United States v. Vaughn
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 20006
1st Cir.2015Background
- Anthony Vaughn pleaded guilty in 2002 to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and was sentenced to 168 months.
- While serving that sentence, Vaughn pleaded guilty in 2012 to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine (relating to attempts to smuggle heroin into prison) and in 2013 was sentenced as a career offender to 120 months, to run consecutively to the 2002 term.
- At the 2013 sentencing, the probation officer stated the BOP would "aggregate the entire sentence" for administrative purposes.
- Vaughn completed the 2002 sentence in December 2014 and remained imprisoned on the 2013 sentence (anticipated release 2023).
- Vaughn moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a retroactive reduction based on U.S.S.G. Amendments 782/788 (two‑level drug guideline reduction), seeking a 33‑month reduction on the aggregate 288‑month term.
- The district court denied the motion; the First Circuit affirmed, holding Vaughn ineligible because the portion of sentence affected by Amendment 782 had already been served.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eligibility under § 3582(c)(2) for retroactive Amendment 782 reduction | Vaughn: he is serving an aggregate 288‑month term and thus eligible for a reduction on the portion tied to the 2002 conviction | Government: only the 2002 sentence is eligible, but Vaughn already finished serving it; the 2013 sentence (career offender) is ineligible | Court: Ineligible — §1B1.10 forbids reducing a term below time already served; separately imposed consecutive sentence not reducible here |
| Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) aggregation | Vaughn: § 3584(c) treats consecutive sentences as a single aggregate term for administrative purposes, so the court should treat them as one term for § 3582(c)(2) | Government: § 3584(c) concerns BOP administrative treatment, not judicial modification; aggregation should not apply to § 3582(c)(2) reductions | Court: § 3584(c) is administrative; cannot be used to rewrite § 3582(c)(2) — aggregation for administrative purposes does not confer eligibility |
| Relevance of cases aggregating consecutive sentences for § 3582(c)(2) relief | Vaughn: citing cases where courts aggregated consecutive sentences to allow reductions | Government: those decisions are distinguishable — often involved simultaneously imposed consecutive sentences by same judge | Court: Prior cases unpersuasive here; most concerns arise when sentences are imposed simultaneously; separately imposed consecutive sentence while incarcerated is different and other circuits reject aggregation |
| Habeas "in custody" analogy (Garlotte/Peyton) | Vaughn: Garlotte/Peyton treat consecutive sentences as a continuous stream for habeas; analogous logic should apply to § 3582(c)(2) | Government: habeas "in custody" doctrine is sui generis and liberally construed; not a sound analogy for sentence‑modification statute | Court: Declines to adopt habeas analogy; § 3582(c)(2) is distinct and habeas precedent is inapposite |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (discusses two‑step § 3582(c)(2) framework)
- United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2008) (standard of review for § 3582(c)(2) denials)
- United States v. Gamble, 572 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2009) (refused aggregation for separately imposed consecutive sentence)
- United States v. Parker, [citation="472 F. App'x 415"] (7th Cir. 2012) (same)
- United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329 (explains BOP responsibility for sentence administration)
- Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (habeas context treating consecutive sentences as continuous stream)
- Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (habeas decision on consecutive sentences)