United States v. Waseem Alam
960 F.3d 831
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Waseem Alam, 64, convicted in 2016 of conspiracy in an $8M Medicare kickback scheme; sentenced to 101 months and has served about half his term.
- Alam suffers from obesity, poorly controlled diabetes, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, and other urologic issues—conditions he says increase COVID-19 risks.
- On March 25, 2020 Alam sent a compassionate-release request to his prison warden; he filed an emergency § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion in federal court 10 days later (April 4) before 30 days had elapsed.
- The government moved to dismiss for failure to satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s administrative-exhaustion requirement; the district court dismissed without prejudice and Alam appealed.
- The First Step Act allows inmates to move for compassionate release after either (1) fully exhausting administrative appeals or (2) waiting 30 days after the warden’s receipt of a request; Alam had not met either before filing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3582(c)(1)(A) exhaustion rule is jurisdictional | The exhaustion requirement should not be treated as jurisdictional or can be excused given COVID urgency | The exhaustion requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule that courts must enforce when timely raised | Not jurisdictional but a mandatory claim-processing rule; courts may not hear motion filed before exhaustion/30 days when government objects |
| Whether courts may create an equitable exception (futility/irreparable harm) | COVID-19 creates exigent circumstances justifying judge-made equitable exceptions to exhaustion | Congress set the exhaustion rule; courts lack authority to craft equitable exceptions to statutory exhaustion | No judge-made equitable exceptions to § 3582(c)(1)(A); exhaustion must be observed |
| Whether First Step Act’s expansion implies exhaustion was relaxed | First Step Act broadened access to compassionate release, so Congress intended easier access | The Act expanded who may move but kept the statutory exhaustion condition intact; omission would have been explicit if intended | First Step Act increased access but did not eliminate or relax the exhaustion requirement |
| Proper remedy for premature filing | Court should hear urgent motions or toll/expedite rather than dismiss | Dismiss without prejudice to allow administrative process and avoid reviewing stale or unvetted motions | Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate; appellant may refile after administrative exhaustion or 30 days |
Key Cases Cited
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (distinguishes jurisdictional rules from nonjurisdictional mandatory rules)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012) (jurisdictional defects must be raised by courts sua sponte)
- Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019) (Congress must clearly state when a rule is jurisdictional)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (courts may not create judge-made exceptions to statutory exhaustion regimes)
- Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017) (properly invoked claim-processing rules must be enforced)
- Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (similar statutory prerequisites held nonjurisdictional)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (PLRA exhaustion requirement is nonjurisdictional)
- Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam) (distinguishing forfeitable claim-processing rules from jurisdictional limits)
- United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 2020) (failure to exhaust is a "glaring roadblock" to compassionate release)
- Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (court may dismiss prematurely filed claims without prejudice)