United States v. William Dahl
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15171
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- William Dahl pleaded guilty to federal counts for attempting to use interstate facilities to entice minors into sexual activity; sentenced to 293 months after the District Court applied U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 (career/repeat sex-offender enhancement).
- Probation and the District Court treated prior Delaware convictions (1991 first- and third-degree unlawful sexual contact; earlier convictions including 1999/2001 offenses) as federal Chapter 109A "sex offense convictions," raising Dahl’s offense level and criminal-history category.
- Dahl objected below on different grounds; on appeal he raised for the first time that the District Court erred by not applying the categorical approach to determine whether his state convictions qualify as federal predicate "sex offense convictions."
- The Third Circuit reviewed the unpreserved challenge for plain error and analyzed whether sentencing courts must apply the categorical approach (elements-based) or may examine underlying conduct.
- The court held Delaware first- and third-degree unlawful sexual contact (as enacted in 1989) sweep more broadly than the federal aggravated sexual abuse statutes (18 U.S.C. § 2241) because Delaware criminalized "sexual contact" (including through clothing and under a reasonable-person standard) and consensual-but-offensive contact, whereas federal law defines narrower "sexual acts" and requires specific intent or nonconsent.
- Because the categorical approach was the correct method and its misapplication was plain and prejudicial, the court vacated Dahl’s sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the categorical approach must be used to determine if prior state convictions qualify as § 2426/§4B1.5 predicate "sex offense convictions" | Dahl: sentencing court must apply the categorical (elements-only) approach, not look to underlying facts | Government: statute’s reference to "conduct" permits a factual inquiry into the underlying conduct | Categorical approach applies; sentencing court erred by not using it |
| Whether the Delaware unlawful sexual contact statutes match federal aggravated sexual abuse (§ 2241) | Dahl: Delaware statutes are broader and therefore cannot serve as §4B1.5 predicates | Government: prior convictions here amount to federal offenses; district could consider underlying conduct | Delaware first- and third-degree unlawful sexual contact sweep more broadly than §2241 and do not qualify as predicates |
| Whether any limited factual inquiry (Nijhawan-type qualifier) is permissible for the "perpetrated against a minor" qualification | Dahl: limited factual inquiry into victim’s age is acceptable, but core elements still require categorical analysis | Government: broader factual inquiry justified by statutory language | Court: may inquire into facts only for the specified qualifier (e.g., victim age); otherwise elements-only analysis remains required |
| Whether the error was plain and affected substantial rights warranting resentencing | Dahl: error was plain under Supreme Court precedents and affected his Guidelines range | Government: Pavulak and pre-existing uncertainty meant error not plainly correct; underlying facts show federal offense conduct | Error was plain as of appellate review (Descamps/Johnson/Mathis); it affected substantial rights and warrants vacatur and remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (categorical approach requires looking to statutory elements, not underlying facts)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (foundational categorical-approach precedent)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (categorical approach applies despite "conduct" language; discussed residual-clause vagueness)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (use of "conviction" signals elements-focused inquiry; divisibility analysis)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (qualifier language may permit a limited factual inquiry for that specific qualifier)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (incorrect Guidelines range can presumptively affect substantial rights)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (plain-error review framework)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (discretion to correct forfeited plain error)