 U.S. agency. human See Reich Sea through Seldin, 336, 661; 422 at 110 S.Ct. Warth v. (7th Co., 413, 417 Sprite Boat 50 F.3d 490, 498, 2197, 95 S.Ct. 45 L.Ed.2d U.S. Cir.1995) abstractions act (“incorporeal (1975); 757; at Rawoof, 343 521 F.3d officers, owners, through agents”). As v. Calumet Org. MainStreet Realtors closely corporations, of their held directors (7th Cir.2007). 742, City, 505 F.3d 745 company set all the Kortes and Grotes Subject the rule exceptions, to certain day-to-day opera policy manage generally that a cannot “holds shareholder Complying tions of their businesses. "with a sue for indirect harm he suffers as result requires purchase them to the mandate Rawoof, injury corporation.” of an to the (or contraception coverage required Bd., (citing 521 F.3d at 757 Franchise Tax services), for these albeit .as self-insure 661). 336, 110 493 U.S. at S.Ct. using corpo agents companies of their third-party Like other rules of But conflicts rate funds. however, standing, the shareholder-stand commitments;- under ing prudential rule is a limitation and does faith, they requirements stand the of their authority not affect the court’s to hear the coverage in putting must refrain from this- “Prudential-standing case. doctrine ‘is not would, place doing make them so because III jurisdictional in the sense that Article complicit morally wrongful act of ” (quoting at Main- standing is.’ Id. 756 another. 747). Realtors, Street 505 F.3d at Unlike jurisdictional rules, a to do an act limita Compelling person prudential true forbids, punishing standing him for can be waived. See G & religion his tions Co., religion requires, paradig Holdings an act his S LLC v. Cont’l Cas. 697 (7th 534, Cir.2012); injuries sufficient to F.3d 540 MainStreet religious-liberty matic Realtors, jurisdiction By failing of the federal 505 at 747. invoke the F.3d See, e.g., shareholder-standing v. O Centro raise the rule in the courts. Gonzales here, Vegetal, Uniao Do district court or Espirita Beneficente 1211, Although it. we have the discre 546 U.S. 126 S.Ct. waived (2006); waiver, Rawoof, Church the Luku tion to overlook the see L.Ed.2d Realtors, Hialeah, 756-57; at Aye, City mi Babalu Inc. v. 521 F.3d MainStreet 2217, 747, here would be doing 508 U.S. 113 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d so (1993); Lee, exception A al pointless. United States v. 455 U.S. well-established (1982); direct, personal 71 L.Ed.2d 127 lows “a shareholder with bring action to suit Emp’t Thomas v. Review Bd. the Ind. interest a cause of DiV., rights if are also corporation’s 67 even Sec. Bd., (1981); Yoder, Tax implicated.” L.Ed.2d 624 Franchise Wisconsin The Kortes and the 32 L.Ed.2d 15 S.Ct. 661. promulgated by excep- The mandate was HHS comfortably fall within Grotes in- tion; personal pursuant authority delegated a direct and to it they have reli- vindicating their individual Act terest section of the Affordable Care though rights, gious-liberty even amends the Public Health Act. Services corporations held are also closely of their § 300gg-13(a)(4). See U.S.C. The stat at stake. utory component imposes of the mandate general preventive-care requirement on all Anti-Injunction Act

2. The plans (including health-care group employ Anti-Injunction pro Act The er-sponsored plans) and issuers of individ purpose of re that “no suit for vides policies. ual and health-insurance group or collection of straining the assessment See id.' The mandate is situated any maintained in court any tax shall be public-welfare title of the Code Federal any person or not such person, whether Regulations specifically, part in the —more tax against whom was person such containing regulations governing group 7421(a). § The Act 26 U.S.C. assessed.” and individual health-insurance markets. ability to col “protects Government’s § See 45 C.F.R. 147.130. mandate is *15 by] lect a consistent stream of revenue! by penalties against backed stiff tax em enjoin barring litigation to or otherwise that fail to ployers comply, see 26 U.S.C. NFIB, the collection of taxes.” obstruct 4980H, 4980D, §§ but there are additional Winn, 2582; see also Hibbs v. 132 S.Ct. consequences noncompliance, including 88, 103, S.Ct. 159 124 ERISA enforcement actions the Secre (2004); L.Ed.2d 172 Bob Jones Univ. v. tary plan participants Labor Simon, 2038, 40 94 S.Ct. beneficiaries, §§ see U.S.C. 1185d. (1974); L.Ed.2d 496 Enochs Williams subject Noncompliant health insurers are Co., Packing Navigation & 370 U.S. 1, authority enforcement of the Secre (1962). By 8 L.Ed.2d 292 tary of as well as the states which HHS Act, ordinarily may a tax operation of the § 300gg-22. operate. See U.S.C. challenged only in a suit for a refund description It should be clear from this NFIB, 2582; paid. after it is 132 S.Ct. at contraception mandate is not Univ., 416 U.S. at Bob Jones predicate imposition a to the structured as independent of a tax but instead an is. Anti-Injunction The Act does not mandate. These lawsuits tar- regulatory here.10 These are not suits “for the apply get the mandate itself. purpose restraining of’ the assessment or complaints It true that the name the collection of a tax. The suits seek relief is Secretary a in addi- regulatory sep Treasury from a mandate that exists as defendant Labor, or tion to the Secretaries of HHS and apart arate and the assessment have asked the court to contraception plaintiffs of taxes. The and the collection enjoin of the mandate provision; is not itself a tax its the enforcement mandate any plaintiffs of them. If the win location within the United States Code and mandate, they will not regulations exemption under from the corresponding HHS penalty be liable for the tax under scores as much. (1962). Hobby Anti-Injunction generally may be incorrect. See 10. is as- That Act J., (Gorsuch, jurisdictional Lobby, sumed to be a bar. See Enochs con- 723 F.3d at 1157-59 Co., Packing Navigation v. Williams & curring). 1, 6-8, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 mandates in the Affordable Care Act and § be insulated from other 4980D and will In implementing regulations. as well. its The sheer means enforcement successful, lawsuits, fairly inci required payment if will size of sense these tax corporate plaintiffs’ Any provide failure to dentally “penalty.” affect the screams Anti-Injunction Act liability. coverage But the does minimum mat the mandated —no tangentially “all related disputes significant not reach deviation —costs the ter how States, taxes.” Cohen v. United whopping per day per a employer $100 (D.C.Cir.2011); 4980D(b). also Pen see § F.3d employee. See 26 U.S.C. (5th Heard, F.2d 451-52 dleton Exacting high price noncompli such Cir.1987) (restraining assessment congressional objec that the suggests ance primary of a tax must be the collection punitive. Empress Casino Jol tive is lawsuit, of the not an incidental purpose Club, Inc., Corp. Racing iet v. Balmoral it, Anti-Injunction for the Act to effect of (7th Cir.2011) (“[A] 722, 729 tax 651 F.3d Chivatero, Linn v. apply); might totally punitive pin-pose be so (5th Cir.1983) (same). that, unimpor effect since nomenclature tant, it be classified as a fine rather should 4980D, Still, § there is no doubt that tax.”) (applying parallel than Tax Code, provision the Internal Revenue Act, Injunction protects the collec sweep in the of these implicated remedial taxes). tion of state cases, think it so we best to address properly it is classified as a “tax” whether Congress regulates private con When Anti-Injunction meaning within the noncompliance painful by duct and makes Act. It is not. exacting disproportionate severe and mon *16 etary consequences, primary purpose acknowledge Congress that used the

We (and regu the scheme must understood as § term “tax” the text of 4980D also latory than 4980H, punitive rather revenue §in re- alternative “shared States, raising. See Robertson v. United sponsibility payment” employers for that (7th Cir.1978) (the 582 F.2d 1128 drop go employee or otherwise without an Anti-Injunction apply Act does to “the not plan). language Congress health-care The tax”). purely regulatory exaction of a The ordinarily to describe an exaction is uses § obvious aim of 4980D is not to raise of whether it meant the best evidence revenue but to achieve NFIB, compliance broad Anti-Injunction Act to apply. See regulatory regime through with the deter Congress 132 S.Ct. at 2582-83. But also punishment. rence and This is so even § payment specified called the 4980D a though generates the exaction some reve-' “penalty.” originally The statute was perfect.” nue because “deterrence is never adopted part of the Health Insurance Casino, 728-29; 1996, Empress 651 F.3d see Portability Accountability Act of 104-191, Stat.1936, also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n Field No. Pub.L. 110 (4th (the er, Cir.2007) 189 “Penalty was titled on Failure to Meet Injunction apply Tax Act does not Group Require- Certain Health Plan challenge Maryland’s “Fair Act” ments,” Stat.1936, Share § see id. added). requiring spending a minimum level of on (emphasis language Con- benefits). employee health-care gress contradictory used is and thus incon- clusive. excep- also contains several The statute scienter, employer’s §

Other features of confirm that tions on the see 4980D based 4980D(c), key § provision penalize employ- is meant to indication U.S.C. not a tax. noncompliance payment penalty, ers for with the various is a (“[S]cienter NFIB, eral applicability.11 at 2595 re Smith altered the statutes, typical punitive then-prevailing quirements standard of Sherbert v. punish often wishes to Congress Verner, 406-07, because U.S.

only intentionally break the those who Yoder, and Wisconsin v. 406 U.S. at 220- law.”); Furniture Bailey v. Drexel Co. 21, applied S.Ct. which strict scru (Child Case), Labor Tax tiny to laws that the effect of had burden (1922) (“Scien- 66 L.Ed. 817 ing religious practices. Under Sherbert not with penalties, associated with ter[ ][is] Yoder, a substantial on reli burden taxes.”). Finally, $100-per-day-per- gious one from the arising exercise—even repeated formula is verbatim in employee application religion-neutral, of a generally § 300gg-22(b)(2)(C)(ii), which U.S.C. applicable un law—was unconstitutional Secretary impose authorizes the of HHS to less the could show .that on penalty noncompliant the same sort of burden was the least restrictive means of 4980D(b)(1) § imposes insurers furthering a compelling public interest. noncompliant employers. changed understanding Smith of the regulato of the Together, aspects these right. free-exercise The Court held that ry point scheme all in the same direction: general applicability neutral laws need noncompli penalty Section 4980D is a only satisfy rationality the basic test regulatory ance with the mandates on em laws; applies to all if a law incidental plans. It not a ployer-based health-care ly religion, burdens the purposes Anti-Injunction tax for exemp Constitution does require Act. By parallel reasoning the same is true Smith, 888-90, tion. 494 U.S. at §in payment of the alternative 4980H. 110 S.Ct. 1595. with the comports This conclusion Su responded to this in free- Congress shift NFIB, preme Court’s decision in RFRA, “a by enacting exercise doctrine held that the Affordable Care Act’s statutory comparable rule to the constitu responsibility payment” “shared for non rejected in tional rule Smith.” O Centro compliance with the insurance individual *17 1211; 424, Espirita, 546 U.S. at 126 S.Ct. purposes a tax for mandate is not Wilkinson, also v. 544 see Cutter U.S.

Anti-Injunction Act. 132 S.Ct. at 2582-84. L.Ed.2d 1020 125 S.Ct. NFIB, Here, Anti-Injunction as in the- Act Flores, (2005); City v. 521 U.S. Boerne a does not block decision the merits. 138 L.Ed.2d 624 S.Ct. B. The RFRA Claim (1997). statutory RFRA creates a broad right case-specific exemptions from laws Division, Department

In Employment substantially religious that burden Smith, Oregon Human Resources generally even the law is neutral and 872, 883-90, 494 U.S. if can applicable, unless the sat (1990), Supreme L.Ed.2d 876 Court RFRA isfy compelling-interest test. religious guaranteed held freedom represents congressional judgment by the Free Exercise Clause of the First insufficiently protec the rule of religious not ex- -Smith require Amendment does emptions facially gen- religious liberty.12 Congress laws of tive of filled neutral provides, hibiting U.S. perti 11. the free exercise thereof....” The First Amendment I. amend. part: "Congress Const, nent shall make no law re specting religion, pro- an establishment or Congress's findings purposes in enact- ing RFRA are as follows: Any religious practices “person accom- Id.13 whose by expressly “requiring] gap neutrality.” ‘may than RFRA rather violation of modation burdened Prisons, Bureau O’Bryan v. a claim or defense assert that violation as (7th Cir.2003). 399, 401 judicial proceeding appro in a and obtain ” Espirita, 546 U.S. priate relief.’ O Centro general rule is as follows: RFRA’s (quoting U.S.C. religion protected Free exercise of 2000bb-1(c)). § (a) general In substantially not Government shall retrospectively pro RFRA applies religion exercise of person’s burden law, spectively to “all Federal and the if results from a rule of even the burden law, implementation of that whether statu except provided general applicability, as otherwise, tory adopted and whether (b) of this section. subsection or after” its effective date. before exception § 2000bb-1. The is as U.S.C. 2000bb-3(a). § Prospective appli U.S.C. follows: qualified by cation is the rule that “stat

(b) Exception cannot Congress utes enacted one bind substantially burden may

Government free to Congress, a later which remains only if it person’s religion statute, exercise of repeal exempt the earlier duplication demonstrates statute, to current statute from the earlier person— to the burden statute, modify apply the earlier or to (1) compelling Dorsey is in furtherance of a earlier statute as modified.” — governmental’interest; States, -, United (2012). (2) 2321, 2331, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 is the least restrictive means of too; principle RFRA furthering compelling govern- accounts apply subsequently to a mental interest. statute does Yoder, (1963)[,] (a) Findings and Wisconsin v. Congress finds that— 92 S.Ct 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1) Constitution, the framers of (1972)[,] guarantee application and to its recognizing religion free exercise of as an religion in all cases where exercise of free right, protection unalienable secured its burdened; substantially in the First to the Constitu- Amendment (2) provide per a claim or defense to tion; sons whose exercise is substan religion may "neutral” toward laws government. tially burdened surely burden exercise as § 42 U.S.C. 2000bb. laws intended to interfere with exercise; Flores, City 13. In Boerne v. *18 of (3) governments substantially should not 2157, L.Ed.2d 624 117 S.Ct. 138 religious burden exercise without com- (1997), Supreme ap- Court held that as pelling justification; States, plied RFRA exceeded Con- to the (4) Smith, Employment Division v. 494 authority § gress’s legislative under 5 of the 872, 1595, U.S. 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d did Fourteenth Amendment. This not call (1990)[,] Supreme virtually 876 Court ' Congress’s authority question to "deter- into requirement gov- eliminated the government how the national will con- mine justify exer- ernment burdens on affairs,” O’Bryan v. Bureau duct its own of imposed by cise laws neutral toward reli- Prisons, Cir.2003), (7th so gion; — against the federal RFRA remains in full force (b) Purposes Espirita government, see v. O Centro Gonzales purposes chapter of this are— Vegetal, Do Uniao compelling to restore the interest test Beneficente (2006); Verner, see 163 L.Ed.2d as set forth 398, Sherbert O'Bryan, 349 F.3d at 401. 10 L.Ed.2d 965 also assigned mediating the task of these con- “explicitly excludes such law if it enacted clear, that role “man- chapter.” to this flicts. RFRA makes by reference application 2000bb-3(b). consideration, qua- dating compelling § note the under the We U.S.C. works; test, it exceptions gen- how RFRA interest to rules of only explain lifier applicability.” Espirita, The Affordable Care eral O Centro bearing no here. (internal application quota- exclude U.S. at 126 S.Ct. 1211 explicitly Act does not omitted). tion marks and alteration marks RFRA. Congress judiciary has instructed the regulatory appara- hold entire federal stan'ce in favor of Congress’s protective ' Sherbert, tus to the standard of unless not be accommodation could specifically says statute otherwise. ex- purpose RFRA’s statement of clearer. our national commitment plicitly reaffirms religion exercise of as an

to the “free prima Once a RFRA claimant makes a 2000bb(a)(l), § ex- right,” unalienable id. application facie case that the of a law or ordinary law. isting prior to and above regulation substantially burdens his reli a “sweeping ‘super- RFRA is structured as to the gious practice, burden shifts statute,’ cutting across all other federal government justify the burden under (now future, specifical- unless statutes scrutiny. Espirita, O Centro strict modifying their reach.” ly exempted) and “Congress’s 1211. S.Ct. Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Michael Stokes legislate compelling express decision Through Religious It: Freedom and the that RFRA chal interest test indicates (1995). U.S.Code, 249, 253 lenges adjudicated should in the same 56 Mont. L.Rev. interpretation” It a rule of and “an is “both constitutionally appli manner as mandated supervision general legislative exercise of Id. at cations the test....” agencies, pursuant over federal enacted Thus, litigation, 1211. in RFRA as S.Ct. gives powers each of the federal rise litigation, “the bur First Amendment agencies in the first legislation preliminary injunction stage at the dens Laycock & S. place.” Douglas Oliver 429, 126 track the burdens at trial.” Id. at Thomas, Religious Free- Interpreting Act, 73 Tex. L.Rev.

dom Restoration Corporations as RFRA 1. For-Profit (1994); Quinn see also Nicholas Rosen- ” “Persons kranz, Statutory Federal Rules Inter- 2085, 2110 pretation, 115 . Haev. L.Rev. prohibits rule general RFRA’s (2002) (explaining generally the function of substan placing federal statutory interpreta- applicable rules person’s tial on “a burdens tion). justification, compelling absent religion” short, if the least only then the burden is operates In RFRA kind furthering compel remedy the inevitable clashes restrictive means utility objective. originally As ling governmental freedom and the reali- between state, enacted, of reli RFRA defined “exercise of the modern welfare ties *19 religion “the exercise of under pervasively nearly gion” and touches regulates to the Constitution.” economic life. First Amendment every aspect of social and 103-141, § No. 107 Stat. Berg, Congress Hath Pub.L. See Thomas C. What (1993).. Congress amended the defi Wrought? Interpretative An Guide to the Act, nition in 2000 with the enactment Restoration Religious Freedom and Institutionalized Religious Land Use Judges (1994). L.Rev. 25-26 Vill. (“RLUIPA”), in the help 42 U.S.C. a court needs is awk- Persons Act Where Congress provides ward case where no the definitions in seq., making §§ 2000cc et definition, particular but the definition The term “exer- the two uniform. statutes § not to fit. There it U.S.C. seems religion” in RFRA is now defined cise of that the “unless the con- qualification is definition of “re- by cross-reference to the job indicates otherwise” has a real text “The term ligious exercise” RLUIPA: do, forcing in excusing the court from any includes exercise of ‘religious exercise’ a square peg a into round hole. by, religion, compelled or not whether point The at which the indication of to, system central a belief.” meaning becomes insistent 2000bb-2(4). particular 2000cc-5(7)(A), §§ This Id. enough poor to excuse the fit broad, undeniably very so the definition is a matter of judgment.... course religion” term “exercise of should be un- in generous 200, 113 derstood a sense. Id. at S.Ct. 716. in RFRA Dic- Nothing suggests that the “person.” RFRA does not define This tionary “person” Act’s definition of is a brings Dictionary play.14 Act into The “poor statutory fit” with the scheme. To expressly corpo- definition there includes Supreme colloquialism, use the Court’s in- determining meaning “In rations: cluding corporations in the universe of any Congress, Act of unless the context “persons” rights under RFRA is not otherwise[,] ‘per- indicates ... the word[ ] “forcing square peg like into a round corporations, compa- son’ ... inelude[s] corporation just special hole.” A Id. nies, associations, firms, partnerships, soci- organizational form of association. No one eties, joint companies, stock as well as that organizational doubts associations can ” § 1 (emphasis

individuals.... U.S.C. engage religious practice. govern- added). By operation of this omnibus defi- accepts ment corporations some —reli- nition, “person” the term in RFRA in- gious nonprofits religious-exercise —have in- corporations, cludes unless the context rights under both RFRA and the Free- dicates otherwise. this, As Exercise Clause. evidence contraception exempts mandate class of To determine whether the context “indi- religious organizations i.e., churches and otherwise,” — Supreme cates Court has auxiliaries, integrated see 45 C.F.R. stray instructed us not to too far from the 147.131(a) § or not conduct —whether statutory text. See Rowland Calif. (as corporate their activities form Colony, Advisory II Men’s Men’s Unit do). many of them HHS also extends its Council, 194, 199-200, “accommodation” to a broader set reli- (1993). 716, 121 L.Ed.2d 656 “‘Context’ giously nonprofit affiliated corporations. Congress here means the text of the Act of 147.131(b). § See id. issue, surrounding the word at or the texts ” Indeed, congressional Supreme of other related Acts.... Court has enforced inquiry incorporated Id. at 716. The the RFRA of an reli sect, basically asks whether the definition in the gious Espirita, see O Centro Dictionary “poor aff'g Act is a fit” with the text (10th Cir.2004) (en banc) (identifying of the statute: Dictionary spectively indicated. 14. The Act is notable for its unless otherwise Quinn Rosenkranz, general breadth. It contains definitions and Nicholas Federal Rules of apply Statutory Interpretation, rules of construction that across the 115 Harv. L.Rev. Code, (2002). prospectively United and retro- States *20 may religion making take into account in church as “a. New Mexico plaintiff the employment subchapter decisions: “This rights free-exercise corporation”), and the ... apply religious corpora shall not to a Lukumi, church, see incorporated an of association, tion, institution, educational 2217. The 113 S.Ct. society respect employment to the in these cases were corporations church of a particular religion....” individuals Id. asserting the solely not in court 2000e-1(a). ADA, § prohibits The members based on associational employment discrimination on the basis of asserting were their own standing; disability, exemption contains similar Accordingly, we take it as rights, too.15 employers. id. See noncontroversial both conceded and 12113(d)(1)-(2). § Some lower courts have form corporate the use of the developed multifactor tests to determine of that legal associated attributes status— religious-employer when Title VIPs ex separate legal personhood, limita- think emption applies; nonprofit status of liability, special on owners’ tax treat- tions is considered a fac employer, relevant organization an ment—-do disable See, Vision, e.g., Spencer tor. v. World religion in the exercise of within engaging (9th Cir.2011) (en Inc., 723, 633 F.3d (or RFRA Exer- meaning Free banc) curiam); (per LeBoon v. Lancaster matter). Clause, cise for that Ass’n, 217, Cmty. Jewish Ctr. 503 F.3d at reli- government The draws line (3d Cir.2007); Falls v. Univ. Great nonprofit corporations. giously affiliated NLRB, (D.C.Cir. 1335, 278 F.3d 1343-44 That line is nowhere to be found 2002) (applying religious-employer ex any text of RFRA or related act of Con- emption implied by Supreme Court gress. Nor can it be the statute’s found a matter of to lim constitutional avoidance purpose, assuming broader contextual we it National Labor Rela the reach beyond inquiry to venture the textual were Act); Univ., Killinger tions v. Samford Supreme for re- envisioned Court (11th Cir.1997); 196, 113 F.3d 198-99 solving Dictionary questions. Act Co., Townley Eng’g Mfg. & EEOC government argues religious/non- that a (9th Cir.1988). Relying F.2d 618-19 profit implica- limitation can be found cases, government on this line of ar judicial interpretations tion from of two gues Congress “carried forward” stat- employment-discrimination unrelated limitation when it enacted nonprofit namely, Title and the Ameri- VII utes— RFRA. (“ADA”) Act cans with Disabilities —both Never mind that much of this caselaw targeted exemptions of which contain the enactment of RFRA. The postdates are not con- religious employers. We important point more is'that a handful vinced. applying interpre- lower-court decisions Act Rights Title VII of the Civil gloss religious-employer tive to Title VIPs prohibits employment discrimination on Congress exemption hardly implies religion. way. the basis of U.S.C. limit RFRA in the same As meant to . Hobby Lobby, § religious employers 2000e-2 Certain Tenth Circuit noted the. asks us to infer from con- exempt part from this of Title VII Commission, standing, of associational see For the rules (1977); L.Ed.2d 383 United Food & Commercial Workers Union Ezell Inc., (7th Group, Local 751 v. Brown Cir. City Chicago, (1996); 134 L.Ed.2d 758 2011). Washington Apple Advertising Hunt v. State *21 act.”). doctrine reflects the narrow- dom to This that a “similar gressional silence right. See imported original understanding should be ing ] construction McConnell, Origins The The Tenth Michael W. F.3d at 1130. into” RFRA. 723 “strained,” id., Understanding Free Exer- Historical argument found this Circuit of 1409, Religion, 103 Harv. Congress If intended cise and so do we. L.Rev. of (1990) (“[T]he RFRA, term ‘free exercise’ surely limitation there in nonprofit protects clear that the clause reli- statutory it in the makes some hint of would be motivated conduct as well as be- giously. text. lief.”). also relies on Su The Corporation

preme Court’s decision right profess to believe and Presiding Bishop the Church absolute. See Bob Jones Univ. United Amos, Latter-day Saints v. Jesus Christ (the States, 603, 461 U.S. S.Ct. 2862, 327, L.Ed.2d 107 S.Ct. 483 U.S. pro “an Free Exercise Clause is absolute (1987). why. do not understand We against governmental regulation of hibition rejected an Establishment Clause Amos Sherbert, beliefs”); 374 U.S. religious-employer to Title challenge VII’s (“The 402, of the Free 83 S.Ct. 1790 door Id. at 107 S.Ct. 2862. exemption. tightly Exercise Clause stands closed govern The case does not advance against any governmental regulation of re ” here. position ment’s ligious (emphasis as such.... add beliefs ed)); W. State Bd. Educ. v. Bar contrary, church labor-rela- Va. To nette, 624, 642, a fundamental flaw 319 U.S. 63 S.Ct. tions cases illuminate (1943) (“If any fixed argument failure L.Ed. 1628 there is government’s —its constellation, in our constitutional it is recognize protects religious that RFRA star official, can broadly religious- high petty, pre than the that no or liberty more politics, scribe what shall be orthodox in employer exemptions in Title VII and nationalism, how, helpful religion, to return to or other matters of ADA. To see it’s opinion of free-exercise doc- or force citizens to confess work principles first some therein.”). Religiously or act faith trine. necessarily subject conduct is motivated that the Free Exer It’s well understood regulation public for the some essential foremost, “first and protects cise Clause Sherbert, good. 374 U.S. at right profess,” to believe and but also may (religiously motivated conduct motivat right engage religiously regulated prevent “substantial threat[s] Smith, ed 494 U.S. at conduct. order”). public safety, peace or (“The religion’ ‘exercise of S.Ct. 1595. usually arise only profes problems involves not belief and Free-exercise often (or law, regulation, when a action of a performance sion abstention some but from) ”); public religiously acts.... also Bob official interferes with a physical see States, forbearance, or other practice, v. United motivated Jones Univ. present conduct. These claims in distinct 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (“[T]he ways, reflecting different dimensions of the provides Free Exercise Clause Laycock, right. generally Douglas conduct To- protection substantial for lawful belief....”); Religion Theory Cant wards a General grounded Connecticut, The Case Labor Rela- 60 Clauses: Church well (1940) (The Autonomy, Right tions and the to Church 84 L.Ed. 1213 con (1981); Amendment embraces two “[First] 81 Colum. L.Rev. 1388-89 Volokh, Model Eugene A Common-Law cepts[ freedom to and free- ] [the] believe —

