We review for a second time Jimmy Lee Stuckey, Jr.’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In his first appeal, Stuckey argued that the district court erred in giving a supplemental jury instruction which indicated that a felon could not possess a firearm “at any time.” We upheld the conviction even though we concluded that the district court should have told the jury to decide whether Stuckey possessed a firearm at a time “reasonably near” the date alleged in the indictment. In doing so, we analyzed Stuckey’s argument under the variance doctrine, and declined to consider whether the instruction amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment.
United States v. Stuckey,
In this second appeal, Stuckey does not challenge any issues related to his resen-tencing hearing. Instead, he again challenges his conviction by (1) arguing for the first time that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, and (2) renewing the jury-instruction challenge he made in his first appeal, claiming we clearly erred by failing to consider whether the supplemental instruction amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment.
Stuckey’s constitutional challenge is foreclosed by several of our past decisions. His renewed challenge to the supplemental jury instruction is barred by the law of the case doctrine. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.
DISCUSSION 2
I. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Stuckey argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
United States v. Lopez,
Because § 922(g)(1) contains an express jurisdictional element that satisfies the Commerce Clause, a long line of post-
Lopez
Eighth Circuit decisions have rejected claims that the statute is unconstitutional.
See United States v. Holman,
197
*530
F.3d 920, 921 (8th Cir.1999);
United States v. Crawford,
Nothing in
Morrison
changes our mind about the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).
Cf. United States v. Hoggard,
The jurisdictional element in § 922(g)(1) puts it into a different category of analysis than the laws considered in Lopez and Morrison. Section 922(g)(1) by its language only regulates those weapons affecting interstate commerce by being the subject of interstate trade. It addresses items sent in interstate commerce, and the channels of commerce themselves — ordering they be kept clear of firearms. Thus, no analysis of the style of Lopez or Morrison is appropriate.
United States v. Dorris,
II. The Renewed Jury Instruction Challenge.
Under the “law of the case” doctrine “a decision in a prior appeal is followed in later proceedings unless a party introduces substantially different evidence, or the prior decision is clearly erroneous and works a manifest injustice.”
United States v. Bartsh,
Stuckey contends that our first opinion is clearly erroneous and works a manifest injustice because we failed to consider whether the supplemental instruction amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment. We previously explained why we didn’t consider the constructive amendment issue:
Stuckey challenge[d] the propriety of the supplemental instruction on appeal, but only in the most perfunctory manner. Stuckey [did] not argue that the supplemental instruction amounted to a constructive amendment of the indictment. Nor [did] he identify the instruction as an infringement of his constitu *531 tional rights under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments [and his] opening brief cites no legal authority in its discussion of the supplemental instruction.
Stuckey,
An “[appellant’s brief] must contain ... appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities ... on which the appellant relies.” Fed. R.App. R. 28(a)(9)(A). As a result, we regularly decline to consider cursory or summary arguments that are unsupported by citations to legal authorities. See
United States v. Wadlington,
In the first appeal, the only legal authority cited by Stuckey (in his reply brief) referred to the general principle that a supplemental instruction must be “nonprejudicial.”
United States v. Suppenbach,
Stuckey now turns our generosity against us, essentially arguing that our first opinion is clearly erroneous and works a manifest injustice because we declined to consider an unsupported argument (i .e., constructive amendment). We disagree. Our remand was limited to the issue of excluding Stuckey’s military drug convictions for purposes of the armed career offender enhancement. A defendant does not receive a second chance to support an argument he failed to support m a first appeal simply because he is resen-tenced.
Cf. United States v. Behler,
Stuckey also argues that we should address his constructive amendment argument now, because he will be able to raise the argument later in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Stuckey reasons that our prior decision thereby “works a manifest injustice” because of the resulting delay in addressing the merits of his argument. We disagree. Any “manifest injustice” resulting from delay stems not from our decision, but from Stuckey’s initial failure to support his argument. Surely, Stuckey has every right to raise a constructive amendment argument in a § 2255 motion. Stuckey’s right to have us review that argument, however, will depend upon his ability to satisfy the procedural strictures placed upon our review of collateral challenges. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
For the reasons stated, we reject Stuck-ey’s constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and hold that his renewed challenge to the supplemental jury instruction is barred by the law of the case doctrine. We therefore affirm his judgment of conviction.
Notes
. The pertinent facts are set forth in the first opinion,
see Stuckey,
.We choose to address the merits of Stuck-ey's constitutional challenge only because that is more convenient than deciding whether Stuckey waived the argument by failing to raise it before the district court or in his first appeal, and because the government didn’t argue waiver.