United States v. Williams
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4391
| 9th Cir. | 2011Background
- Williams admitted on seizure of his computer to possessing child pornography, later confirmed by search, including incest and rape of young children.
- He described rape fantasies and attraction to girls aged nine to sixteen and a preference for content depicting men raping children.
- He had a 2000 Montana state conviction for sexual assault involving two girls, resulting in a ten-year sentence with supervised release.
- His federal case imposed a fifteen-year mandatory prison term plus a life term of supervised release, with additional conditions on release.
- The district court sentenced concurrently the federal sentence with an undischarged Montana sentence, and Williams appealed the lifetime supervised release as excessive under the Eighth Amendment.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that a life term of supervised release was not grossly disproportionate and was not a categorical bar to such sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a life term of supervised release for sex offenses is grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment. | Williams contends the life term is cruel and unusual. | Williams argues the sentence is disproportionate to the crimes and offender. | Not grossly disproportionate; not unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment. |
| Whether the challenge to life terms of supervised release is categorically disproportionate. | As a class, such sentences may be disproportionate. | Societal norms and sentencing data show acceptance of lifetime supervised release for sex offenders. | Not categorically disproportionate given crime severity and recidivism risk. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (narrow proportionality principle for noncapital crimes; not strict proportionality)
- Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (gross disproportionality standard; extreme sentences may be allowed)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (extremely harsh penalties permissible for still serious offenses)
- Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (reiteration that severe penalties can be constitutional in some recidivist contexts)
- Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (high penalties for drug offenses within constitutional bounds)
- Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (second most severe penalty; supports proportionality considerations in noncapital cases)
- Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (categorical prohibition of death penalty for nonhomicide crimes; context for proportionality analysis)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty inapplicable to juveniles; evolving standards of decency)
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibition of death penalty for mentally disabled)
- Gonzalez (5th Cir.), 445 F.3d 815 (2006) (reliance on lifetime supervised release not categorically disproportionate)
- Cope, 527 F.3d 944 (2008) (lifetime supervised release reasonable for possession/receipt of child pornography)
- Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2005) (within-Guidelines sentence reasonable; lifetime supervision supportive of deterrence and rehabilitation)