677 Religious Exemptions, category itself, 46 UCLA are Hosanna-Tabor for (1999). 1465,1505-08 recognized right L.Rev. of churches to choose understood) their (broadly ministers own aspect and intuitive of reli One obvious ministerial, adopted and a constitutional ex gious liberty right is the of conscientious ception regulating to laws employment dis objection regulations to laws and that con crimination, 705-06, see at id. and the prescribed proscribed flict conduct cases, church-property see Serbian E. Or Sherbert, Yoder, by an faith. adherent’s thodox Diocese the U.S. & Can. v. are the in paradigm and Thomas cases this Milivojevich, 696, 2372, 426 U.S. 96 S.Ct. In category. Seventh-day Sherbert a Ad (1976); 49 L.Ed.2d 151 Presbyterian unemployment compen ventist was denied Mary Church in the U.S. v. Elizabeth Blue job sation benefits after she lost her Church, Presbyterian Hull Mem’l refusing day. to work on her Sabbath (1969); S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 658 399-400, U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1790. In Yoder v. St. Nicholas Cathedral Rus Kedroff challenged Amish families application Am., sian Orthodox in N. Church compulsory-education of a state law re (1952). 73 S.Ct. 97 L.Ed. 120 quiring public their children to attend The church-autonomy doctrine respects 207-09, through age school 16. 406 U.S. at the authority of churches “select their 92 S.Ct. 1526. In Thomas a Jehovah’s leaders, doctrines, own define their own was denied unemployment Witness com resolve their disputes, own and run their pensation benefits after he was fired for own governmental institutions” free from job declining department a transfer to a Laycock, interference. Towards a Gener that produced war materials. 450 U.S. at Clauses, Theory Religion al supra, 709-12, cases, In S.Ct. 1425. all three at 1389. This dimension of liber the claimants asserted a conscientious ob ty Clauses, in Religion foothold both jection legal placed burdens on their Hosanna-Tabor, see 132 S.Ct. at religiously motivated conduct. In all three perhaps marking best understood Supreme Court held that the Free boundary separate between two polities, required exemption. Exercise Clause the secular the religious, and acknowl 718-19, 1425; Yoder, See id. at 101 S.Ct. edging prerogatives of each in its own 234-36, 1526; at U.S. 92 S.Ct. Sher sphere. example, Milivojevich, For bert, 374 U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1790. case, church-property explained Court A aspect religious liberty different that the First Amendment “permit[s] hier protects, broadly speaking, autonomy religious organizations archical to establish Supreme the church. As the Court regulations their own rules and for inter explained in Evangelical Hosanna-Tabor nal discipline government, and to cre , — Lutheran Church & School adjudicating ate tribunals for disputes EEOC over U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 181 L.Ed.2d these matters.” 426 (2012), religious-liberty this strand of a church When tribunal or other “gives special doctrine solicitude religious authority decides an internal dis religious organizations” as reli pute, requires “the Constitution ... civil gious organizations, respecting their au accept courts [to] th[at] decision[ ] as bind missions, tonomy shape 2372; own con ing.” Id. see also ministries, Garnett, duct their own generally Ap Richard W. A Hands-Off govern themselves accordance with their proach Religious Doctrine: Are What About?, own doctrines as Talking institutions. Id. We 84 Notre Dame L.Rev. paradigm at 704-06. The (explaining cases this that the church- recognizes that secular mental involvement such ecclesiastical autonomy doctrine decisions. power to answer some tribunals “lack the questions res- questions at 706. —whose — is, pluralis- an appropriately olution under way In Religion Clauses work *23 theory, left to other institu- political tic together protect the institutional free- tions”). itself, of the church “for and dom not simply proxy religious-liberty as for the principles are at work in Two related individuals,” light in of the Con- First, these cases. civil authorities have ordering relationship stitution’s of the be- say religious gover- no over matters of religion government. tween and Richard nance; second, judges must and secular Garnett, Standing, Spending, Sep- W. and on ques- defer to ecclesiastical authorities aration: How the No-Establishment Rule properly tions within their domain. These (and Not) Conscience, Does Does Protect justification limitations arise from the see also (2009); 54 Vill. L.Rev. 674 aspects religious liberty Horwitz, the different Paul as Churches First Amend- Sovereignty ment Institutions: and Religion secured Clauses. See Of Spheres, HaRV. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 44 Douglas Laycock, Autonomy Church Re- (2009).16 Pol’y 116-22 visited, 7 & Geo. J.L. 260- Pub. (2009). Supreme As the ex- Court religious-employer exemptions The legislative ap- Title VII and the ADA are

plained Hosannctr-Tabor: plications church-autonomy of the doc- Requiring a church to accept or retain By exemptions trine. their terms the minister, an unwanted or punishing a religiously employers, limited to affiliated so, failing church for to do upon intrudes light a limitation that makes sense in employment more than a mere decision. the rationale for the rule. The exemption Such action interferes with the internal categorical, contingent; there is no church, governance depriving interests, balancing of competing public or church of control over the selection of words, private. applies, In other where it personify By those who will its beliefs. church-autonomy principle operates minister, imposing an unwanted complete immunity, very nearly so. infringes state the Free Exercise strong jus- Such a principle hands-off isn’t Clause, protects which organizational tified for associations that religiously are not affiliated. group’s right shape its faith own through appointments. mission its Ac- contrast, In judicial remedy cording power the state the to deter- RFRA is both and more broader flexible. mine which individuals will minister to such, It covers organizations as the faithful also violates the Establish- it stop remedy but does not there. The Clause, prohibits govern- any ment available to objec- sincere Berg, Voluntary 16. See also Thomas C. The Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Principle Now, Autonomy, Clauses, and Church Then and Understanding Religion 53 Vill. (2004); 2004 BYU L. Rev. Gerard Lund, (2008); Christopher C. In L.Rev. Bradley, Autonomy V. Church Constitu- Exception, the Ministerial 90 N.C. Defense of State?, tional Order: The End Church and Wasserman, (2011); L. Rev. Howard M. (1989); Brady, 49 La. L.Rev. Kathleen A. lurisdiction, Prescriptive Adjudicative Jurisdic- Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: tion, Exemption, and the Ministerial 160 U. Pa. Smith, Surprising Lessons L. BYU (2012). L.Rev. PENNumbra 289 (2004); Garnett, Rev Richard W. Do organizations tor—individuals alike— We acknowledge novelty ques- organizational applications its tion; are not Supreme Court has never consid- limited religiously. organiza- affiliated ered whether a for-profit corporation may exemption tions. The is.comprehensive in assert a free-exercise claim. Hobby — it applies across the Stores, United Lobby States Sebelius, Inc. v. Code and Regulations -, Code Federal 184 L.Ed.2d 448 restrains the conduct of all federal offi- (Sotomayor, 2012) (“This Circuit Justice cials. But it can be overridden a suffi- Court has not previously addressed similar ciently strong governmental interest. RFRA or free exercise claims brought by closely held for-profit corporations and reasons, For these interpret- the cases *24 their controlling ”). shareholders.... But ing the Title VII and ADA exemptions do the Court has on several occasions ad- not shed on light scope the of the RFRA the dressed rights free-exercise of individ- exemption. The government’s proposed uals engaged in profit-mak- commercial or secular, exclusion of for-profit corporations ing activity. support finds no in the text or relevant context of RFRA or any related statute. We already have mentioned Thomas and

Sherbert, both of which involved claimants who jobs lost their refusing for to work on That’s enough to matter, the resolve but days in ways that would violate their it’s worth briefly exploring whether Thomas, faith. See 450 U.S. at animating RFRA’s purpose provides a clue 1425; Sherbert, at U.S. 399- that it is not meant secular, to apply to for- 400, 83 S.Ct. 1790. The cases challenged profit corporations. Congress was clear the denial of unemployment compensation pre-Smith RFRA codifies free-exer- benefits, background but the facts involved jurisprudence cise particular, the rule —in the loss employment remunerative at a of Sherbert and if Yoder—so the Supreme and a foundry words, mill. other In Eddie pre-Smith Court’s free-exercise cases cate- and Thomas Adell Sherbert were working gorically secular, excluded for-profit corpo- money for yet they retained free- their rations, perhaps then RFRA should be exercise permitted and were to as understood that way, too. sert against them the denial of unemploy begin by

We reiterating two doctrinal ment benefits. The held that Court Thom points (1) we made a ago: moment the as and Sherbert could not be compelled Free Exercise Clause protects not just choose between their livelihoods and their belief and profession but also religiously Thomas, faith. 450 U.S. at conduct; motivated and individuals (“Here, and S.Ct. Sherbert, inas the em organizations incorporated or ployee put was to a choice fidelity —whether between not—can religion. exercise It’s common to religious work; belief or cessation of the ground nonprofit corpora- impact coercive on Thomas is indistin tions religion exercise in the guishable sense that ”); Sherbert, from Sherbert.... their activities are religiously (“The motivated. [un So unless there is something disabling employment compensation] forces ruling about mixing profit-seeking [Adell Sherbert] choose between follow practice, it faith-based, follows that a ing for- the precepts of religion her and forfeit profit corporation can claim ing benefits, free-exercise hand, on the one and aban protection extent aspect that an doning one of the precepts of religion her its conduct religiously motivated. work, to accept order other maintaining interest public broad correct

hand.”)- If order, high of such system is earning sound-tax marketplace entering the pay- conflict belief in then rights, free-exercise money forfeits no resist- basis of taxes affords been ment have would Sherbert Thomas ing tax. differently. decided Brown, 366 U.S. In 260, 102 S.Ct. Id. Braunfeld L.Ed.2d 600-02, 81 S.Ct. Braunfeld, merchants Like the a free- brought (1961), merchants Jewish in farm- engaged was in Lee farmer Amish Pennsylvania’s challenge against for subsis- furniture-making not ing and at a law, them put Sunday-closing moneymaking If profit. but tence on their disadvantage based competitive claim, foreclose the enough were alone profit-making if Again, Sabbath. the bur- addressed have would Court merchants disqualify the enough was pub- rights or den, free-exercise on his surely claim, Court bringing administration in the sound interest lic Instead, not. It did so. have said would Instead, system. Security Social rejected addressed the Court *25 and review plenary the claim gave Court Id. at the on merits. claim free-exercise deny ex- to an reason compelling a found 608-09, 1144. 81 S.Ct. emption. Lee, 455 U.S. States In United categori- from that far show These cases (1982), an 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 102 S.Ct. from excluding profit-seekers cally exemp- a sought farmer Amish Su- right, of the free-exercise scope withhold obligation from tion their claims has considered Court preme employ- his Security taxes for pay Social merits, exemptions granting on the farm on his worked ees, who coreligionists compel- on not others based some 254-55, shop. Id. at carpentry in his test. ling-interest holds religion Amish The 1051. 102 S.Ct. community that members concluding relies on government The needy el- own for their provide must position its support in Lee as statement Security system ex- The Social derly. Id. incompatible profit-making objectors self-employed empts rights: free-exercise asserted so farmer employers, not but have been courts and the Congress Id. exemption. right to a constitutional from the flowing needs sensitive held Court The 102 S.Ct. Clause, every person but Free Exercise in the social participation that “compulsory all the burdens shielded cannot be free the[ ] interferes with security system aspect of exercising every incident Id. at the Amish. rights” of exercise religious beliefs. When practice right to concluded the Court 1051. But into enter particular sect of followers in the finan- public interest strong that the a matter activity as commercial .sys- Security of the Social cial soundness on their choice, they accept limits the farmer’s enough defeat was tem conscience as a matter conduct own exemption: claim an superimposed are not to and faith if function could not system The tax binding statutory schemes challenge allowed were denominations activity. in that on others payments tax because system the ... add- (emphasis S.Ct. 1051 Id. at that violates in manner spent were ed). Because religious beliefis].... apparently reads this jurisprudence corporate constitutional passage foreclosing all religious-exer- rights suggests a nonprofit limitation on cise arising claims in the course of com- organizational rights. free-exercise Prior activity merely mercial because the context Smith, and continuing present to the is commercial. reading That is both un- day, the Court has held corporations sound and extraordinary. Unsound be- may claim some but not all constitutional , cause it nullify would the rest of the rights. See Darrell A.H. Guns, Miller opinion, Court’s which considered the Am- Inc.: United, Citizens McDonald, and the ish farmer’s claim on the merits even Future Corporate Constitutional though his activities were for profit; the Rights, N.Y.U. L.Rev. 908-11 commercial did context not defeat cases). (collecting claim. And extraordinary because it example, For long before Citizens Unit would leave religious wholly un- ed reinvigorated the political-speech rights protected in the commercial sphere. At of corporations, see Citizens United v. bottom, government’s argument FEC, 558 U.S. premised on a far-too-narrow view of reli- (2010), L.Ed.2d 753 the Court confirmed gious freedom: Religious exercise is pro- corporations have free-speech rights, tected in the home and the house of wor- see, e.g., Bd. Trs. the State Univ. ship beyond. but not Religious people do Fox, N.Y. v. practice their faith in that compart- 106 L.Ed.2d (1989); Pac. Gas & Elec. way; mentalized free-exercise rights are Co. v. Pub. Cal., Utils. Comm’n not so circumscribed. *26 903, 106 S.Ct. (1986) 89 L.Ed.2d 1 If government’s correct, view is com- (plurality opinion); Central Hudson &Gas monplace religious practices normally Elec. Corp. v. N.Y., Pub. Serv. Comm’n of thought protected would fall outside the 557, 447 2343, U.S. 100 S.Ct. 65 L.Ed.2d scope of right. free-exercise The Jew- (1980); 341 First Nat’l Bank Bos. v. of ish deli is the usual example. On the Bellotti, 765, 435 776, U.S. 1407, 98 S.Ct. government’s of understanding religious 55 (1978); L.Ed.2d 707 N.Y. Times Co. v. liberty, a Jewish restaurant operating for Sullivan, 254, 376 710, U.S. 84 S.Ct. 11 profit could be denied the right to observe (1964). L.Ed.2d 686 Prior to Smith the dietary Kosher restrictions. That cannot Court held that the Fourth Amendment right. be There nothing is inherently in- protected corporations from unreasonable compatible between exercise and searches and seizures. See Silverthorne profit-seeking. The better reading of the Lumber Co. v. States, United 385, 251 U.S. concluding dictum Lee is that it fore- 392, 182, 40 S.Ct. 64 (1920); L.Ed. 319 shadowed the coming holding in Smith Henkel, Hale 43, v. 76, 201 U.S. 26 S.Ct. eight years later. The references to “inci- 370, (1906), 50 L.Ed. 652 overruled on dental burdens” and “statutory schemes other grounds by Murphy v. Waterfront on binding suggest others” as much. Harbor, N.Y. Comm’n 52, 378 U.S. 84 of short, In in the nothing Supreme Court’s 1594, (1964). 12 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 678 Corpo free-exercise jurisprudence prior to Smith qualify persons rations at least some categorically forecloses RFRA claims purposes under the Due Process profit-seeking entities. Equal Protection Clauses of the Four

teenth Amendment. Grosjean v. Am. For the sake completeness, of Co., we note Press 233, 297 444, U.S. 244, 56 S.Ct. as well that nothing in the general Court’s (1936); 80 L.Ed. 660 Covington Lexing- &

682 prior whether 578, to determine task 164 Sandford, U.S. Rd. Co. Tpk.

ton closely a (1896). it was established Smith 198, 41 L.Ed. 592, 17 S.Ct. not as- could Riggs, held, corporation for-profit v.Co. Ins. Nw. Nat’l But see Life not so 126, It was L.Ed. claim. 255, a free-exercise 243, sert 203 U.S. L& that K th[e] to in (“The conclude liberty referred We established. of liberty “per- are Grote Industries Amendment Contractors [Fourteenth] theOn artificial, persons.”). of RFRA.17 natural, meaning not within sons” ex- the Court hand, to Smith prior other Amend- Fifth corporations cluded Burden 2. Substantial self-incrimination, against privilege

ment is whether States, question Our next v. United see Wilson substantially bur (1911), mandate contraception 55 L.Ed. 383-84, 31 S.Ct. religion. see privacy, right plaintiffs’ exercise emerging dens Co., 338 U.S. means religion” v. Morton Salt that “exercise United States Recall (1950). not 357, L.Ed. religion, whether “any 70 S.Ct. to, system a central by, or compelled theo- unifying yield do cases These § 2000cc- 42 U.S.C. belief.” but rights, constitutional ry corporate added). minimum, At a 5(7)(A) (emphases might language some contains Bellotti gov when exists burden a substantial decisional general suggest read to person compels ernment guar- personal’ ‘purely “Certain approach: fun odds with undeniably at acts “perform com- against privilege antees, as the such religious beliefs.” [his] tenets damental self-incrimination, unavailable pulsory But Yoder, 92 S.Ct. be- organizations and other corporations also arises religious exercise on particu- a burden function’ ‘historic cause substantial “put[s] pro- to the when limited has been guarantee lar modify his n. at 778 an adherent pressure of individuals.” tection his beliefs.” States to violate United (quoting behavior 98 S.Ct. 1425; Thomas, *27 White, U.S. (1944)). Miller, this: And v. 88 L.Ed. also Nelson see is guarantee Bryan, 523 particular (7th Cir.2009); Koger or not “Whether corpo- Cir.2008). (7th Construing or is unavailable personal’ ‘purely F.3d depends RLUIPA, other reason have for some we rations parallel provision of purpose nature, history, and gov upon law, or other regulation, that a held provision.” constitutional particular substantially burdens command ernmental elaborated. has never direct, But the Id. Court pri it “bears if religious exercise for responsibility mary, and fundamental parse don’t need Ultimately, we ... effec religious rendering [a] rights too corporate constitutional on cases Liberties tively impracticable.” Civil here with confronted finely. We are Chicago, City Believers Urban Our interpretation. statutory of question of religious commit- to their that conforms corporations that ner We deal two here be the normally will not same managed by the ments. closely held and both are large publicly traded when comes it ex- case As we have them. that own families are the hallmarks corporations, two Gjrotes controlling plained, Kortes control ownership from separation company set all and directors shareholders 1A See directors. boards multimember the activities personally direct policy such, Cyclopedia they in a Fletcher, corporations; as Fletcher Meade their William rev.). (2006 § 70.10 Corporations in a man- operate their position to businesses Law (7th Cir.2003). F.3d The same ical views or personal code). moral understanding applies to RFRA claims. These are factual inquiries within the court’s authority and competence. But we Importantly, the substantial-bur agree with our colleagues in the Tenth inquiry den does not invite the court to Circuit that the substantial-burden test un- determine the centrality of der RFRA focuses primarily on the “inten- practice faith; to the adherent’s RFRA is sity the coercion applied govern- explicit about that. And free-exercise doc ment to act contrary to [religious] beliefs.” trine makes it clear that the test for sub Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1137. Put an- stantial burden does not ask whether the other way, the inquiry substantial-burden claimant correctly interpreted his reli evaluates the coercive effect govern- gious obligations. Lee, 455 U.S. at pressure mental on the adherent’s reli- 1051; Thomas, 450 U.S. at gious practice and steers well clear of de- 715-16, 101 Indeed, S.Ct. 1425. that inqui ciding religious questions. ry prohibited. is area, “[I]n this sensitive is judicial it not within the function and On this understanding substan judicial competence inquire whether the burden, tial there can be little doubt that [adherent ... correctly perceived has] the contraception imposes mandate a sub commands of ... [his] faith. Courts are stantial on plaintiffs’ burden scriptural arbiters of interpretation.” exercise. K L& Contractors and Grote Thomas, 101 S.Ct. 1425. Industries pay must per day per $100 em It enough the claimant has an ployee if do not include coverage for “honest conviction” that govern what the contraception and sterilization in their em ment is requiring, prohibiting, pressur ployee plans. health-care The Kortes and ing him to do conflicts with his religion. the Grotes as corporate owners and man Id.; see also id. 101 S.Ct. 1425 agers must arrange for their companies to (“Thomas [religious] line, drew a and it is provide-the mandated coverage. They ob not for us to that the say line he drew was ject grounds so, to doing ex one.”). an unreasonable plaining that providing this coverage would make complicit them in a grave moral Checking sincerity and reli wrong and would undermine their ability giosity important out weed sham give to the witness moral teachings of claims. The religious objection must be their church. No questions one their sinc both sincere and religious in nature. Cf. erity or the religiosity of objection.18 States v. Seeger, United 184- *28 86, 850, 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 733 short, In the federal government has (military-conscription exemption applies placed pressure enormous on the plaintiffs only objections to based on sincerely held to violate their beliefs and con- religious beliefs as opposed philosoph- to form to regulatory its Refusing mandate. 18. The teaching Catholic Church’s on the 25031995_evangeliumvitae_en.html; Cate- sanctity of human life and wrong- the 2258, ¶¶ moral 2270- chism of the Catholic Church 75, contraception, 2284-87, fulness of 2366, 2370, abortion-inducing (2d ed.1997); 2399 drugs, documented, and sterilization is well Peace, Pontifical Council for Justice and Com- as is its of moral complicity doctrine pendium and the the Social Doctrine the Church of of requirements ¶¶ 62-64, of 66-68, Christian Pope witness. (2005), 230-33 available at II, Evangelium John Paul Gospel Vitae [The of www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_ ¶¶ (1995), Life] 58-62 http://www. available at councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_ Vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott- soc_en.html. encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_

