United States v. Willie Stokes, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7996

Willie Stokes pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute ≥28 grams of cocaine base; sentencing range calculated under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 as a career offender.
Stokes had multiple prior convictions; two relevant felonies were a 2006 Michigan delivery of cocaine conviction and a 2009 Michigan third‑degree fleeing/eluding conviction.
The district court designated Stokes a career offender, producing an initial Guidelines range of 188–235 months; the court departed one criminal‑history level downward to a revised range of 168–210 months.
At sentencing the court denied a variance and imposed 168 months (bottom of revised range); the court relied in part on statements inferring Stokes had been selling drugs for roughly ten years based on long‑term unemployment and prior convictions.
On appeal Stokes challenged (1) whether the Michigan eluding conviction is a "crime of violence" qualifying for career‑offender status and (2) whether the sentence was procedurally erroneous because the court relied on clearly erroneous factual assumptions (decade‑long drug dealing).
The court affirmed the career‑offender designation but reversed and remanded for resentencing due to plain procedural error in relying on an unsupported factual finding that affected substantial rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Michigan third‑degree fleeing/eluding is a "crime of violence" for career‑offender predicate	Stokes: eluding under Michigan law is not a crime of violence and thus not a predicate	Government: vehicular flight creates a serious risk of physical injury and qualifies as a crime of violence	Court: Affirmed; applying Bartel, vehicular flight under Mich. § 257.602a is a crime of violence and qualifies as a predicate for § 4B1.1
Whether the sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the court relied on speculative/clearly erroneous facts (concluding Stokes sold drugs for 10 years)	Stokes: the record lacks support that he sold drugs for a decade; court relied on speculation and a government suggestion rather than PSR facts	Government: court properly considered criminal history and employment gaps in denying a variance	Court: Reversed and remanded — the court made a plainly erroneous factual finding (decade of dealing), which was a principal basis to deny variance and likely affected substantial rights

United States v. Bartel, 698 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 2012) (vehicular flight presents serious risk of physical injury and is a violent felony/crime of violence)
United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for crime‑of‑violence determinations under career‑offender guideline)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (procedural‑error standards in sentencing review)
United States v. Grimes, 702 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2012) (plain‑error review in sentencing; prejudice requires reasonable probability of a lighter sentence)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (framework for plain‑error review)
United States v. Lee, 570 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2009) (district court may accept undisputed portions of PSR as factual findings)