United States v. Xavier Brooks, 112 F.4th 937

Xavier Rashad Brooks, a convicted felon, pled guilty to possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) after two separate incidents involving firearms.
In October 2020, Brooks was found in possession of a Glock pistol, which led to his federal firearm charge; three months later, he was found with a stolen Smith & Wesson.
Brooks was also subsequently charged in Georgia for theft by receiving stolen property (the stolen Smith & Wesson).
The presentence report (PSI) recommended enhancements to Brooks’s sentence based on prior felony convictions, possession of a stolen firearm, and possession in connection with another felony offense.
At sentencing, the district court overruled Brooks’s objections, applied the enhancements, and sentenced him to 100 months after a two-level downward variance.
Brooks appealed, disputing the determination of his base offense level and application of both sentencing enhancements.

Issue	Brooks's Argument	United States' Argument	Held
Whether the 2008 Georgia robbery conviction counts as a "crime of violence" for base offense level	Robbery under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-40 is not categorically a crime of violence because it can be committed by sudden snatching, which is not violent	Statute is divisible; Brooks was convicted of robbery by force, which qualifies as a crime of violence	Affirmed. The conviction was for robbery by force and counts as a crime of violence.
Whether possession of the stolen Smith & Wesson was 'relevant conduct' justifying a two-level enhancement	His later possession of the Smith & Wesson was unrelated to the Glock offense and not "relevant conduct"	Both incidents were similar, close in time, and part of the same course of conduct	Affirmed. The conduct was deemed "relevant" for enhancement purposes.
Whether a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied for possessing a firearm "in connection with" another felony (theft by receiving)	Did not "facilitate" the theft-by-receiving as the gun was itself the subject of the theft, not a means to facilitate	Enhancement applies if the firearm is the fruit of the crime and has the potential to facilitate the offense	Affirmed (majority). The firearm, as stolen property, facilitated or had potential to facilitate theft.

Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (defines which court documents can be used to determine elements of a prior conviction under the modified categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (distinguishes between divisible and indivisible statutes in applying the categorical approach)
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) (clarifies use of modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach requires considering the least acts criminalized by a statute)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (explains principles for categorical approach to violent felony)
United States v. Smith, 480 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2007) (interpreting "in connection with" section of Sentencing Guidelines broadly)
United States v. Young, 115 F.3d 834 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding firearm can still be "in connection with" a crime if it is the fruit of that crime)