684 a challenge to free-speech rejected fines, essentially worth ruinous means comply to be- student-activity fee university’s public to choose and Grotes Kortes forcing the to were collected the funds allocated fol- cause and companies saving their between ba- viewpoint-neutral on groups faith. student teachings of moral lowing the “ impression sis, mistaken removing ‘any substantial and least as direct is at This the speak groups] the [student unemployment of as the denial burden ” objecting student. or the [u]niversity’ and in Sherbert benefits compensation (quoting 1346 120 S.Ct. 529 U.S. at to withhold Thomas, obligation the and (cid:127) & Visitors Univ. v. Rector Rosenberger in Lee. Security taxes of pay Social and Va., 115 U.S. of tack a different takes government The (1993)). cases These L.Ed.2d man the arguing question, this on en- governmental questions about raised is in religious exercise on burden date’s (Zelman) un- and religion dorsement decision employee’s an because substantial (Southworth). degree speech wanted purchase to coverage insurance use her to government the between separation “can services or contraception sterilization the was important the funds use of the or Grotes. the Kortes to” be attributed not case, it’s but analysis each constitutional argument, the on same twist a different In here.19 a relevant consideration any bur insists also government the Zel- on misplaced reliance from its Aside plaintiffs’ on den Southworth, government’s man as “substantial” count “attenuated” too is trivial burden cov insistence contraception provision because point of misses the simply nonexistent steps removed several erage is government claim. The religious-liberty use independent decision employee’s employ- thing wrong on the focuses govern support For contraception. —the addresses contraception ee’s use of v. Simmons-Har on Zelman ment relies —and sep- many steps question wrong 153 the 639, 122 S.Ct. ris, 536 U.S. —how for con- paying act employer’s Regents arate (2002), and Board L.Ed.2d de- employee’s and an coverage traception System University Wisconsin it. to use cision Southworth, 120 S.Ct. U.S. (2000). case Neither L.Ed.2d plain- Although point: first To the here. relevant use grounds object on tiffs drugs, contraception, abortifacient school-voucher upheld Ohio’s Zelman saying that sterilization, goes it without Clause Establishment against an program inter- nor inquire about neither they may funds flowed public challenge because em- of their choices private pri- fere through only religious schools They can subjects. these ployees parents. of the students’ choice vate pro- however, being forced do, object to South- 2460. U.S. Wilkinson, suggest- argument the At oral *29 § hold C‘[W]e L.Ed.2d 1020 prelimi- granting first time ed for the between the corridor fits within RLUIPA contraception against the injunction nary face,. Act its the Religion On Clauses: the Clause might Establishment create mandate accom- legislative permissible qualifies as litiga- the too far late That was concerns. by the barred religion that is not Supreme modation argument. The tion to raise Clause.”). government The Establishment Establishment rejected a facial Court has applying argument RLUIPA, an has not advanced parallel— challenge to Clause the Establish- violates in this context exemp- EFRA statutory albeit narrower — ment Clause. Cutter to the States. applicable tion vide coverage insurance drugs for these burden on religious exercise, properly un- and services in violation of their faith. As derstood. explained

we in our order granting an plaintiffs The have prima established a injunction pending appeal, religious- “[t]he facie case under RFRA. The government liberty violation at issue here inheres in justify must the mandate under the com- coverage coerced of contraception, pelling-interest test. abortifacients, sterilization, and related services, not—or perhaps more precisely, Compelling-Interest Test only purchase the later or use of —in RFRA requires the government contraception Korte, or related services.” shoulder the burden of demonstrating that 528 Fed.Appx. 2012 WL applying the contraception “is mandate at *3. least restrictive means of furthering [a] government’s compelling governmental

The argu- “attenuation” interest.” 2000bb-1(b). § U.S.C. posits ment that the loosely is too The Supreme mandate Court connected to the use of instructed us contraception to look beyond to be “broadly a substantial burden on formulated interests religious exercise. justifying the general Because several independent applicability of government decisions separate employer’s mandates” act of providing “scrutinize[ ] the asserted harm coverage granting specific mandated exemptions an employ- particular religious ee’s eventual use of contraception, any claimants.” O Centro Espirita, complicity problem insignificant U.S. at non- S.Ct. 1211. words, In other existent. argument This under purports RFRA’s to re- version of strict scrutiny, solve the question underlying must es these tablish a compelling, cases: Does providing specific justifica coverage tion for burdening impermissibly assist the these commission of a claimants. wrongful act in violation of the moral doc- The compelling-interest test trines of the Catholic Church? No civil generally requires “high degree ne authority question. can decide that cessity.” Brown Entm’t Merchs. — repeat, To judicial Ass’n, duty to decide -, substantial-burden questions under RFRA (2011). 180 L.Ed.2d 708 gov- The does not permit the court to resolve reli ernment “identify must prob- ‘actual gious questions or decide whether lem’ need solving, curtail- claimant’s understanding of his faith is ment right] of [the must actually Lee, mistaken. 455 U.S. at 102 S.Ct. necessary to the solution.” Id.

1051; Thomas, (citations omitted). U.S. at In the free-exercise S.Ct. 1425. question The context, for us is not “only those interests whether compliance with the contraception highest order and those not otherwise mandate can be reconciled with the teach served can legitimate overbalance claims ings of the Catholic Church. That’s a to the free Yoder, of religion.” question of religious conscience for 406 U.S. at 92 S.Ct. 1526. “[I]n Kortes and the They Grotes to decide. this highly area, sensitive constitutional have legal concluded only and reli gravest abuses, endangering gious obligations are incompatible: paramount interests, give occasion for ” contraception mandate forces them to do permissible Sherbert, 374 limitation.... what their religion tells (internal them must U.S. at 83 S.Ct. 1790 quo- *30 not do. qualifies That as a substantial omitted). tation marks and alteration that held Supreme Court In Lee the “pose[ ] must conduct regulated

The of the So- administration financial safety, sound public to threat substantial some sufficiently was a Security system 403, 83 S.Ct. cial at Id. or order.” peace[,] override regard- interest to compelling cannot “a law Finally, 1790. Security with-holding Social high- objection to interest of an protecting as ed 1051. appreciable at S.Ct. it leaves taxes. ... when est order why explained interest vital not has supposedly government The to that damage Lukumi, ranked to be deserves contraception free unprohibited.” (internal quotation to interest akin governmental aas omitted). impor- in order of Security system marks Social assume good. Let’s public to the tance two identifies government The it Even is. argument sake “gen health” “public public interests — assist, government generous with the contra argues that equality” der —and its burden carrying close not come to has interests these mandate furthers ception its cannot achieve demonstrating that it pregnancies, reducing unintended reli- to damaging ways less goals policy in health-care greater parity achieving rights. gious-exercise autonomy of costs, promoting re in their economically and not even Indeed, both government women seri This argument capacities. productive satisfy the to least-restrictive-means tried By scrutiny. strict ously scrutiny, perhaps misunderstands be- strict component of generally, interests so public stating so here. do nearly impossible cause it is the man guarantees government ex- grandfathers, scheme regulatory The scrutiny Strict test. flunk the date catego- will several “accommodates” empts, or close congruity a substantial requires contraception employers —a ries of interest governmental “fit”—between others apply to and does mandate in to further chosen means and the employees). (those fewer than interests governmental Stating the terest. many ex- so grants Since the it makes generality high level at such argue hardly it can already, ceptions is the that the mandate to show impossible plaintiffs.20 these exempting against furthering them. least restrictive means in- many ways Moreover, there are public promote many ways There are without contraception to free crease access all of almost equality, gender health and religious-liberty to the doing damage liberty. them less burdensome The objectors. conscientious rights of gov- a few: have identified plaintiffs apparent a bit. The translate We will “public option” provide can ernment access is to broaden of the mandate aim insurance; tax give it can contraception so that sterilization contraception and free suppliers contraception incentives control over greater might achieve women and services medications provide these accept health. We reproductive in- consumers; give tax it can no cost to interest. governmental legitimate as a contraception consumers centives to of sur- interest qualifies it Whether No doubt there services. sterilization contestable is both importance passing options. other contested. Lee, contrast, Security ex- the Social in Lee In (1982). persons L.Ed.2d 127 self-employed emption for States v. extremely See United narrow. was *31 government

The has no real response to Circuit reached a similar conclusion. Au argument. this It has not any tocam, made (“The effort 730 F.3d at 624 decision to explain how the contraception mandate comply with the mandate Autocam, falls on is the least restrictive furthering means of not the Kennedys.”); id. at 627 (“Congress goals its stated of promoting health public did not intend the ‘person’ term to cover gender equality. We noted short entities like Autocam when it enacted coming in our orders granting injunctions RFRA.”). For reasons that should be ob pending Grote, appeal. See 708 F.3d at now, vious we respectfully disagree. 855; Korte, 587-88, 528 Fed.Appx. at III. Conclusion

WL *4. In light of this obser vation, might we expected have a better For reasons, the foregoing we ReveRSe effort government’s in the merits briefing. and Remand with instructions to enter pre- We did not get it. The best the govern liminary injunctions barring enforcement ment could do was to insist that the least- of the contraception against mandate test restrictive-means “has been in never plaintiffs. terpreted require government private subsidize religious practices.” ROVNER, Judge, Circuit dissenting. just That’s evasion o'f Lifting RFRA. The holding court’s in these cases is as a regulatory burden is not necessarily a remarkable for its reasoning as for its subsidy, and it’s not á subsidy here. The result. The Kortes and the Grotes are plaintiffs are not asking government to business Luitjohan owners: Korte & Con pay for anything. They asking tractors is a firm, construction and Grote relief regulatory mandate that Industries manufactures motor vehicle coerces them pay for something signals, turn reflectors, emergency light —insur- ance coverage for contraception ing, and safety systems. other Neither —on sincere conviction that so doing violates company has a declared religious purpose their religion. They have made a strong or mission. subject Both are to the full case that RFRA entitles them to that re- range of regulatory demands and con lief. straints imposes on all such businesses. These include the Af Our aligns conclusion us with the Tenth (ACA’s) fordable Care Act’s requirement majority Circuit and Judge Jordan in dis provide comprehensive employers sent Circuit, in the Third Hobby Lobby, health insurance to their employees that 1137-44; 723 F.3d at Conestoga Wood includes fully subsidized access contra Specialties, 724 F.3d at (Jordan, J., 407-15 ceptive care for women who choose to use dissenting), and in some respects with the it. The Kortes and the Grotes are Catho majority opinion in Circuit, the D.C. Gilard and, lic consistent with the teachings of i, 733 F.3d at 2013 WL religion, view the use of contracep at *7-15. The Third Circuit analyzed the tives as Invoking immoral. Religious identical very issues differently, concluding - Freedom Restoration Act of that “a for-profit, secular corporation can § (“RFRA”), U.S.C. they object 2000bb-1 not engage in the exercise of religion,” and to the contraception mandate ACA its owners “do have viable- claims” as a substantial burden right on their against the contraception mandate because the free religion. the mandate “does. not actually require to do anything.” [them] Conestoga Wood In exempting (preliminarily) the two Specialties, 724 F.3d at corporations 388-89. Sixth from the contraception man- *32 way no Act in Care Affordable the Yet activi- business the equates date, court the ac- beliefs, worship their on their imposes firms with secular, for-profit these ties of personal of their tivities, or the conduct Be- its owners. exercise religious

.the endorse, use, or dis- They need not Grotes declare lives. the and Kortes cause the free to remain they contraception; in a manner corporations pense the they run that contraception beliefs, the use of religious against the speak their out with consistent In they wish. that and wherever the views burdens whenever court religion the com- is corporations and exercise short, own on the their imposes the reli- corporations, on as burdens It the plans is pany wholly health undisturbed. of the indi- exercise the obli- and shoulder consciences gious employers, which as the court only that: ACA; Not and owners. the vidual imposed gations religious ex- corporations respect to the attributes with anything say or do need not own, that rights the of their rights among including ercise it beyond contraception to assert, in- as can themselves companies and ser- goods medical other the countless of their beliefs religious by the formed health employee by their covered vices and Kortes the the Because owners. object to nonetheless plaintiffs The plans. contraception, the the use oppose Grotes contraception. use of facilitating the as contracep- to include obligation companies’ facilitating an it as characterize I would health workplace in their coverage tive contraception. use choice to employee’s as a burden understood plans insurance may be inconsistent choice employee’s An and in rights free exercise on the owners’ beliefs, but it the owners’ with free exercise companies’ the turn on choice, does and it not the owners’ any off-limits declares The court rights. their exercise of the substantially burden degree of the and the into nature inquiry religious freedoms. instead, rights; these imposed on burden the made colleagues have My esteemed RFRA terms both the rewriting the the notion possible for best case the jurisprudence, clause free exercise the interferes mandate contraception the ACA it court sufficient declares I be- but rights; free exercise plaintiffs’ comply corporations two the compels rep- holding and rationale court’s its owners lieve which requirement with a and unwarranted unprecedented reason- Thus resent an grounds. object on exer- the free sub- what re-conception mandate of both contraceptive ing that and what constitutes free exercise religion entails stantially burdens cise of companies, the on that exercise. burden a of the individuals substantial a right to strict the mandate subjects highly personal court then court extends it fails that fic- legal scrutiny and concludes a man-made corporation, secular enabling belief demanding standard. no conscience tion that corporation’s It then deems worship. exercise that, in name free So isit contraceptive care duty to cover secu- two has relieved the court of religion, on the burden impermissible statutory obli- corporations lar its own- corporation both rights of to their insurance provide health gation considering so without It does ers. coverage of con- that includes employees on the the burden degree directness female companies’ traceptive care for of their free exercise right plaintiffs’ only reli- Realistically, employees. plain in contravention religion, at stake those gious interests only RFRA, proscribes terms of is the faith owners—their corporations’ itAnd right. burdens contraception. substantial objection source permits plaintiffs to invoke their free facts in hypotheticals these my are of own rights offensively invention; rather than de- the legal provisions are not. *33 fensively, way in a circumscribes 1. Tom Smith is the sole owner and rights Congress given employees, to TS-Co, chief executive officer of a soft- by permitting corporate employers company ware employs more than 50 statutorily-man- rewrite the terms of the people subject and is therefore to the dated health plans they provide to their ACA. sponsors TS-Co a self-insured employees. result, As a employees are left health plan care for employees. its Joe highly important without a form of insur- employee Wilson is an of TS-Co who suf- coverage ance that Congress intended fers from Amyotrophic Sclerosis, Lateral them to have. ALS, commonly as known Lou Gehrig’s

Disease. ALS is a progressive neurode- 1. generative disease that affects nerve cells in the spinal cord; brain and the disease In place today’s order to decision and its destroys motor neurons and with them the import in a perspective, broader I want to ability of the brain to initiate and control begin my analysis by posing hypo- several muscle function. Eventually, the disease illustrating theticals how the court’s ruling leads to total paralysis. people Most with in this might case out in play other factual ALS die of respiratory pneumo- failure or scenarios. Part of responsibility our as an nia, typically within years three to five appellate court is to consider the ramifica the onset of symptoms. precedents tions our will have other litigants. cases and Contraception is the From another employee, TS-Co Smith current focus of litigation nationwide chal learns that accepted Wilson has been into lenging mandate; the ACA’s employer and a clinical trial testing the effectiveness of because duty coverage include embryonic an stem-cell therapy on ALS. h contraceptives in employee plans healt is a devout Smith Methodist who shares women, implicates sexuality, reproduc and United Methodist disapproval Church’s tion as well as religion, might one be research therapies and on stem based tempted to assume that the issues raised embryos. cells derived from human Smith in this case and the holding court’s manage does wish to company’s his confined, if not to case, the facts in this plan way benefit that conflicts with his then to a range narrow beliefs; circumstances. he is although concerned But, out, as points the court health, RFRA applies for Wilson’s he is adamantly op- law, Federal “all implementa and the posed facilitating the use of embryonic law, tion of that whether statutory or oth any way. cells in stem thinks it He unlike- erwise, and adopted whether ly before or af company that the plan will pay health ter” RFRA’s date. 42 effective U.S.C. for the care during Wilson will receive his 2000bb-3(a); § ante 672. The participation trial, court’s clinical but when holding today potential has the to reach he raises plan the issue with the adminis- beyond far contraception trator, and to invite em he learns that under section 1201 of ployers (which to seek exemptions any num the ACA created a new turn ber of federally-mandated employee bene 2709 of section Health Public Service fits to which employer might object (“PHA”)), plan Act health must cover religious grounds. following three the costs of routine patient care associated hypotheticals are why intended to show I clinical involving with trials treatments for think might this The names so. life-threatening cancer other condi- associ- any costs not cover would insurance In 300gg-8. § 42 U.S.C.

tions. in the clinical participation pa- with his expand ated meant was the ACA way, matter, that, practical trial; such participation to and tient access participate unable plan would render Wilson Although might trials.1 clinical routine the costs of Wilson’s in the trial. only cover therapy, cell the stem care associated owner is the Bill Blasdell sole therapy cell the stem costs of and not the Out!, corpo- officer of Get chief executive covering Wil- itself, believes Smith chain of *34 operates a small ration which plan would care, the company son’s routine enact- Prior to stores. outdoor-gear three prac- in a facilitating participation his ACA, company did ment of the objects on he tice which employees; to its insurance health provide grounds. is now Get Out! employees, with but a seek- under RFRA brings suit Smith mandate. employer subject to ACA’s reliev- injunctive relief declaratory and ing member of life-long been Blasdell has to com- obligation company of ing the Christ, Christian Scientist. the Church PHA, insofar 2709 of the section ply with illness is an dogma postulates that Science coverage, of costs associ- requires as it only be can false belief that illusion employing em- trials clinical ated with realigns prayer which through addressed argues Smith therapies. bryonic stem cell with Consistent soul God. one’s with plan health company’s his requiring historically has dis- view, Science Christian care associ- any medical cover costs conventional forms most approved of objects he treatment ated with a Nonetheless, many in practice, medicine. with interferes his grounds on them- have availed Christian Scientists in a manner company wish to run treatments, medical of conventional selves convictions. with his consistent itself years, the church in recent today, Smith on court’s decision Based med- more tolerant conventional become argu- colorable have a would and TS-Co Vitello, See, Sci- Paul Christian e.g., icine. by section coverage required that the ment Modem Truce With Seeks ence Church on their burden imposes a substantial (Mar. 24, Medicine, A20 York Times New Although govern- rights. free exercise 2010). that section argument might have ment life, among was his Blasdell Earlier in compelling interest 2709 is supported embraced who Scientists those Christian therapies development effective in the witnessing But after traditional medicine. such as life-threatening conditions treatment through brutal wife suffer his least-restrictive ALS, on this court’s based premier at a cancer for breast regimen might a court conclude analysis, means center, as a result of only to die medical itself, in lieu of ob- that the mis- from the treatment complications for all pay could costs jecting employers, staff, came Blasdell by the medical steps partic- individual’s with an associated teachings of his believe, meantime, consistent trial. In in a clinical ipation medicine does church, conventional exemption TS-Co an granting was His belief good. than more workplace far harm mean that Wilson’s PHA would 3-5%.”), ranges consistently between adults Society, Cancer Ac- Cancer 1. See American ac- http://http:// Network, available Care Fact Sheet: tion Affordable scan.org/pdf7healthcare/implementa- ("Nearly of cancer Trials 20% Act: Clinical (last tion/factsheets/hcr-clinical-trials.pdf visit- eligible participation in can- patients 7, 2013). trials, ed Nov. among but enrollment cer clinical year reinforced in the following firm, his wife’s which has over 100 full-time em- death, when his ulcerative colitis went into ployees. The Bowers belong to a church remission during prayer-centered treat- which is affiliated with the Southern Bap- ment at a Christian nursing Science cen- tist Convention. The posi- 'Convention’s ter. tion marriage and sexuality may be summarized as follows:

As a result religious convictions, of his Blasdell is adamantly We opposed plan to facilitat- affirm God’s for marriage and ing the use of conventional intimacy man, medical care sexual and one —one his employees. woman, He willing for Get Out! for life. Homosexuality is not a sponsor an employee plan health lifestyle.” “valid alternative The Bible pays for care Christian Science nursing condemns it not, as sin. It however, centers, but he believes company1 that his unforgivable s sin. The same redemption compliance with the ACA’s mandate available to all sinners is available to cover traditional medical care would abe They, too, homosexuals. may become *35 violation of his principles. new creations in Christ.

