United States v. Voisine
778 F.3d 176
1st Cir.2015Background
- Defendants Armstrong and Voisine had prior Maine misdemeanor domestic-assault convictions under Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A § 207 (assault) / § 207-A (domestic) that allow conviction on intentional, knowing, or reckless mens rea and for either bodily injury or offensive physical contact.
- Each was later charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Lautenberg Amendment) for possession of firearms, with the Maine convictions alleged as § 921(a)(33)(A) "misdemeanor crime[s] of domestic violence" predicates.
- The First Circuit initially affirmed denial of motions to dismiss, relying on prior circuit precedents (e.g., Booker, Nason) that a reckless misdemeanor assault can qualify as a § 922(g)(9) predicate; defendants sought certiorari.
- The Supreme Court decided United States v. Castleman (2014), holding that “physical force” for § 921(a)(33)(A) includes common-law offensive touching but expressly left open whether recklessness suffices and noted circuit consensus that recklessness is insufficient (listing Booker as the lone outlier) — then vacated and remanded these First Circuit convictions for reconsideration.
- On remand the First Circuit majority (Lynch, C.J.) reaffirmed that Maine reckless-assault convictions (as defined by Maine’s conscious-disregard/gross-deviation recklessness) categorically satisfy § 921(a)(33)(A) and affirmed the § 922(g)(9) convictions; the panel emphasized § 922(g)(9)’s domestic-violence purpose and Maine’s mens rea definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Armstrong/Voisine) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Maine conviction for reckless assault (including reckless offensive physical contact) "has as an element the use or attempted use of physical force" under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) | Maine recklessness (conscious disregard; gross deviation) is sufficiently volitional to be "use of physical force" in the domestic-violence context; Congress intended a broad predicate to keep firearms from domestic abusers | Reckless mens rea lacks the intentional/active employment of force required by Castleman/Leocal and the weight of circuits; thus cannot be a § 922(g)(9) predicate | Held: Yes — Maine reckless assault fits § 921(a)(33)(A); convictions affirmed (narrow ruling tied to Maine's recklessness definition and § 922(g)(9)'s purpose) |
| Whether Castleman’s footnote and sister-circuit precedent foreclose First Circuit’s prior view (Booker) that recklessness suffices | Footnote does not control here; Castleman stresses context and did not definitively rule on recklessness; Booker remains persuasive in the domestic-violence context | Defendants: Castleman’s footnote and the near-uniform circuit rulings show Booker was wrong and the Supreme Court intended alignment | Held: Footnote 8 does not dictate the outcome; context of § 922(g)(9) and legislative history justify a broader reading than in other statutes |
| Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(9) as applied | Statute is constitutional as applied given circuit precedent and § 922(g)(9)’s focus on domestic violence risks | Defendants argued an as-applied Second Amendment violation | Held: Second Amendment challenge foreclosed by binding circuit precedent (Booker/Carter line); rejected |
| Descamps/constitutional/fair-notice challenges (Fifth, Sixth, Ex Post Facto) based on when domestic-relationship element is proven | The domestic-relationship element is properly proved in the § 922(g)(9) prosecution (as Hayes holds); Descamps’ limits on modified categorical approach do not invalidate that structure | Defendants argue Hayes was undermined by Descamps and that post‑hoc element-finding raises constitutional problems | Held: Rejected; Hayes remains controlling that domestic-relationship is an element of the federal offense proved in the § 922(g)(9) case; Descamps does not require reversal here |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) ("physical force" for § 922(g)(9) includes offensive touching; left open whether recklessness suffices)
- United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009) (domestic-relationship element may be proved in the § 922(g)(9) prosecution)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) ("use" requires active employment; negligent/accidental conduct not a "use" of force)
- United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (recklessness may suffice for § 922(g)(9) in the domestic-violence context)
- United States v. Nason, 269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001) (offensive physical contact under Maine law falls within "use of physical force")
- Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (interpreting analogous statute; held recklessness insufficient for § 16 context)