United States v. Weems
896 F.3d 104
1st Cir.2018Background
- Four defendants (Rose, Weems, Sabetta, Rodríguez) convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) received ACCA-mandated 15+ year sentences based in part on prior Rhode Island convictions for Assault with a Dangerous Weapon (A/BDW), R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2(a).
- Johnson v. United States held ACCA's residual clause void for vagueness; Welch made Johnson retroactive on collateral review, allowing § 2255 challenges to ACCA enhancements that relied on the residual clause.
- The district court applied the categorical/modified categorical approach, assumed the assault and battery forms of Rhode Island A/BDW were not divisible, and found record evidence showing convictions were for A/BDW.
- The district court concluded Rhode Island A/BDW could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness (finding statewide authority ambiguous and applying the rule of lenity) and that, under First Circuit precedent, crimes requiring only recklessness do not satisfy ACCA’s force clause; it granted § 2255 relief and resentenced the defendants to 120 months.
- The government appealed; the First Circuit affirmed, holding Rhode Island A/BDW is not categorically a "violent felony" under ACCA's force clause and upholding the district court’s relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rhode Island A/BDW is a "violent felony" under ACCA's force clause | A/BDW requires more than recklessness ("wantonness" implies intent or greater culpability); therefore it satisfies the force clause | A/BDW is ambiguous and can be committed with recklessness; if so, it cannot categorically qualify as a violent felony | A/BDW is not categorically a violent felony under the force clause because it can be committed with recklessness |
| Whether Rhode Island A/BDW's mens rea includes mere recklessness | Government: state cases and language show wantonness/"intended" language requires intent (greater than recklessness) | Defendants: state decisions and definitions (e.g., Gilligan) permit reading "wantonness" as recklessness; ambiguity triggers rule of lenity | Court: Rhode Island precedent is unclear; reasonable possibility exists that A/BDW can be committed with recklessness, so mens rea ambiguity precludes categorical treatment as violent felony |
| Whether offenses committed with a reckless mens rea satisfy ACCA's force clause (post-Voisine) | Government: Voisine supports that recklessness can satisfy a "use of physical force" formulation | Defendants: First Circuit precedent (Fish, Windley) and rule of lenity preclude treating reckless offenses as force-clause violent felonies | Court: First Circuit precedent forecloses treating offenses that can be committed recklessly as force-clause violent felonies; government conceded as much for this circuit |
| Procedural default of Johnson-based collateral challenges (cause & prejudice) | Government: defendants procedurally defaulted by not raising challenge earlier; relief should be barred | Defendants: Johnson was novel; cause exists; they suffered prejudice because ACCA sentence was imposed | Court: Government did not meaningfully press the cause question on appeal; district court correctly found prejudice and excused default; relief remains available |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating ACCA's residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding Johnson announces a new substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (establishing the categorical approach for prior-offense analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explaining divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (distinguishing elements from means; instructing inquiry into divisibility)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (holding recklessness suffices for the misdemeanor domestic-violence statute’s "use of physical force")
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (limiting certain "crime of violence" analyses and excluding negligence crimes)
- United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding Massachusetts ABDW requiring recklessness did not qualify under an analogous definition of "crime of violence")
- United States v. Windley, 864 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (concluding Massachusetts reckless ABDW is not a violent felony and endorsing Bennett reasoning)