After Get Out!’s request for an exemp- Baptist Convention, Southern Position tion employer from the denied, mandate is Statement on Sexuality, available at http:// Blasdell and the company bring suit under (last www.sbc.net/aboutus/pssexuality.asp RFRA contending that employer man- 7, 2013). visited Nov. The Bowers’ local date is a substantial burden on the free congregation promotes endorses and exercise of their religious beliefs. Pursu- view; same in the past years, several ant to the court’s today, decision both pastor of their given church has several Blasdell and Get Out! have a would color- sermons condemning same-sex marriage, argument able compliance that with the adoption by gay and parents, lesbian and employer mandate, by facilitating company the repeal of the military’s Ask, “Don’t employees’ use of conventional medical Don’t policy. Tell” The Bowers accept and treatments to which Blasdell opposed on follow their church’s teaching on,homosex- religious grounds, represents a substantial uality. When marriage same-sex was re- burden on his religious freedom and that cently legalized in their state as a result of corporation. of the although And the gov- decision, a Bowers, court knowing that ernment, again, urge would no doubt they a had number gay and lesbian it compelling in pursuing interest employ individuals their and in keeping universal healthcare, access to Blasdell beliefs, their amended the and his firm could this invoke court’s deci- Red Pie employee plan benefits to make sion argument for the that the ACA’s ex- clear spousal insurance benefits are emptions interest, belie that that, and in not available to the spouses same-sex any event, pursue could its employees; Red Pie their as state does not goal through publicly-funded healthcare, prohibit employment discrimination on the credits, individual tax or other means that orientation, basis sexual and because the do not require employers to subsidize em- ACA not require does employers pro- ployee healthcare that is inconsistent with vide coverage insurance employee their own beliefs. spouses, change legally permitted. was Pie, Inc.,

3. Red sells ships and to con- Mr. Mrs. and Bowers become alarmed sumers variety frozen, nationwide a spe- they when learn that one of employ- cialty pizzas. Bill Betty and Ann ees, Jones, Bowers Stan has submitted a request and their three children own operate to take three weeks unpaid under leave ap- the FMLA suit, contending that Act Leave Medical Family and instance would in this may Red Pie plied husband

(FMLA) and his that he so free on the child via burden of their a substantial birth constitute expected attend baby California, bring the and its corporation surrogacy See 29 child. either home, owners, bond with force them as would it 2612(a)(1). Bowers view the § ar- parental U.S.C. and facilitate recognize a child conceiving men gay two idea of or suffer as sinful they view rangement that child into bringing surrogacy FMLA for under penalties substantial to the Lord. anas abomination their home mandated The leave refusing to do so.2 deny manager to their office They instruct course, and to is, unpaid, by the FMLA him that and inform request Jones’ leave arguably constitute it extent would in any can company nor their they neither minimal on Red burden no more than an immor- such facilitate recognize or way but rights;3 free exercise Pie’s asserted protests the in turn Jones arrangement; al this court’s readily invoke Red Pie could After rights. denial, his FMLA citing that the sub- proposition for the decision further, the matter thinking about not on burden turns stantiality of the troubled Bowers so decide the ,on the imposed degree interference in their keep Jones longer no they can rather but religious exercise company’s they fire him. day, next employ. The coercive nature solely on the Wages contacts Jones After is manda- with which compliance FMLA— *36 La- Department Hours Division significant litigation tory pain on against Red bor, files suit Department Ante at failure to so. for the do penalties contending FMLA Pie under 4980D(a) §§ & 683-84; 26 U.S.C. see denied wrongfully his both Jones was 4980H(a) (c). (b)(1), & the statute under leave right parental potentially Department Labor having request- retaliation and fired in ' next, strict-scruti- at the might fair better 29 U.S.C. See leave. ed FMLA Certainly, analysis. ny phase of 2617(b)(2). Red Pie invokes 2615(a)(1); §§ means of least restrictive terms of the Department’s to the RFRA as a defense may as- this section violation of burdened in may as a defense RFRA invoked 2. Whether ais de in a private individuals a or defense a between claim suit sert that violation produced split a veloping issue which appropriate proceeding and judicial obtain Compare v. Hankins among the circuits. Tomic, 442 government.”); against a relief Cir.2006) (2-1 96, (2d Lyght, 103-04 441 F.3d F.3d at 1042. decision) may be invoked (holding that RFRA suit), (Sotomayor, at 114-15 a with id. in such L, employer incurs no say that an 3. This is Corp. Sev dissenting); Gen. Conference Although FMLA of the leave. costs as a result 402, McGill, F.3d enth-Day Adventists v. required to employer unpaid, leave is Cir.2010); (6th Dio v. Catholic Tomic 410-12 1036, (7th Peoria, coverage the ab- providing health Cir. continue cese of by 2006), abrogated grounds Hosan on other and condi- employee the same terms sent Church & Sch. Evangelical Lutheran na-Tabor work- were still apply if he tions that would E.E.O.C., - U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. v. course, 2614(a)(2), § ing, 29 U.S.C. (2012); and Sutton L.Ed.2d 650 n. having some- the cost of employer bear must Ctr., 192 F.3d Joseph Med. Providence St. even employee on leave fill in for one else 1999) (all (9th holding that Cir. 837-43 employee open position a as he holds suit). may in such not be invoked RFRA leave, anticipation his return however, doubt, may that RFRA is no There 2614(a)(1). employer respects, the § In both litigation with the as a defense in be invoked employee to the assistance lends considerable 2000bb-1(c) § government. U.S.C. taking ("A leave. religious exercise has been person whose families, supporting promoting the De feres with the free of religion exercise or is would partment strong argument have at most a modest plaintiffs burden on a there is no substitute for granting free rights, the court’s rationale time to parents leave at critical times when subjects a potentially range wide of statu- their presence is by most needed tory protections to strict' scrutiny, one of point aside, children. But that would a the most demanding standards known in court deem the interests underlying the legal our system. In some ways, this is sufficiently compelling FMLA to constitute reminiscent of era, the Lochner when an highest order,” “interests of the Wisconsin employer claim that could the extension of Yoder, 205, 215, statutory protections to its workers consti- (1972), 32 L.Ed.2d 15 “paramount tuted an infringement undue on the free- jeopardized by interest[s]” “the gravest dom of contract right and the operate abuses,” Verner, Sherberb v. private, lawful business as the owner 10 L.Ed.2d 965 wished. And exempting employers (1963), such that rights Jones’ under the from extending to employees rights trump FMLA would the asserted religious specified statute, And, interests of the corporation? in con forced to pick up the slack and take com- sidering the government whether has “es pensatory protect action to a compelling tablish[ed] and specific justifi those employees; that, short of the em- cation for burdening claimants,” these ante ployee of religiously-motivated employ- (emphasis at 685 in original), would a court er is left with right no at all. I doubt that assess the strength of the government’s this is what Congress intended when it interest promoting familial relationships enacted RFRA. generally, or its interest in promoting the between parents bonds same-sex and their children, as is the interest which Red *37 I begin my discussion of specific the Pie contends is irreconcilable with its reli legal points presented by appeal with gious if latter, interests? And the would my where colleagues First, and I agree. I specific that more interest qualify as a agree Anti-Injunction that the poses Act compelling interest? The outcome of that no bar to this action. This is not a suit analysis is far from clear me under restraining aimed at the collection of a today’s precedent. case, tax—in this penalties the for non- hypothetieals These illustrate the uncer- compliance Rather, with the ACA. it is a tainty that the expansive court’s interpre- direct challenge to a provision substantive tation and application of brings RFRA ato of the contraception ACA: the mandate. of statutory number in schemes which I am Congress also in my has accord with specific colleagues accorded rights to (not on employees standing. to mention parties), other not con- tested recognition standing any the plaintiffs and of the accommodation of ‘ corporation, cases, these agree which and I my addition to its with col- own- ers, can say leagues now burden their corporations both By interests. easting the their mandatory pro- owners indeed do have standing. vision of benefits to an Because the employee as a burden of the contraception substantial burden on the directly free exercise mandate falls corpora- the two rights closely-held of a corporation and its tions as employers, corpo- because owners, considering without whether com- rations they contend have their own with pliance directly mandate right inter- to free of religion which is mandate, they have by the burdened to, mandate. See challenge standing to the free exercise I turn first U.S.A., Int’l Amnesty v. Clapper

generally underlying premise One corporations. — 1138, 1147, U.S.-,-, cases these claims advanced the RFRA Kortes (2013). And 185 L.Ed.2d interests, obligations rights, and is that the of these Grotes, owners as the who identical are closely-held corporation of a assert corporations closely-held fact, I have owners. In of their those inway in the religious beliefs their express In they are distinct. previously, argued have corporations, these they run corpo through the business electing to do free exer own that their standing to assert have form, Grotes Kortes and the rate contracep by the burdened rights are cise compa their from separated themselves notwithstanding general tion mandate le independent are corporations nies: standing. See shareholder against rule and obli legal rights entities with gal Aluminium v. Alcan Bd. Franchise Tax individual independent gations 331, 336, 110 S.Ct. Ltd., 493 U.S. Sebelius, F.3d Grote owners. (1990) (exception L.Ed.2d 696 (dissent). (7th Cir.2013) That is the standing “allow[s] rule shareholder sepa create a incorporation: point of direct, interest personal with a shareholder some of person to shoulder legal rate if the even bring suit action in a cause of See Cedric of the business. burdens implicated”); rights are also corporation’s Promotions, King, 533 Ltd. v. Kushner Health & Dep’t v. U.S. see also Gilardi 158, 163, 121 U.S. 1208, 1215-17, Servs., 733 F.3d Human ba (“[I]ncorporation’s L.Ed.2d 198 (D.C.Cir. 5854246, at *6-*7 2013 WL legal distinct is to create a purpose sic 2013) Brown, J.); id. at 1228- Nov. 1, (op of obligations, pow legal rights, entity, (Ed *19-*22 2013 WL those of ers, privileges different dissenting wards, J., concurring part & it, created who who the natural individuals in part). see also it, employs.”); it own or whom Sebelius, F.3d Corp. Autocam I that the say believe This is not (6th Cir.2013), cert. pet’n 623-24 corporations respective interests filed 2013) (No. 13-482); (U.S. Conesto Oct. The fact congruent. and their owners Sec’y, Corp. v. Specialties ga the man- Wood imposed obligations that the *38 Servs., 724 F.3d Human Dep’t Health & whereas it corporation, upon fall the date (3d Cir.2013), cert. 377, pet’n in- 387-88 only the the individual owners—and is (U.S. 19,1993) Sep. 3139 filed, 82 U.S.L.W. dividuals, hold free exer- my view—who in (No. 13-356). here is that means What to wheth- great matters a deal rights, cise which, as corporations two that it is the substantially burdened. rights are er those ACA, pro the must employers covered goes to the merits point that But employees to insurance their standing vide health the rather than of this lawsuit That, turn, contraceptives. covers points court plaintiffs, set as the either the Gilardi, between meaningful distance 9; puts n. also Ante at 667 see out. company 5854246, and Grotes and 1228, at *19 Kortes 2013 WL F.3d at the notion that undercuts plans health (Edwards, J., & dissent- concurring part the Grotes the Kortes and forces proceed I ACA why, And that is part). ing use of contra practice facilitate a corporate to plaintiffs explain, to —the —both object on they ception prevail to which unlikely individual—are —to grounds. their RFRA claim. the merits of

The distinction between a corporation matism if not legal theory. A religious explains why its owners plaintiffs association is often as well if not better argued, today holds, have the court situated as the individuals who make up secular, that a for-profit corporation pos- the association to assert the relevant reli right its own sesses to the free exercise of gious interests: can speak association religion. That novel way idea is a to get on behalf of members; all of its it- likely past problem people whose has resources pursue legal relief that leads object faith them to to the contracep- not; individual members do it can speak tion mandate legally are not responsible authoritatively on matters of religious dog complying with the mandate: endow ma; may it be the association that owns “persons” corporate their own property and other assets affected right religion exercise may which challenged government action; and in invoke in objection conscientious to the many instances, the law or govern other mandate. It is an unprecedented holding, ment action being challenged intrudes di and one I believe without legal logical rectly on the worship collective activities of support. the association itself. E.g., Church concede, I must, Ias that the Supreme Lukumi Aye, 534-35, Babalu 508 U.S. at Court has not restricted the invocation of 113 S.Ct. at (challenged 2227-28 ordi free rights solely individuals, exercise nances practices restricted which were but has very allowed—albeit with little service); to worship central see also Prim discussion—houses of including worship, Iglesia era Bautista Hispana Boca Ra those which incorporated, have to assert ton, Inc. Cnty., 1295, Broward 450 F.3d rights. such ante citing (11th Cir.2006) (incorporated church Gonzales v. Centro Espirita O Beneficente standing assert, alia, had inter free ex Vegetal, 418, Uniao do challenge ercise clause to local zoning ordi (2006), 168 L.Ed.2d 1017 and Church nance which interfered with church’s relo Aye, Lukumi Babalu v. City Inc. cation); In re Young, Hialeah, U.S. (8th Cir.1996) (church had standing to as (1993); Gilardi, L.Ed.2d 472 see also sert free rights of debtors in chal F.3d at 2013 WL *4 (op. lenge to bankruptcy court order di J.) Brown, (coll.cases); Harris v. cf. rected church return funds debtors had McRae, donated to church prior to'declaring bank 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (noting that a ruptcy; party were not debtors free adver exercise claim is “one ordinarily sary requires proceeding seeking return of funds participation”).4 individual Per mitting a religious organization, and could not assert incorpo free exercise not, rated or forum, to invoke the Free Exercisé another and interests of Clause makes sense as a prag- matter of church and its members were sufficiently *39 26, Of the cases cited this court and Id. at n. 105 S.Ct. at 303 1962 n. 26. The Gilardi, District of only Columbia Circuit in Court plainly relying was thus doctrine Found, Tony Labor, & Sec'y Susan Alamo v. of standing any associational rather than on 290, 1953, U.S. 471 (1985), 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 278 notion possessed that the Foundation inde says actually anything standing. about pendent rights. free exercise The Court's ci Found, footnote, In a the Court in Alamo said tation to N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patter simply, “The standing Foundation also has to son, 449, 458-59, 1163, 357 U.S. 78 S.Ct. raise the free exercise claims associ- 1169-70, (1958), 2 any L.Ed.2d 1488 removes ates, who are organ- members doubt regard. in that employees ization as well as under the Act.”

696 corporation, that a to doubt are reasons repre effectively could church

similar nature, rights. has such its judgment whatever rights), free exercise their sent grounds, on other remanded & vacated ac- rights Constitution Not all 2502, 138 L.Ed.2d 1114, 117 S.Ct. 521 U.S. corpora- a are extended person cords to reinstated, 141 F.3d (1997),judgment 1007 recognized has Court Supreme tions. (8th Cir.1998); Presbyterian Church 854 identity has deter- been “[Corporate 518, States, F.2d 870 (U.S.A.) v. United cor- denying decisions in several minative (church Cir.1989) standing (9th had 521-23 rights, constitutional certain porations gov challenge free exercise pursue compulsory against as the privilege such membership); of its surveillance ernment Bank First Nat’l self-incrimination.” Smith, God, v. Inc. Peyote Way Church of 14, Bellotti, 765, n. 778 435 U.S. v. Boston Cir.1984) (5th (incorpo 193, 199 742 F.2d 14, L.Ed.2d 1407, n. 55 1416-17 98 S.Ct. in free stake personal had rated church (1978). explain: went on Bellotti proscribing to statute challenge exercise guarantees “purely personal” peyote, [C]ertain “because and use of possession directly corporations will ... are unavailable statute enforcement the “historic its members organizations with which other because affect the freedom com guarantee professed particular may fulfill function” of mitment”); Scientology Cali of individ- protection Church limited to the been Cazares, White, 1279-80 638 F.2d v. 322 U.S. States v. United uals. fornia Cir.1981) (church (11th standing to had 694, 698-701, [88 1251-52 of its member rights (1944). assert free or not Whether L.Ed. 1542] may- alleging town rights suit ship in civil person- guarantee “purely particular its church and unlawfully harassed or had corporations unavailable to al” or is members). na- depends on the some other reason particu- ture, purpose of the history, and

Still, religious organization although a provision. constitutional lar standing represent enjoys associational members, see rights of its the free exercise Ibid; Indus. Browning-Ferris also see Un Workers Food & Commercial United Inc., Vt., Disposal, Inc. v. Kelco Inc., Group, v. Local 751 Brown ion 257, 284-85, 544, 551-53, U.S. (1989). L.Ed.2d (1996); Washington Hunt L.Ed.2d 758 reviewing have struck I been Comm’n, Adver. Apple State corporations granting of decisions handful 2434, 2441-42, 53 L.Ed.2d 342-44, 97 S.Ct. (and matter, for that rights free exercise Seldin, (1977); Warth case) by how in this briefs plaintiffs’ 45 L.Ed.2d 343 511, 95 S.Ct. articulating substan- wanting are in exer (1975), it has free I whether question why any tive, explanation for affirmative aWould defunct rights of its own. cise secular, for- let alone type corporation, any longer has members no church that reli- should be accorded corporation, profit and other assets property but still owns Stores, Lobby Hobby gious rights. E.g., own its free exercise able to claim (10th Sebelius, Inc. v. Court, Supreme example? The right, for Cir.2013) (“[W]e why an indi- see cannot religious bod incorporated allowing while Free for-profit retains operating vidual yet to rights, has assert free exercise ies to who an individual protections but Exercise what *40 why, let alone delineate fully explain sharehold- as the sole incorporates any, indepen if can types corporations, of —even in engages he not, though even There er—does rights. free exercise dently assert before.”), pet’n N.C., Inc., exact same activities as Fed. the Blind 487 U.S. of of (U.S. filed, Sep. 781, cert. 787-89, U.S.L.W. 2667, 2672-73, 108 S.Ct. 2013) (No. 13-354). 19, My colleagues (1988) (charitable see solicitation); L.Ed.2d 669 no think Congress reason to meant to N.Y., Bible Soc’y Watchtower & Tract of preclude corporations asserting such Straton, 150, Inc. Vill. 536 U.S. 160- RFRA, 682, rights under at but I ante 61, 2080, 2086-87, 122 S.Ct. 153 L.Ed.2d think gets things backward. Given (2002) (religious speech); Citizens Supreme that the recog Court has never United, 342-43, 558 U.S. at 130 S.Ct. at nized that secular corporations have free (political speech). Beyond paro- those I rights, exercise think it is more accurate interests, (which chial Bellotti struck down say there is no reason to think prohibiting corporation a law from mak- Congress meant step to take the novel ing expenditures to influence the outcome extending rights free exercise to such cor any public referendum other than one porations when it RFRA. enacted directly which the property, affected busi-

Perhaps argument the best in ness, favor of or activities corporation), according free rights corpora exercise stressed the core First Amendment inter- tions is that right speech to free al dialogue est a robust on issues of public ready recognized among has been those concern, an beyond interest extends rights corporations enjoy. Citizens particular speaker’s wish to express his Comm’n, United v. Fed. Election 558 U.S. views include the public's right to hear 876, 899-900, 130 S.Ct. 175 his views and those of others. 435 at (2010) (coll.cases); Bellotti, L.Ed.2d 753 776-77, 98 S.Ct. at 1415-16. The Court 780-81, 435 U.S. at 98 S.Ct. at 1417-18 added that “[t]he inherent worth of the (colbcases). beyond But the fact that the speech in terms of capacity its for inform- clause, free exercise speech the free like ing the public depend upon does not clause, Amendment, resides in the First I identity sources, of its corpora- whether little, find if anything, speech in the cases tion, association, union, or individual.” Id. that speaks to the religion nature of and 98 S.Ct. at recog- 1416. Decisions why corporations, as a history matter of nizing speech corporations logic, and should be able assert free only thus rest “not on the role of the First rights. See Conestoga Spe Wood Amendment in fostering individual self-ex- cialties, 724 (noting F.3d distinct pression but also on its role in affording treatment speech of free and free exercise discussion, debate, public access to Supreme clauses in jurisprudence); Court the dissemination of information and Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 2013 WL ideas.” Id. at at 1419. (op. Brown, J.); at *5 Auto contrast, Religion, by cam, personal is a un 730 F.3d at Corporations, 627-28. dertaking. financial, Conestoga Specialties, Wood property, because have political interests, Certainly 724 F.3d at there course have a free speech collective societal in protecting interest interest re protecting promot , ing ligious liberty religion those can pursuing interests and in and has agendas, charitable, goals public sphere positive be their stated influenced the religious, political, ways. Lynch or profit-making. Donnelly, See 668, 674-78, 1355, 1360-61, Hudson Corp. Cent. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. N.Y., Serv. Comm’n (recognizing longstand 561- L.Ed.2d 604 life). ing 65 L.Ed.2d 341 role of religion American But (1980) (commercial speech); is, nature, Riley v. Nat’l faith an intense- its *41 1785))). (7th LaNguage In ed. the rea- and for experience,

ly individual Fleischfres 680, 200, Dist. 15 F.3d v. Dirs. Sch. ser follow, likely it is one of I believe sons of (7th Cir.1994), a we set forth n. 5 constitutional personal” “purely those religion” working definition “general will not Court Supreme clause that of the free exercise purposes not corporations certainly extend — - addressing beliefs “any set of includes secular, for-profit corporations. occupying ultimate concern matters of qualifies as a corporation fact that a filled God in tradi parallel to that place Act, Dictionary 1 U.S.C. person under persons.” (quoting Welsh tionally religious 673-74; Hobby Lobby 1,§ ante at see 333, 340, States, 398 U.S. v. United 1132, 1129, by no Stores, F.3d at (1970)) 1796, 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 S.Ct. pro its RFRA bestows dispositive. means (internal omit ellipsis marks and quotation whose upon person tection “[a] ted). Circuit, in that the Second I note § 2000bb- burdened.” exercise has been term, same in attempting to define the mine). 1(c) Thus, “the focus on (emphasis philosopher, psycholo renowned voked the instead, narrow; we is too personhood James, who William gist, professor and together ‘person’ term must construe the acts, feelings, religion as “the described ” religion.’ Gi ‘exercise of phrase in their of individual men experiences and 5854246, lardi, 2013 WL 733 F.3d solitude, they apprehend far as them so Autocam, J.); Brown, *2 see also (op. in to stand relation whatever selves words, we must In other 730 F.3d at 626. States v. may consider the divine.” United corpo for a possible whether it is consider (2d Cir.1983) Moon, 1210, 1227 religion. ration to exercise James, Wm. (quoting The VaRieties course, Amendment, of does The First Experienoe: Study Religious A in Human century than a “religion.” More define (1910)); see also Patrick Nature Supreme Cir.1984). “[t]he Court said ago, (2d LeFevre, 745 F.2d ‘religion’ reference to one’s views term references an Each of these definitions Creator, to his and to the of his relations understanding of his relation individual’s they impose of reverence for obligations necessarily per being, ship to divine character, and of obedience being his and subjective viewpoint. In that sonal and Beason, his Davis v. will.” the views they are consistent with regard, Madison, 33 L.Ed. 637 a drafter of of both James (1890), Jefferson, grounds by Amendment, other abrogated on and Thomas First Evans, 620, 634, 116 Virginia’s Bill predecessor, Romer v. its who drafted (the (1996); Freedom, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 in 1779 bill Religious Cnty. Allegheny eventually adopted by Virginia v. A.C.L.U. see also was 1786). Madison, in his 1785 Pittsburgh Chapter, Assembly Greater Against Remonstrance Reli 106 L.Ed.2d Memorial and Assessments, opposed he (Stevens, J., wrote that concurring part gious & dissent- Virginia bill to Henry’s proposed Patrick (noting “religion” as used ing part) religion on support for the levy a tax clause was “understood establishment being: first of which ‘[v]irtue, grounds, fifteen mean as founded primarily to God, expectation hold it for a fundamen upon reverence of 1. Because we truth, only religion “that punishments,’ and undeniable future rewards tal to our duty faith and which we owe Creator secondarily system of divine or the ‘[a] ” it, can be discharging and the Manner opposite (quoting to others.’ worship as conviction, English Dictionary only by reason Johnson, directed A S. *42 Religion Believing The with you religion force or violence. is a matter solely which lies between man every man must be left to the then of God, and his that he owes account man; every conviction and conscience of none other for his faith or his worship, right every it of man to is the legitimate powers of govern- may exercise it as these dictate. This only, ment reach actions opin- and not in nature an unalienable right is its ions, contemplate I sovereign rev- unalienable, right. It because the erence that act of the whole American men, depending only on the opinions of people legisla- declared that their contemplated by evidence their own ture should respecting “make no law cannot of other minds follow dictates religion, establishment of or prohibiting also, men: It is unalienable because thereof,” the free exercise building thus men, right what is here a towards is a a wall of separation between church and duty towards the It is the Creator. State. Adhering to this expression' of duty every of man to the to render supreme will of the nation behalf homage, only, Creator such and such as conscience, of the of I see shall acceptable he believes to be to him. with sincere satisfaction the progress of duty precedent, This both in order of those sentiments which tend to restore in degree obligation, time and of to the to man all his natural rights, convinced Society. any claims of Civil Before man he has no natural right opposition to can be considered as a member of'Civil his social duties. Society, he must be considered as a Letter from President Thomas Jefferson subject of the Governour Uni- al., Dodge, Danbury Bap- to Nehemiah et if Society, verse: And a member of Civil (Jan. 1, 1801), reproduced tist Association any who enters into subordinate Associ- Brown, 599, 604, Braunfeld ation, always must it with a do reserva- 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 duty general authority; tion of his to the (quoting 8 WORKSof Thomas Jefferson every much more must man who be- (A. eds.1905)), Lipscomb Bergh & A. also particular comes a member of a Civil available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/ Society saving do it with a of his alle- founder/documents/amendL_religions58. ” giance Sovereign.... to the Universal (last 2013). html visited Nov. Ewing Everson Bd. Educ. Such remarks are consistent with the 1, 64, 504, 535, Twp., 330 U.S. 91 historical underpinnings of the free exer- (1947) (App. L.Ed. 711 of Rut dissent cise clause. the congressional Neither rec- J.) ledge, (quoting The WRITINGSof James underlying ord the enactment of the First (Gaillard ed.1901)), Madison 183-91 Hunt Amendment nor the records of the state http://religiousfreedom.lib. also available at legislatures which subsequently ratified virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785. provide any help the amendment in ascer- (last 2013). html visited Nov. Madison’s taining legislators what meant “reli- religion something articulation of gion” and the free exercise thereof. See must be “left to the conviction and con McConnell, Origins Michael W. The & every obviously man” science describes Understanding Historical Free Exer- highly personal experience thought Religion, cise 103 Harv. L.Rev. Likewise, Jefferson, and belief. in his (1990); Phillip Vincent Danbury Baptists, Muñoz, 1802 letter to the de Original Meaning The the Free religion scribed terms individual con Exercise Clause: Evidence from Congress, science: First & J.L. Harv. Pol. Pub. at 1481-84. derstanding, 103 Harv. L.R. (2008). two reference But there are *43 omit why “conscience” was It is not clear notion that reli- that reinforce points of the free adopted version ted from the matter of to be a gion was understood clause, that the but it is doubtful personal conscience. signify a differ was meant elimination of all First, the constitutions by understanding pro of what the clause ent Connecticut, states, included thirteen save and oth As Professor McConnell tected. many ref and liberty provisions, observe, religion” of and “freedom ers freedom to wor right as the erenced the of were terms “freedom conscience” to the dictate’s of according ship one’s God in interchangeably discussions were used McConnell, Origins See one’s conscience. McConnell, liberty. E.g., Ori of Understanding, 103 & Historical HaRV. Understanding, 103 gins & Historical text of (reproducing n. 242 L.Rev. at 1457 A. Philip Harv. L.Rev. at 1493-94; Flores, City provisions); state of Boeme Right Re Hamburger, A Constitutional 507, 553-54, 117 S.Ct. An Historical Per ligious Exemption: (1997) (O’Connor, J., dis L.Ed.2d 624 933-34 spective, 60 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. (discussing examples pro of such senting) (1992). suggests & n. 80 McConnell visions). Hampshire’s 1784 constitu New dropped was either “rights of conscience” tion, “[e]very example, provided it redundancy, to the extent to eliminate unalienable has a natural and individual the free exer thing the same as signified to the worship according GOD right emphasize that it was religion, cise or to conscience, own and rea dictates of his conscience, only the freedom of Delaware, son”; constitutions of and the nonreligious to the freedom opposed as Massachusetts, Jersey, New North Car belief, protected. that was meant to be olina, Virginia and all con Pennsylvania, McConnell, Historical Under Origins & McCon very language. tained similar See at standing, 1488-96. Harv. L.Rev. nell, Understanding, Origins & Historical it clear that the clause was way, Either n. 242. at 103 Harv. L.Rev. of reli protect the exercise intended York constitutions —those of New Other Id. at 1495-96. And gious conscience. separately described and South Carolina — by provisions state ad shown both the then religion freedom of protected religion and the dressing the freedom “liberty of to the conscience” referred I cit contemporaneous writings have other thereby guaranteed. See id. “Con ed, religious conscience was the exércise of by ways in still other science” was used understood to be a matter between of other state constitutions. provisions not, in perhaps, and his individual God— See id. believing what more modern sense of stage for provisions state set the wants, These rather as a reflection ever one but debate, adoption drafting, his or her obedi that the individual owed free exercise clause. directly First Amendment’s Id. on moral matters to God. ence by adopted 1498-99; proposed The clause as A Hamburger, Constitutional Representatives incorporated Religious Exemption, House of Right of Geo. of con- language recognizing “freedom 938. The understand Wash. L.Rev. science”; by religion was a adopted ing but the version the exercise of Senate, relationship with by ensuing conference commit- matter of the individual’s rati- was also consistent tee, was submitted to and and obedience God and which minority religions States, multiplicity language. omitted that fied the sec- McConnell, practiced the United States Origins & Historical Un- part & century, concurring dissenting part); of the 18th ond half consen- Assocs., Phoenix, away City Fleck & Inc. v. country should sus that move cf. Corp., an Ariz. Muni. officially estab- history Colonial from a (9th Cir.2006) (and (holding corporation does religions officially disfavored lished right recognized possess Lawrence religious pluralism. toward Id. religions) Texas, at 946. (2003), L.Ed.2d to make autonomous would All this reinforces what one *44 in intimate gov- choices relations free of that it religion: intuit about otherwise “Corporations ernment interference: are inextricably intertwined characteris- with self-defining not autonomous creatures conscience, uniquely are tics that human: worthy respect dignity of and in the rele- faith, belief, Religious and be- devotion. sense.”). vant to liefs have do such fundamental Indeed, it strikes me as de potentially mankind, as where questions the nature of religious faith meaning say to to from, world, in what place

