United States v. William Marshall, 891 F.3d 716

Marshall left California in 1992 while on probation and soon began using the identity of a real person, Terry Jones, obtaining IDs, employment, and other benefits under that name for decades.
In 2015 he was indicted on eight counts; he pleaded guilty to making a false statement to a government agency (18 U.S.C. § 1001) and aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A) based on a 2011 replacement Social Security card application. Other counts were dismissed.
The PSR counted prior convictions (forgery, theft, drug offenses, etc.), yielding a Guidelines range of 6–12 months on Count 1; Count 2 carried a mandatory consecutive 24 months.
The government sought an upward variance based on Marshall’s long-term use of a false identity and fugitive status; Marshall sought a downward variance citing coercion by criminals, health problems, family dependence, attempts to clear his identity, and limited resources.
The district court granted an upward variance, imposing 24 months on Count 1 (above the Guidelines range) and the mandatory 24 months on Count 2 to run consecutively (total 48 months), plus two years supervised release.

Issue	Marshall's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether district court relied on clearly erroneous facts at sentencing	Court credited erroneous theory that he absconded to avoid California justice; he left due to mob threats and before a warrant issued	Defendant lived under false identity, left while on probation, and an active warrant later existed; court’s fugitive finding supported by record	No clear error; court’s finding that he absconded/fugitive for 20 years was reasonable
Whether court improperly discredited Marshall’s testimony about mob coercion	Testimony should be credited as mitigating explanation for identity change	Credibility is for the district court; only Marshall’s self‑serving testimony supported coercion claim	Court permissibly declined to credit Marshall’s testimony; not reversible
Whether sentencing penalized indigency in violation of Due Process/Equal Protection	Indigency prevented him from resolving the California warrant; punishment for poverty	Argument unsupported and largely cursory; record shows Marshall had means at times	Rejected for lack of developed argument and record support
Whether upward variance was substantively unreasonable under § 3553(a)	Court gave insufficient weight to health, family reliance, work/tax history, and long clean period	Prior history, long misuse of a false identity, and fugitive status justified upward variance	No abuse of discretion; variance from 12 to 24 months on Count 1 was reasonable

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (sets procedural and substantive review framework for sentencing)
United States v. Hunt, 840 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2016) (two-step review: procedural then substantive reasonableness)
United States v. Martin, 757 F.3d 776 (8th Cir. 2014) (procedural error examples at sentencing)
United States v. Kirlin, 859 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for guidelines calculation and factual findings)
United States v. Bryant, 606 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010) (de novo review of guidelines interpretation)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (abuse-of-discretion standard and factors for substantive reasonableness)
United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2013) (district court credibility determinations are entitled to deference)
United States v. Quintana, 340 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2003) (credibility assessment at sentencing)
United States v. Stuckey, 255 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2001) (declining to consider cursory arguments unsupported by authority)
United States v. David, 682 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2012) (district court’s broad discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors)
Ferguson v. United States, 623 F.3d 627 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding substantial sentence above Guidelines range as reasonable)