we came our the corporation should be said to the possess die, happens when we and our relation- same free exercise of right religion to obligations people. and to other ships with being enjoys in In country. a human Only human mind can such entertain extricably person’s bound it is with a questions. himself, world, origins, sense of his corporation is a which legal A construct is, religious (including what life belief does not have the sentence and. conscience belief) lack is a of defining of such trait questions. such ultimate “In entertain humankind; this is we why one reason Marshall, of Chief Justice words component view it as a core of individual invisible, corporation being, is ‘an artificial liberty freedom: “At the heart of is the existing only contempla in intangible, right concept one’s own of define exis ” Browning-Ferris law.’ Indus. tion of of universe, tence, meaning, of of of Inc., 492 Disposal, supra, Vt. v. Kelco U.S. mystery of human life. Beliefs about 284, 109 at (quoting at S.Ct. 2925 Trustees could not these matters define attrib Woodward, 17 Coll. v. U.S. Dartmouth of were un personhood utes of formed (4 Wheat.) (1819)). 518, 636, 4 L.Ed. 629 compulsion der State.” Planned man, creature God. It It is a not of Pennsylvania Casey, Se. Parenthood “believes,” any if it can be said to believe 851, 833, 505 112 120 U.S. S.Ct. found, only thing, people what who (1992); Conestoga see also L.Ed.2d 674 own, manage corporation be and/or Sebelius, 917 Corp. v. Specialities Wood Ira Lupu, Keeping lieve. See C. the Faith: 394, (E.D.Pa.2013); F.Supp.2d 407-08 Equality Religion, Speech & Dep’t Korte v. U.S. Health & Human Constitution, 739, 18 766 (S.D.Ill. Conn. L.Rev. Servs., F.Supp.2d 743-44 nature, (“By their can institutions Stores, 2012); Hobby Lobby Inc. v. Sebeli faith.”); (W.D.Okla. a conscience or Citizens us, have F.Supp.2d United, 558 U.S. at at 972 banc, 2012), To rev’d en 723 F.3d 1114. (Stevens, J., concurring part dissent & say, today, right does that the as the court (“It ing might also added that part) may faith be to exercise one’s consciences, no corporations legal have no be by asserted the same terms liefs, feelings, thoughts, no no no de ex incorporated currency construct —an firm, sires.”); Conestoga accounting re Specialties, change, Wood or automobile 385; Gilardi, example at a human pair shop, F.3d at 733 F.3d —as least, (Edwards, J., is, my being, mind at irreconcil- 2013 WL at *18 can exer for-profit, corporations' secular very essence of able with the matter, ”); Autocam, and, religion.’ humankind. accord faith cise Gilardi, 627; also F.3d at see good reasons ex Perhaps there 1214-15, (opinion 2013 WL at *5 right of free exercise tend the J.) (“No Brown, juris corpus such exists including not-for-profit cor organizations, suggest right a free-exercise for secular pursue religious organized to porations Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d corporations.”); Conestoga Specialties, Wood ends. See (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in (noting that churches are 724 F.3d at 386 (“during part dissenting part) & practice individuals the “means adoption of the 200-year span between the Presiding Corp. also religion”); see passage, First Amendment and RFRA’s Jesus Christ Lat Bishop Church Amos, consistently treated ter-day Supreme Court Saints L,Ed.2d 2862, 2872-73, 97 as confined to individu free exercise *45 (1987) (Brennan, J., in concurring non-profit religious organizations”; als and (recognizing potential for judgment) case, now, single a until and “not religious to chill exercise is protections for-profit extended RFRA’s ac greatest respect not-for-profit with corporations”).

tivities). said, entirely I it As have is not Certainly agree profit I that the wish to why step necessary even this clear to me automatically an indi disqualify does not standing such given the associational asserting religious interests. vidual rights, the free exercise entities to assert 679-81; Burstyn, Joseph ante at Inc. See least, But, members. at the those Wilson, 495, 501-02, 72 v. 343 U.S. S.Ct. religious aby purpose, entities are defined 780, (1952); 96 L.Ed. 1098 Beckwith extending protections and so to them — Sebelius, F.Supp.2d -, Elec. Co. v. clause could be seen as of the free exercise (M.D.Fla. --, 3297498, at *11 2013 WL purpose with the of that clause. consistent 2013) J.). (Kovachevich, Individ June in But let us be clear: we are this case acting, multiple uals often have reasons for beyond being right asked to extend the simply because have reasons not-for-profit religious corporations to cor not religious addition to a motive does organized any purpose not porations disqualify asserting them from free exer religion. Conestoga See connected But rights. cise that does answer (“We 724 F.3d at 385 Specialties, Wood an question corporation again, whether that, just conclusion be will not draw the — accorded invention of law—should be recognized the free ex cause courts have religious rights, particularly when it is not of churches and other reli rights ercise entities, gious necessarily organized it follows that ends.5 asserting majority postulates for-profit his 5. The if a ifies owner from Second, interests. to the extent the restau rights, business cannot assert free exercise Jewish, target rant’s clientele is the business theoretically then a Jewish restaurant could third-party standing might have to assert the right dietary to observe restric- be denied rights free exercise of its customers. responses at 681. Three come to tions. Ante Boren, 190, 194-97, Craig S.Ct. v. First, operator the owner and of the mind. 451, 455-57, (vendor (1976) 50 L.Ed.2d 397 restaurant, assuming he is an observant "non-intoxicating” had third- beer 3.2% Jew, might well have a meritorious conten- equal protection party standing to assert the directly own exercise is tion that his customers, rights year-old male who of 18-20 having substantially han- burdened being proscribed law from sold were state food; said, not); dle and serve non-kosher as I have age females of same were beer whereas also, Servs., Int’l, e.g., Carey Population profit-motive disqual- I do not believe that the see I a clear point, preliminary injunc- this would also note the entitlement to On protecting tive relief significance procedural posture whatever free exer rights they might cise Hobby have. Lob plaintiffs seeking pre case is in. The by, (Briscoe, C.J., 723 F.3d at 1164-65 injunctive “A liminary preliminary relief. concurring in part dissenting part); & injunction extraordinary remedy nev (Matheson, J., id. at 1183-84 concurring v. Natu right.” er awarded as of Winter part dissenting part). & The notion Council, 7, 24, ral Resources U.S. Def. any type corporation may possess (2008) 172 L.Ed.2d 249 rights its own free exercise is itself far Geren, (citing 689- Munaf proposition; from a settled plain and the 171 L.Ed.2d 1 tiffs’ claim calls for a wholly unprecedent (2008)); Armstrong, see also Mazurek v. secular, ed extension such for- 968, 972, 117 profit corporations. (describing preliminary L.Ed.2d injunction “extraordinary drastic are, finally, significant logical There dif remedy”) (quoting Wright, 11A C. A. Mil posed by attributing religious ficulties Kane, § ler & M. Prac. Fed. & Proc. 2948 rights corporations. to secular Whatever (2d ed.1995)). burden, at 129-30 religious rights a corporation might theo course, plaintiffs is on the as the movants retically only exercise can come from the showing demonstrating to make clear establish, own, people who manage *46 id.; their entitlement to such relief. See corporation. Conestoga Special Wood Walker, 385, Legal Soc’y Christian v. 453 F.3d (“General ties, 724 F.3d at business (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Goodman not, corporations separate apart do Dep’t Regulation, v. Ill. Fin. & 'l systems from the actions or belief of their of Prof (7th Cir.2005)); Chicago F.3d or employees, individual owners Carpenters Dist. Council Pension Fund Stores, religion.”) (quoting Hobby Lobby Constr., Inc., v. K&I 270 F.3d 1291). Sebelius, Inc. F.Supp.2d at (7th Cir.2001). stage The record-at this here, saying And no one is that Korte & is, litigation generously, to put the it slen Luitjohan Contractors and Grote Indus illuminating der in terms of evidence the instead, corporations; tries are I Catholic religious asserted interests of the two cor plaintiffs understand the individual to be porate plaintiffs and how those interests in a saying they corporations that run the by including coverage with, would be burdened way expresses, that is consistent contraceptives employee for in their health But principles the of their Catholic faith. plans. I am thus far challenges defining care short of con in poses some rights corpora vinced that Grote Industries and Korte & beliefs and Luitjohan Contractors have demonstrated tion. 678, 683-84, 2010, 2015, D. 97 S.Ct. consume non-kosher food. See Jonathan Sarna, Birth Con- Constitutional Dilemma on (1977) (distributor contracep- L.Ed.2d 675 trol, (March 2012) (“We all devices); Bolton, Forward.Com tive Doe might agree kosher delis should not be 35 L.Ed.2d 201 ham, selling hopefully coerced but we into services). (physicians providing abortion employees agree would also all that a deli's

Third, bring hypothetical into line with penalized should not be for customers case, question of this the relevant would facts it.''), choosing http://foward.com/ to consume whether be free exercise of the articles/1 52606/constitutional-dilemma-on- might kosher restaurant or its owners some- (last 2013). visited Nov. For birth-control/ below, substantially private how burdened I forth I do not believe reasons set . employee they choice that a restaurant makes to would be. First, purposes that a for of free exercise ego to the extent owners corporation’s claim). identity derive religious principles owners, if the owners have from its what Second, suppose company’s beliefs, degrees diverse of devo- diverse ownership changes. happens What then tion, as to whether and and diverse notions to the beliefs we have attributed to ought .to reflect their corporation how the corporation ownership? based on its Are McRae, religious beliefs? See Harris v. challenges presented such the one in 320-21, at supra, 448 at subject re-litigation every this case time (noting that where individual church change corporation there is a owner- diversity of religious members hold views ship? law, challenged church itself lacks as to Third, corpo- are beliefs claim standing infringe- associational solely rate owners determinative of the rights); on free exercise ment cf. corporation’s religious principles? Sup- Gilardi, 2013 WL pose, example, corporation’s that a (Edwards, J., *22 concurring entirely owners have entrusted the man- part) (noting part dissenting & extent to agement corporation longtime to its theory religious rights corpo- which CEO, public corpora- who is the face of the by requirement rate owners are burdened happens strongly tion and who also to have imposed corporation' with which way held about beliefs inextricably unanimity bound tuns on the corporation should be run. Are beliefs; minority of owners’ “there are no corporation? her beliefs attributable views”). shareholders with different What suppose corpora- Or that the owners of a if, example, corporation’s one of á two professed religious tion have no interest in equal owners is Catholic and the other is way run, corporation in which a but Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, athe- corporation serving focus of the is on ist—are the beliefs one or both attrib- *47 members a particular religion selling — corporation, uted to the and if the beliefs kosher or halal -products, example. food for count, only one which does? Are the See ante at corporation 681. Can the conglomeration

beliefs a or neither? Or religious said to hold the beliefs of its Catholic, suppose both owners are but market, target even if man- its owners and only one of them claims that his beliefs are agers do not? (like by legal requirement burdened some At argument, oral Grote Industries’ here) the at imposed mandate issue on the counsel if ownership conceded that of the company, professes whereas the other ei- company changed, as death and inheri- support ther indifference or for that re- tance, then a might court have to revisit quirement. Are the beliefs of the one the corporation’s nature of the asserted owner sufficient alone to define those of religious why interests. But if is true corporation? the Sepper, See Elizabeth corporation the has its own free exercise Contraception Corporate and the Birth of Conscience, (Wash. rights? By permitting corporation a 17-18 Univ. St. Louis are, religious rights, assert its own we I Legal Sch. of Law Paper Studies Research 13-07-01) think, Series, 2013), saying corporation would Paper (July No. may possess rights independent such http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ available at assert; papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289383, 22 Am. what its owners believe and a J. 2014) Pol’y L. (forthcoming change ownership Gender Soc. & itself would theo- (discussing practical retically portend nothing doctrinal difficul- about the status posed by treating corporation ties as alter corporation’s religious interests. holding its also limited has The court closely-held corporations.

today to provides that “Government shall RFRA prag- are both that limitation reasons substantially person’s burden a exer company aWhen matic and obvious: if the burden results religion cise of even number of by small managed owned applicability,” unless general from a rule of overlap appreciate easy it is people, compel is in furtherance of the burden corpo- owners and interests of between the interest and is the least ling governmental Thus, is owned and a firm that ration. furthering that inter restrictive means of religious in its family united operated by a (b). 2000bb-1(a) By § & est. U.S.C. case for strongest presents beliefs burdens, to substantial its reference claim free exercise making type qualitative calls for a as expressly RFRA But if a corporation here. presented challenged burden that a sessment of the Dictionary rights*because free exercise impos action statute or other among “persons” suggests Act it is religion. exercise of es on an individual’s right grants RFRA make below, long en I courts have As discuss claim, any if n. ante such assessments, distinguishing gaged in such religious and secular between distinctions indirect, and between direct between at-679-82, matter, ante do not corporations meaningful burdens on the ex minor and large, di- why corporation does a then today Yet the court religion. ercise verse, ownership not have even public, inquiry, departing from rejects any such how would rights also? And free exercise language and the practice historical both be deter- public corporation of a the beliefs RFRA. sharehold- by a vote at the annual mined — lead in Following the Tenth Circuit’s meeting, example? ers’ majority rejects any as Lobby, the Hobby or attenuated the of how direct that Korte sessment court has held Although the plaintiff’s religious imposed on Indus- burden and Grote Luitjohan Contractors & be, reason may ante practices it is rights, what have free exercise tries asking equivalent it ing that end, it is the in the is that saying, practice is the burdened mat- whether the Kortes and Grotes beliefs of or whether faith effect, embody plaintiffs central to the ter; corporations, interpreting his plaintiff is ante at of their beliefs. See expression *48 Instead, at Autocam, correctly, ante 682-83. beliefs 659, 684-85; 730 F.3d at see also inqui pertinent that the majority holds the plaintiffs characterize (noting that noncompli for- penalties the ry form is “the business whether corporation as their exert mandate government’s the their ance with [they] endeavor to live through which the world”). influence on sufficiently coercive in the as Christians vocation Hobby Lob (citing at 683 Ante plaintiffs. have corporations the two Holding 1137). single-minded This is, by, 723 F.3d at I said at interests religious their own of the man aspect coercive focus on the start, circumventing merely a means of the getting past means.of yet is another of date it is the beliefs problem the that while have of courts that a number point that are at issue and the Grotes the Kortes the man that because previously: made here, by upon the ACA imposed the duties employ corporate imposed on date is significantly bur- do not corporations themselves, than the owners ers rather the Kortes rights of den the free exercise the owners require it does not and because to that I turn themselves. and Grotes in violation anything to do themselves point next. faith, directly it does not juris- relevance coercion free exercise substantially prudence, burden the owners’ reli and as result it writes RFRA’s Grote, gious at practices. See 708 F.3d provision “substantial burden” out of the (dissent) (coll.cases); 858-59 see also Gi statute. lardi, 733 F.3d 2013 WL analysis way The coercion one addresses (Edwards, J., at *29-*31 concur in which government may potentially inter ring part dissenting part). & Per the plaintiffs fere with a free exercise rights. view, majority’s plaintiffs the individual Calbone, Abdulhaseeb v. only obligation imposed need cite an on the. (10th Cir.2010), upon cited and relied corporations that is inconsistent with their by Hobby Lobby test, for the coercion de practices; own beliefs and long so ways scribes three in which a plaintiffs corporations as the into com coerced (1) religious rights may be burdened: (as pliance by prospect of substantial government compels plaintiff to do comply) fines if do not enough that is something that is inconsistent with his reli to establish a substantial burden on their (2) beliefs; gious government the' forbids rights, inqui free exercise without further plaintiff doing something that his ry genuinely into whether the mandate religion do; him motivates meaningfully interferes with their reli government directly does compel gious practices. Hobby Lobby reasons plaintiff to something by do forbidden his it is not the court’s business assess religious beliefs or to doing refrain from obligation whether imposed by the something beliefs, commanded those government is substantial in the sénse of but puts pressure instead substantial directly whether it burdens plaintiffs’ plaintiff to do so. See also Sherbert v. practices beliefs and or instead is Verner, supra, 374 83 S.Ct. at attenuated, government as the claims it to (1793) (describing in different terms the equated be. That assessment is with a multiple ways in government which the inquiry forbidden into the theological merit might religious rights); burden Mack v. plaintiffs’ claim. 723 F.3d at 1137. (7th Cir.1996) O’Leary, 80 F.3d only “Our task is to determine whether the (same), granted cert. judgment & vacated sincere, so, belief claimant’s and if grounds, on other

whether the applied sub 36, 139 (1997). L.Ed.2d 5 pressure stantial on the claimant to violate that belief.” Id. categories The third of the Abdulhaseeb Thomas, exemplified coercion-only

This test is one of the petitioner S.Ct. 1425. The in Thomas Tenth Circuit’s invention. It has the su- unemployment was denied benefits be- perficial support of language found in mul- cause he had left decisions, see, employment his volun- tiple court e.g., Hobbie v. tarily: quit he Fla., employer gave after his Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of *49 136, 141, assignment him an (producing military ar- 107 S.Ct. maments) that he L.Ed.2d 190 believed he could not (quoting Thomas v. perform given religious Review Bd. his In Employ. the Indiana beliefs. de- Sec. Div., Thomas, 717-18, 1425; nying 450 U.S. benefits to the state unem- S.Ct. 1431-32, (1981)); ployment 67 L.Ed.2d forcing Vision board was not him to Grove, act, Long Church v. Vill. or refrain acting, contrary 468 F.3d to his (7th Cir.2006); Nonetheless, Kaemmerling religious by faith. placing Lappin, (D.C.Cir.2008), 553 F.3d him place— between a rock and a hard misapprehends but it stay job, both the and either context on the and violate his coverage in their contraceptive to include beliefs, his and surrender quit, religious Even absent the plans. health employee compensation unemployment right to —the penalties for non-com- financial the state substantial reasoned Court Supreme presumably companies the two pliance, him to act con- coercing effectively was by govern- subject to suit would be religious principles. trary his to injunctive by employee an ment or receipt of an the state conditions Where if did comply them to ordering relief pro- conduct upon benefit important so, (citing ante at 660 not otherwise do see faith, it or where by a scribed 1132, 1185d); and, any §§ 29 U.S.C. of conduct a benefit because denies such event, corporations and most individuals belief, thereby mandated deliberately ignore feel free to an will not on pressure substantial putting to do. plainly requires them and to what the law behavior modify his adherent to inquiry into whether beliefs, reli- the entire upon a burden So his violate on the may pressure substantial compulsion places ACA While gion exists. objec- indirect, upon free to take action over their infringement plaintiffs unnecessary point. and beside the nonetheless substantial. tions is exercise is that it does. dispute There is no 717-18, at 1432. See 101 S.Ct. 450 U.S. at 139-41, Hobbie, at also does not an- inquiry the coercion What ' (refusal unemploy award to at 1048-49 swer, must turn to the court and which who refused plaintiff ment benefits next, by re- government, whether the is on Sabbath vio to work religious reasons to take action companies two quiring the Sherbert, clause); exercise lated free their owners companies and to which (same). at 1793-94 U.S. at imposing object religious grounds, Abdulhaseeb, Likewise, prison where a free plaintiffs’ burden on substantial pro that the failure complaining er was This is where religion. which included him with a halal diet vide Hobby Lobby, decision Tenth Circuit’s to the free right with his meat interfered court, awry. goes this now embraced prison was religion,6 exercise of evaluating Lobby postulates Hobby his reli him to violate literally compelling the burden im- degree the nature nonetheless, him beliefs; by putting gious an im- require will by the mandate posed a non-com unacceptable choice—eat into whether inquiry permissible being go hungry was diet or pliant interpreting correctly plaintiffs are —he religious princi violating into his coerced at dogma. 724 F.3d following religious 1316-17; Huna see also ples. 600 F.3d Thomas, 1137; see (7th 46, 47-48 Murphy, (“We ... that Thomas see at 1430 fa Cir.1990). line, say it is not for us drew a unreasonable was an the line he drew mind, is not a substantial my To to dis- not undertake Thomas; rather, Courts should this is one. case like pressure the believer because religious beliefs sect instance straightforward more position with his ‘struggling’ he is admits plaintiff overtly requiring are not articulated his beliefs or because contrary that he asserts something do a more clarity precision with the unambigu- beliefs. The ACA his employ.”); might person sophisticated corporate plaintiffs ously requires the two *50 2000cc-1(a). ("RLUIPA”), § 42 U.S.C. Religious prisoner suit under 6. The filed Act Persons Land Use and Institutionalized 708 Lee, 252, Lines, 257, Inc., 471, 491,

United 455 U.S. Air States United 527 U.S. 2139, 2150-51, 102 71 L.Ed.2d 127 S.Ct. 119 S.Ct. 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1982); Gilardi, 1216-17, (1999) (both F.3d at 733 2013 construing Americans With Hobby Lobby WL at *7. thus Disabilities Act’s use of term “substantial plaintiff concludes that once the has ly” major vis-á-vis on limitations life activi government put shown the has substantial ties). Otherwise, any honestly-perceived him pressure something on to do to which religion resulting govern burden on from sincerely objects religious grounds, he on ment action would suffice to make out a he all to has shown that he needs show to prima facie free exercise claim under establish right that his free exercise (a) prong of RFRA and trigger the strict substantially 723 burdened . F.3d at (b). scrutiny § by prong called for 2000bb- 1137-38; see ante at 683-84. (b). 1(a), Div., Employ. Dep’t Hu Smith, holding effectively Oregon This rewrites RFRA. man Res. 494 U.S. 872, 888-89, prohibit govern 1595, 1605-06, The statute does not 108 ment putting pressure (1990); substantial on L.Ed.2d 876 Civil Liberties for a plaintiff anything, to do or to be a party City Urban Believers v. Chicago, 342 anything, to (7th which he has an honest Cir.2003). F.3d 761 rather, religious objection; it states that doubt, assessing No substantiality substantially “shall not ” the claimed burden one’s free exercise person’s religion.... burden a exercise of religion will call sometimes for difficult 2000bb-l(a) mine). § (emphasis Congress judgments, Supreme as the recog- Court “substantially” modify used the term Smith, nized in 494 at n. U.S. 110 “burden,” inquiry and the relevant consid Indeed, S.Ct. at 1605-06 n. 4. difficulty ers how that burden affects the individual’s making key such assessments ais rea- believe, ability profess, practice his why son ultimately Court Smith religion. Judge points As Edwards out in abandoned its earlier free exercise clause Gilardi, RFRA was specifically drafted in jurisprudence in simpler favor of a test that way to every make clear that not focusing on the neutrality facial imposed by government burden on reli 882-89, challenged law. Id. at S.Ct. gious justified by exercise need be a com Smith, prior 1602-04. But the Court pelling governmental interest. 733 F.3d at engaged often qualitative such assess- WL *27-*28 ments in evaluating the merits of free ex- (Edwards, J., concurring part & dissent See, ercise e.g., claims. Jimmy Swaggart Abdulhaseeb, ing part); see also Equalization, Ministries v. Bd. (“we F.3d at 1316 do not intend to imply 378, 391, 688, 696, 107 L.Ed.2d every infringement on a ex (1990) (“to imposition extent that ercise will constitute a substantial bur den”). generally of a By terms, then, applicable merely tax plain its de- the stat money creases the amount of appellant ute calls for a inquiry threshold into the spend activities, nature of on its placed any the burden on the plain such constitutionally tiffs free burden is not religion: signifi- exercise of “substan cant”); C.I.R., tial” is a degree, term of Hernandez v. invites the court distinguish large or considerable S.Ct. 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (“We burdens from minor or incidental ... ones. do have doubts whether Toyota Mfg., Ky., alleged Motor imposed by Inc. v. burden the [tax] Cf. Williams, 184, 196-97, deduction disallowance on the Scientolo- 681, 691, 151 (2002); L.Ed.2d gists’ practices one.”); Sutton v. is a substantial

709 and mak Cemetery pre-Smith jurisprudence Indian Protective Court’s Lyng v. Nw. 1319, 439, 447, Ass’n, 108 S.Ct. ing 485 U.S. a “substantial burden” on the free (1988) (“It 1324, is undis 99 L.Ed.2d 534 religion controlling criteri exercise beliefs respondents’ Indian puted the articulation of a facie case prima on for pro and that Government’s are sincere RFRA, Congress expressly under will adverse ef posed actions have severe just this sort inquiry. called for Gilard religion. practice fects on the of their i, 1235-37, 5854246, 733 F.3d at 2013 WL bur respondents contend that the Those (Edwards, J., concurring at *27-*28 in heavy religious practice den on in part dissenting part). & Exercise enough to violate the Free And, fact, in when the substan applying can demon unless the Government Clause requirement in tial-burden found both compelling complete strate need RLUIPA, 42 RFRA and U.S.C. engage road or to in timber harvest G-0 2000cc(a)(1), 2000ce-1(a), §§ this circuit Chimney dis ing in the Rock area. We always others have the na considered 707, 693, v. agree.”); Roy, Bowen degree imposed by ture burden (1986) 2156, 2147, L.Ed.2d 735 106 S.Ct. 90 action, holding multiple government (“the nature of the burden [on insig that de minimis cases or otherwise liberty] is relevant to standard that the nificant burdens on the free exercise of justify must the bur meet to religion do not warrant relief under these den”); v. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. Eagle E.g., Camp statutes. Cove & Conf. Labor, 290, 303, 304-06, 471 Sec’y U.S. Ctr., Wisconsin, of Woodboro, Inc. v. Town 1962, 1953, 1963-64, L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. 85 680, 5820289, *5, 673, F.3d 2013 at 734 WL (after observing that “[i]t 278 2013) (7th (“the 30, must Cir. Oct. burden virtually Free Exer self-evident that the substantial”); truly at 2013 id. exemption does not an require cise Clause 5820289, *5-*7; at Constantine & WL Sts. unless, at a governmental program from a Church, City Inc. v. Helen Greek Orthodox minimum, program inclusion actual (7th Berlin, 895, 396 New F.3d 899-901 to exer ly burdens claimant’s freedom Cir.2005); Harris, 999, v. 172 Rapier F.3d rights,” finds that cise the Court (7th Cir.1999); n. 4 Roman Catholic 1006 overtime, wage, recordkeep- minimum Bishop Springfield City Spring v. ing requirements imposed by Fair Labor (1st 78, Cir.2013); field, 724 F.3d 95-97 Act on foundation and Standards Valenzuela, 564, v. F.3d 576- McFaul 684 did not burden significantly its associates (5th Cir.2012); Abdulhaseeb, 600 F.3d 77 rights); free Johnson associates’ 1316; Navajo at Nation v. U.S. Forest Robison, (9th Serv., 1058, 535 F.3d 1068-1073 Cir. (1974) (“The 1174, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (en 2008) banc); Allen, Smith v. 502 F.3d in withholding educational benefits (11th Cir.2007), abrogated 1277-78 only upon ap- volves incidental burden Texas, grounds Sossamon v. on other in pellees’ religion if, free exercise of — — U.S.-, L.Ed.2d all.”); deed, any burden at see also exists (2011); Strada, 249 Fed. Norwood v. Gilardi, 1233-35, 1235-37, 700 733 F.3d at (3d Cir.2007); McEachin *25-*26, Appx. *27-*28 WL (2d McGuinnis, F.3d n. 6 J., (Edwards, & dissent concurring part Nix, Cir.2004); 821- Olree, Weir v. ing part); generally Andy see G. (8th Cir.1997); v. O Centro Gonzales Continuing Test Free Threshold cf. Claims, Mary Vegetal, su Espirita Uniao do Exercise WM. & Bill Beneficente (2008). at 1217 Rights adopting the By pra, J. 103 *52 710

(noting purposes plaintiffs of voting rights); Dep’t tion of Mich. State Sitz, claim, 444, 451-52, RFRA government conceded law in Police v. 496 U.S. 110 2481, (1990) question substantially 2486, burdened sincere 412 S.Ct. 110 L.Ed.2d (traffic E.E.O.C., religion). stops); free exercise of These cases are Univ. Penn. v. 182, flatly 198-201, 577, inconsistent with the notion that we 493 U.S. 110 S.Ct. 586- (1990) 88, cannot or degree any assess nature 107 (compelled L.Ed.2d 571 dis imposed plaintiffs burden on free exer closure of university faculty confidential reviews); rights by government cise action.7 peer Safley, Turner v. 482 U.S. 78, 87-89, 2254, 2261, 107 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed.2d Evaluating the nature of the im burden (1987) (restrictions 64 prisoner’s on First posed orthodoxy, is not a test of the con Amendment rights); v. Bur Weatherford sistency, theological plaintiffs merit of a 545, 557-58, sey, 837, 429 U.S. 97 S.Ct. religious stated beliefs. Provided the 844-45, (1977) (violations 51 L.Ed.2d 30 sincere, 682-83, plaintiff is ante at may we attorney-client privilege); Branzburg v. objection accept grounded, that his is one 665, 682-83, Hayes, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. religious his beliefs. But simply be (1972) (compelled L.Ed.2d 626 good-faith objection, cause someone has a disclosure reporter’s confidential in religion, particular govern based to a sources). Without venturing into the con ment action does not mean that his right tent and plaintiffs’ merit of the religious to the free of religion actually exercise beliefs, may we still consider the nature of substantially by burdened that action. act plaintiffs that the upon are called routinely Courts undertake examinations perform, the connection between their degree given law, of the to which a regula action, beliefs and the compelled and the tion, or other action does or extent to which ability practice their upon does not intrude an individual’s con religion their is interfered with stitutionally protected interests. See Bow action. 706-07, Roy, en v. 106 S.Ct. at U.S. (burdens Thus, 2155-56 on liberty); see example, in assessing the sub- also, Harris, e.g., Scott v. stantiality U.S. of the imposed burden on a 383-84, 1769, 1778, 127 S.Ct. plaintiffs L.Ed.2d free rights, may exercise we con- (2007) (use of force in seizure of the sider whether the burden is direct or indi- person); Knights, Brown, United States v. 534 rect. supra, Braunfeld 112, 118-19, 587, 591, 6 L.Ed.2d makes (2001) (searches home); L.Ed.2d 497 this clear. Pennsyl- sustained Braunfeld Planned Casey, Parenthood Se. Pa. v. vania’s Sunday-closing against law a free supra, 505 U.S. at 112 S.Ct. at 2819 challenge notwithstanding the (abortion regulations); Burdick v. Taku economic burden that imposed the law shi, Jewish merchants: because religion their (regula- L.Ed.2d 245 proscribed them doing business on may Some of the RLUIPA cases plaintiffs distin- mandate that the contend is incon- guished superficially, plaintiffs in that sistent with their beliefs. Nonethe- prisoners sought damages were who for occa- less the proposi- cases remain relevant for the sional denials of kosher or halal meals or tion that not all burdens on the free exercise other religion accommodations qualify as substantial. The nature E.g., Rapier, needs. 172 F.3d at (impingement 1006 n. 4 of the claim on the free exer- (unavailability non-pork same; trays pris- religion) only food cise of is the differ- meals). suit, oner at three of 810 This ence context in which the claim is contrast, challenge involves a statutory to a asserted. upon rights is also close ment free exercise nonethe Saturdays, requiring them to *53 substantial.”). an the Sundays extra But Court’s deci imposed on less their doors impose on supra, that it did not at Roy, cost on them Bowen v. sion empha- 2156, court businesspeople. 706-07, other four 106 S.Ct. at decided “only an indi- imposed the below, sized that law years I after Lee and which discuss of reli- on the exercise rect burden regards it makes clear that the Court still at 1147. at 81 S.Ct. Id. gion....” as a relevant consideration. Lower court re- be much less expected, cannot [I]t cases confirm the directness likewise reg- legislators enact no law quired, that imposed indirectness of the burden on or way may in some ulating conduct that the exercise of one’s exercise disadvantage to result in an economic a right remains material consideration. to and not others some sects Compare, e.g., D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balti practices special because Com’rs, more Bd. Sch. 706 F.3d not believe religions. various We do (4th Cir.2013) (school poli 263-64 district’s an effect is absolute test that such cy requiring pub student to be enrolled vio- legislation determining whether un lic school in order to receive services protected religion lated the freedom of Act, section 504 of the Rehabilitation der First by the Amendment. unduly § not burden 29 U.S.C. did 606-07, Hobby at 1147-48. Id. at they rights, although parents’ free exercise in Lee sub Lobby that the Court suggests private to school and send him to wished consideration sequently abandoned have to bear full costs of reha would a imposed by statute whether the burden their if did services for son bilitation is or indirect. free exercise direct on so), Cnty. v. Baptist and Messiah Church Yet, govern 723 F.3d at 1139-40. Colo., 820, 825-26 Jefferson, an Amish argument ment’s in Lee—that (10th Cir.1988) (zoning ordinance which contribute to Social businessman could schools, community buildings, prohibited violating reli Security system his without agricultural zone did and churches family not sinful for a gious belief it is impermissibly free exercise burden elderly-was not an care for its own to even if it rights of church and its members ef argument about the direct or indirect ex religion made their exercise of more law, quarrel rather a with fect of the but where, alia, any burden im inter pensive, faith; Amish understanding of the Lee’s an indirect bur neutral law was posed a unwillingness to and the mediate Court’s den), & with Paul v. Watchtower Bible it re theological dispute what led to was N.Y., Inc., F.2d Soc’y Tract 819 257, 102 at ject argument. U.S. (9th Cir.1997) (subjecting Jehovah’s 880-81 at is true is S.Ct. 1055. What for reli damages church tort Witness Court, Braunfeld, rejected subsequent “shunning” would violate practice of gious of the bur or indirectness the directness clause, imposition as dam free exercise free controlling factor in den a a burden on constitute direct ages could Verner, supra, cases. Sherbert religion). (“[I]t S.Ct. at U.S. a have drawn Free exercise cases also directly no criminal sanctions true that challenged law what between distinction six-day week. compel to work a appellant plaintiff himself end, practice requires the only not the beginning, But this is party— Thomas, do, permits it another and what inquiry.”); our see also (“While do to government specifically, at 1432 U.S. —to plaintiff objects indirect, may infringe- compulsion grounds. example, in v. Roy, identify daughter. For Bowen number young daugh- American man with a Native Free Exercise “[T]he Clause written objected statutory requirement ter to a terms of what the cannot provide Security Social he number individual, do to the not in terms of what each member of his household order gov individual can extract from the from the obtain benefits Aid Families Verner, ernment.” Sherbert Dependent program Children L.Ed.2d [10 *54 (“AFDC”) requirement companion and to a J., (Douglas, concurring). 965] that plans state AFDC use such numbers result, Roy may As a prevail no more on administering plans. respect in With religious objection his to the Govern- to requirement, the latter he believed that use of Security ment’s a Social number agencies if identifying state an num- used daughter his than he on could ber for his daughter, would “rob” her religious objection sincere to the size or spirit “prevent her from attaining color of the filing Government’s cabinets. greater spiritual power,” 476 U.S. at The Free Exercise Clause affords an 2150; at he therefore contended protection individual from certain forms requirement agencies that the that state of governmental compulsion; it does not daughter’s Security use their Social num- an afford right individual to dictate the ber violated his to right the free exercise conduct of government’s the internal religion. Supreme his Court disa- procedures. greed. It plaintiff noted that the was not 699-700, Id. at at (empha- complaining of an intrusion on his freedom original). sis in Lyng See also v. Nw. belief, absolute, of religious which was or Ass’n, Cemetery Indian supra, Protective of an intrusion the upon liberty his own at U.S. 108 S.Ct. at 1326-28 conduct, absolute; which was less than in- (government’s to decision allow timber stead, plaintiff invoking the was the free harvesting and in road construction area of exercise clause in an effort to dictate how national forest religious purposes used for the government should transact its busi- by Native American tribes not did inter- ness. Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 2152. The fere tribes, with free rights exercise rejected Court the notion that the reach of notwithstanding potentially devastating free exercise clause extended this far: impact government’s might decision have to knowledge Never our Court religious tribes’ activities: “Whatever interpreted the First Amendment to re- rights may the Indians have to the use of quire the Government in behave itself area, ... those do not divest the ways that the individual believes will right is, Government of its what use spiritual his or development further her land.”) all, after (emphasis its original). in that his or her family. The Free Building upon Supreme

Exercise simply Clause Court’s cannot under- holding Roy, the D.C. in require stood Circuit Kaem the Government to con- merling Lappin, supra, duct its own ways internal affairs in comport religious sustained dismissal of a par- prisoner’s beliefs of ticular claim citizens. as under RFRA that statutorily Just the Government may appellees not insist that engage in mandated collection and use his DNA any religious observance, set form for purposes of a so national law enforcement appellees may not demand that the database substantially Gov- burdened his free join rights. ernment in their religious alleged chosen Kaemmerling practices by refraining using Christian, Evangelical he viewed compelled law the Amish to of God’s crea- education building block DNA as the work, collec- “perform undeniably he believed that the acts odds with tive tion, use one’s DNA was storage, tenets of their be- fundamental laying foundation for liefs,” tantamount. S.Ct. 1526. rejecting In of an-anti-Christ. contrast, the rise alleges Kaemmerling, claim, court viability Kaemmerling’s requirement that fed- the DNA Act’s not government was emphasized that his eral collect and store modify own forcing him to his behavior: govern- DNA information requires Kaemmerling allege not facts ... does ways that violate ment act his to state burden beliefs, sufficient substantial way suggests but he no exercise because he can on his governmental pres- in which these acts any which is the identify “exercise” modify him his own behavior sure which he subject of the burden to ob any way would violate his beliefs. *55 jects. storage The extraction and Appellant’s (describing Br. at 21 entirely activities DNA information are “knowing as alleged substantial burden FBI, Kaemmerling plays in which had vio- strongly held beliefs been [his] after [Bu no role and which occur unholy oppressive lated act of an a[n] his taken fluid or Prisons] reau regime”). (to he does not sample tissue ob (The at court went on to 553 F.3d 679. extraction, ject). government’s hold,- if alternatively, that the DNA even storage Kaemmerling’s analysis, and a burden impose mandate did substantial call Ka- DNA information does not for Kaemmerling’s rights, free it on exercise modify religious to his behav emmerling step- survive RFRA’s would nonetheless no or any way in involves action ior —it scrutiny analysis. Id. at 680- two strict part, on his nor it oth forbearance does 85.) any religious act erwise interfere supply thus two These lines' cases engages. Although gov which he help criteria that can us determine tis activities with his fluid or ernment’s imposed govern- whether the burden may after takes it sample sue the BOP a free upon plaintiffs action exercise beliefs, ment religious Kaemmerling’s offend First, the rights is substantial. they hamper cannot be said to his reli Braunfeld look line of cases instructs us to at they not gious exercise because' do resulting action burden his modify behavior “pressure [him] way it Thomas, purport- consider the in which and to his beliefs.” violate . interferes with an individual’s exer- 718, 101 edly' at S.Ct. 1425 direct, religion: such burden cise religious Kaemmerling alleges no ob- person from actually prevents it a or impedes, that the DNA Act servance his behaving religion, in accordance with religious violation of his beliefs acts indirect, only it inciden- impose or does pressures it Reli- perform. him to that, example, makes the tal burden- necessarily involves an gious exercise religion costly more but of his Sherbert, observance or where practice, action actually preclude his not does unemployment the denial of benefits n Second, Roy line- of cases exercise? plain- the observance” of the “impede[d] law a what the draws distinction between her work religion by pressuring tiffs do, what a himself to requires plaintiff Saturday in violation of tenets party to do. requires a third permits it religion, her Yoder, although the recognize that compulsory or in These cases where beliefs, plaintiff may a religiously-based have ob- their and because their jection government or to what the another not to companies desire have their facili- something party third does with that the tate the use of contraception necessarily (in provide requires plaintiff law implicates private employees choices of number, Roy, Security Social Raem- they as to how will use the insurance cov- DNA), his merling, the free exercise erage have earned as a benefit of necessarily work, permit clause does him to I any am convinced that bur- impose upon restraint another’s action. den imposed on the free exercise plaintiffs individual is too attenuated to Admittedly, speaks directly neither line qualify as substantial burden. us Supreme the issues before now: the Court has never before considered wheth- er and under what circumstances the stat- A

utorily-mandated provision particular substantial burden is of a one bears direct, to an employee substantially primary, respon benefit will and fundamental employer’s sibility plaintiffs burden the rights. making free exercise (The precedent impracticable. 682-83; that is closest that sce- Ante Lee, Miller, (7th nario United States v. in which Nelson v. Cir.2009); Roger Bryan, Court held that the objecting Amish em- F.3d (7th *56 ployer Cir.2008); obliged pay was to Security Social Civil Liberties for notwithstanding City taxes Urban religious objec- Chicago, his Believers v. su of so, doing pra, Here, tion to 342 F.3d given government’s the at 761. the conten compelling interest in a tion is not that proscribes uniform national the ACA any system of pay.) retirement The belief or any cases I interferes with form of wor just ship activity, have discussed are nonetheless rele- but that the statute none First, vant in requires plaintiffs two senses. the theless like various the to lend ma (the finding circuit cases support activity certain terial to an burdens on use of free rights insubstantial, exercise to contraception) is inconsistent with 709-10, supra they the plaintiffs’ confirm that we can individual Catholic faith. and in fact Specifically, company must examine the plans the nature and health degree of the must resulting gov- provide coverage which, burden insurance by fully underwriting ernment action to it decide whether consti- the cost contra care, tutes a purpose ceptive substantial burden for facilitates what the Kortes Second, RFRA. they and the Grotes demonstrate that in view as a moral wrong (the assessment, making that we use of contraception). must consider precisely objected-to how the action re- reasons, key For two poses the mandate lates to the individual’s exercise his no direct burden on the Kortes’ and religious rights. First, religion. Grotes’ exercise of the my cases,

Taking cue I from these move require mandate does not to them alter on to precisely consider how the practices any ACA’s their own way. As the requirement corporate employer that a court’s articulation of the asserted burden provide clear, health insurance employees they to its objecting makes what to is contraceptive includes coverage does the contraception by parties, use of third or does not burden the free plaintiffs which the do not to facili- wish Second, its owners. Because the does not tate. ACA to the extent the Kortes’ actually require plaintiffs the individual and the Grotes’ concern has to do with themselves to anything contrary do facilitating to what they believe to be immor- (a) and the ception the is indirect: Grotes corpo- it is the by parties, third al conduct they, closely-held who fund the both the owners of Kortes are plans, rate health (b) to may employees required use are now corporations; insurance which which contraception. procure provide the ACA to standardized (c) to coverage employees; health-care obvious, I have first point elect, alia, inter to may employees before, repeated but it cannot be it made contraception. step to obtain Each use ACA re enough. Nothing often separates chain them an additional them quires the Grotes Kortes objected-to practice degree from that violates the anything to selves do contraception. of contra disapproval Catholic Church’s use, or purchase, need not ception. They corporations, It is not the individual contraceptives; they need not dispense are obli- plaintiffs, employers which as contracep use or endorse the promote requisite coverage to gated provide the tives; nor need remain silent as employees of firms. The Kortes them about what their faith teaches incorporated Grotes their businesses immorality use. See Gi contraceptive cor- a reason. Business owners form lardi, 733 F.3d at WL to insulate themselves porations precisely J., (Edwards, concur *29-*31 obligations corporation from the dissenting in ring part part); & Goehr entity separate carry to create a (9th 1294, 1300 ing Brophy, only corporations business. The Cir.1996) (use university fee registration corporations obligation provide bear the plan that to fund student health insurance coverage employees; the insurance coverage not sub included abortion did personal bear no Kortes and Grotes rights of stantially burden free exercise coverage. obligation pay for the Thus objected to on reli who abortion students *57 “material as the money support,” the —the because, gious part, “plaintiffs in grounds & from Korte court describes it—comes in, to required accept, participate are not Luitjohan and Grote Indus- Contractors any the provi or advocate in manner for tries, pockets not from the individu- services”), on sion of abortion overruled plaintiffs.8 al Flores, by City grounds other Boerne of Moreover, companies pro- what the 2157; supra, cf. compensation, viding employee is a form of Stormans, Selecky, Inc. v. F.3d to (9th Cir.2009) wages. Handing paycheck over a like (objection by pharmacy may the employee materially facilitate an contraception); dispensing emergency any (perfectly legál) number of purchase of F.Supp.2d Menges Blagojevich, alcohol, (C.D.Ill.2006) (same). lottery tick- only and goods Their 1000-02 services— ets, eontra- cigarettes, pornography, of adult objected-to connection to the use eontra- Closing Gaps, the sparse us not Women: 8. The record before does reveal (costs pregnancies United degree contraceptive unintended to what the of whether and billion, $5 may in- States in 2002 estimated to mandate increase the cost of health contraception coverage due to esti- employers. con- while costs saved Full of surance billion), (like http:// coverage $19.3 available at traception may mated to be the mandated services) preventive www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13181. insurers and of other save case, .argument reducing any plaintiffs’ here money long the employers in the In run providing the multiple unplanned turns on additional cost costs with the associated 144-145; coverage facilitating the contraceptive but pregnancies. See Institute infra Medicine, contraceptives by providing cover- that on Preventive Ser- use Committee Women, period. age,- Preventive Services vices for Clinical abortion, books, ception, Harry employer and Potter that plays the some role es- contrary to name a few—that are to an tablishing administering the health course, religious beliefs. care as employer’s plan, opposed supplying Of does not know with employer typically employee employ- how an a voucher that the (Neither employee spend wages. purchase his ee can use to will his own insurance know typically does he what healthcare elsewhere. But the insurance nonethe- is making.) component his is less a employee compensation decisions But that the Suppose employee what if he does know? an em- employee earned—an ac- announces, ployee get cepts “As soon I my salary hourly less or pay ex- paycheck, insurance, I am going change have an abortion.” like health benefits and, cases, suppose Or it is well known at the work- in most contributions have been place a particular employee employee’s drinks paycheck withheld every himself blind at a local tavern Fri- defray further costs that insurance. day gets after night paid. Sepper, Contraception he Can the See Birth Conscience, employer paycheck withhold the Corporate supra, at 22.10 grounds turning it materially employer over will fact in administer- morally assist an act that he finds ing plan fiduciary, intoler- as a treated with explaining why, plain- obligation able? Without a corresponding to act in the employer employee’s tiffs concede that an cannot do interest consistent They insurance, possi- this. do not contend that the provided notion that the while bility, foreknowledge, or even the employer, belongs that an employee. to the employee 1002(21)(A)(I) can will use wages §§ her to See 29 U.S.C. (defining engage activity proscribed in an by the ERISA fiduciaries to include person with plaintiffs’ religious substantially beliefs authority assets); over plan control 1104(a)(1)(A)(ERISA their free rights, burdens notwith- fiduciaries must dis- standing payment wages charge solely to the duties to plan in interests of employees objected-to will facilitate plan participants beneficiaries, for ex- activity.9 provision How is the of health purpose clusive providing benefits thereto).11 insurance different? One difference is Gilardi, Judge put share). 9. As (roughly 28-percent Edwards it in Henry "the J. *58 Foundation, Gilardis are no of an Family more 'essential cause’ Employer of Kaiser 2013 increasing contraception they the use of when Survey, Summary Findings Health of Benefits 20, 2013), Freshway company] pay (Aug. [their authorize http://kff. to & BEx. available at plan employees might for a benefits that use org/report-section/2013-summary-of-findings/ (last get contraception they 2013). to than when authorize visited Nov. wages employee might pur- that an use to contraception chase she would Motorola, not otherwise Inc., generally 11.See Howell be able to 733 F.3d at afford." (7th Cir.2011) (discussing F.3d when (Edwards, J., 2013 WL at *29 con- fiduciaries); employer plan sponsor and act sis (em- part curring dissenting part) in in also, e.g., Emp. see Orth v. Wis. State Union phasis original). in (7th Counsel 546 F.3d Cir. 2008) (employer fiduciary duty breached to

10. The record by deducting percent does disclose what the retiree cost of his plaintiffs' employees contribute toward the pay insurance benefits from retirement rather their average percent specified contract); cost of health insurance. The than 10 as Inc., employee Enters., currently Phelps $999 contributes toward v. C.T. 221 - $5,884 (4th Cir.2005) (evidence the employer-sponsored, cost of an employer that di single-coverage plan (roughly 17-percent employee verted contributions to health bene $4,565 $16,351 share), and plan corporate the supported toward cost of fits to other uses employer-sponsored, family-coverage plan an fiduciary duty); claim for breach of LoPresti This is. the in Zelman v. objec- their sense which plaintiffs the cast Although Simmons-Harris, 639, 652-654, contracep- provision to the tion one 2460, 2467-68, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 S.Ct. itself, in what coverage tive (2002), Regents and Bd. of Univ. of Wis. private the objecting to is really Southworth, 217, 233-35, Sys. v. their families employees and choices that 1346, 1356-57, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 in health care make reliance on might (2000), emphasize are relevant: both the contraceptive care. coverage that includes independent that the critical role decisions provided is does not coverage That the play in parties walling of third off un used, or necessarily it will mean that willing speech financier from activities or objec- find way plaintiffs that the used objects subsidizing he on constitu clear the This -much is made tionable. Zelman, objectors In grounds. tional itself rec- policy, firm’s ethics Korte taxpayers who contended that were contraceptive ognizes that use of some parents state’s issuance vouchers that medications, non-contraceptive pur- (and did) overwhelming could numbers with the Kortes’ poses, is consistent Catho- parochial to send their children to use The Ante at & n. 5. court lic faith. 662-63 schools violated First Amendment’s es this when it describes the recognizes too clause, public in that funds tablishment objection providing as one to plaintiffs’ religious purposes. used being were to immoral conduct— Southworth, material assistance public the objectors In were ie., at contraceptives. university argued Ante use students who fees to mandatory activity use their And is the point 685. —that groups whose missions support student objection coverage turns not on the speech they opposed violated their to use covered isolation but decision right First Amendment free own purpose, ie. contraceptives particular for a rejected Supreme Court speech. procreation. Sepper, Con- prevent cases. In First Amendment claims both traception Corporate Con- and the Birth of Zelman, emphasized that be the Court science, (noting is at that burden program the voucher was neutral cause employees company’s if share non-existent money respect religion, public religious values and therefore do asserted way solely by religious schools reached contraceptive coverage). That de- not use choice,” private independent “genuine and plaintiffs merely many one of cision taxpayers did not have a protesting objectionable. might find For what Clause claim. 536 valid Establishment provide requires plaintiffs ACA And in in- contraceptive not a employees Southworth, likewise stressed the Court plan but a health care policy surance activity were that because student funds *59 literally of covers thousands services. basis, viewpoint-neutral a en allocated on might ways employees in which potential minority majority suring that both and surely choose to use those services number heard, genu no there would be was views more, many any and of times number would any group that student be ine risk might objectionable to one choices university those speaking the perceived as Grote, students, religion another. See F.3d thus no meritorious or and its (dissent). objecting were be- that the students claim Cir.1997) (2d fiduciary breach of Terwilliger, other uses constituted (company pension con- owner’s diversion of duty). employee pay to deducted from tributions ing “speak” to in of ute that alone compelled company, violation choice to let Gilardi, own and views. 529 U.S. at its owner. See beliefs 733 F.3d at 1238- 233-35, 120 (Edwards, J., S.Ct. at 1356-57. 2013 WL at *30 in part dissenting part). & in concurring

Yes, Zelman and Southworth can be in- it distinguished Finally, considering from this case: Zelman rami- worth claim, deeming may an clause and fications one choice volved establishment of that claim, speech a using Southworth involved free be made an her work- employee this case a free presents place plan whereas exercise healthcare to be burden' on clause But at the bottom all her employer’s rights. free claim. Again, three cases is the claim that forcing compels what the ACA a covered give plaintiff activity employer provide his financial aid to contraceptive not a speech objectionable comprehensive or that he finds can- plan care but health care not be reconciled with First Amend- plan his includes thousands of medical services, rejection ment including contraceptive freedoms. Central to care. It may of this claim Zelman and both possible Southworth seem reasonable agnosticism, permitted coverage was official which out the contraceptives carve (in parties the funds to be used as third from the rest of the insur- ACA-mandated Zelman, Southworth, parents, plan, and in ance the plaintiffs have a council) chose, categorical objection the student no with reason- to the use of contra- (insofar perception ceptives able those pre- choices were as are used to government attributable to either the or contraception) vent contraception objecting plaintiff. The same reason- mandate itself stands out in it re- n why mandatory, ing explains employer- quires coverage contraceptives without (I sponsored coverage insurance in- copayment by employee.12 suspect contraception cludes as a public discourse, covered that as a matter service if not meaningfully treatment, does not plain- judicial burden the contracep- the fact that tiffs’ rights. By including women, free exercise implicates tive care both sex and contraception required coverage, something also has to do reason with the way is in no requiring any why the contraception mandate seems dif- use, endorse, ACA.) company owner to or dis- provisions ferent other pense contraception However, violation of own I pointed his as previously, have out beliefs; given employer the choice whether and might any find number services, under what circumstances to use that cov- those categorically either erage is employee situationally, left the individual inconsistent with his or her physician, private, If, her to be made in today beliefs. as the court participation by employer. holds, no Al- it is a substantial burden though funds company employer’s from the compel health free exercise plan being used to facilitate that him to insure a form of medical care to choice, objective no objects observer would attrib- on religious grounds, which he however, misleading, say, many It is copayment http:// out a under the ACA. See do, reports requires that the mandate the cov- www.healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive- erage contraceptives at no cost to the em- (listing categories preven- care-benefits *60 ployee, given employees pay that most some tive copayments care to be covered with no portion workplace of cost of their health insureds, categories for all 22 of such care for Many supra pre- insurance. See n. 10. other women, (last children) categories and 25 for screening ventive and healthcare services are 7, 2013). visited Nov. provided employee be likewise to to the with-

719 legal requirement granting ser- from a when of insured medical then all manner subject challenge rights to under of exemption vices are would burden 1240-41, 733 F.3d at RFRA. See Inc. v. Monthly, others. See Texas Bull Gilardi 5854246, (Edwards, J., ock, at *32 1, 8, 890, 2013 WL n. 18 901 part). part dissenting concurring 8, (1989) (not & n. 1 (plurality) 103 L.Ed.2d ing in free exercise and significance, estab Nor, objec- potential would the logically, jurisprudence, clause of lishment extent employers that could raise be limited tions ' exemptions for proposed religious which grants Federal law to health insurance. groups of rights would burden third rights to any employees, of number parties); Bd. Virginia West State Educ. of which recognition and accommodation of Barnette, 630, 624, 63 S.Ct. be might find to inconsistent employer (1943) (noting 87 L.Ed. 1628 My hypothetical beliefs. with his challenge requirement that free exercise extending gay leave to a about FMLA public that school students salute Likewise, Ameri be- example. is but one parent bring flag [plaintiffs] can “does not into relationship, yond employer-employee by any rights collision with asserted other rights of any number federal may there individual.”); 604, Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at parties customers, on third bestowed — vendors, creditors, (noting 81 at 1146 debtors —to the- S.Ct. Barnette’s obser theoretically might rights); of a business vation as a limit on free owner Today’s deci- pose religious objection. a Ridge Baptist see Church v. also South challeng- Ohio, certainly opens the door to sion F.2d Indus. Comm’n against (“We ing rights (6th Cir.1990) the enforcement of those respect a on the free exercise a business as burden objections to workers’ com Church’s rights its owner.13 pensation system and its remarkable devo every .aspect tion its beliefs also should not be overlooked is What clash with im life. Where such beliefs from a exempting corporation a in the welfare of portant state interests right to the grants particular statute that others, however, accommodation is corporation’s employee or another third mandated.”); constitutionally Catholic ground on the the mandate- party Sacramento, v. Superior Inc. Charities impinges religious rights on the Court, 527, Cal.Rptr.3d 32 Cal.4th owners, depriving corporate the court is (2004) enhancing (“Strongly 85 P.3d Congress right the third of a party is the circumstance that the state’s interest Court give Supreme meant him. statute re any exemption from recognize [state has hinted at reluctance contraceptive religious exemption quiring employers to include plaintiffs request for a taxes); Young, requirements rity supra, In variety re F.3d 13. The individuals, businesses, or (recovery of debtor's avoidable trans 1418-20 challenged ganizations have on free exercise Ridge proceeding); bankruptcy fers South See, Tony e.g., grounds & makes this clear. Ohio, Baptist Church v. Indus. Comm’n of Labor, Sec'y supra, Susan Alamo Found. Cir.1990) (workers (6th F.2d 1206-09 303-06, at 1962-64 471 U.S. at Photogra compensation premiums); Elane overtime, (minimum recordkeep- wage, Willock, (N.M. phy, 72-75 LLC v. 309 P.3d ing Standards requirements of Fair Labor ordinance), 2013) (state pet’n human States, Act); v. United Bob Jones Univ. 8, 2013); (U.S. Nov. Koolau cert. filed 603-04, 2017, 2034-35, Dep't & Baptist Labor Indus. Church v. (criteria (1983) tax-exempt 76 L.Ed.2d 157 Relations, 271-73 718 P.2d Lee, Haw. status); supra, 455 U.S. United States v. taxes). (Social (unemployment insurance 102 S.Ct. at 1055-57 Secu- *61 720

coverage workplace plaintiffs, in health own religious based on their insurance beliefs, plans] sacrifices the affected women’s in- effectively will have narrowed the receiving equitable in terest treatment scope of healthcare that is available to respect with health benefits. We are very those employees. This is the scenar- any decision in which this unaware of court io about the Supreme Court has or Supreme the United States Court has concern; signaled that given plain- and exempted objector a from the tiffs’ rights own free exercise are at most neutral, operation a generally applicable of modestly by contraceptive burdened despite recognition law that the re- mandate, territory we tread on dangerous quested exemption detrimentally would af- by exempting plaintiffs from the statu- fect the of third rights parties.”); Perry tory mandate. Dane, Note, Religious Exemptions Under I mentioned the outset that A the Free Exercise Clause: Model of court’s decision struck me as reminiscent Authorities, Competing 90 L.J. Yale era; explain the Lochner let why me I (1980) (injury parties may 368 to third think this so. progeny is Lochner and its against exemption). counsel hour, struck a wage, down host of and might possible Whatever work-around other workplace regulations theory on the right through bestow that alternate' they that impermissibility intruded on the means, is no certainty gov- there contract, rights of property, and to engage or implement ernment can will the work- lawful, in a private protected business as around it on any given or that will do so by process the due clauses of the Fifth and timeline, and the meantime the corpo- See, e.g., Fourteenth Amendments. Lo rate owner has its vindicated asserted York, chner v. New rights expense at the of others. The stat- (1905) (state S.Ct. 49 L.Ed. 937 utory mandate issue this case impli- specifying bakery statute employees only a constitutionally protected cates not could per work no more than hours day freedom to use but contraception, range per impermissibly hours week in of other interests related to health of employer’s employee’s truded on free women ability children and the dom contract: “There no is reasonable women to enter and remain in the work- ground interfering with the liberty of place. just It is the women who work person contract, right or the by of free Luitjohan for Korte & Contractors and labor, determining hours of the oc interests; Grote Industries who those have cupation baker.”); Kansas, Coppage daughters employees wives and who 1, 11-14, 240, 242-43, family have health coverage insurance (1915) (state L.Ed. 441 proscribing statute through implicated. those firms are also “yellow dog” contracts that forbade em employees Whether the family mem- ployees joining a union bers who interfered are affected court’s ruling will of contract contraception private proper be able to access in the ty); D.C., Hosp. absence of a Adkins Children’s work-around can- what, known; 394, 401-02, virtually not be certain (1923) (federal L.Ed. pay percent will have to statute estab contraception lishing wage cost of minimum absent access to standards for wom en coverage through spouse’s working alternative and children in- District of Co plan, example. surance To the lumbia extent interfered with freedom contract employees some will pay artificially be unable to restricting employer’s side of the out-of-pocket contraception, wage costs of negotiation); Ice New State Co. v. *62 liberty. uncontrollable and absolute 262, 278, 52 S.Ct. Liebmann, 285 U.S. phases has histo- (1932) (state in each of its Liberty statute L.Ed. liberty the in manufac- connotation. But engage ry and to a license requiring organi- liberty interfered in social distribution, of ice is safeguarded or sale ture, of engage protection lawful the right requires which common zation business). the menace evils which against the law private morals, the welfare of health, safety, is jurisprudence the Lochner flaw of One under the Constitution Liberty people. protect purported the Court that while to the re- necessarily subject is thus as well rights of workers constitutional the regulation process, and of due straints reality the itself to it blinded employers, to its in relation is reasonable which possess not did frequently employees that of in the interest adopted and is subject pursue enabling them power bargaining process. due community is the interests, so liberty their own protect meant regulations invalidating that In conclud at 581-82. 57 S.Ct. Id. at (cid:127) in fact workers, was the Court protect law fell within minimum-wage ing that contractual of their them depriving imper- not and did power, police this broad was process due substantive rights; other of rights em upon missibly intrude important club to defeat as a being wielded approvingly quoted the Court ployers, the Court When protections. workplace dissent Adkins: Holmes’ from Justice its era with the Lochner an end to signaled anybody not compel does statute This v. Parr- Co. Hotel West Coast decision employ- forbids simply It anything. pay 578, 81 L.Ed. ish, as the those fixed below at rates ment statute estab- (1937), a state uphold health requirement minimum women and wage for minimum lishing a assume that is safe to living. It right decision its thus to overrule minors—and at even the employed will not women concept of that the in Adkins —it stressed they earn allowed unless wages lowest clause process in the due liberty enshrined business employer’s them, unless the government-to right also includes In short the burden. can sustain promoting at aimed legislation enact like is and operation in its character law including public, welfare health and laws that police of so-called hundreds employees: protection up-held. have been control our must principle The constitu- not doubt. is decision (quoting at Id. at pro- invoked is due provision tional Adkins, Amendment Fourteen clause of the cess (Holmes, J., dissenting)). states, process due as the governing in common claim has plaintiffs’ What gov- Case in the invoked Adkins clause it is jurisprudence Lochner with the the viola- In each case Congress. erned secular, for- of a affairs daily elevates attacking minimum by those alleged tion status, to constitutional corporation profit depriva- is for women regulation wage as the embodiment treating the business isWhat of contract. freedom tion of such religious principles, its owners’ does The Constitution freedom? conceived corporation on the burden It contract. of freedom speak not rights of on the as a burden prohibits de- liberty and speaks statutory wáy, a In this corporate owners. process due liberty without privation by the justified amply mandate deprivation, prohibiting In of law. which falls power, police government’s recognize does the Constitution *63 corporation, gious may on the which re- beliefs and who to use solely and choose absolutely nothing do quires wages the owners to in that ways their and benefits are in that is personal their lives inconsistent to matter offensive those beliefs. As a beliefs, is religious with their nonetheless legal common reasoning, both sense impermissible to intrusion deemed be an plausibly no one would treat those choices constitutionally their upon the exercise of decisions, the Kortes’ Grotes’ own burden, protected religious beliefs. The so a burden meaningful or as on exercise the conceived, as the springboard is then used religious rights. of their the What ACA neutral, overruling generally-applica- for a imposes employers obligation on is an to that statutory provision Congress ble has provide employee health that insurance protect rights the necessary deemed to standard, comprehensive set covers others. employee benefits. How an individual up her; those is the Kortes and the Grotes chose uses benefits to she not

When world, they to enter the did not earns the only through business insurance her labor rights, surrender their exercise but typically free but a significant por- contributes reg- did assume responsibility the of her to wages pay tion for it. Her ulatory obligations imposed on all like will guided by, among choices other businesses, statutory obligations including things, religious her own Al- principles. Lee, employees. to U.S. at 455 though employer, in the conveying ben- Gilardi, 1057; 102 S.Ct. at F.3d at earned, she efits has no doubt facilitates (Ed- 1242-43, WL *34 choices, those her freedom to make choices J., wards, in part dissenting & concurring employer’s inconsistent with the Motel, in part); Atlanta Inc. v. Heart cf. imposes nothing own beliefs like States, 241, 259-61, United employer’s a substantial on burden S.Ct. L.Ed.2d practice religion.14 Only by extending (rejecting contention that federal prohibi- scope employer’s of an exercise of tion racial in public discrimination ac- religion beyond belief, far his own worship, commodations motel’s right violated employ- and conduct to the conduct of his operate its choose customers and business ees, we can conceive the insurance bene- wished, given as it powers well established employees provided fits as an undue Congress of both regu- States to burden the free exercise commerce). They late inter- and intra-state is, view, This company my owners. far form corporations legally chose to beyond what Congress had in mind when separated them from the assets and obli- it enacted RFRA. gations of their businesses. See Cedric Ltd., Promotions, supra, Kushner 6. 163, 121 any U.S. at at 2091. Like necessary employer religiously secular If it were pluralistic reach the second nation, the prong inquiry, Kortes and the Grotes must the RFRA I would find companies realize that their indi- employ contraception sup- is mandate who ported by governmental viduals do not share their own reli- a compelling in- beliefs, Judge pointed required As Edwards has but merely out: might action people take enable other No Free Exercise decision issued things plain- do that are at Supreme recognized odds with Court substan- plaintiff’s religious tial burden on a tiff’s beliefs. plaintiff required not F.3d at WL where *29 himself forgo (emphasis original). to take or action that his violates families —those many individuals say, chides court terest. far premiums spent could afford case this who of a more making — time, medical debt- same mind, nature and At the more. But, my respect. underin- uninsured supporting ors—whether the interests weight of larger I much regard, becoming a In this sured —were are obvious. mandate *64 different See materially bankruptcy. no filing those of this case share view al., Himmelstein, found Lee, the court et Medical in which U. David from States, social in a national 2007: interest the United Bankruptcy in government’s sufficiently compelling system Study, 122 Am. J. security a National Results of an Amish em- infringement 8) Uncompen- (Aug.2009). warrant (No. Med. by requiring charity interests ployer’s both (including care hospital sated system. pay into him to hospitals ex- for which services care and it) get not but did compensation pected an obvious has The prior three over had increased tenfold Ameri- broadening in interest compelling 1980, in decades, $39.3 from billion That all $3.9 insurance. to health access cans’ Associ- Hospital in 2010. American in access interest billion have a keen Americans Cost Hospital Care beyond ation, Uncompensated services goods and to medical 2013), at available (January health care of both at 3 As the Fact costs Sheet question. substan- have risen http://www.aha.org/content/13/l-2013- health insurance (last number Nov. and the visited in decades tially recent ncompensated-care-fs.pdf declined, 2013). has plans workplace insurance reform health insurance need for mandate, coupled employer ACA’s year In urgent. become more applicable individual mandate with an enacted, million some 50 was ACA by employer-spon- not covered persons all insurance— health lacked Americans eligi- and otherwise plans health sored non-elderly pop- percent roughly 18 Medicaid, logi- was a or Medicare ble for Human Health & Dep’t of ulation. only, means cal, certainly not although Sec’y for Plan- Servs., Ass’t Office country toward universal moving Brief— Evaluation, ASPE Issue ning & upon the It builds insurance. health the United the Uninsured Overview of of employer-sponsored tradition American Current Summary the 2011 States: A early in the that began health insurance http:// at available Survey, Population Blumenthal, See, century. e.g., David 20th aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/ Ins. Health Employer-Sponsored (last visited Nov. cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml Implications, 355 New Origins and 2013). in the indi- U.S.— insurance Obtaining 2006). EngláND (July J. Med. No. In av- expensive: was vidual market econ- risk-spreading, advantage of It takes in the premiums monthly erage per-person control, other scale, quality omies insurance for health market' individual insurance. of employer-procured features Alabama a low ranged $136 Dem- of a work And, although was the Massachusetts, nationwide for a $437 it had Congress, President ocratic $2,500 (more per than average of $215 proposed having been first advantage Family Founda- Henry J. Kaiser year). Nixon—nearly 40 a Republican Fads, Monthly Average President — tion, Health State Message from Special ago. See years Individual in the Premiums Per Person Con- to the M. Nixon Richard President

Market, http://http://kff.org/ available Health Comprehensive Proposing gress other/state-indicator/individual-premiums/ 1974), (Feb. 6, available Plan 2013). Insurance (last Needless Nov. .visited http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. the conditions that are statistically (last 2013). Nov. php?pid=4337 visited likely most to result in their death— My intention to validate nor here is neither breast, cervical, colorectal, ovarian and policy the ACA as is not endorse cancer, lung and heart and dis- vascular —that my merely purview recog- within insurance, ease—either because lack —but nize that it embodies rational choices and the services are not covered their insur- leading that the road to those choices has plans, copay- ance large because the long and difficult one. been required by ments their compa- insurance

Compelling government interests in nies screenings beyond for these preventive gender both health care and financial childbearing means. “Women of support equality contracep- the inclusion age percent incur pocket more out of *65 coverage tives within the mandated men,” health than pointed care costs she plans including employer-spon- insurance — “My guarantees out. amendment access plans sored provide copay- without —must preventive to critical screening care and by ment the insured. As the court has for women to combat their one number noted, included with the coverage standard provides killers and it at no cost. This required non-grandfathered of all health amendment a big eliminates barrier of plans preventive are a series of services high copayments.” Press release: Mikul- provided that must be all to adults without ski Puts Women First Care Health copayment, including immunizations for (November 30, 2009), Debate available tetanus, measles, meningitis, influenza, http://www.mikulski.senate.gov/media/ B, hepatitis and other communicable dis- (last pressrelease/ll-30-2009-2.cfm visited eases; screening high cholesterol, dia- 7, 2013); Nov. see also Jessica Arons & betes, infection, high HIV blood pressure, Rosenthal, Lindsay Center for American cancer, colorectal other potentially and Progress, Facts About the Health Insur- conditions; life-threatening and both (June 2012) Compensation ance Gap screening counseling abuse, and for alcohol (“Even employer-based coverage, with use, obesity. http://www. tobacco and women higher out-of-pocket have medical healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive- Overall, costs than repro- men. women of (last 2013). care-benefits Nov. visited age ductive spend percent more out requiring The rationale behind coverage of pocket care, than men on health part copayment such services without is obvi- reproductive because their care health ous: these are pre- services either require needs frequent more health care altogether vent illness or facilitate detec- always visits and are not adequately cov- at an tion earlier when it stage is more by ered their Among insurance. women treatment, thereby amenable to reducing by insured employer-based plans, con- oral the direct and costs of indirect oth- illness traceptives alone account for one-third of insured, by family, erwise borne his his out-of-pocket total health spend- care insurer, employer, his medical providers, ing.”), http://www.american available government. and the The Women’s progress.org/issues/healthcare/news/2012/ ACA, Health Amendment spear- Mikulski, headed U.S. Senator Barbara 06/01/11666/facts-about-the-health- (last insurance-eompensation-gap/ expanded requisite range preventive visited 2013). noted, Nov. As the court separate preventive care include a set of has In passage services for proposing women. Women’s Health amendment, Amendment, Senator Mikulski panel experts noted that convened many women forego preventive screenings the Institute of Medicine determined (last wom- Nov. 2013. A visited 029.pdf pre- what criteria on evidence-based based when control whether and necessary pro- ability an’s were services ventive highly sig- pregnant health and will become protect women’s she and mote ad- health, no included—at her child’s ought to be impacts nificant her therefore individual—in to the insured well-being of her- health, ditional cost economic and required of coverage health the standard pregnan- family. and her Unintended self plans. insurance non-grandfathered all and fetus to both mother pose risks cies include, in addition now services Covered woman, preg- planning neither that a mammog- breast cancer contraception: is, may both realizing that she nant nor ehemopre- screening, genetic raphy, practices care and continue delay prenatal variety for a screening counseling; vention drinking) that en- smoking and (including including diseases sexually-transmitted fetus. developing health of danger HIV, syphilis, chlamydia, gonorrhea, contraindicated Pregnancy is Id. at 103. virus; screenings papilloma human health with certain altogether for women cancer, di- B, gestational cervical hepatitis Intervals be- at 103-04. Id. conditions. tract in- urinary abetes, osteoporosis, matter, preg- pregnancies also tween http://www.healthcare.gov/ fections. See eighteen than commencing nancies less *66 (last what-are-my-preventive-care-benefits delivery higher prior pose months after 2013); Dep’t 7, see also U.S. Nov. visited birth births and low pre-term risks of Servs., Health Re- Human Health of & preg- unintended weight. Id. at An Admin., Pre- Women’s & Servs. sources strain on may put also financial nancy Guidelines, available at ventive Services family, to the extent her woman and http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ time off her to take require will the birth 2013). 7, (last Nov. visited work, quit work may her cause from surprise that con- as no come It should have or cannot if altogether she does of in the set care was included traceptive childcare, and pay for alternate afford the Institute services that preventive substantial, expenses unplanned-for adds to wom- panel deemed essential Medicine preg- family budget. Unintended of Amer- Ninety-nine percent en’s health. impose also in birth resulting nancies have en- who aged 15 ican women 2008, for In public fisc: on large costs used at least men have in sex with gaged resulting births percent of example, 65 control. Institute birth one form of paid were pregnancies, unintended Preventive Medicine, on Ser- Committee (primari- insurance by public programs for Women, Preventive Clinical Ser- vices for Medicaid) in total estimat- and resulted ly Gaps, 103 Closing the vices Women: for In- billion. Guttmacher of $12.5 costs ed (2011), http://www.nap.edu/ at available stitute, on Unintended Fact Facts Sheet: Guttmach- catalog.php?record_id=13181; (Oct. States in the United Pregnancy Institute, Contraceptive Fact Sheet: er 2013), http://www.guttmacher. at available States, (Aug.2013), 1at in the United Use org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US. http://www.guttmacher.org/' available at 2013). Finally, (last 7, Nov. html visited (last 7, Nov. visited pubs/fb_contr_usc.pdf pregnancies and unwanted unintended Jones, 2013); & Jo D. Mosher William lion’s share account naturally for Control, Nat’l. Ctr. Disease for Centers nearly one- Currently, induced abortions. Statistics, Contraception Use for Health (49 in the pregnancies of all percent) half 1928-2008, 5, 15, & the United States: in unintended, roughly are United States http:// available (Aug.2010), Table (22 per- pregnancies of those percent www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_ pregnancies) abortion, cent of all (2007)); end in 360-365 Jeffrey al., Peipert, F. et resulting than 1.2 more million abor Preventing Unintended Pregnancies By tions annually as of 2008. Guttmacher Providing No-Cost Contraception, 120 Institute, In Facts on Induced Obstetrics & Gynecology (Oct.2012); Brief: (Oet.2013), Abortion in the United States Amy Cohen, Deschner & Susan A. Contra- ,at available http://www.guttmacher.org/ ceptive Key Use Is Reducing Abortion (last pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html visited Worldwide, 6 GuttmacheR Report on Pub- 2013). Nov. Abortions themselves have (Oct.2003), liC PoliCY No. 4 available at (roughly economic costs percent http://www.guttmacher.Org/pubs/tgr/06/4/ Medicaid, paid id.), example, see (last gr060407.html 7, 2013)); visited Nov. and, as important, many because Ameri John Bongaarts Westoff, & Charles F. oppose cans abortions on moral grounds, The Potential Role Contraception legitimate interest Abortion, Family Reducing 31 Studies in reducing the abortion rate. See Planning (Sept.2000). Planned Parenthood Se. Penn. v. Ca right contraception is, use sey, supra, 505 112 S.Ct. at course, constitutionally protected. (state may express preference for Connecticut, Griswold v. 381 U.S. abortion); childbirth over Michael M. v. 485-86, 1678, 1682, 14 85 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 510 Superior Ct. Cnty., Sonoma (1965) (state statute forbidding use of con 470-71 & n. 1205 & traceptives impermissibly intrudes n. 67 L.Ed.2d 437 (noting that right of marital privacy); Eisenstadt v. statutory rape justified law was by state’s Baird, 438, 453-55, “strong interest” preventing out-of-wed (1972) (state 31 L.Ed.2d 349 stat *67 lock teenage pregnancies thereby, in ute forbidding distribution of contracep alia, ter reducing rate); abortion Choose tives to persons unmarried equal violates Illinois, White, Inc. v. Life protection clause of Fourteenth Amend (7th Cir.2008) (Manion, J., concurring); ment). As the put Eisenstadt, Court it in Gilardi, but see 733 F.3d at “If the right privacy of means anything, it WL at *12 (although govern right the of individual, the married or ment’s interests in asserted abortion cases single, to be free from gov unwarranted have been described as “legitimate and ernmental intrusion into matters so funda substantial,” they have never been de mentally affecting a person as the decision scribed as compelling). Ready access to beget whether bear or a child.” Id. at contraception only thus not maximizes the 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1038. ability of women to pregnant become only I am if and when also convinced partners making and their that contra- ceptive prepared coverage part of responsibilities shoulder the the standardized of parenthood, insurance that non-grandfathered but could well employ- lower the rate of provide ers abortion. See -must- employees Institute of Medi is the cine, least Clinical Preventive restrictive means furthering Services of these Women, at (eliminating compelling or reducing my interests. I have doubts out-of-pocket costs of about contraception feasibility creating, makes of let alone it more likely women will enacting, publicly-funded use more effec a contraception tive methods contraception) plan, (citing establishing Deb system of tax cred- Postlethwaite, al., bie et A its to comparison contraceptive manufacturers' or the contraceptive procurement pre-and post- women who given use contraception, that ContRaception 76(5): changes, it has taken years more than 60 to enact a benefit unques- marriages made lawful on the scale reform effort insurance health States”). authority of the tioned Act, given Affordable Care inevitably that surround controversies contraception pro- Nor can we view At of women. reproductive I in isolation. As have visions of ACA times, least, any plan that unlikely it is such out several the contra- very pointed now merely require- mandate is one ception in the near future. be established will comprehensive require- in a set ment aside, must consider Putting that we imposes on all ments that the statute Health point of the Women’s the entire discussed, I have plans, health and as to redress a to the ACA was Amendment of medical services any there are number inequalities history gender-based and medical plans that health cover Carving and health insurance. healthcare might make to choices that an insured coverage insurance out from the standard might object particular employer which a of healthcare type the ACA mandated Logically, religious grounds. on has determined to panel experts that a Luitjo- to relieve Korte & court’s decision women, vital to the health needs be han Industries Contractors Grote provided sepa it saying that must limit- contraception mandate cannot be very rately, disparities reinforces contraception alone. The relevant ed to the Amendment. Additional motivated then, govern- question, whether surely will attend transaction costs to contra- feasibly may ment ensure access to con separate plan of a devoted creation means, but through care other ceptive or a set of public option be it a traception, may feasibly it ensure access whether incentives, of this segregation and the tax employers might types all of care to which insur form of healthcare standard The answer object religious grounds. coverage stigmatize will both these ance it is not feasible to that is obvious: who wish to employees and the services pub- government to establish expect the hardly could be more access them.15 This picks up responsi- option lic insurance underlying the with the intent inconsistent individual ser- crazy-quilt for the bility Amendment. Romer Health Women’s employer might any individual vices Cf. *68 Evans, at supra, reli- with his individual incompatible find (observing that state con at 1626-27 gious beliefs. foreclosing gays provision stitutional in Lee remarked Supreme The Court of nondiscri protections and lesbians the can be accommo- “[rjeligious that beliefs disability imposes unique a mination laws accom- dated, point a at which there is but individuals); United States on that class of op- ‘radically restrict would modation ” — U.S. -, Windsor, 133 S.Ct. legislature.’ latitude of the erational (reasoning 186 L.Ed.2d (quoting at 1056 at recognition to same- denying federal at Braunfeld, 366 U.S. omitted). 1147) (additional “im authorized state law In a marriages sex citations status, many religions disadvantage, separate society a posed pluralistic a beliefs, it variants of even more on all who enter same-sex stigma and so a alternative, aside Each a come tax return. either have to enroll in 15. A woman would program providing on her to obtain government imposing dedicated extra burdens from coverage, a contraceptive establish coverage, singles insurance her out as contraceptive relationship government-subsidized with a to use con- sexually-active woman who wishes manufacturer, contraceptive or claim credits traception. contraception on her in- purchase for the impossible would be to move ingful toward a party sense to an individual’s deci- system of sion healthcare relies to use that service. universal substantially employer-sponsored exemptions The already provided for in permitting corpo- health while insurance the AGA neither undermine the compelling objections particular rate owners with government’s nature of the interests types of health or specific deci- services broadening Americans’ access to health- sions about how use those services to care and ensuring women have com- exclude workplace plans. them from health prehensive healthcare nor do make Even if government chose instead to religious-based exemptions any more rea- pursue universal healthcare through the First, sonable or given feasible. the finan- entirely publicly-funded, means of an sin- cial burdens workplace associated with gle-payer system insurance, of health cor- plans, health exempting employers with porate taxpayers owners as would still be fewer than 50 employees fulltime from the facilitating contraception and other health- obligation provide insurance is an en- they object. care services to which tirely practical, logical, justifiable ac- decision in Lee makes clear that gov- commodation to the financial needs of ernment would be required employers, accom- small particularly in the first religious-based objections modate phase where of a national expand effort to access program in question is through funded to healthcare. Individuals who work for general Indeed, revenues. employers, Kortes’ those part-time like employees, counsel argument conceded oral individuals, self-employed and unemployed employer even an tax dedicated to a public individuals are to the steered insurance program underwriting contraception might exchanges ACA, established under be upheld under analysis. Taxpayer Lee’s government where the offers subsidies to funding contraception just facilitates as those who cannot full shoulder the cost of much any other means of financing. Likewise, insurance on their own. grand- Granted, by making fathering existing workplace health plans middleman, taxpayer financing separates a follows a time-honored and common-sensi- corporate owner his employee’s path use cal in expediting implementation of contraception. But new, as I have already complex, potentially burden- out, pointed in the context of employer- regulation. some Employees participating financing insurance, form, the corporate in those plans by already definition have plan’s the health separate identity, insurance, third- health so the accommodation to party administration of the plan, health employers represented by exemption private and the choices of employees unduly and does not burden employees nor *69 physicians, their similarly place corporate undermine the goal central of legisla- owners at a employee’s remove from an tion. Existing plans will lose the benefit decision to use contraception. Insisting on of exemption they major as make exception in setting one but not changes that, to their plans health inter sense, other no makes when in alia, both cases reduce benefits increase costs to corporate lending owners are support to employees. § 45 C.F.R. 147.140(g). type of they objectionable, healthcare find There is no reason to think this will take but in neither case are in any mean- long for employers,16 given most the cost 16. government's mid-range quish estimate grandfather by is status the end of percent that “66 employer plans small of 2013.” Interim Group Rules for Final Health percent large employer plans of will relin- Plans and Coverage Health Insurance Relat- in And there is a demonstrable range ing part). insuring a broad of complexity not-for-profit employ- between a which difference market forces and the of healthcare defined expressly er whose mission is make such revisions employers prompt goals corporation and a secular religious basis; and, in the again, regular on a profit. business is commerce for whose re- employees changes, such absence of plans, grandfathered main covered access to health insurance goal so the of Lyng for the in v. Nw. Speaking Court are, grandfa- these many of Odds served. Ass’n, Cemetery Protective Justice Indian contraceptive already cover plans

thered say the limited had this to about O’Connor of degree. See Institute care to some clause: reach of the free exercise Medicine, Services Clinical Preventive for it might 'much we wish However (as Women, 85% 108-09 otherwise, simply were plans health cov- and 62% of small large required if it were operate could not Claxton, (citing Gary contraception) ered every religious citizen’s needs satisfy Found., al., Family Kaiser et ANnual Sur- govern- A range and desires. broad Employer vey Benefits, Health pro- welfare ment activities—from social (2010), http://kaiserfamily available foreign aid to conservation grams foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/ considered es- projects always be 2013)); (last see visited Nov. 8085.pdf —will spiritual well-being sential Institute, Guttmacher also Polioies State citizens, of sin- often on the basis some Coverage Brief, Contra- Insurance Others will cerely held beliefs. which re- (surveying state laws ceptives offensive, deeply find the same activities contraceptives), to cover quire insurers with their own perhaps incompatible http://www.guttmacher.org/ available at spiritual fulfillment and with search for (last visited statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf religion. The First the tenets of their 2013). Finally, the fact that Nov. all citizens apply to Amendment must exemption ACA contains an alike, to none of them a give and it can permanent the sole employers —which programs that do public veto over man- contraception exemption from the religion. prohibit the free exercise Gilardi, date, F.3d at see not, and courts does The Constitution (Edwards, J., 5854246, at *33 2013 WL cannot, reconcile the various offer to part dissenting part)— & concurring government, competing demands exemp- that an by no means demonstrates them rooted sincere many of any employer with required tion is belief, inevitably arise in so diverse objection contracep- potential religious task, to the society ours. That That of healthcare. any type tion or other feasible, legisla- is for the extent it is common to exemption is a feature type of tures and other institutions. statutes, including any number of federal (citation at 1327 Rights Act Title VII of Civil omitted). 2000e-l(a), § and the Americans 42 U.S.C. seek accommodation plaintiffs Act of U.S.C. What with Disabilities *70 conduct, Gilardi, on their 12187; here is a demand 12113(d), §§ see beliefs; and the 5854246, religious than their 1241-43, at *33-*34 rather at 2013 WL “the recognized that always (Edwards, J., part in & dissent- Court concurring 34,552 (June Act, 34,538, Fed.Reg. at Care 75 ing Health Plan to Status as a Grandfathered 17, 2010). and Affordable the Patient Protection Under 730 act, exemption

freedom to even where the action is in from the mandate burdens the convictions, accord with one’s is rights of the plaintiffs’ employees. Final- totally legislative free from restric ly, it precedent establishes a which invites 603, Braunfeld, tions.” 366 at U.S. 81 free-exercise challenges to a host of feder- at (citing S.Ct. 1146 Cantwell v. Connecti which, al corporations laws secular cut, 296, 306, 303-04, 310 U.S. reality, have no beliefs of their 903-04, (1940)); also, 84 L.Ed. 1213 see religion. own and cannot exercise Smith, e.g., Employ. supra, Div. v. 494 For all of these reasons I have set forth 878-80, 1600; U.S. at 110 at S.Ct. Bowen here, my prior dissents, Korte v. Sebeli Roy, supra, v. 476 U.S. at at S.Ct. us, 583, 588-90, Fed.Appx. 2012 WL 2152; Yoder, supra, Wisconsin v. (7th Dec.28, 2012), at *5-*6 Cir. 219-20, 1535; 92 S.Ct. at Baird v. State Sebelius, 855-867, Grote v. 708 F.3d at of Ariz., 1, 5-6, Bar U.S. S.Ct. in the opinions Judge well-reasoned 705-06, (1971); 27 L.Ed.2d 639 Sch. Dist. Reagan, Dep’t Korte v. U.S. Health & Abington Twp., Pennsylvania v. Servs., Human supra, F.Supp.2d Schempp, 217-18, Barker, Indus., Judge Grote LLC 1560, 1569, (1963); 10 L.Ed.2d 844 Sher Sebelius, (S.D.Ind. 914 F.Supp.2d 943 Verner, 402-03, supra, bert v. U.S. 2012), below, I would affirm the district 1793; Ballard, 83 S.Ct. at United States v. deny plaintiffs’ courts’ decisions to re 78, 86, 88 L.Ed. quests for preliminary injunctive relief. (1944). Furthermore, the conduct for which the Kortes and the Grotes seek I respectfully dissent. exemption corporate is their conduct as world; owners the commercial more

over, it is implicates also conduct that

rights parties of third employees. —their

The reach of the free exercise clause limited, setting quite whereas the

government’s interests in pursuing the uni application

form religiously-neutral of a COUNTY, ILLINOIS, UNION promoting statute et employees al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, quite strong. holding The court’s granting the Kortes Grotes, along and the with their two secu- MERSCORP, INC., al., et Defendants- corporations, lar a religiously-based ex- Appellees. emption from an rep- insurance mandate resents a dramatic turn in free exercise Nos. 13-1794. jurisprudence for all of the I reasons have United States Court of Appeals, discussed. It a highly personal bestows Seventh Circuit. right secular, exercise on two for-profit corporations that have no facility Argued Sept. 2013. conscience, thought, or belief. It deems Decided Nov. religious rights plaintiffs bur- dened contraceptive mandate with-

out consideration of the indirect and mini-

mal intrusion on their religion. exercise of

And it disregards the extent to which the Notes organization is an that meets employers mandate] applies mandate traception following criteria: employees. full-time See all 50 or more with employers— § 4980H. Smaller 26 U.S.C. (1) religious The inculcation of values employ- than 50 full-time fewer those with purpose organization. of the is a health required provide not ees—are (2) organization primarily The em- apparently employees their plan for persons religious who ploys share mínimums, coverage subject to the are organization. tenets of the contraception mandate. See including the (3) primarily organization The serves it’s not say “apparently” because id. We religious share the tenets persons who categori- mandate entirely clear that the organization. of the employers; to small cally inapplicable nonprofit or- organization The if a position takes the government in section ganization as described required to employer not otherwise small 6033(a)(1) 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) and section plan employee health-care provide an (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code so, regulato- chooses to do nonetheless [covering as amended the tax of the man- ry requires scheme inclusion integrat- status of churches and their coverage. contraception dated auxiliaries, conventions or associa- ed when the Act plans Health existence churches, exclusively tions of and the and do adopted “grandfathered” are was religious orders]. activities of mini- coverage comply not need to 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B). man- including contraception § Id. mums— sponsor makes cer- plan date —unless the Religious-Employer The Controver- B. plan. changes tain to the terms sy Grandfathering § is a U.S.C. was contraception The mandate instant- measure; category will transitional religious-employer ly The controversial.4 existing employer-based plans as shrink for conscien- exemption did not leave room changes. undergo to March prior religious objectors other houses tious than that the num- estimates integrated organ- affiliate worship, status will plans grandfathered ber izations, acting orders fairly rapidly as older health-care dwindle words, the definition of such. In other In- plans updated and renewed. See employer” was so circumscribed “religious Group Final Rules for Health Plans terim colleges and uni- it left out Coverage Relating Insurance and Health clinics; versities; religious hospitals Plan, as a Grandfathered Health to Status

Case Details

Case Name: Cyril Korte v. HHS
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Nov 8, 2013
Citation: 735 F.3d 654
Docket Number: 12-3841, 13-1077
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.